the general feeling in UK is that being there is no longer doing any good.

 

the situation in Basra has gotten worse over the last year with more and more attacks on the British and there is no payback for actually being there. the locals no longer support the British being there and are making this quite clear.

 

the UK has limited resources and current MOD thinking is that they would do more good in Afganistan than in Iraq.

 

GB is looking to drawdown and pullout as quickly as possible without it looking like giving in.

 

Paul

 

 

Anthony Cordesman of CSIS called the British defeat in Basra back in February.  This is old news.

 

"http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3733/type,1/"

"http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3733/type,1/"

I believe much of counter-insurgency doctrine is owed to British colonial practices.  However I wonder if all of the instruments that had been a part of those practices had been carried forward into operations where the British did not enjoy a  position of colonial administration.  In particular, and I am not particullary well informed of whats been going on in Basra, I wonder if the management of the local police forces and the intelligence opportunities this can supply to a counter insurgency force were fully taken advantage of.  Hopefully in our own surge we'll be able to fortify  the ability of local contabularies to resist insurgent actions and contribute to the general campaign.