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Subject:
Confidential Informants and Terrorists
James Dunnigan
4/12/2005 12:26:16 AM
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The use of rewards in the war on terror has not worked as well as was expected,
largely because of the difficulty in getting the word out, and fear of
retaliation against potential informants. This has always been a problem with
offering rewards for information. And this is why television programs like
?America?s Most Wanted? have been so successful in bringing in useful tips. This
demonstrates how many people out there could provide useful information, if
properly informed about what was being sought. But the ?America?s Most Wanted?
criminals are usually fugitives, living among strangers that are not easy to
intimidate. Iraq is a different situation. Only recently has the Iraqi mass
media (at least that part of it the government has some influence over) been
promoting the importance of letting the police know of people planning terrorist
acts. Until recently, the police in the most dangerous areas didn?t really
exist, and didn?t have the means to act on many tips. That has changed. There
are police everywhere. The cops are often of very mixed quality, but there are
over a dozen SWAT teams that can act on tips.
But that still leaves the
retaliation factor, which is very real in the Sunni Arab areas where most of the
violence originates, and usually takes place. In the United States, police
informants are regarded as ?confidential informants.? But in the Middle East,
the culture lends itself to more of a ?everyone knows everyone else?s business.?
Thus confidentiality is difficult to maintain, and if an informer is identified,
retribution often follows. This is why the anti-government forces spend so much
time attacking the police. This eliminates those you can inform to, and those
that can offer some protection to informants. Over the last year, the terrorists
lost that effort. The police force continued to grow, because Iraqis kept
joining the police force, even though terrorist attacks killed hundreds of cops
a month.
The United States forces took advantage of the growing police
presence to start, this past January, a program of cash rewards for tips.
However, in three months, only $9,500 of the $60,000 available has been paid
out. The program is not a failure, because most awards are only a few hundred
dollars. The most common tip is the location of weapons and bomb making
materials, or a roadside bomb rigged for use. Lots of Iraqis know where these
roadside bombs are set up, because they stay out of the area until the damn
thing is set off. This sudden lack of Iraqis along a road, however, has provided
U.S. troops with a good sign that there is a bomb nearby. Troops are taught to
suspect a bomb if, when going through a populated area, they suddenly see a
stretch of road where the people that should be there, aren?t. Now the army is
trying to get more Iraqis to report these bombs, rather than just walking away
until after the explosion.
There have been informal, ?paid informants?
for the past two years. American troops would give cash or goods to informants.
This was often brokered by translators (who were often the tipsters) or the
special intelligence teams that worked among the Iraqis. Most of the cash came
from money the American troops acquired during raids. You know you?ve nailed
some terrorists, or successful kidnappers, when you find a bunch of guys with
guns, and lots of cash (especially American currency).
But the new
program hopes to be the start of a much larger informant effort. Many of the
American reserve troops in Iraq have been policemen, including some detectives.
They have made it clear to the American intelligence officers that, without lots
of ?CIs? (Confidential Informants), you?ll never be able to shut down the
terrorists, much less the more troublesome (to the average Iraqi) criminal
gangs. That message got through, and the number of casual (one time) informants
is increasing daily. The CIs, in American police parlance, are regulars, who
provide tips continually, or on demand when there is some kind of emergency.
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