link
A new study has been released by the Lancet medical journal estimating over 650,000 excess deaths in Iraq. The Iraqi mortality estimates published in the Lancet in October 2006 imply, among other things, that:
If these assertions are true, they further imply:
In the light of such extreme and improbable implications, a rational alternative conclusion to be considered is that the authors have drawn conclusions from unrepresentative data. In addition, totals of the magnitude generated by this study are unnecessary to brand the invasion and occupation of Iraq a human and strategic tragedy.
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rational alternative conclusion to be considered is that the authors have drawn conclusions from unrepresentative data. In addition, totals of the magnitude generated by this study are unnecessary to brand the invasion and occupation of Iraq a human and strategic tragedy.
Re: the Lancet study, Shek's recent points were why they would spend time in their report comparing their findings to what we know about mortality in other wars (Congo, East Timor, Vietnam, etc.) and why they only used 14 months of pre-invasion data as their benchmark for the expected death rate. As I see it, the answer to the first one is quite straightforward; it was an external 'sanity check' to see if their findings were reasonable. The question there was "are the results we are obtained consistent with what we've seen in previous conflicts?", and the aswer to that was a resounding "yes" - 2.5% of the population dead over 3+ years of armed conflict seems to be highly consistent with what we have seen elsewhere. If anything, it's unusualy low.There are two issues here.
First, they attempt to benchmark their final numbers, but they hardly spend time developing this. For example, they cite Vietnam and 3 million casualties. Is that over 25 years? 15 years? 8 years? What about the causality of these deaths? Agent orange? Air strikes? Indiscriminate carpet bombing? The blockade of North Vietnam? Besides making zero effort to give details on Vietnam, they make no effort to motivate that comparing Vietnam and Iraq is a valid comparison.
For East Timor, they cite a number provided from CNN. Do you find this very scholarly? Do you expect researchers well versed in statistics to rely on a citation from CNN? They criticize the IBC method, and yet they engage in using a news source. Coincidentally, their number is the highest number out there, 200K, published by Amnesty International. While I didn’t do an exhaustive search, I couldn’t find any scientific methodology behind the 200,000K number that Amnesty International cites. However, why do they not cite the following?
link This study cites 103K as the number of excess deaths over the 25 year period. This would equate of half of the excess death rate claimed by Iraq. Once again, they provide no details and make no attempt at motivating how East Timor is a good benchmark for Iraq. Lastly, they cite the Congo as a benchmark, once again without giving many details that could then be used to motivate why it is a good benchmark for Iraq. As an aside, when you read the study they cite, you find that the methodology used for Congo is different. Furthermore, the study they cite doesn’t even talk about the methodology in computing the wartime deaths. Instead, the study they cite looks at the peacetime (post-war) death rates and talks about how there had been 500K of deaths in the 16 months following the peace, with 0.1% of the deaths resulting from violence. The bulk of the deaths resulted from HIV/AIDS, lack of vaccinations, and malaria. Those are certainly problems in Iraq, not! Either their scholarly research capabilities are not worthy of the doctorates they have, or else they purpose chose black box figures. The second issue is that they don’t even touch benchmarking for their pre-war numbers (other than citing their original study, which is slightly incestuous). Given their attempt to benchmark their overall results, don’t you find it disingenuous that there is no benchmarking discussion over their pre-war results, for which there are benchmarks to compare against? Bottomline, their benchmarking efforts are poor and not sufficient. The implication (which they did not state) is that numbers previously presented (such as Bush's claim last December that around 30,000 Iraqis had died) are extremely unusual. 0.125% of the population dead over 3 years of fighting is on the face of it, absurd. It would be the first time in history that we see anything like that. I believe that you are making an apples and oranges comparison here on a couple of fronts. link link First, you are trying to make comparisons across different time periods. Not central to the argument, but sloppy and fallacious all the same. Next, President Bush hasn’t argued that the “excess” death figure in Iraq is 30,000. When he spoke about the 30K figure last year, he spoke of Iraqi “citizens.” Does this include those who have died from non-violent causes? Does it include Iraqi insurgents, who I’m pretty sure he wouldn’t include as “citizens.” Because he didn’t define his metric, you cannot make direct comparisons (although you can make some plausible assumptions and then compare some components of Roberts et al once you’ve adjusted the figures in one time direction or the other). Regarding the question of why they only used 14 months worth of pre-war data as their benchmark, I dont have a good answer for that. I imagine they could have used more, dont know what their reasons were. The related question, however, is how much of a difference this would have made. To determine if limiting the pre-war time period would have a bias, you’d have to ask yourself if anything in pre-war Iraq would have been different in 2003 than it was prior to that. I’d argue that the answer is yes. First, you have a dictator that understood that the war clouds were gathering and began to negotiate truces with many tribes so that he’d have a more united front against any potential invasion. So, you have fewer regime related deaths than if you were to have opened up the time period. Next, you have to look what effect the release of tens of thousands of prisoners in October 2002 link had, to include nearly 10K violent crimes prisoners. If you think through this, I believe there is a bias there that would overestimate post-war deaths (i.e. while there would be some extra crimes in the pre-war figure, these didn’t factor in during the entire pre-war period; conversely, these criminals would be reflected in the entire post-war period). Furthermore, despite your claims of causality, you cannot argue that the deaths at the hands of these criminals is a causal relationship with the invasion. Next, if the authors were worried about recall bias by opening up the time period, they could have just broken the pre-war period into several phases just as they did the post-war period. If they found a large # of unsubstantiated deaths, then they could make a compelling argument that to include the oldest phase would bias they figures and then drop them. Someone, I think it was EW3 went through and calculated it using a 5 year average of CIA figures - I believe the figure he came back with was 6.1 deaths/thousand pop. (it's in the missing threads). The benchmark the Lancet used was 5.5 deaths/thousand. While significant, the 0.6 difference is not central; the average post-war mortality measured by the Lancet was 13.2 dead/thousand. Hence even if we apply the more stringent benchmark, the difference would account for less than 1/20th of the measured total.Once again, you are trying to have it both ways. You have yet to demonstrate some methodological change that means that we should accept the pre-war numbers but reject the post-war numbers. Can’t have it both ways! Accept them all, reject them all, or demonstrate some change that would result in accepting the pre-war while rejecting the post-war – what’s it going to be? Which comes back to the central point, which is that even allowing for the issues we've located so far (the clustering, the empty-house problem, the two excluded datasets, and the lenght-of-benchmark) the Lancet study is still by a *long* shot the best study of post-war mortality I have seen so far. Most of the rest have glaring base errors - for one, most are simple secondary source aggregates, which is simply not a relevant method, by any stretch. Not only that, their results cluster around 0.1 to 0.4% of the population dead in 3+ years of armed conflict, while the CIAs numbers actually claim that mortality has steadily gone down over the course of the war. To put it mildly, those results are radically out of synch with what we've seen in other conflicts. Further, the documentation about their study design, field work and statistical analysis is either non-existent or a dramatically lower quality than the Lancet's. The cluster sample design doesn’t necessarily affect the accuracy of the study – it does make it very imprecise, however. I am not raising this an issues. The empty-house problem doesn’t necessarily present a problem. While it could present a survivor bias problem (which would result in underestimation of the mean), it could also reflect a bias towards overestimation of the mean (e.g. a family that’s taken a sectarian holiday to avoid violence by going to a friends or relatives house elsewhere – this would be a double whammy – as it would result in overweighting the cluster as well as missing a family where you had fewer deaths than the mean), or it could be a wash. A problem, but I think one that at this point is hard to find a distinct bias in a particular direction. As far as the benchmarking, I have a significant issue with the Roberts et al study that completely undercuts their numbers. I would agree that this study has the best post-war results of mortality in Iraq mainly because they look at total mortality and not at more specific subgroups that other sources monitor. However, as the only post-war study of the crude mortality rate, it’s not hard to get the label “best.” Once you benchmark their pre-war rates, you could reduce the excess death rates by over 1/3, and now that you are playing on the margin, I would find it plausible that you could move the rate even further down such that you would fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Maybe not, but it’s possible. Next, I will take issue with the documentation. IBC’s documentation is vastly superior to Roberts et al. You can search their database online and are free to draw the conclusions from the primary source data. With Roberts et al., all we get is an 8 page study with some frivolous benchmark and no underlying data. No ability to replicate their results. No ability to determine if the field researchers added a death post-war every 5th house, or whatever. Taking all that, at this point it looks like on one side we have a well-designed, well documented study published in a top tier scientific journal that produced results that are very much in line with what we have seen previously. Once again, why are Vietnam, DRC, and East Timor good benchmarks? The study made no compelling argument (in fact, I’d argue that they made no argument and instead threw up conflicts with high numbers for propaganda effects relative to their own research). So, the “in line with what we have seen previously” has not been established or proven. What we do know is that their pre-war numbers are NOT “in line with what we have seen previously.” “pdf.wri.org/wr98_hh2.pdf” Next, it is not well documented, whether you want to point to the sloppy and/or misleading references I already pointed out or point out the fact that the data is not available to attempt to replicate the results and to see what measurement biases may or may not exist. I’ve already beat this horse. Additionally, in the original thread, you called the methodology used by Roberts et al as the “gold” standard in survey methodology. This is wrong. The “platinum” standard would be to survey the entire population. The “gold” standard would be identifying strata and then conducting random sampling with the strata. The “silver” standard would be just a simple random sample. Finally, I’d classify the methodology used in the Lancet study as the “bronze” standard – cluster sampling will yield imprecise results, which is exactly what you see here. Next, how random is this? “The interview team were given the responsibility and authority to change to an alternate location if they perceived the level of insecurity or risk to be unacceptable.” This is a violation of random sampling when you don’t sample the random site selected. Not quite the impeccable execution of random sampling that you claimed way back. Now, it is arguable as to what bias this introduces. Does it mean that the mortality rate was underestimated, because you reason that if it’s too insecure to sample, it must have had a lot of deaths? Does it mean that the mortality rate was overestimated, because the interview team were Sunni and didn’t want to move through a police checkpoint into the “randomly” selected neighborhood that happened to be Shia for fear of their own safety? Or was the team Shia and didn’t want to move through an Iraqi Army checkpoint into an all Sunni neighborhood? I could continue on with the permutations of the implications of this, but we can’t figure out the underlying truth because the information is not revealed to us in the level of detail necessary to analyze this properly. Why not? On the other we have a collection of methodologically unsound, poorly documented studies published across a motley collection of websites and newspapers whose main conclusion is that what we are seeing in Iraq is a level of mortality that's radically lower than any other armed conflict we've ever seen, by a factor of 10-20. Once again, I’ve already covered your errors here – you are comparing apples and oranges and instead of addressing the weaknesses of the Roberts et al study, you are trying to distract the topic by diverting to other studies that are looking at different measures. However, I’d state (again) that the IBC is better documented by orders or magnitude. You can search their database and see EXACTLY how they come up with their numbers. Nor do they attempt to hide the limitations of their methods. Their process is completely objective and transparent. Their methodology is very sound with regards to the results that they advertise. They don’t claim to have the full answer. Not so with Roberts et al. Their data lies in a black box that yields only results. No full disclosure, no full transparency. As far as the apples and oranges comment, it is clear that IBC will not report any deaths as a result of health issues that Roberts et al may capture. Also, as I’ve motivated several times now, your benchmarking (e.g. the 10-20 times lower) is misled by the “benchmarks” that Roberts et al purports. Make an argument on why Vietnam, DRC, and/or East Timor are good benchmarks, and I’ll accept them as a valid comparison. Given that, if we had an office pool going, I'm very clear about where I would put my money.Yes, we all know. Irrelevant, however. You’ve claimed that it’s a great study, and yet beyond cherry picking benchmarks and appealing to authority, you have to discuss details of the study in-depth.
This study cites 103K as the number of excess deaths over the 25 year period. This would equate of half of the excess death rate claimed by Iraq. Once again, they provide no details and make no attempt at motivating how East Timor is a good benchmark for Iraq.
Lastly, they cite the Congo as a benchmark, once again without giving many details that could then be used to motivate why it is a good benchmark for Iraq. As an aside, when you read the study they cite, you find that the methodology used for Congo is different. Furthermore, the study they cite doesn’t even talk about the methodology in computing the wartime deaths. Instead, the study they cite looks at the peacetime (post-war) death rates and talks about how there had been 500K of deaths in the 16 months following the peace, with 0.1% of the deaths resulting from violence. The bulk of the deaths resulted from HIV/AIDS, lack of vaccinations, and malaria. Those are certainly problems in Iraq, not! Either their scholarly research capabilities are not worthy of the doctorates they have, or else they purpose chose black box figures.
The second issue is that they don’t even touch benchmarking for their pre-war numbers (other than citing their original study, which is slightly incestuous). Given their attempt to benchmark their overall results, don’t you find it disingenuous that there is no benchmarking discussion over their pre-war results, for which there are benchmarks to compare against?
Bottomline, their benchmarking efforts are poor and not sufficient.
The implication (which they did not state) is that numbers previously presented (such as Bush's claim last December that around 30,000 Iraqis had died) are extremely unusual. 0.125% of the population dead over 3 years of fighting is on the face of it, absurd. It would be the first time in history that we see anything like that. I believe that you are making an apples and oranges comparison here on a couple of fronts.
link link First, you are trying to make comparisons across different time periods. Not central to the argument, but sloppy and fallacious all the same. Next, President Bush hasn’t argued that the “excess” death figure in Iraq is 30,000. When he spoke about the 30K figure last year, he spoke of Iraqi “citizens.” Does this include those who have died from non-violent causes? Does it include Iraqi insurgents, who I’m pretty sure he wouldn’t include as “citizens.” Because he didn’t define his metric, you cannot make direct comparisons (although you can make some plausible assumptions and then compare some components of Roberts et al once you’ve adjusted the figures in one time direction or the other). Regarding the question of why they only used 14 months worth of pre-war data as their benchmark, I dont have a good answer for that. I imagine they could have used more, dont know what their reasons were. The related question, however, is how much of a difference this would have made. To determine if limiting the pre-war time period would have a bias, you’d have to ask yourself if anything in pre-war Iraq would have been different in 2003 than it was prior to that. I’d argue that the answer is yes. First, you have a dictator that understood that the war clouds were gathering and began to negotiate truces with many tribes so that he’d have a more united front against any potential invasion. So, you have fewer regime related deaths than if you were to have opened up the time period. Next, you have to look what effect the release of tens of thousands of prisoners in October 2002 link had, to include nearly 10K violent crimes prisoners. If you think through this, I believe there is a bias there that would overestimate post-war deaths (i.e. while there would be some extra crimes in the pre-war figure, these didn’t factor in during the entire pre-war period; conversely, these criminals would be reflected in the entire post-war period). Furthermore, despite your claims of causality, you cannot argue that the deaths at the hands of these criminals is a causal relationship with the invasion. Next, if the authors were worried about recall bias by opening up the time period, they could have just broken the pre-war period into several phases just as they did the post-war period. If they found a large # of unsubstantiated deaths, then they could make a compelling argument that to include the oldest phase would bias they figures and then drop them. Someone, I think it was EW3 went through and calculated it using a 5 year average of CIA figures - I believe the figure he came back with was 6.1 deaths/thousand pop. (it's in the missing threads). The benchmark the Lancet used was 5.5 deaths/thousand. While significant, the 0.6 difference is not central; the average post-war mortality measured by the Lancet was 13.2 dead/thousand. Hence even if we apply the more stringent benchmark, the difference would account for less than 1/20th of the measured total.Once again, you are trying to have it both ways. You have yet to demonstrate some methodological change that means that we should accept the pre-war numbers but reject the post-war numbers. Can’t have it both ways! Accept them all, reject them all, or demonstrate some change that would result in accepting the pre-war while rejecting the post-war – what’s it going to be? Which comes back to the central point, which is that even allowing for the issues we've located so far (the clustering, the empty-house problem, the two excluded datasets, and the lenght-of-benchmark) the Lancet study is still by a *long* shot the best study of post-war mortality I have seen so far. Most of the rest have glaring base errors - for one, most are simple secondary source aggregates, which is simply not a relevant method, by any stretch. Not only that, their results cluster around 0.1 to 0.4% of the population dead in 3+ years of armed conflict, while the CIAs numbers actually claim that mortality has steadily gone down over the course of the war. To put it mildly, those results are radically out of synch with what we've seen in other conflicts. Further, the documentation about their study design, field work and statistical analysis is either non-existent or a dramatically lower quality than the Lancet's. The cluster sample design doesn’t necessarily affect the accuracy of the study – it does make it very imprecise, however. I am not raising this an issues. The empty-house problem doesn’t necessarily present a problem. While it could present a survivor bias problem (which would result in underestimation of the mean), it could also reflect a bias towards overestimation of the mean (e.g. a family that’s taken a sectarian holiday to avoid violence by going to a friends or relatives house elsewhere – this would be a double whammy – as it would result in overweighting the cluster as well as missing a family where you had fewer deaths than the mean), or it could be a wash. A problem, but I think one that at this point is hard to find a distinct bias in a particular direction. As far as the benchmarking, I have a significant issue with the Roberts et al study that completely undercuts their numbers. I would agree that this study has the best post-war results of mortality in Iraq mainly because they look at total mortality and not at more specific subgroups that other sources monitor. However, as the only post-war study of the crude mortality rate, it’s not hard to get the label “best.” Once you benchmark their pre-war rates, you could reduce the excess death rates by over 1/3, and now that you are playing on the margin, I would find it plausible that you could move the rate even further down such that you would fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Maybe not, but it’s possible. Next, I will take issue with the documentation. IBC’s documentation is vastly superior to Roberts et al. You can search their database online and are free to draw the conclusions from the primary source data. With Roberts et al., all we get is an 8 page study with some frivolous benchmark and no underlying data. No ability to replicate their results. No ability to determine if the field researchers added a death post-war every 5th house, or whatever. Taking all that, at this point it looks like on one side we have a well-designed, well documented study published in a top tier scientific journal that produced results that are very much in line with what we have seen previously. Once again, why are Vietnam, DRC, and East Timor good benchmarks? The study made no compelling argument (in fact, I’d argue that they made no argument and instead threw up conflicts with high numbers for propaganda effects relative to their own research). So, the “in line with what we have seen previously” has not been established or proven. What we do know is that their pre-war numbers are NOT “in line with what we have seen previously.” “pdf.wri.org/wr98_hh2.pdf” Next, it is not well documented, whether you want to point to the sloppy and/or misleading references I already pointed out or point out the fact that the data is not available to attempt to replicate the results and to see what measurement biases may or may not exist. I’ve already beat this horse. Additionally, in the original thread, you called the methodology used by Roberts et al as the “gold” standard in survey methodology. This is wrong. The “platinum” standard would be to survey the entire population. The “gold” standard would be identifying strata and then conducting random sampling with the strata. The “silver” standard would be just a simple random sample. Finally, I’d classify the methodology used in the Lancet study as the “bronze” standard – cluster sampling will yield imprecise results, which is exactly what you see here. Next, how random is this? “The interview team were given the responsibility and authority to change to an alternate location if they perceived the level of insecurity or risk to be unacceptable.” This is a violation of random sampling when you don’t sample the random site selected. Not quite the impeccable execution of random sampling that you claimed way back. Now, it is arguable as to what bias this introduces. Does it mean that the mortality rate was underestimated, because you reason that if it’s too insecure to sample, it must have had a lot of deaths? Does it mean that the mortality rate was overestimated, because the interview team were Sunni and didn’t want to move through a police checkpoint into the “randomly” selected neighborhood that happened to be Shia for fear of their own safety? Or was the team Shia and didn’t want to move through an Iraqi Army checkpoint into an all Sunni neighborhood? I could continue on with the permutations of the implications of this, but we can’t figure out the underlying truth because the information is not revealed to us in the level of detail necessary to analyze this properly. Why not? On the other we have a collection of methodologically unsound, poorly documented studies published across a motley collection of websites and newspapers whose main conclusion is that what we are seeing in Iraq is a level of mortality that's radically lower than any other armed conflict we've ever seen, by a factor of 10-20. Once again, I’ve already covered your errors here – you are comparing apples and oranges and instead of addressing the weaknesses of the Roberts et al study, you are trying to distract the topic by diverting to other studies that are looking at different measures. However, I’d state (again) that the IBC is better documented by orders or magnitude. You can search their database and see EXACTLY how they come up with their numbers. Nor do they attempt to hide the limitations of their methods. Their process is completely objective and transparent. Their methodology is very sound with regards to the results that they advertise. They don’t claim to have the full answer. Not so with Roberts et al. Their data lies in a black box that yields only results. No full disclosure, no full transparency. As far as the apples and oranges comment, it is clear that IBC will not report any deaths as a result of health issues that Roberts et al may capture. Also, as I’ve motivated several times now, your benchmarking (e.g. the 10-20 times lower) is misled by the “benchmarks” that Roberts et al purports. Make an argument on why Vietnam, DRC, and/or East Timor are good benchmarks, and I’ll accept them as a valid comparison. Given that, if we had an office pool going, I'm very clear about where I would put my money.Yes, we all know. Irrelevant, however. You’ve claimed that it’s a great study, and yet beyond cherry picking benchmarks and appealing to authority, you have to discuss details of the study in-depth.
link First, you are trying to make comparisons across different time periods. Not central to the argument, but sloppy and fallacious all the same. Next, President Bush hasn’t argued that the “excess” death figure in Iraq is 30,000. When he spoke about the 30K figure last year, he spoke of Iraqi “citizens.” Does this include those who have died from non-violent causes? Does it include Iraqi insurgents, who I’m pretty sure he wouldn’t include as “citizens.” Because he didn’t define his metric, you cannot make direct comparisons (although you can make some plausible assumptions and then compare some components of Roberts et al once you’ve adjusted the figures in one time direction or the other). Regarding the question of why they only used 14 months worth of pre-war data as their benchmark, I dont have a good answer for that. I imagine they could have used more, dont know what their reasons were. The related question, however, is how much of a difference this would have made. To determine if limiting the pre-war time period would have a bias, you’d have to ask yourself if anything in pre-war Iraq would have been different in 2003 than it was prior to that. I’d argue that the answer is yes. First, you have a dictator that understood that the war clouds were gathering and began to negotiate truces with many tribes so that he’d have a more united front against any potential invasion. So, you have fewer regime related deaths than if you were to have opened up the time period. Next, you have to look what effect the release of tens of thousands of prisoners in October 2002 link had, to include nearly 10K violent crimes prisoners. If you think through this, I believe there is a bias there that would overestimate post-war deaths (i.e. while there would be some extra crimes in the pre-war figure, these didn’t factor in during the entire pre-war period; conversely, these criminals would be reflected in the entire post-war period). Furthermore, despite your claims of causality, you cannot argue that the deaths at the hands of these criminals is a causal relationship with the invasion. Next, if the authors were worried about recall bias by opening up the time period, they could have just broken the pre-war period into several phases just as they did the post-war period. If they found a large # of unsubstantiated deaths, then they could make a compelling argument that to include the oldest phase would bias they figures and then drop them. Someone, I think it was EW3 went through and calculated it using a 5 year average of CIA figures - I believe the figure he came back with was 6.1 deaths/thousand pop. (it's in the missing threads). The benchmark the Lancet used was 5.5 deaths/thousand. While significant, the 0.6 difference is not central; the average post-war mortality measured by the Lancet was 13.2 dead/thousand. Hence even if we apply the more stringent benchmark, the difference would account for less than 1/20th of the measured total.Once again, you are trying to have it both ways. You have yet to demonstrate some methodological change that means that we should accept the pre-war numbers but reject the post-war numbers. Can’t have it both ways! Accept them all, reject them all, or demonstrate some change that would result in accepting the pre-war while rejecting the post-war – what’s it going to be? Which comes back to the central point, which is that even allowing for the issues we've located so far (the clustering, the empty-house problem, the two excluded datasets, and the lenght-of-benchmark) the Lancet study is still by a *long* shot the best study of post-war mortality I have seen so far. Most of the rest have glaring base errors - for one, most are simple secondary source aggregates, which is simply not a relevant method, by any stretch. Not only that, their results cluster around 0.1 to 0.4% of the population dead in 3+ years of armed conflict, while the CIAs numbers actually claim that mortality has steadily gone down over the course of the war. To put it mildly, those results are radically out of synch with what we've seen in other conflicts. Further, the documentation about their study design, field work and statistical analysis is either non-existent or a dramatically lower quality than the Lancet's. The cluster sample design doesn’t necessarily affect the accuracy of the study – it does make it very imprecise, however. I am not raising this an issues. The empty-house problem doesn’t necessarily present a problem. While it could present a survivor bias problem (which would result in underestimation of the mean), it could also reflect a bias towards overestimation of the mean (e.g. a family that’s taken a sectarian holiday to avoid violence by going to a friends or relatives house elsewhere – this would be a double whammy – as it would result in overweighting the cluster as well as missing a family where you had fewer deaths than the mean), or it could be a wash. A problem, but I think one that at this point is hard to find a distinct bias in a particular direction. As far as the benchmarking, I have a significant issue with the Roberts et al study that completely undercuts their numbers. I would agree that this study has the best post-war results of mortality in Iraq mainly because they look at total mortality and not at more specific subgroups that other sources monitor. However, as the only post-war study of the crude mortality rate, it’s not hard to get the label “best.” Once you benchmark their pre-war rates, you could reduce the excess death rates by over 1/3, and now that you are playing on the margin, I would find it plausible that you could move the rate even further down such that you would fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Maybe not, but it’s possible. Next, I will take issue with the documentation. IBC’s documentation is vastly superior to Roberts et al. You can search their database online and are free to draw the conclusions from the primary source data. With Roberts et al., all we get is an 8 page study with some frivolous benchmark and no underlying data. No ability to replicate their results. No ability to determine if the field researchers added a death post-war every 5th house, or whatever. Taking all that, at this point it looks like on one side we have a well-designed, well documented study published in a top tier scientific journal that produced results that are very much in line with what we have seen previously. Once again, why are Vietnam, DRC, and East Timor good benchmarks? The study made no compelling argument (in fact, I’d argue that they made no argument and instead threw up conflicts with high numbers for propaganda effects relative to their own research). So, the “in line with what we have seen previously” has not been established or proven. What we do know is that their pre-war numbers are NOT “in line with what we have seen previously.” “pdf.wri.org/wr98_hh2.pdf” Next, it is not well documented, whether you want to point to the sloppy and/or misleading references I already pointed out or point out the fact that the data is not available to attempt to replicate the results and to see what measurement biases may or may not exist. I’ve already beat this horse. Additionally, in the original thread, you called the methodology used by Roberts et al as the “gold” standard in survey methodology. This is wrong. The “platinum” standard would be to survey the entire population. The “gold” standard would be identifying strata and then conducting random sampling with the strata. The “silver” standard would be just a simple random sample. Finally, I’d classify the methodology used in the Lancet study as the “bronze” standard – cluster sampling will yield imprecise results, which is exactly what you see here. Next, how random is this? “The interview team were given the responsibility and authority to change to an alternate location if they perceived the level of insecurity or risk to be unacceptable.” This is a violation of random sampling when you don’t sample the random site selected. Not quite the impeccable execution of random sampling that you claimed way back. Now, it is arguable as to what bias this introduces. Does it mean that the mortality rate was underestimated, because you reason that if it’s too insecure to sample, it must have had a lot of deaths? Does it mean that the mortality rate was overestimated, because the interview team were Sunni and didn’t want to move through a police checkpoint into the “randomly” selected neighborhood that happened to be Shia for fear of their own safety? Or was the team Shia and didn’t want to move through an Iraqi Army checkpoint into an all Sunni neighborhood? I could continue on with the permutations of the implications of this, but we can’t figure out the underlying truth because the information is not revealed to us in the level of detail necessary to analyze this properly. Why not? On the other we have a collection of methodologically unsound, poorly documented studies published across a motley collection of websites and newspapers whose main conclusion is that what we are seeing in Iraq is a level of mortality that's radically lower than any other armed conflict we've ever seen, by a factor of 10-20. Once again, I’ve already covered your errors here – you are comparing apples and oranges and instead of addressing the weaknesses of the Roberts et al study, you are trying to distract the topic by diverting to other studies that are looking at different measures. However, I’d state (again) that the IBC is better documented by orders or magnitude. You can search their database and see EXACTLY how they come up with their numbers. Nor do they attempt to hide the limitations of their methods. Their process is completely objective and transparent. Their methodology is very sound with regards to the results that they advertise. They don’t claim to have the full answer. Not so with Roberts et al. Their data lies in a black box that yields only results. No full disclosure, no full transparency. As far as the apples and oranges comment, it is clear that IBC will not report any deaths as a result of health issues that Roberts et al may capture. Also, as I’ve motivated several times now, your benchmarking (e.g. the 10-20 times lower) is misled by the “benchmarks” that Roberts et al purports. Make an argument on why Vietnam, DRC, and/or East Timor are good benchmarks, and I’ll accept them as a valid comparison. Given that, if we had an office pool going, I'm very clear about where I would put my money.Yes, we all know. Irrelevant, however. You’ve claimed that it’s a great study, and yet beyond cherry picking benchmarks and appealing to authority, you have to discuss details of the study in-depth.
First, you are trying to make comparisons across different time periods. Not central to the argument, but sloppy and fallacious all the same.
Next, President Bush hasn’t argued that the “excess” death figure in Iraq is 30,000. When he spoke about the 30K figure last year, he spoke of Iraqi “citizens.” Does this include those who have died from non-violent causes? Does it include Iraqi insurgents, who I’m pretty sure he wouldn’t include as “citizens.” Because he didn’t define his metric, you cannot make direct comparisons (although you can make some plausible assumptions and then compare some components of Roberts et al once you’ve adjusted the figures in one time direction or the other).
Regarding the question of why they only used 14 months worth of pre-war data as their benchmark, I dont have a good answer for that. I imagine they could have used more, dont know what their reasons were. The related question, however, is how much of a difference this would have made. To determine if limiting the pre-war time period would have a bias, you’d have to ask yourself if anything in pre-war Iraq would have been different in 2003 than it was prior to that. I’d argue that the answer is yes. First, you have a dictator that understood that the war clouds were gathering and began to negotiate truces with many tribes so that he’d have a more united front against any potential invasion. So, you have fewer regime related deaths than if you were to have opened up the time period. Next, you have to look what effect the release of tens of thousands of prisoners in October 2002 link had, to include nearly 10K violent crimes prisoners. If you think through this, I believe there is a bias there that would overestimate post-war deaths (i.e. while there would be some extra crimes in the pre-war figure, these didn’t factor in during the entire pre-war period; conversely, these criminals would be reflected in the entire post-war period). Furthermore, despite your claims of causality, you cannot argue that the deaths at the hands of these criminals is a causal relationship with the invasion.
Next, if the authors were worried about recall bias by opening up the time period, they could have just broken the pre-war period into several phases just as they did the post-war period. If they found a large # of unsubstantiated deaths, then they could make a compelling argument that to include the oldest phase would bias they figures and then drop them.
Someone, I think it was EW3 went through and calculated it using a 5 year average of CIA figures - I believe the figure he came back with was 6.1 deaths/thousand pop. (it's in the missing threads). The benchmark the Lancet used was 5.5 deaths/thousand. While significant, the 0.6 difference is not central; the average post-war mortality measured by the Lancet was 13.2 dead/thousand. Hence even if we apply the more stringent benchmark, the difference would account for less than 1/20th of the measured total.Once again, you are trying to have it both ways. You have yet to demonstrate some methodological change that means that we should accept the pre-war numbers but reject the post-war numbers. Can’t have it both ways! Accept them all, reject them all, or demonstrate some change that would result in accepting the pre-war while rejecting the post-war – what’s it going to be?
Which comes back to the central point, which is that even allowing for the issues we've located so far (the clustering, the empty-house problem, the two excluded datasets, and the lenght-of-benchmark) the Lancet study is still by a *long* shot the best study of post-war mortality I have seen so far. Most of the rest have glaring base errors - for one, most are simple secondary source aggregates, which is simply not a relevant method, by any stretch. Not only that, their results cluster around 0.1 to 0.4% of the population dead in 3+ years of armed conflict, while the CIAs numbers actually claim that mortality has steadily gone down over the course of the war. To put it mildly, those results are radically out of synch with what we've seen in other conflicts. Further, the documentation about their study design, field work and statistical analysis is either non-existent or a dramatically lower quality than the Lancet's. The cluster sample design doesn’t necessarily affect the accuracy of the study – it does make it very imprecise, however. I am not raising this an issues. The empty-house problem doesn’t necessarily present a problem. While it could present a survivor bias problem (which would result in underestimation of the mean), it could also reflect a bias towards overestimation of the mean (e.g. a family that’s taken a sectarian holiday to avoid violence by going to a friends or relatives house elsewhere – this would be a double whammy – as it would result in overweighting the cluster as well as missing a family where you had fewer deaths than the mean), or it could be a wash. A problem, but I think one that at this point is hard to find a distinct bias in a particular direction. As far as the benchmarking, I have a significant issue with the Roberts et al study that completely undercuts their numbers.
I would agree that this study has the best post-war results of mortality in Iraq mainly because they look at total mortality and not at more specific subgroups that other sources monitor. However, as the only post-war study of the crude mortality rate, it’s not hard to get the label “best.” Once you benchmark their pre-war rates, you could reduce the excess death rates by over 1/3, and now that you are playing on the margin, I would find it plausible that you could move the rate even further down such that you would fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Maybe not, but it’s possible.
Next, I will take issue with the documentation. IBC’s documentation is vastly superior to Roberts et al. You can search their database online and are free to draw the conclusions from the primary source data. With Roberts et al., all we get is an 8 page study with some frivolous benchmark and no underlying data. No ability to replicate their results. No ability to determine if the field researchers added a death post-war every 5th house, or whatever.
Taking all that, at this point it looks like on one side we have a well-designed, well documented study published in a top tier scientific journal that produced results that are very much in line with what we have seen previously.
Once again, why are Vietnam, DRC, and East Timor good benchmarks? The study made no compelling argument (in fact, I’d argue that they made no argument and instead threw up conflicts with high numbers for propaganda effects relative to their own research). So, the “in line with what we have seen previously” has not been established or proven. What we do know is that their pre-war numbers are NOT “in line with what we have seen previously.”
“pdf.wri.org/wr98_hh2.pdf”
Next, it is not well documented, whether you want to point to the sloppy and/or misleading references I already pointed out or point out the fact that the data is not available to attempt to replicate the results and to see what measurement biases may or may not exist. I’ve already beat this horse.
Additionally, in the original thread, you called the methodology used by Roberts et al as the “gold” standard in survey methodology. This is wrong. The “platinum” standard would be to survey the entire population. The “gold” standard would be identifying strata and then conducting random sampling with the strata. The “silver” standard would be just a simple random sample. Finally, I’d classify the methodology used in the Lancet study as the “bronze” standard – cluster sampling will yield imprecise results, which is exactly what you see here.
Next, how random is this?
“The interview team were given the responsibility and authority to change to an alternate location if they perceived the level of insecurity or risk to be unacceptable.”
This is a violation of random sampling when you don’t sample the random site selected. Not quite the impeccable execution of random sampling that you claimed way back. Now, it is arguable as to what bias this introduces. Does it mean that the mortality rate was underestimated, because you reason that if it’s too insecure to sample, it must have had a lot of deaths? Does it mean that the mortality rate was overestimated, because the interview team were Sunni and didn’t want to move through a police checkpoint into the “randomly” selected neighborhood that happened to be Shia for fear of their own safety? Or was the team Shia and didn’t want to move through an Iraqi Army checkpoint into an all Sunni neighborhood? I could continue on with the permutations of the implications of this, but we can’t figure out the underlying truth because the information is not revealed to us in the level of detail necessary to analyze this properly. Why not?
On the other we have a collection of methodologically unsound, poorly documented studies published across a motley collection of websites and newspapers whose main conclusion is that what we are seeing in Iraq is a level of mortality that's radically lower than any other armed conflict we've ever seen, by a factor of 10-20. Once again, I’ve already covered your errors here – you are comparing apples and oranges and instead of addressing the weaknesses of the Roberts et al study, you are trying to distract the topic by diverting to other studies that are looking at different measures.
However, I’d state (again) that the IBC is better documented by orders or magnitude. You can search their database and see EXACTLY how they come up with their numbers. Nor do they attempt to hide the limitations of their methods. Their process is completely objective and transparent. Their methodology is very sound with regards to the results that they advertise. They don’t claim to have the full answer. Not so with Roberts et al. Their data lies in a black box that yields only results. No full disclosure, no full transparency.
As far as the apples and oranges comment, it is clear that IBC will not report any deaths as a result of health issues that Roberts et al may capture. Also, as I’ve motivated several times now, your benchmarking (e.g. the 10-20 times lower) is misled by the “benchmarks” that Roberts et al purports. Make an argument on why Vietnam, DRC, and/or East Timor are good benchmarks, and I’ll accept them as a valid comparison.
Given that, if we had an office pool going, I'm very clear about where I would put my money.Yes, we all know. Irrelevant, however. You’ve claimed that it’s a great study, and yet beyond cherry picking benchmarks and appealing to authority, you have to discuss details of the study in-depth.
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