http://www.nypost.com/seven/03...
http://www.townhall.com/column...
By Robert KaganSunday, March 11, 2007; B07
A front-page story... in The Post last week suggested that the Bush administration has no backup plan in case the surge in Iraq doesn't work. I wonder if The Post and other newspapers have a backup plan in case it does.
Leading journalists have been reporting for some time that the war was hopeless, a fiasco that could not be salvaged by more troops and a new counterinsurgency strategy. The conventional wisdom in December held that sending more troops was politically impossible after the antiwar ten
Moqtada al-Sadr has signed an agreement with his Shi'ite rivals in southern Iraq to end all hostilities... between them. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, which recently signed a peace agreement with the central government and the Kurds, has now managed to put Sadr into its coalition, ending years of conflict between the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades:
Two of Iraq's most influential Shia leaders have signed a deal to try to end violence between their groups. Radical cleric Moqtada Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, have been locked in a bitter dispute for months. The leaders have agreed to try to end further bloodshed, foster a spirit of good will and form joint committees throughout the country.
Radical cleric Moqtada Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, have been locked in a bitter dispute for months.
The leaders have agreed to try to end further bloodshed, foster a spirit of good will and form joint committees throughout the country.
The SIIC stated that the various factions of Iraq had to find ways to come together to "enhance and preserve Iraqi unity." Sadr's spokesman said that the pact would become a "commitment of honor." Both sides want to find ways to end the squabbling that has existed between the groups since liberation, but which have recently created a rising amount of violence.
Sadr appears to have capitulated to the SIIC in this instance. Over the summer, his Mahdi Army started a gunfight with the Badr Brigades during a Shi'ite holiday and pilgrimage, killing dozens. Shortly afterwards, Hakim outmaneuvered Sadr with an alliance between the SIIC, Nouri al-Maliki, and the Kurds. The alliance strengthened Maliki after Sadr withdrew his deputies from Maliki's ruling coalition, leaving Sadr more isolated than ever before, even among Shi'ites.
Sadr is a survivor, as we have learned over the last four years. He knows when to hold 'em, and he knows when to fold 'em. It looks like he's made another pragmatic calculation, but even Sadr can't hide the fact that he's taking his faction ever backwards. At one time, he played kingmaker to Maliki. Now he has to fight for scraps from Hakim's table and only has indirect influence over the government. Surviving may be a form of success, but Sadr could have played his hand so much more effectively -- and it won't be long before his underlings start to realize it, if they haven't already.
One of the big success stories of the surge came from the disaffection between the Sunnis in western Iraq and the foreign terrorists of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Anbar Awakening started as a tribal alliance against AQI and blossomed into a widespread movement to bring the Sunnis stability and engagement with the rest of the nation. Now it looks like the Shi'ites have tired of their sectarian milit... headed by the onetime kingmaker, Moqtada al-Sadr:
In a number of Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad, residents are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia they once saw as their only protector against Sunni militants. Now they resent it as a band of street thugs without ideology. The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war. The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect. In interviews, 10 Shiites from four neighborhoods in eastern and western Baghdad described a pattern in which militia members, looking for new sources of income, turned on Shiites.
The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war.
The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect.
In interviews, 10 Shiites from four neighborhoods in eastern and western Baghdad described a pattern in which militia members, looking for new sources of income, turned on Shiites.
The split was entirely predictable. The militias have always run their neighborhoods like Mafioso thugs, extorting money from their own people to maintain their own power. The Shi'ites in these areas put up with it just as long as they saw the Sunni insurgents and AQI terrorists as a larger threat.
The surge changed that calculation. When the US and Iraqi forces started pushing back hard against AQI, the Sunni insurgents changed sides and fought against the foreigners as well. That reduced the pressure on the Shi'ite areas and stripped the Mahdis of their sheen as sectarian defenders. As the Shi'ite residents began to reject the gangster tactics of the Mahdis in greater numbers, the gangsters themselves resorted to typical gangster tactics, increasing in severity, up to murder of their own brethren.
Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The Shi'ites in Iraq have learned this lesson again, and they have given the rational response to it. Their rejection of Sadr's militias will extend to Sadr himself, further isolating him politically and eroding his corrosive power on Iraqi politics. It positions the Shi'ites to finally start reaching out to the Sunnis who have started their own political march to the middle.
The Washington Post's editorial board noticed something over the last few weeks that many of us have pointed out all along. They discover that General David Petraeus told the truth about the improving situation in Iraq. They have also found out that hardly any news agency seems interested in reporting it:
NEWS COVERAGE and debate about Iraq during the past couple of weeks have centered on the alleged abuses of private security firms like Blackwater USA. Getting such firms into a legal regime is vital, as we've said. But meanwhile, some seemingly important facts about the main subject of discussion last month -- whether there has been a decrease in violence in Iraq -- have gotten relatively little attention. A congressional study and several news stories in September questioned reports by the U.S. military that casualties were down. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), challenging the testimony of Gen. David H. Petraeus, asserted that "civilian deaths have risen" during this year's surge of American forces. A month later, there isn't much room for such debate, at least about the latest figures. In September, Iraqi civilian deaths were down 52 percent from August and 77 percent from September 2006, according to the Web site icasualties.org. The Iraqi Health Ministry and the Associated Press reported similar results. U.S. soldiers killed in action numbered 43 -- down 43 percent from August and 64 percent from May, which had the highest monthly figure so far this year. The American combat death total was the lowest since July 2006 and was one of the five lowest monthly counts since the insurgency in Iraq took off in April 2004. ... This doesn't necessarily mean the war is being won. U.S. military commanders have said that no reduction in violence will be sustainable unless Iraqis reach political solutions -- and there has been little progress on that front. Nevertheless, it's looking more and more as though those in and outside of Congress who last month were assailing Gen. Petraeus's credibility and insisting that there was no letup in Iraq's bloodshed were -- to put it simply -- wrong.
A month later, there isn't much room for such debate, at least about the latest figures. In September, Iraqi civilian deaths were down 52 percent from August and 77 percent from September 2006, according to the Web site icasualties.org. The Iraqi Health Ministry and the Associated Press reported similar results. U.S. soldiers killed in action numbered 43 -- down 43 percent from August and 64 percent from May, which had the highest monthly figure so far this year. The American combat death total was the lowest since July 2006 and was one of the five lowest monthly counts since the insurgency in Iraq took off in April 2004. ...
This doesn't necessarily mean the war is being won. U.S. military commanders have said that no reduction in violence will be sustainable unless Iraqis reach political solutions -- and there has been little progress on that front. Nevertheless, it's looking more and more as though those in and outside of Congress who last month were assailing Gen. Petraeus's credibility and insisting that there was no letup in Iraq's bloodshed were -- to put it simply -- wrong.
Let's put it a little more simply: they lied. Being "wrong" would have meant them saying, "General Petraeus, your numbers appear to be incorrect," or alternately, "We don't believe these trends will last." That's not what Petraeus heard. He heard a Senator -- someone vying to become Petraeus' Commander in Chief -- tell him that his testimony required a "willing suspension of disbelief". MoveOn greeted Petraeus' testimony with a full-page ad declaring him a potential traitor to his country.
All of that was very wrong on many levels, but his critics were much more than just incorrect. They lied about Petraeus, and the Washington Post lets them off far too easily.
They appear to do the same with their colleagues in the media. The Post notes the lack of "attention" given to the improving numbers, but never asks why this story hasn't gotten more press. The same agencies that reserve room on the front page for endless Blackwater stories somehow can't find room to report on military progress in Iraq -- and political progress as well. Somehow the story becomes much less interesting to editors when the American military reverses violent trends, starts saving lives, and starts beating terrorists.
In a rare case where all sides appear to be displaying some sense, the military has not said that al-Qaeda in Iraq has been defeated, and a media outlet isn't hiding the fact that AQI has suffered a rout. The Washington Post... reports on the delicate matter of what to make of the tremendous progress the US has made against the terrorists in western Iraq, and the likelihood that a premature declaration of victory would get used as a propaganda stunt by our enemies:
The U.S. military believes it has dealt devastating and perhaps irreversible blows to al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent months, leading some generals to advocate a declaration of victory over the group, which the Bush administration has long described as the most lethal U.S. adversary in Iraq. But as the White House and its military commanders plan the next phase of the war, other officials have cautioned against taking what they see as a premature step that could create strategic and political difficulties for the United States. Such a declaration could fuel criticism that the Iraq conflict has become a civil war in which U.S. combat forces should not be involved. At the same time, the intelligence community, and some in the military itself, worry about underestimating an enemy that has shown great resilience in the past. "I think it would be premature at this point," a senior intelligence official said of a victory declaration over AQI, as the group is known. Despite recent U.S. gains, he said, AQI retains "the ability for surprise and for catastrophic attacks." Earlier periods of optimism, such as immediately following the June 2006 death of AQI founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in a U.S. air raid, not only proved unfounded but were followed by expanded operations by the militant organization. There is widespread agreement that AQI has suffered major blows over the past three months. Among the indicators cited is a sharp drop in suicide bombings, the group's signature attack, from more than 60 in January to around 30 a month since July. Captures and interrogations of AQI leaders over the summer had what a senior military intelligence official called a "cascade effect," leading to other killings and captures. The flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq has also diminished, although officials are unsure of the reason and are concerned that the broader al-Qaeda network may be diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and elsewhere.
But as the White House and its military commanders plan the next phase of the war, other officials have cautioned against taking what they see as a premature step that could create strategic and political difficulties for the United States. Such a declaration could fuel criticism that the Iraq conflict has become a civil war in which U.S. combat forces should not be involved. At the same time, the intelligence community, and some in the military itself, worry about underestimating an enemy that has shown great resilience in the past.
"I think it would be premature at this point," a senior intelligence official said of a victory declaration over AQI, as the group is known. Despite recent U.S. gains, he said, AQI retains "the ability for surprise and for catastrophic attacks." Earlier periods of optimism, such as immediately following the June 2006 death of AQI founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in a U.S. air raid, not only proved unfounded but were followed by expanded operations by the militant organization.
There is widespread agreement that AQI has suffered major blows over the past three months. Among the indicators cited is a sharp drop in suicide bombings, the group's signature attack, from more than 60 in January to around 30 a month since July. Captures and interrogations of AQI leaders over the summer had what a senior military intelligence official called a "cascade effect," leading to other killings and captures. The flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq has also diminished, although officials are unsure of the reason and are concerned that the broader al-Qaeda network may be diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and elsewhere.
One point the Bush administration has made over and over again has been proven, at least. The US forces had insisted for the past two years that AQI presented the deadliest challenge in Iraq. Critics claimed that the Pentagon and the administration were lying, and that the AQ forces only represented 10% of all insurgents in Iraq. Yet now, with AQI dispersed, demoralized, and mostly defeated, the plunge in casualties has been far greater than the 10% number critics and skeptics tossed around so casually as late as this summer.
Momentum clearly shifted to our side in Iraq since the surge. It accomplished exactly what it intended -- the elimination of destabilizing violence, especially in western Iraq and the Baghdad environs. And peace has become a habit that the Iraqis have enjoyed. They have reached out and built ground-up coalitions, even reaching across sectarian lines, in order to keep the progress going forward towards stability.
The Mal
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