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Subject: U.S. Navy Rethinks The Silent Service
SYSOP    7/6/2012 5:06:20 AM
 
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HeavyD       7/10/2012 6:11:27 PM

 
ALSO having our own fleet of SSKs will allow the Navy to develop the important institutional skill and memory of thinking like our threats do:  Kinda like 'Top Gun'.  I've read that our allies in SSKs sometimes feel that US sub captains are so enthralled with being able to blast about at 35 knots submerged that they have lost sight of the 'laying in wait' strategy.  Think about it:  Wouldn't there be benefit to have senior officers on a SSN who had prior experience on SSKs?
 
 
 
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JFKY       7/10/2012 9:29:05 PM
RAN Collins class and a number of NATO allies provide that, HeavyD....and unless you are submariner, I don't believe SSN's "blast about at 35 knots" as a matter of course.  And what would be the advantage of having SSK experience, for the USN?
 
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HeavyD       7/11/2012 2:31:07 AM

RAN Collins class and a number of NATO allies provide that, HeavyD....and unless you are submariner, I don't believe SSN's "blast about at 35 knots" as a matter of course.  And what would be the advantage of having SSK experience, for the USN?

Studying the tactics of a SSK on a very part-time basis (your primary focus is running the kit you have) and actually LIVING them 24/7/365 are two different things.
"Here's what we used to do in this situation..." gives far more real-world insight than wargaming against a friendly once a year (if that) and studying books.  If you can't see the value in this given that the majority of threat subs are SSKs, well, what more can I say.
 
 
 
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Reactive    Sigh..   7/11/2012 9:51:04 AM
They (USN) optimise their ASW for SSK's because those SSK's make up the majority (not exclusively) of the sub threat, they don't deploy SSK's themselves because it doesn't fit with USN doctrine.
 
What is it in particular that makes you think the USN is complacent about SSK's? I don't really understand the logic behind what you're saying other than that you think there 'might' (based on no evidence) be a lack of understanding of enemy ambush capabilities. Apart from SSK's being only fractionally as capable in terms of range, endurance, operational independence and speed. Undoubdedly 
 
It's precisely that ability to wargame against friendlies who operate new and quiet SSKs that enables the USN to update and adapt its ASW to meet that evolving threat - operating an entirely new class of boats seems a strange suggestion for someone otherwise claiming the Sub fleet needs to be drastically cut. Other than improved wargaming how do SSKs fit in to USN operational doctrine? I can't really see any advantage unless you also want to build a few more naval bases in China's backyard.
 
 
 
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HeavyD       7/11/2012 1:34:34 PM
"You cannot awaken someone who is pretending to be asleep" - Navajo Indian Proverb.
 
I guess there is nothing that I can say that will change the opinions of some who believe that within the largest Navy in the world, with the most numerous required and potential missions, and a navy for which there is a shift to increase focus on littorals the MINIMUM practical and cost-effective submarine platform is a 6000 ton, 360 foot, 129 man (women now too, yikes) SSN, but even these are too small so they are being replaced with even larger 7800 ton, 377 foot, 135 crew SSNs.
 
Really?  A 7800 ton, nearly 400 foot long nuke sub with a complement of 135 is optimal for littoral ops in laces like the Med, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea?
 
Really?  The Navy's budget will allow for 30 new SSNs AND 1000+ F35s AND new CVNs AND 60 LCSs, AND...
 
 
 
 
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JFKY    HeavyD   7/11/2012 2:59:54 PM

Where will this SSN deploy from?  That's right San Diego or Norfolk.  And ONLY an SSN can do that, in a timely and efficient manner.

 

I'm just going to say this, read any of Friedman's "Design Histories" and you will come away with a strong appreciation of the design/technology/doctrine interaction that drives the USN's procurement policies.  Generally speaking, If the Navy bought they bought it for a fairly good reason.

 

There's a REASON the USN doesn't emply SSK's.  Speed and refueling are at least two of them.  And, overall, they may be QUIETER than an SSK.  A SSK lying "doggo" may emit almost nothing, but when schnorkel'ing they are very noisy.  A SSN is, on the avergae, quieter than the SSK...true the pumps operate continuously, but they don't "snort".  And AIP isn't "all that" as a nuclear replacement.

 
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jimbomo       7/11/2012 4:17:26 PM

 
The premise both you and @HeavyD see to be exploring is "What if  US national interests now include maintaining navigation and asserting allied national boundries in the South China Sea?" 
 
If so, I'd  want our allied nations to have SSKs @ Subic Bay; or Okinawa/S. Japan; or Singapore. (Or, if  I'm really smoking good stuff, Cam Ranh Bay.) Local theater, high operational tempo, short ranges, easy resupply, existing bases, nearby air cover. 
 
Obviously existing USNs SSNs would be able to do same mission; but if the SSN fleet needs to be replaced, is there a sufficient national interest of sufficiently long duration to justify replacing some SSN assets w/SSKs?  That would address @HeavyD's point about upscaling the boats -- why build an SSN for a smaller boat's mission? 
 
Open questions:  is there really a twenty year need to have an undersea detterent in the South China Sea?   For a twenty year mission in the SCS, does an SSN have sufficient advantages over an SSK to justify the added cost and crewing issues?  And what is the liklihood that basing could be acquired and maintained? 
 
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WarNerd       7/12/2012 5:18:07 AM
Open questions:  is there really a twenty year need to have an undersea detterent in the South China Sea?   For a twenty year mission in the SCS, does an SSN have sufficient advantages over an SSK to justify the added cost and crewing issues?  And what is the liklihood that basing could be acquired and maintained? 
I think you have it backward:
 
For a twenty year mission in the SCS, does an SSK have sufficient advantages over an SSN to justify the added cost and crewing issues?  And what is the likelihood that basing could be acquired and maintained?
 
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Reactive       7/12/2012 6:22:03 PM
SSK's are inherently LIMITED in terms of their mission profile, they can't choose to spend days submerged operating at high speed trailing/tracking/listening, they are speed limited, they are endurance limited, and they are arguably payload and sensor-limited. (disagree? have a look at the fuel penalties incurred for fully-submerged operation at speeds above 12 knots). 
 
Why on earth you'd want to employ an asset that has severe caveats placed on its operations (have a look at endurance stats for submerged travel) when you have an asset that seems to offer the absolute holy grail of operational independence and forward deployment capability anywhere on earth.
 
They (SSK's) make a lot of sense of other operators, they can fulfil a range of offensive and defensive anti-shipping missions as well as anything else out there (not all, owing to speed and fuel considerations) but if your mandate happens to be the entire world and your potential adversaries include Russia and the PRC now and for the foreseeable future  then you need SSN's - there's no real argument there and I suggest those suggesting otherwise come up with more cogent supporting arguments that take into account doctrine, forward deployment, basing, logistics, range, etc.
 
 
 
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HeavyD    Cold War Thinking   7/12/2012 6:57:54 PM
Our entire philosophy re:  attack subs is HEAVILY influenced, still, by the Cold War.
 
The LA Class was designed PRIMARILY to deal with Soviet subs:  their boomers on one hand and their attack subs on the other.  Both blue-water missions.  Our ENTIRE sub infrastructure was set-up to support this mission, and as far as subs go, this infrastructure hasn't changed.
 
The Seawolf is also a Cold War sub, being designed in the early 80s:  Cold War mission and at a Cold War budget.  The Virginia Class is a Los Angeles Plus:  (Same armament limitations of only 4 tubes, hell a Type 212, Kilo or Lada have 6 plus the 12 VLS cell.).  And the LA was designed as a blue-water anti-sub sub.
 
Revisionists may try to twist and contort but the above are historical facts:  We are sailing Cold War-designed subs and supporting them with Cold-War era base structures.
 
 
Well, the Cold War has been over for 23 years now, and the Navy is finally getting around to prioritizing for littoral capabilities.  This is why the 'designed by committee' LCS has taken priority over the DDX.  Littoral over Blue.  
 
QUESTION:  Are we gonna support our LCS fleet ONLY from Stateside ports?  No.  Is there any good reason why the ports that will support LCS couldn't also support SSKs?  No.  
 
THE MISTAKES that some on this board are making are 1)  We don't have the support structures for SSKs.  I just proved that to be BS.  2)  We need 50 SSNs to all be capable of doing all missions/A 377 foot, 7800 ton sub is the minimum that we could consider operating, ever.  Really?  I'd say we could meet our missions better with 42 SSNs and 20 SSKs than 50 SSNs alone.
 
 
 
 
 
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