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Subject:
Radical Islam Based Insurgencies
DGreat1
10/10/2008 5:25:08 PM
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Understanding Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Operations: A Comparative Analysis
by Terrance Jones
The content of insurgent ideology has shifted. While there are a few lingering Marxist insurgencies, an ideology based on transnational, radical Islam is clearly on the ascent. In some ways it poses greater challenges than Marxism.
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
The threat of radical Islam based insurgencies is greater than any other insurgency because of several factors:
Divergent Distribution of Radical Islam- Al Qaeda alone has a significant amount of followers in over 60 nations across the globe. This fact has allowed Al Qaeda to turn the global war on terror into a global insurgency effort that could potentially destabilize multiple regions of the world simultaneously.
Proxy War Facilitation- Many of the nations in which Al Qaeda operates have anti-American inclinations; therefore the insurgents that are based in those nations immediately become proxy war subordinates of those nations. The insurgents are willing to kill Americans and their allies while using their operational autonomy to provide their proxy war superiors with a veneer of deniability.
Caliphate Factor- The divergent distribution of radical Islam has set the stage for a scenario in which a global Caliphate can be formed. The Caliphate would most likely be comprised of a majlis (committee) based leadership model that retains representation from every region across the globe while acknowledging one Imam (leader) as the Caliph (Successor/Representative) who will exercise authority over the Islamic community that is represented by the majlis. Osama Bin Laden is the most likely candidate to be officially given the title of Caliph, as he currently operates as the de facto Caliph of the Al Qaeda led global network of Islamic radicals. Bin Laden has been able to do the unthinkable in successfully launching terrorist attacks in the United States and various other regions of the world in addition to crossing sectarian lines and uniting radical Wahabi Sunnis, Shiites and Orthodox Sunni Muslims.
Note:
Has a precedent been set in Islam with regard to a majlis (committee) based selection process when choosing a Caliph (Successor/Representative)? Is Osama bin Laden really acting as a de facto Caliph of the global network he commands?
In an Islamic Caliphate system of governance, there is a selection process for choosing a Caliph (Successor/Representative). In this paper, I used the word elect. The difference between elect and select is just a question of semantics but let me get back to the issue of whether or not Muslims have an election or selection process. Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of islam was chosen as Calipha based on a majlis (committee) based selection process. The majlis was comprised of prominent Ansar and some of the Muhajirun. Umar Ibn Al Khattab, the second Caliph of Islam, reaffirmed the committee based selection process that was to be used when selecting a Caliph when on his deathbed, he ordered the remaining members of the ten companions of Prophet Muhammad who were promised paradise to elect a Caliph from amongst themselves within three days. It is also important to note that the first four Caliphs were chosen based on their ability to maintain the religious and philosophical tenets of Islam. Al Qaeda, puritanical in every sense of the word can be expected to make an attempt to follow the example of the four "rightly guided" Caliphs who laid the foundation and set the precedent for the committee based Caliph selection process in Islam. As you can see my assertions as to how Al Qaeda would most likely attempt to reestablish the Caliphate is backed up by Islamic history. To suggest that Osama Bin Laden is not acting as a "de facto Sheikh, Imam and Caliph of the global network he controls would be the ultimate form of denial and could prove to be a costly mistake.. If Al Qaeda is successful in reestablishing the Caliphate, Osama Bin Laden is the most likely candidate to be officially selected as the Caliph of Islam.
Insurgency is challenging for the United States because two of its dominant Characteristics¯protractedness and ambiguity¯mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Rapid decisive operations are seldom, if ever, strategically decisive; long-term involvement with extensive interagency activity and partner cooperation is the norm.
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
Radical Islam based insurgencies are different than the norm. Using the war in Iraq as a model, we have a scenario where the insurgents have proven to be flexible and adept at waging asymmetrical warfare. For instance, the Shia based insurgents of Sadr City negotiated a deal where they would put away their arms in return for a hard timeline for an American withdrawal from Iraq . This withdrawal is scheduled for 2011. This is a clear paradigm shift where the insurgents, who are well aware of the many mistakes that have been made by the American led coalition, see the benefit of switching from a strategic goal of protractedness to brevity concerning the war. An agreed withdrawal allows the insurgents to retain all of the advantages that have been gained up to this point including the ability to keep its weapons, therefore, allowing them to remain a threat to peace and stability although they have agreed to put them away for now. The agreement also gives the insurgents political legitimacy and sets them up as a proxy war ally of the Shia controlled contingent of the Iraqi government that can be called upon to bear arms on behalf of the same at any given time. There is no ambiguity here.
Since the military battlespace is not decisive, ultimate success requires that the U.S. military play a supporting role to other government agencies and, more importantly, to the partner governments and their security forces.
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
This is problematic, as many governments that are threatened by insurgents have to overcome the fact that they have a weak central government to contend with. This severely limits the qualitative aspect of their ability to lead a coalition based counter insurgency operation. This reality is even more prevalent in scenarios similar to the current war in Iraq in which a new government was set up before a multi sect insurgency was decisively subdued or defeated, therefore placing the new government of Iraq in a position where its central government would be significantly weakened by and under constant threat from the various insurgents factions who are operating in country. Because of scenarios like this, a precedent must be set where very clear goals must be set concerning the tandem force continuity of counter insurgency initiatives and nation building operations. War must not be waged against a given nation unless the invading force is willing to sacrifice what is necessary to ensure victory. While these sacrifices include the implementation of a hard pursuit strategy that will lead to a casualty rate that is higher than the norm over the short term, the advantages will be an exponentially shortened conflict with less casualties over the length of the war because of the strategic, tactical and technological advantages that America has in conventional, low intensity and asymmetrical warfare.
The more the local government and security forces are seen as proxies or subordinates of the United States , the more difficult it will be for them to establish legitimacy. This process will entail having the local government and military forces take the lead in projects and operations whenever possible (even if they might approach them differently than the United States ).
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
Due to the rapidly emerging threats of nuclear proliferation and global terrorism, proxy warfare has become the strategic choice of rogue and terror sponsoring nations who wish to exacerbate these threats. Iran has been innovative in its ability to form proxy war relationships that are comprised of the following configurations:
Diametrical Regimes Based Proxy War Relationships- This particular proxy war relationship details the link between conventional nations and terror sponsoring nations who seemingly are diametrically opposed to one another in regards to their national interests and strategic goals. The Iran/Russia relationship is the perfect example of such a pairing.
Sectarian Based Proxy War Relationships- The Iran / Syria and Iran/Hezbollah relationships show the flexible, interchangeable and lethal nature of sectarian based proxy war relationships, as they can involve nation to nation or nation to insurgent group configurations.
Nation/Group Based Proxy War Relationship- This proxy war relationship is represented by the tandem force continuity of terror sponsoring nations and the insurgent groups who act as their proxy war subordinates. Once again, the Iran/Hezbollah relationship is used as an example of this type of proxy war relationship.
Because of the paradigm shift to proxy warfare, America must engage in the same to strengthen its global interests. No longer should it be taboo to be perceived as an American proxy, as proxy warfare may prove to be America ?s only way to defeat the expansionist agenda of China , Russia and the wide assortment of terrorist organizations with a global agenda. It is also important to note that once America gets used to the realization that she must effectively engage in proxy warfare, America will no longer be pressured into letting weak central governments take the lead in counter insurgency operations. These have long been face saving initiatives that have yielded very little in regards to positive results.
The United States must make clear whether its approach to counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring the response and method to the threat.
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
The question of whether or not to implement a strategy of victory or containment regarding counter insurgency operations depends upon the type of insurgency that is being waged. As previously noted, radical Islam based insurgencies are on the rise and have been addressed exclusively in this brief. That being said, when fighting a radical Islam based insurgency it is imperative that you adopt a strategy of victory, as each theatre where victory is achieved allows you to disrupt the Caliphate based expansionist agenda of groups like Al Qaeda. In Iraq, America has clearly chosen to adopt a strategy of containment that has been made more obvious by the absence of a hard pursuit strategy that would deny terrorist the seasonal reprieves that they have become accustomed to as they have used these reprieves to recruit, train, and reconstitute its configurative appearance. Containment has not worked in Iraq . While the surge strategy has worked over the short term, it will fail in the end if it is not coupled with a long term; seasonal reprieve denying and continuity based hard pursuit strategy.
Traditional thinking is that victory, defined as the eradication of the insurgency as a political and military force and the amelioration of the factors that allowed it to emerge in the first place, is the appropriate goal.
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
This is the right way to wage a counter insurgency operation. Insurgent forces must be decisively subdued, disarmed and defeated by implementation of a concerted hard pursuit strategy. Only then should a new government be formed, as this will prevent that government from being significantly weakened by insurgent attacks or threats of the same. It will be easier to win the societal compliance of a given nation state once you have disarmed the insurgents that would force them into concessions that are criminal in nature and immoral in every sense of the word.
A strategy of containment merits consideration. This would be similar to the contemporary Israeli approach. The Israelis know they cannot win the ?hearts and minds? of the Palestinians. They therefore have built a strategy designed to keep the insurgents ineffective for as long as it takes.
Steven Metz, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the 21st Century
The Israeli strategy is problematic as well, as they have adopted a strategy of intermittent surges that is geared towards frustrating and disrupting the strategic goals of the insurgents. This is a stopgap measure, not the panacea for terror and mayhem. Intermittent surges only yield temporary benefits. In fact, intermittent surges that are not coupled with continuity based pursuit strategies only prolong conflicts, fragment insurgent forces and significantly increase the amount of counter insurgent force casualties over time. |
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