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Subject: Did Hitler Err In Not Concentrating On the Mediterranean Right After France?
CJH    4/2/2005 10:17:55 PM
I think it was Albert Spear but someone who had been high up in the 3rd Reich and wrote a book in the seventies wrote that Hitler made a big mistake. He wrote the mistake was in not immediately pursuing control of the Mediterranean Sea after the Battle of France was won.

It makes sense in that control of seas is the key to victory on land and control of the Med seems to have given strong advantage in the past.

And more so considering that the Suez Canal was Britain's link to India. India and the Indian Ocean were the fulcrum of WWII many ways. Most of the Lend Lease to Russia for instance went through Iran.

Should Hitler have made the capture of North Africa and the expulsion of the allies from there of the highest priority? Should Hitler have taken the Suez Canal, Palestine and Syria and perhaps have tried to bring Turkey (access to the Black Sea) over to the Axis? Should he have proposed a joint Axis-Spanish siege and/or assault on Gibraltar? Perhaps German control of the Med and North Africa could have brought General Franco over.

Were Hitler to have the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, access to the Black Sea and the Caucasus and Arabian oil before attacking Russia or before Russia attacked him, how would he have faired?

It's an interesting speculation.
 
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Strech Red    RE:Did Hitler Err In Not Concentrating On the Mediterranean Right After France?   5/18/2005 11:52:15 PM
CJH, All good questions. I'll get back to you with a better answer, but I think the most important aspect of this question is not which power will control the land routes of the Mediterranean (such as Gibraltar, Tunis, Sicily, Crete, etc.) but rather who controls the sea lanes. The Royal Navy vastly out numbered and had greater experience than the Kreigsmarine under the command of Doenitz. As such, the Germans would have expended copious amounts of men and materiel to seize ports and other airfields to patrol the sea lanes with the Luftwaffe, but the Kreigsmarine could never have held the Mediterranean under the threat which would have been posed by the Royal Navy. In fact, it appears (with the exception of U-boat tactics) the German high command was never overly willing to directly confront the Royal Navy at sea ? dissimilar to the Japanese fleet. Hitler may have made many mistakes, but gambling on control of the Mediterranean with the threat of the RN (and without full control of Mussolini and the Italian boot) would have been an error. Not an error as great as Barbarossa, but an error none-the-less. Strech
 
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CJH    RE:Did Hitler Err In Not Concentrating On the Mediterranean Right After France?   5/29/2005 6:17:09 PM
This refers back to an earlier error of Hitler's. He seems to have neglected the importance of sea power. Of course, I have suspected that Hitler had naively believed Great Britain would wind up on his side thus relieving him of the necessity of building a duplicate navy.
 
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S-2    RE:Did Hitler Err In Not Concentrating On the Mediterranean Right After France?   7/21/2005 4:09:08 AM
Many more possible benefits to an fully concerted axis effort to control the Mediterreanean than pitfalls. A complete conquest, to include to ultimate capture of the Arabian peninsula captures oil, dramatically extends lend-lease distances over a predictable route (Horn of Africa), and allows for air interdiction of Persian ports from Arabia, if not the outright capture of Iran. However, a few problems. Yugoslavia and, more importantly, Greece were still free and anchoring the northeast coastline of the Med, and would need to be defeated before Alexandria could be attacked. Franco is a non-issue. England's defeat in the eastern Med would ensure his compliance/acquiescence with Gibraltar. The Greek/Yugo battles would be critical as those nations protected the flanks of Royal Navy and merchant ships operating through the eastern Med and Suez. As the Italians later showed in the winter of 1940-41, their assistance in the Balkans would not be helpful, and might only hinder the German effort. Still, as an alternative to attacking England directly, or engaging in Babarrossa the following summer, the Mediterranean offered the Axis forces a strategic prize that might have been affordable.
 
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