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The Fallujah Brigade was essentially the first major attempt to rely on local Iraqis to tame the insurgency, and after less than 5 months it's vaporized so thoroughly that yesterday's official announcement of its dissolution was almost anticlimactic. Contrary to what the Bush administration endlessly claims (and SP slavishly repeats), there's no such thing as reliable "Iraqi forces" that can get the job done in the Sunni triangle - at least not before the scheduled January elections.
Sunni Iraq now appears on the brink of a major turn - whether for better or worse remains to be seen. The interim government's strategy of trying to coopt moderate insurgents has already bore some fruit on paper, most recently in the deal to allow US forces to reenter Samarra (another hotbed of Sunni resistance). As of yesterday, however, it remains doubtful that this deal will prove any more substantive and survivable than the accord that created the Fallujah brigade, as insurgents still roam freely in Samarra: link
It's clear that many insurgents won't accept anything less than a complete US withdrawal from the region, not just the cities. With some moderates laying down their arms (for now), the various extremist cells must coordinate more closely to be effective. This is both a threat and an opportunity for both sides. The interim gov't and US forces must now strive to isolate the implacable rebels from the moderates, whose passivity will be critical in the upcoming confrontation. The diehard insurgents on the other hand must present enough of a challenge to necessitate an all-out US assault on Sunni cities - such an assault, they think, will compel some of the moderates to rejoin armed resistance.
So it all boils down to a simple question: will the insurgents succeed in drawing an excessively heavyhanded US crackdown, or will the US fight smart enough to keep the insurgents isolated?. |