That’s why I stated early on in my thread that I am merely speculating about the numbers (See above). Lighten up dude seriously it’s just a message board (talk about being guided by emotions). Yes I don’t know the exact number of civilian deaths, but I am “speculating” that it is high given the intense level of violence in Iraq, which is why numbers like 150,000 appear credible. What I do know is the violence has not lessened in four years, it has become more intense. So low numbers like 30,000 do not seem credible to me; maybe they are right, but it would be surprising.
Say the entire state of California (roughly same size and population of Iraq) breaks away and is engulfed in violence for four years. Nothing can stop it; four car bombs a day go off in LA, and it is sectioned off by ethnic group, ethnic cleansing takes place, etc. Do you honestly think only 30,000 civilians would be killed in such upheaval?
As for the Saddam numbers they are merely a point of reference: It has been widely stated by many human rights groups that Saddam directly killed 300,000 Iraqis: 180,000 Kurds, 60,000 Shiites, and 60,000 political opponents during his regime. Over his 8,000+ day regime that adds up to 34 killed per day. Taking the lowest number of Iraqis killed per swhitebull’s link to icasualties.org and their average is 54 Iraqis killed per day. Perhaps Saddam killed double that number than we have only marginally improved the lives of Iraqis since the invasion.
As I stated before I am speculating. However there is some more evidence in my favor.
In this new poll:
link
26% of Iraqis have directly experienced the murder of a family member. Not death but actual murder. The poll was conducted with over 5,000 adult Iraqis from every province and ethnic group using random sampling etc, etc. Now of course six million Iraqis have not been murdered, but a sizeable number have. It isn’t unreasonable to believe that several hundred thousand Iraqis have been killed in the four year war.
Close to one hundred thousand civilians were killed in the First Chechen War in three years, and Chechnya only had one million people living there to begin with, and none of the high-profile bombings that are a trademark in Iraq. So is there less death in Iraq with a higher concentration of people, more weapons, more enemies, and more space?
In 2004, British medical journal The Lancet released a study in the final days leading up to the US presidential election. Their attempted October Surprise was heavily promoted by international media and the international left (there’s a difference?), and claimed the US was responsible for more than 100,000 civilian deaths in Iraq. Then, in 2006, they published another study with even more wildly inflated claims.
Today Michelle Malkin has posted a new critique of the Lancet’s 2004 study, a statistical analysis by David Kane, Institute Fellow at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University?who identifies serious problems in the Lancet’s methodology: Document drop: A new critique of the 2004 Lancet Iraq death toll study.
Much of the math here is mind-numbingly complicated, but Kane’s bottom line is simple: the Lancet authors “cannot reject the null hypothesis that mortality in Iraq is unchanged.” Translation: according to Kane, the confidence interval for the Lancet authors’ main finding is wrong. Had the authors calculated the confidence interval correctly, Kane asserts that they would have failed to identify a statistically significant increase in risk of death in Iraq, let alone the widely-reported 98,000 excess civilian deaths. An interesting side note: as Kane observes in his paper, the Lancet authors “refuse to provide anyone with the underlying data (or even a precise description of the actual methodology).” The researchers did release some high-level summary data in highly aggregated form (see here), but they released neither the detailed interviewee-level data nor the programming code that would be necessary to replicate their results.
Much of the math here is mind-numbingly complicated, but Kane’s bottom line is simple: the Lancet authors “cannot reject the null hypothesis that mortality in Iraq is unchanged.” Translation: according to Kane, the confidence interval for the Lancet authors’ main finding is wrong. Had the authors calculated the confidence interval correctly, Kane asserts that they would have failed to identify a statistically significant increase in risk of death in Iraq, let alone the widely-reported 98,000 excess civilian deaths.
An interesting side note: as Kane observes in his paper, the Lancet authors “refuse to provide anyone with the underlying data (or even a precise description of the actual methodology).” The researchers did release some high-level summary data in highly aggregated form (see here), but they released neither the detailed interviewee-level data nor the programming code that would be necessary to replicate their results.
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