105mm or 155mm for Medium Brigades

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doggtag RE:105mm Sabot? 10/6/2005 11:35:13 AM

I think there would be too great inaccuracy at range if we attempted to fire sabot(unguided) artillery rounds. What might be better would be soft-launched sub-caliber PGMs. But here again, I think we need to look at how systems will overlap each other in support of battlefield doctrine: a thinner-walled 120mm mortar shell certainly has more downrange oomph than a 105mm arty shell, but I don't know how it compares to a 155mm arty shell. The US had the Copperhead CLGP a while back, but was apparently unhappy with it because it got too expensive. So now we (US) are pursuing the 155mm Excalibur and the 120mm PGMM for mortars, which still might be overkill downtown (anyone know their actual explosive content?). But I still ask, why no 105mm PGM, if we are so set on continuing to use the M119 gun for a while longer? DARPA and BAe are trying to create a guided 60mm round for mortars (ODAM), but yet we don't seem interested in a 105mm system? Today's portable designators are flyweights compared to models from 20 years ago. I would at least think that we would provide our gun crews with a precision close-to-medium range defensive round to ward off enemy vehicles. (aircraft flying top cover are fine in open desert, but more heavily-wooded areas like the Balkans don't allow for it as easily.) I'll have to dig for it, but I'm almost certain someone offered up one of the Russian gun-launched PGMs (the 115mm AT-12, I think) in a sleeve that allows it to be fired from western 120mm guns. And the Russians can already fire a PGM (AT-10) from towed 100mm guns, so I don't think it would be too complicated to adapt that one to our 105s: the Kastet weighs about 28kg for the towed gun launched model, and ranges out to 5500m can be reached. But I think we might want to get a little more range. The Russian gun-launched AT missiles are more for closer-range point targets, not medium-to-long range artillery support rounds. The US is pleased with its Viper Strike weapon, a 44-pound, laser-guided variant of the BAT anti-armor submunition. If we want a munition more favored to city combat without excessive overkill, maybe some kind of launch system for Viper Strikes that fits on a light truck and doesn't need MLRS rockets or UAVs to deploy it would be favorable. I think back to the US rocket artillery in WW2, and there was this multiple-launch 4.5" model on the back of trucks that was used consderably in the Pacific. Perhaps something similar to a Calliope, but firing high-angle munitions out to mortar ranges (but without the potential for overkill of the 120mm mortar) might prove more feasible than depending on 155mm guns for close support with sabot 105mm rounds? However, if the 60mm ODAM does work as hoped for (<5m CEP), then we won't have to worry about overkill when we can pinpoint any AFV, truck, doorway, window, manhole, or other target with a smaller warhead. Question will be, though: just how far will we be able to shoot with such precision? Perhaps this is a good time to evaluate: do we really need 155mm guns? MLRS rockets have the range and payload for distant formations. 120mm mortars and 105mm guns have the close-range capability, without the overkill in cities that 155mm would cause (questionable on the 120.) Is there as much a place for the 155mm gun as people would try and convince us? (personally, I still like that LEO 105 expirement they mounted on the LAV III.)

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ArtyEngineer RE:Thanks Neutralizer and ArtyEngineer - doggtag 10/6/2005 7:22:15 PM

I will answer your question on the potential to expand the M777, and a few of your other comments, but REALLY busy right now. AE

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neutralizer RE:Thanks Neutralizer and ArtyEngineer - doggtag 10/7/2005 6:41:19 AM

The air-arty argument is a problem, the reality is that they have complimentary features, air has long range but don't be in a hurry for it, arty has less range but you can have it now. I used to say that air could deliver a heavier crunch but that's not routinely true any longer although air carries bigger weapons. However, arty also has the capability to sustain their fire for an extended period (and in any weather), and keep it on tgt whereas with air every 'round' (more or less) has to be directly aimed. The political problem is that the chief of AF is a 4 star and his offensive capability is his pride and joy, his rank and his massed underlings can bash a lot of ears, they also have the aerospace industry batting for them. Arty is headed by a 2 star with many less gofers (and a far smaller industry lobby), and for the army chief there are other key components not least inf and armd. The result is that the proponents of air have the voice and muscle in the public and political arena. You see the effect on the ground in war, initially the cbt arms are still mesmerised by airpower, because of the propaganda they've been blasted with. After a few days they wake up to the fact that air is hype heavy but they can rely on arty. Of course all fire control gets back to the basic conundrum, the urgent is seldom important and the important is seldom urgent. This problem is most marked in the decision between close and depth targets. Close tgts are often urgent (fire in the next few minutes at most), but seldom impotant in the greater scheme of things. Depth tgts tend to be the other way around, the real trick is to have a tactical fire control process that can square this circle. There are no free lunches in gun design, everything has a price. Longer range is the product of carrying power, for a given MV the heavier shell goes further. But to move the heavier shell you need more or more energetic propellant. More means a bigger chamber. You also have to burn it all before the shell leaves the barrel, long barrels are one part of the solution, but the other is usually needed as well - more energetic propellant, which burns hotter, which increases barrel wear, which reduces barrel life. Better barrel materials are part of the solution (I think ESR may have been first introduced by the Brits for Chieftain barrels), as is chrome plating (which adds substantially to the cost) and barrel cooling. You also get some range improvement by increasing the proj streamlining (but the max length of a spin stabilsed proj is about 6 or 7 times it's calibre), which decreases payload (and you may need thicker shell walls) so you need to fire more shells so the barrels wear out quicker (and you need more ammo and the logistics to move it). Arty is a system, you have to consider its entirety and make trade-offs, just focussing on the guns is not good enough.

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Carl S RE:Fire Support Priorities 10/7/2005 7:50:58 AM

"Close tgts are often urgent (fire in the next few minutes at most), but seldom impotant in the greater scheme of things. Depth tgts tend to be the other way around, the real trick is to have a tactical fire control process that can square this circle." I did get to spend a couple years involved with planning and executing artillery fires at the div/corps level and left that with doubts about the ideas about value of deep targets vs close. As we became more practiced at manuver warfare suppresing the key enemy manuver units became as important as disrupting the traditional high value targets in terms of "shaping the battle". The complexites of this question or problem caused us to use the published fires support doctrine as a general planning guide vs a start to finish procedure.

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Carl S RE:Propellant Oxidation & Chamber Pressures 10/8/2005 8:39:17 AM

ArtyEngineer. I've here on the shelf a extra copy of a 1940s artical from the Journal of Royal Artillery. Probably stuff you are overly familar with, but if you'd like it for historical refrence it is yours. Paragraphs of detailed descriptions of how propellant grains burn and a cool graph of chamber pressures. Nine pages of stuff you will never see in 'Military History' magizine.

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S-2 RE:Fire Support Measures-Carl S/Neutralizer 10/8/2005 6:24:08 PM

I always have thought that the manuever cdr (bn, bde, div, corps) area of influence was directly related to the range of the organic direct/indirect systems available to service tgts, as well as the estimated time for the anticipated arrival into the engagement areas of those targets, i.e, a bde. cdr. would service those targets expected to arrive into his area of interest within the next twelve hours of battle, given movement rates. Equally, a commander's area of influence related to those tgts. beyond the organic means of the manuever force, and thus were nominated to the next higher command echelon. Thus, wouldn't it be most efficient to attack those targets beyond the Div/Corps area of interest through long range rocketfires, artillery raids, Army/Marine attack aviation, and U.S.A.F. BAI resources? Too, doesn't the Corps FSCL (Fire Support Coord. Line) serve as the de facto demarkation between the Corps area of interest vs. influence, thus also between Army/Marine fires (to include Naval gunfire) and U.S.A.F. All fires within the FSCL should be provided only at the behest of the gaining manuever commander, while BAI, falling beyond the FSCL, becomes the air commander's area of interest. Manuever resources such as artillery raids, army attack aviation, surface to surface rocket fires, and naval gunfire may supplement his resources when available. I'd be very interested in your comments.

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Carl S RE:Fire Support Measures-Carl S/Neutralizer 10/9/2005 2:42:11 AM

A decade ago I'd say you were more or less right with that. But even then, at least in the circles I trained with, the FSC measures were begaining to be taken less seriously. Another factor is that as Marines many of us did not draw a sharp line between the different systems you mention. When I use the term artillery I'm automaticly including long range weapons like MLRS. In the mid 1990s we were taking the traditional fire support coordination measures less seriously. Few were going into hysterics over minor issues of the FSCL as seemed to often happen in the 1980s. We were already contemplating broad manuvers of the same scale as in OIF and comparable speeds. There were a lot of offhand discussions and ad hoc experiments in more effcient methods for controling battlefield fires. In the artillery at least we had got a grip on the earlier generation of networked communications and at least some of us were looking at the possibilities. The possibilites of the new intel gathering methods (drones, RPV, UAV or whatever you want to call them) were becoming apparent. In OIF the coordinating measures did not look like the traditional methods, and neither did the way the Marines and the US Army fought their way to Bagdad. The battle as it was fought defined the ground forces area of influence with depth vastly larger than usually contemplated. I strongly suspect that were I still in service in a tactical or operational role I'd not be thinking of a FsCL or in any of the traditional language or concepts mentioned in the previous post.

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neutralizer RE:Fire Support Measures-Carl S/Neutralizer 10/9/2005 7:39:27 AM

The origin of the FSCL was the 'bomb line' and the purpose was to ensure that friendly forces didn't get attacked by own aircraft on their own initiative(we'll pass on how effective it was!). If you know where everyone is then the FSCL is not needed, similarly if air only attacks specified and cleared tgts it isn't either. If you subscribe to manouevre theory, then the key qualities are cohesion and tempo. This means maintaining your own and denying them to the enemy. Targets anywhere have to be selected with these outcomes in mind, the tricky bit is translating these desired outcomes into actions to produce contributory effects. The most obvious point is that close combat reduces your own tempo, therefore it should be avoided or the enemy's capability to engage in effective and efficient close combat reduced, eg by applying 'D' word effects (destroy, delay, disrupt, dislocate, distract, deny), fix, harass, neutralise, etc (all these words have meaning, although I think only a few have made AAP-6 to date) throughout the battlespace where they will contribute most to desired outcomes. The corollory of this is that manouevre operations should seek to not need to indulge in close combat, at least not on any significant scale. In other words the main action is in depth. One point about effects based manouevre ops is that 'destroy' is only one option, and I'm not sure that arty (or air) effects planning has come fully to grips with how to translate some of the others into rds on the ground! Of course one example is arty Illum, and its soft effect of 'we are being seen' (thinks the bad guys), the Brits worked it in Sierra Leone, Kosova and Basra (5km linear through the night!).

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Carl S RE:Fire Support Measures-Carl S/Neutralizer 10/10/2005 9:15:04 PM

"close combat reduces your own tempo, therefore it should be avoided or the enemy's capability to engage in effective and efficient close combat reduced," That little line is why I've prefered fire support missions on the enemy manuver battalions. Keeping them suppressed or nuetralized allows ones own manuver freedom. While fire support on the enemys HQ or key support elements is usefull and cant be neglected, ones own combat groups blowing through those HQ & support units is much more destructive.

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neutralizer RE:Fire Support Measures-Carl S/Neutralizer 10/11/2005 6:32:58 AM

But start the process of disruption and dislocation as early as you can, plus some destruction all reduces cohesion. Suppressing and neut is only needed when en close cbt (or other forces) are in a position to interfere with you. The rest of the time you reduce their cohesion and their tempo by engaging tgts for those purposes. Do it right and they need a lot less suppressing and neut.

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