The NAVY wants their subs to be the premier cruise missile launch platforms because they need to attach more missions to this platform.  This is the one of the main points of this article:  given the current evolution of warfare - where less than 20 blue-water surface ships have been sunk in all wars since WWII (I'm not sure whether to count the USS Liberty of not...), and practically no merchant ships sunk in open hostilities, subs need additional missions to justify their numbers and costs.

 

Fact is though if we were starting from scratch with a panel of objective experts the Air Force would be tasked with more of the Cruise Missile load:  Each B52 can carry as many readily-launchable cruise missiles as an attack sub but with twice the warhead size, to ANYWHERE in the world in 48 hours.  A SSN needs to be in-theater:  it can't be in the Persian Gulf one day and be off North Korea 48 hours later.  A Buff or a B1 can.  A B-52 on the ground waiting for a mission is a helluva lot less costly than a SSN. 

 

Subs are great for what they are, they do a lot of things well, but they are not the premier cruise missile platform.  Great to pop-and-shoot a dozen missiles to spank some shitheads up to mischief.   

 

HERE IS MY PROOF:  

1.  The US will NOT build anymore Ohios or a replacement with 150 Cruise Missile capability once they are taken out of service.

2.  The BULK of new cruise missile deployment capabilities will come from air assets, not surface ships, not subs.  WHEN (not if) the US doubles it's ready-launchable cruise missile capability, the bulk will come from the air. 

 

I have no axe to grind, and if we had an annual trillion dollar budgetary surplus, then hell yeah, build more subs!  But we don't, so I'll just call it like I see it.  

 

 

 

 

 

The problem with that analysis is that the USAF isn't very interested in cruise missiles and only has a few hundred in their inventory.  The subs are more versatile than you believe and in any potential conflict they're already on station doing various tasks and additionally can launch cruise missiles.  The B-52's and tankers have to be deployed in theater or you need a lot more tankers to operate them out of theater.  Large USAF deployments are something potential foes will be aware of vs the subs they can only suspect are on station.

 

 

grngh...

 

Subs are not cruise missile launchers. They have and will continue to be best at interdicting enemy shipping, warships and serving as a nuclear deterrent.

Well that is some of them are, but to think that will be their primary purpose with the ranges these days... arghhhh...

That is it is of course a good tool, but the main purpose of submarines has always been presenting a danger to enemy ships of all kinds, and since the cold war to present a final deterrent. This is backed up by a hundred years of submarine warfare.

Having served on US SSNs, I can tell you there are numerous capabilities not known by the public.

Definitely, everything I've read confirms they can do everything from spy to start a nuclear war. 

 

But I still think the author of the article is mad to think of launching cruise missiles as the future primary purpose, I'm not sure if you're agreeing with the article or just disagreeing with something Heavy-D said, if it's the former I would be really confused since being an old sea hand you must know what you're talking about (not that I'm sure, but you sound real enough).

 

Oh well, nuff reading strategypage. : )  

Subs are not generally designed for sustained bombardment, TLAM capability does provide capability for them to attack and disrupt enemy airbases, radar and C4i with little or no warning.

 

That they can also prevent enemy naval assets from leaving port and importantly that area-denial or engagement can take place even without air superiority overhead: For example, if Mount Pleasant Airbase in the Falklands was somehow put out of operation the Argentine navy would still have to think very carefully about a naval expedition unless they had the necessary ASW capabilities, they have no idea how many SSN's are in theatre. The same logic applies elsewhere, without being able to track or engage SSN's an enemy is forced to risk-manage either with ASW (resource intensive) or by keeping ships in port. 

 

And this is the key point: An adversary that is aware that the USN has a huge SSN fleet is aware that any number of them may be in their backyard, how can you mitigate that which is present in unknown quantities? surely the greatest effect of SSN's is the tactical and strategic deterrent itself, which therefore requires that known operational platform numbers be maintained. 

 

R 

which therefore requires that known operational platform numbers be maintained. 

 Given the proliferation of threat subs in littorals I'd argue that we increase overall sub count, with a preponderance of new builds of the smaller and cheaper SSK varieties.  Surfacing every 3-5 days for 6 hours to run the diesels doesn't compromise the mission much at all:  Our enemies know we have subs in strategically important areas already, so it matters little if they know for example that we have a SSK or two near the Korea Strait because they can detect snorkel activity.  They operate as if we're there anyway.  I'd like to 'sub' 4 type 212's (or the like) for every other new SSN.

R