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Subject: The Military Morale Myth
James Dunnigan    11/2/2003 8:23:49 PM
Despite the large number of reservists and National Guard troops mobilized for Afghanistan and Iraq, troops are staying in uniform. The Army National Guard, which has had the largest proportion of troops called up, has so far only lost ten percent of troops to attrition (not re-enlisting) among units returning from overseas. The normal rate of attrition, for all National Guard units, is 17 percent. What is probably keeping the re-enlistment rate up is efforts by the army to get reservists off active duty, and making plans to limit the active duty time in the future. Last week, for example, the number of reservists on active duty fell another 1,289, to 157,605. But that number is going up in the next few months, as units are called up for training, and movement to Iraq to replace reservists coming home. Meanwhile, the number of new recruits for the active army, and the army reserve and National Guard, continue match needs. For the fourth year in a row, the army met its annual goal for new recruits. In the past year, 74,132 men and women enlisted (against a goal of 73,800.) The army reserve for 27,365 (against a goal of 26,400.) A number of things are at work here. First, it's important to remember that American troops don't hesitate to gripe when things are rough. It's an ancient military tradition. But once out of danger, morale makes a remarkable (and pretty predictable) come back. And then there is the unemployment issue. Many (the army isn't saying how many, and they probably don't know) troops were unemployed when they were called up. All of a sudden they were employed again, although if the unemployment rate continues to go down, going on active duty will be even more unpopular. But the high unemployment rate, and uncertain economy, causes troops to stay in the reserves, and on active duty. Finally, there's patriotism. There is an enemy out there trying to kill Americans. While this is hardly World War II, we did have another Pearl Harbor and many of the troops have not forgotten September 11, 2001.
 
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Horsesoldier    RE:The Military Morale Myth   11/13/2003 9:16:49 AM
>>First, it's important to remember that American troops don't hesitate to gripe when things are rough. It's an ancient military tradition. But once out of danger, morale makes a remarkable (and pretty predictable) come back. << The problem with this (falsely) rosy portrayal of things is that in my experience overseas deployment is not the cause for personnel to leave the reserve component. There are two issues typically cited when personnel leave the National Guard, in my experience. First, there is the glacial and still politicized rate of promotion for enlisted personnel. As structured, the 'Guard retains soldiers beyond any plausible usefulness (i.e. a sixty year old infantry platoon sergeant simply cannot meet the physical demands of his job), because on one level the National Guard, as currently structured, is simply a numbers game where nothing matter to the powers that be except maintaining end strength to keep federal funds rolling in. The other issue is the corruption and incompetence inherent to the National Guard (again as currently configured). Personnel I know who have gotten out after overseas deployment (or CONUS deployment for force protection) do not, as a rule of thumb, cite being deployed or being away from their families as the reason to get out. They cite the incompetence of their officer and NCO leadership. Quite simply put, the National Guard, for various reasons, does not consistently produce commissioned or non-commissioned leaders who have the skills needed to actually lead and run a unit for more than a weekend at a time (or two weeks played to a well-rehearsed script). Even fundamental notions like "take care of your troops before yourself" are not uniformly understood by alleged leaders in the National Guard. Which is not to say that all officers and NCOs in the 'Guard are bad -- but I would argue that the National Guard, again owing to the numbers game aspect of its existence (as well as politics) has not demonstrated that it is particularly capable of identifying either good or bad leaders to advance the former and remove the latter. Finally, above the unit level, you have fifty very corrupt state bureaucracies which simply do no function as they should. The various bits of stupidity and occasional criminality carried out at this level are generally outside the range of complaints one hears from departing 'Guardsmen, except when personnel run directly into evidence of this. So morale may take a dip when units are overseas and finding out that their platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, etc., are not universally up to the task. But morale doesn't "bounce back" to anywhere when the troops come home and find out those same incompetent leaders are not held accountable for their failings. It doesn't bounce back when promotion rates remain stagnent because of geriatric 'Guardsmen holding out in the service so they can go directly from drawing a drill check to a drawing a retirement check at age 65. It doesn't bounce back when states fail to find money, as they usually do, to send troops to required NCOES or MOSQ schools, etc. Between the current (and likely to continue) deployment rates and the resistance to reform and facing its problems, I believe the National Guard is heading towards a crisis point, as do most of the other Guardsmen I serve with. The eventual crisis will not be because troops are asked to deploy and serve, but because the leadership and bureaucrats who are supposed to provide for the troops are abusing their trust and voiding out the social contract between leaders and the led.
 
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Scorpene    Like Horsesoldier was saying   11/24/2003 11:23:40 AM
There is a certain AH-64 Apache unit in Texas that has been tattled about to me by an anonymous yet highly experienced Regular Army leader; the unit is made up of people that are not only NG but they also are government GS-type contractors who get paid GS money to do their job as maintenance men. He almost put me rolling around in the parking lot one day as he described the nonsense these people engage in. The unit has most of it's aircraft deadlined and has all of the skill and polish of one of Saddam Hussein's helicopter units. They don't wear uniforms, come in late, never do PT, cannot pass a PT test, and do little except take breaks and walk around an AH-64 all day pretending to work on it or just staring at the thing. This is an extreme example (I know a high ranking reserve officer who, by contrast, is a great professional and goes to great lengths to take care of his unit) but based on what I have been able to gather, Horsesoldier is dead on, and there is a serious problem with the Total Force concept, and specifically with the leadership, preparedness, and training (and overall attitude) in many non-regular units.
 
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MikeG    RE:The Military Morale Myth   12/21/2003 8:28:54 AM
Reservists and NG have a different motivation than AD troops. The NG and USAR are usually in it for the long haul because they get points towards retirement and that aspect is NOT minor. There is a lot to throw away. Many of them never expected to be on AD this long, and DoD has frozen them in place as well. Before I get the deluge of comments about patriotisn... I am retired from the USAR and did my AD thing. I do predict that after this is over, we'll see a major rethinking of this because NG and USARs expected to be called up in a major "classic" style war, not something like this. When they get home this time, the family dissintegration, that the shoot 'em up lobby likes to ignore or classify as a demacho issue, and the private life career dissintegration realities will hit home hard. Many will say that it wasn't worth the loss of personal lives. The benefits are meager; VA health care which is still being scaled back, meager retirement pay much later in life etc will be telling. DoD's new HR system which was pushed by DoD HR folks who wanted to eliminate the VA hiring preference.. makes the computer system messy. Stick a mic in front to them and they'll deny it, but MSPB studies show that fed HR uses vets appointments only if they have to and kick and scream even then. All that "service to country" is not as well rewarded as we like to think.. not even by DoD itself. They are doing their duty now and deserve everything this country can provide, but the reality is that they won't get it and will worry about getting another call up.
 
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2 Ways    RE:The Military Morale Myth   12/22/2003 11:23:13 AM
The Guard will always keep high numbers because it is a very patriotic. Keep in mind some reasons why the Guard makes its Recruiting mission. It is a family organization. Unlike the Reserves the Guard is a hometown unit. In most units 90% of the troops in the unit live within 20 miles of the armory. Many of the troops are related and went to school with the other members of the unit. The Guard kept its numbers up even with the Active duty keeping it from purchasing TV ads, enacted the Stop-Loss that kept 45% of our enlistments from getting in the Guard and fighting to keep money from us. Go Guard!
 
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Horsesoldier    RE:The Military Morale Myth   12/23/2003 11:05:12 AM
>>The Guard will always keep high numbers because it is a very patriotic. << The Army Guard is currently hemorrhaging personnel, according to the state level S1 folks in my state. The numbers Dunnigan quoted about retention do not reflect mid-enlistment transfers to active duty, the USAR, Air Guard, etc, and, at least in my state, we're losing mountains of good troops to those other organizations. A portion of the motives involved seems to be the notion that "if I have to go to Iraq, I'd rather go with professionals than the members of my local beer drinking club that I know have half-assed their training for years." Plenty of people in the ARNG have a "the regular army hates up" persecution fantasy, but I honestly don't think there would be any resistance to the National Guard if it could do the job. It can't, without extensive "corrective" training before deployment, and so here we are.
 
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2 Ways    RE:The Military Morale Myth   12/23/2003 3:26:31 PM
Horsesoldier I think you may be looking at a very small portion of the numbers leaving. Before anyone can switch to active they have to have a DD Form signed by the Commander. No Commander is going tom allow his unit to hemorrhage. Let me know the name of your state and I can go on the virtualarmory and tell you the exact numbers. Present my state has the highest number of soldiers activated (Army Times) and we don't have those problems. As for professial, I am at an Active Duty post and I just don't see the difference. The only troops I see that can't pull thier weigh is the USAR. Also why did the 3 star ask for units from my state to come back? They were activiated, sent to Afgan, sent home and after 4 months sent back. Professional........Yes. Doing as good if not better than Active YES
 
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Horsesoldier    RE:The Military Morale Myth   1/28/2004 11:58:33 AM
Just as a bit of follow up, a recent article I saw at the Army AKO website reported that the USAR and ARNG are projecting a 22% departure rate for personnel next year, up from 12% or so. So nearly 1 in 4 US reservists are potentially going to hang it up in the coming year. Presumably this is because their morale is so robust and because there aren't any problems at all inherent in the reserve component. Per the article, the USAR is admitting that they've been staving off significant personnel loss by stop-lossing their folks. The ARNG doesn't admit to the same thing, but is doing the same thing with selected MOS's and with a general 90 day stop loss on any personnel coming off active duty deployment . . .
 
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Thomas    RE:The Military Morale Myth   1/30/2004 7:59:09 AM
I feel I can butt in in this USA subject because Denmark has Hjemmeværnet (or Home Guard) some problems are common - some are not. Leaving due to dissatisfaction with the management is a very common reason, this means that badly led units rapidly stand without personel. Recommandation: Disband these units and start all over with new build up from the ground. The good units have good leadership, because they have recruited good leader to begin with - this status as a good unit has its time, the original team of leader will retire and their successors might not be up to standard. Rules: A National Guard is an organic growth that dies and is born continiously. A typical Guards unit does not exist in the same way a regular unit does. Set standards and see who live up to them. For the regulars set standard and make them live up to them. Big difference. The numbers game is universal everywhere there is funding involved. Recommandation: The units that live up to the standard should get the funding - take it from the others - it will help them towards their grave.
 
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Tsquare    RE:The Military Morale Myth   2/2/2004 8:43:13 AM
Has anyone heard anything about only 'peace time' commendations being available to those serving in Iraq? Newsweek is running a story that makes that claim?
 
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macawman    RE:The Military Morale Myth   2/3/2004 9:23:39 PM
>>>The numbers game is universal everywhere there is funding involved.<<< Thomas: Over here NG eBdes get additional funding and training time apparently to no avail. >>>Are Enhanced Brigades A Terrible Waste? I pulled a two-year assignment in an AC/RC unit. The enhanced brigade (eBDE) personnel never listened to us and seldom took our advice - they just already knew everything there was to know about skinning the cat. The only way we had to evaluate them was that our brigade commander had to sign the eBDE commander's annual unit readiness assessment. My commander, COL Malcolm Johnson - now retired, was often in arguments with the eBDE commander that we supported and would not sign the report if the assessment were not accurate - IAW COL Johnson's troops' observations. COL Johnson had us make detailed trip reports every time we went on a training mission with a National Guard unit; he used our reports and his own observations to measure the accuracy of the eBDE commander's report. I was proud that COL Johnson took his responsibilities so seriously and would not yield to pressure and rubber stamp a fictious readiness report - he held the line on standards and retired with his integrity intact. A part from the eBDEs, I noticed that the Regular National Guard units that I worked with (from California, Nevada, and Montana) were decent units. Their leaders and soldiers cared about what they were doing, they told the truth on their readiness reports, and recognized that their units were not fully combat ready. However, what they could and did do was utilize their troops, time, equipment, and training budget to ensure that their troopers, squads, and crews were solidly prepared in their basic combat skills. With only 38 days of training annually, it was tough to get them any further along and both chains of command recognized and reported this. It seemed to me that the eBDEs were more worried about their reports securing their funding rather than using them as a training tool to improve their units' readiness. The Regular National Guard units did not have access to the additional funding that the eBDEs did so they did not hesitate to report the truth. These National Guard commanders were smart enough to realize that we were/are in a war and that they needed more help in case they were required to deploy their troops for either a campaign or in a Homeland Defense emergency. They were begging us for all of the assistance visits that we could give them; sadly we were never funded with any money to assist those units, unless it was time to give them their three-year training assessment report. COL Johnson and his battalion commanders had to comb their funds budgeted to support the eBDEs for every saved dollar imaginable in order to fund some visits to support these Regular National Guard units. Fortunately the 11ACR, under COL Mike Davis, also greatly supported a few of these units using his own unit's budget since some of the National Guard units supported his regiment at the NTC. He took care of his own as best as he could sending training teams not currently need at Ft. Irwin to work with these units. Together COL Johnson and COL Davis kept several non-eBDE Guard battalions in the western US focused and pointed in the right direction. While all of these units still required additional company and battalion-level training before going to war, they were all equipped with trained soldiers who cared about what they were doing and leaders with integrity who cared about the mission and the troops entrusted to their command - I would gladly cross the LD with any of these Regular National Guard units before I would even think about going with an eBDE. This might be unfair - but it's also just my observed opinion Bottom-line: The Guard leaders without access to eBDE special funds took their responsibilities more seriously and reported their efforts and results accurately; others who were more worried about their funding than their troops did not. REGULAR ARMY MAJOR <<< Note: The eBde the Major is refering to is scheduled to replace elements of the 82nd Airborne in Iraq this Spring. If leadership and training are as bad as suggested, it will be interesting to compare casuality figures of the 81st NG Bde with other regular Army units in the Sunni Triangle.
 
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