Assuming England Conquered by Nov. 1940, What About Iceland?

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Seeker Norway 1940. 11/5/2005 6:58:52 PM

Got this from a website.. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- German Norway plans ; link German attack : link British response : link ?After the initial phase of Weserubung the Germans responded to the menace they faced at sea by transporting to the south Norwegian ports all troops in small, fast warships and transports routed from Frederikshaven located on the Jutland Peninsula. Between the middle of April and June, 1940, 42,000 troops were ferried to Norway without loss. From the beginning of the campaign to June 15, 1940, a total of 370 ships and trawlers carried 107,581 officers and men, 16,102 horses, 20,339 vehicles, and 109,400 tons of supplies to Norway at a cost of twenty-one ships. ? ?Since the failure of the Ausfuhrstaffel particularly affected German garrisons in the north, it proved necessary to utilize aircraft and submarines for purposes of transporting supplies. Submarines carried out a total of eight transport missions; while the tonnage carried was insignificant to the need, what supplies were delivered alleviated the Wehrmacht's critical situation in the northern latitudes. The Luftwaffe performed yeoman service: 582 transport aircraft delivered 29,280 men and 2,376 tons of supplies during the course of the campaign. ? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- So over the course of the month or two, each transport delivered ~ 50 troops & 4080kg supplies. Not sure of the delivery capacity of JU-52. I seem to remember it hauled upto 17 troops in high density configuration? Anyone know how many tons supplies it could haul and what distance?

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S-2 RE:Norway 1940/Ju-52 Cargo Capacity 11/6/2005 2:14:25 AM

"The JU 52 was be used as a troop transport (17 fully equipped troops), a supply carrier, a staff transport, a casualty evacuator, and as an Ad-Hoc bomber. When used in the supply role, a JU 52 3m could carry a large amount of supplies. One plane could load 1500kg, inside the plane, and up to 4 drop containers which could load a plethora of items. These containers could load 100 litres of fuel or 250kg of ammunitions. These ammunitions could be 500 rounds for a 2cm gun, 150 3.7mm PAK rounds, 20 7.5mm rounds, or 55 8mm mortars to name a few of the possibilities." Interestingly, the German Army had calculated 250 Ju-52s at a daily sortie rate of four to supply 350 tons to Stalingrad. Richtofen could only provide 150 as a result of losses sustained in Crete over 18 months before. Perhaps poor mobilization of available aircraft or inadequate command emphasis account for these abysmal numbers. Then again, maybe German production limitations precluded the rapid replacement of Crete related losses, particularly as Hitler didn't foresee the use of large airborne contingents. Still the sortie numbers would indicate a 1000 Ju-52 daily providing 350 tons is only 700 lbs. cargo per aircraft! What's up with that? A function of fuel requirements and flying distances, I presume? Clearly a factor when conducting air re-supply to Iceland. Interesting performance data for the KM's Norway operations provided by the Seeker. More thoughts later...

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Carl S RE: 1940 Ju-52 Replacement 11/6/2005 8:18:00 AM

A further complication to arcraft availability in 1939-1941 was Hitlers policy of shutting down aircraft production as each campaign started. Production stats. show a steep increase in the months leading to a camapign, then a abrupt vertical drop as production nearly halts. There were two ideas driving this. First was the cost of full blown production, Between direct cash costs which brought complaints from the businessmen financing the Nazi state, and the diversion of resources from consumer goods, maintaining full capcity production for sustained periods was distasteful to Hitler. Second Hitler thought each campaign would be very short. There would be no need to replace losses imeadiatly. He was suspirsed by the Brits & French declaring was over Poland, and was suprised again with Britian not seeking peace, and suprised a third time by the USSR not evaporating. Replacement production of aircraft was sufficent for ordinary peacetime attrition during May, June & early July 1940, as few as 20 new Ju57 may have been deliverd to the Luftwaffe by 1 September 1940. A similar condition existed for aircrew replacement. Many of the training (Lehr) schools were attached to combat groups at the start of each campaign. Consequently aircrw replacements ceased for a couple months each time until the schools were fully established again.

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Carl S RE:Norway 1940/Ju-52 Cargo Capacity 11/6/2005 8:33:29 AM

You are correct about the reduction of net payload due to aircraft logisistics requirements. Aside from fuel the initial lifts will include ground crew and the equipment needed to turn the planes around and relaunch. At Stalingrad I would guess an airfield already existed with some ground support. In Iceland this would be established entirely from scratch. There is also a tradeoff of payload vs range but I have no idea what this might be for the Ju57. Last there is gross payload reduction from long term aircraft losses. Initially you can assume a starting loss of 2-5% per day for aircraft either complete losses or requiring several weeks to repair. Heavy use can boost that up to 10%, depending on the aircraft type. I dont know what the mechanical attrition rate for the Ju57 was. Add that to a percent for combat losses, and a further loss for autum weather, and by the end of the week the transport availablity rate could be somewhere between 80% & 60%.

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Seeker RE:Norway 1940/Ju-52 Cargo Capacity 11/6/2005 12:34:56 PM

link ?By the time Germany was ready to crush Poland, the Luftwaffe's Transportverband possessed an inventory of 552 aircraft, of which 547 were Ju 52/3mg3e and Ju 52/3mg4e aircraft (the balance being two obsolete He 111 transports, a Junkers G 38, a Ju 90 and a Focke-Wulf Fw 200). Losses in the month-long campaign in September amounted to 59 Junkers Ju 52/3ms, all but two to ground fire or flying accidents. In the course of 2,460 flights, the aircraft carried 19,700 troops and 1451 tonnes (1,600 tons) of supplies.? Norway: ?A total of 29,000 men, 1180000 litres (259,300 Imp gal) of aviation fuel and 2155 tonnes (2,376 tons) of supplies were airlifted during the campaign, for the significant loss of 150 aircraft.? ?It may be said of the Ju 52/3m that its star shone brightest in adversity from 1942. In February of that year, when six German divisions were trapped at Demyansk, the Luftwaffe performed the prodigious task of sustaining 100,000 troops, and in three months delivered 22045 tonnes (24,300 tons) of materiel, airlifted 15,446 men into the pocket and evacuated 20,093 casualties. The cost of this effort was a loss of 385 flying personnel (including Major Walter Hammer, commanding KGrzbV 172) and 262 aircraft.?

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Seeker More Ju-52 range/payload 11/6/2005 1:20:36 PM

link Reports bomber version carried 500kg over maximum range of 800miles & maximum speed of 190 mph . This should translates into a radius of action of ~ 300miles @ 160mph cruise [with 25% reserves] at an altitude of ~ 3000 feet. link This site gives 515miles range at 156mph or cruise @ 115mph carrying 16 troops [~ 1500kg]. Given above figures that should mean ~200 miles range @ 115mph ,with a maximum payload of 16 troops or ~ 1500kg . So that?s ?. Long cruise at 160mph carrying 500kg, with radius of 300miles. Heavy cruise at 115mph carrying 1500kg, with radius of 200miles link

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Carl S RE:More Ju-52 range/payload 11/6/2005 4:33:56 PM

A quick check on the map shows the near edges of Iceland and Scotland ovr 500 miles apart. From Reykjavik to Scot cities like Inverness or Glassgow, where there would be airfields of decent capacity is over 700 miles. Looks like the Ju87 does not have the legs for a round trip. A one way might possible if fuel can be supplied on the other end. If there is a unfavorable headwind you will ditching in the sea or on a Icelandic glacier. With the best of conditions your payload would not be much. Using the Faeroes as a intermediate stop requires a airfield usable in winter weather be available or built and a refuel stop there be established. Even then it is a long one way flight. I suspect you will find the Luftwaffe bombers of 1940 barely able to make the trip either. And, forget about fighter cover. If the Nazis are to occupy Iceland it would have to be against a opposition of poor morale, rotten leadership, and zilch for a naval force.

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Seeker RE:More Ju-52 range/payload 11/6/2005 8:50:17 PM

-------------------------------------------------- "Using the Faeroes as a intermediate stop requires a airfield usable in winter weather be available or built and a refuel stop there be established. Even then it is a long one way flight. I suspect you will find the Luftwaffe bombers of 1940 barely able to make the trip either. And, forget about fighter cover. If the Nazis are to occupy Iceland it would have to be against a opposition of poor morale, rotten leadership, and zilch for a naval force." -------------------------------------------------- Yep, I'd have to agree. Many people don't seem to recognise that for bombers you need much more than just having the range to get their....its payload/range. If you can just get their at maximum range, you are not going to be able to deliver much ordnance to the target. In BoB the Germans did possess bombers able to reach Scotland , but not with any serious payload. A 1938 Luftwaffe study annoyed Goering cause it concluded they could only seriously threaten Airfields , industries and ports in southern England. Another one of there biggest blunders has to be abandoning Knauss strategic bomber force. OK it started out as only 500 Ju-52 bombers , but by 1937 they would have adopted the multi engined Ju89 and supplimented that with the multi engined He-177 in 1940. With out Udets clumsy Dive bombing requirement, these would have been alot lighter and with the same engines they would have been high altitude bombers able to fly above RAF fighter cover of the day and descend on their targets with minimal interference. I read once that the RAF commissioned a study in 1936 and 1/2 the simulated bombers got through inflicting an estimated 1.6 million casutlies in 6 weeks of bombing. I'm not sure if the study assumed poision gas would be used [since that was the literature of the day] but thats what clinched the case for RADAR.

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S-2 RE:More Ju-52 range/payload 11/7/2005 6:19:23 AM

The whole point of an icelandic occupation by the Germans would be the operation of an airfield and perhaps submarine forward operating bases. Any ground troops would be for the purposes of local security of base operations. Beyond that, defense of the island against a concerted effort would be problematic. Moreover, support for base operations, munitions, fuel, parts, etc, much less demands by submarine forces, nevermind sustaining the overall force sounds improbable without regular calls by German sea transport. That puts the burden of convoy and individual vessel security back onto the Germans. As such, rather than acting as an offensive force designed to close the G.I.U.K line, Iceland may find itself attacked, suppressed, and eventually neutered at great cost to the axis. All a function of the overhead involved. Still, denying Iceland to the allies as a trans-Atlantic staging point for the reconquest of Europe has an attraction. However attractive, though, it appears to be beyond the grasp of the Germans, by air, sea, or both. Gentlemen, I am becoming convinced of the futility of my musings. Demyansk aside, sustaining this force would have required all the effort the Luftwaffe could muster at the expense of anything else, to later include Demyansk, btw. Only a dramatic shift in production prioities, coupled with a Euro-wide rationalization of shipbuilding facilities could have made even this limited goal feasible. Also, as Carl S. points out, that navy would not come overnight. The problem isn't ability, but sustained capability. While there may have been some elasticity in their shipping to accomodate a surge in operations directed at Iceland, it would be nearly impossible for the KM to sustain that effort, even in the absence of American/Royal Navy forces interdicting these waters. That, however, could be counted upon.

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Carl S RE:More Occupying Iceland. 11/7/2005 6:25:24 AM

No S2! Dont give up!! You can do it through will power, sheer determination, guts. Besides quiting now ends a thread with a civilzed tone & no flaming posts ; )

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