Panzer Halt, English Channel

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S-2 RE:Just a few thoughts..../S-2 Reply 10/27/2005 11:22:55 PM

"The Nationalist Chinese had already become a nonentity" They did have some marginal usefulnes in Burma, but damn, I'm still chewing on those other non-threads you've mustered for our pleasure. Go introduce those threads as separate topics. India would immediately apply for admission as our 49th state, knocking Hawaii into the sixties. Speaking of which, aren't we due for another state? I'll take Iraq before P.R. Might change the whole dynamic.

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Seeker RE:Just a few thoughts.... 10/28/2005 3:17:38 AM

"BTW, at the time of the Fall of France, the USN had over 150 submarines in service versus the 59 (?) of the KM. Not to mention it had 6 fleet carriers in service, 16 battleships, 18 heavy cruisers, 21 light cruisers and 77 destroyers (excluding the 4 stack flush deckers)in service....and a lot more stuff on the ways....don't know if the KM would put a dent in that." This is true, but USN was about the same size of the RN and probably suffered from the same type of rotation schedule. Prewar treaty entitled the Germans to a fleet 35% of the RN in size, suggesting that had the KM given the resources it needed to grow from 1935-1940 period, they could have duplicated some of the WW-I "High Seas Fleet". In fact historicaly the KM warship building slipped further and further behind schedule in the late 1930s, due to shortage of steel allocation. A report to Admiral Raeder showed accumulated delays of over 1 year on most warships and 2 years on carriers. Going on my previous numbers, the KM could end up with double the tonnage it historically got. So in the period 1935-1940 they could have accumulated the following warships [laid down built and commissioned]... 2 x Bismarck BB 2 x Scharnhorst BB 5 x Scheer BC 1 x Graf Zeppelin carrier [ another finished in 1941] 8 x improved Koln Cruisers 85 x DD/DE 64 x Subs & 217 smaller craft [S-Boot?] This would be added to the existing fleet of 3 x Scheer BC 6 x Koln CL 12 x Torpedo Boats [DE]. During WW-I , the german shipyards pumped out 350 UBoats & ~300 escort warships of which 1/3 were minesweepers and 1/4 were small torpedo boats, while the rest were destroyer size torpedo boats. They also built and commissioned 15 cruisers & 6 Battelships/Battlecruisers and were working on an aircraft carrier at the end of the war. So each year they produced roughly.... 1 x BB ; 3 x cruisers ; 20 x destroyers & 40 x DE/TB & 70-80 Uboats. That was with an old style ship building industry. Had the economy been overhauled along the lines of American industry [similar to British and Soviet overhauls] , the capital ship production would have expanded to about ~8 ships Carrier or Battlecruiser size ships,every 3 years .The CL/DD/DE/SS production could also have doubled their tonnage or their numbers. That only covers the issue of numbers, but wars are not always won by numbers. Often doctrine tactics and technology play a larger role than numbers. There is little doubt that Allies had plenty of time to perfect these , while the Germans did not, but I would remind people that the same can also be said of the Panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe. Both were 'born' in the early 1930s and appeared to make up enough ground to become 'world class' by the end of that decade. I'm also reminded of the German invasion of Norway in spring 1940. In theory the RN went up against the KM in this clash with much more experience technology and numbers of ships than the Germans. But the inexperienced Germans sailed their fleet upto 2000km ;invaded and over ran Norway in a couple of months despite the best efforts of the UK/France to counter them. None of which proves anything other than to show there was real potential on the German side. If occupied UK means no ABomb by 1945 then that opens doors to other possiblities. It also occured to me that the Enigma code might never have been cracked since alot of that was done in the UK in the early 1940s. Enigma was the single most important variable in the down turn of the UBoat success from 1943 on.

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S-2 RE:Just a few thoughts..../Seeker Reply 10/28/2005 3:25:06 AM

"...But the inexperienced Germans sailed their fleet upto 2000km ;invaded and over ran Norway in a couple of months despite the best efforts of the UK/France to counter them." And were willing to lose ships to achieve their objective. I imagine that there was a little residual High Seas Fleet operational experience in the KM of 1940.

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AlbanyRifles RE:Just a few thoughts..../Seeker 10/28/2005 1:31:01 PM

My numbers did not include anything launched or commissioned after June 1940....a lot of shipd in the USN came on line over the next year...to include 2 more BBs and the newer class of submarine, as well as 3 more carriers. And the point there is the Germans had 0 carriers in 1940 and they had 0 carriers in 1944. They woul dnot have been abloe to compete in the Atlantic agsint a US Navy which had no obligations in the Pacific. And thsoe ships of the4 RN which did not get sunk would have sailed for Canada, Bermuda, Etc. And there still would have been the RCN, RAN and RNZN to contend with. On the naval front, the KM never could have matched the US

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Seeker RE:Just a few thoughts..../Seeker 10/28/2005 3:39:53 PM

"On the naval front, the KM never could have matched the US " Certainly not on numbers, but the point I was getting to is that numbers are not enough, other factors could creep in. USA would have its fleet divided between two and possibly three oceans, while the Germans would be concentrating on one. USA would be on the defensive protecting its traditional sea lanes like the brits meaning the actual number of ships at sea would be maybe 1/4 of the overall fleet. If the Germans retain the capital fleet for surging, it might be able to match the USN - if the KM had been given the same priority as it got in WW-I. Two carriers could be ready by 1941 and with the limits on really heavy gun industry, germany could not commision much more than 2 battleships a year[even thats ify] . So the logical next choice would be more carriers instead [several per year]. Germany had more than a dozen big shipyards for construction, repair ,refit and overhaul. If 8 are set a side for construction [4 capital ships shells completed each year, to be commissioned the following year]....that still leaves 4+ yards to repair/refit/overhaul capital ships. Normally refit/overhaul of capital ships is a 6 month task [with serious damage taking a year] . So from a maintenance POV, a force of up 15-30 servicable capital ships could be sustained . If this was held in reserve as a 'surge fleet' it could match the Allied rotational fleet. There are also exotic technologies that could be exploited to mulitply the effectiveness of such a german fleet. In the late 1930s German research featured Radars/Sonars [active and passive] for detection and Helicopters for ASW and scouting. Jets and guidance systems for missiles were in development and the technology matured into prototype weapons. In fact by 1940 these missiles had worked so well that families of missiles were offered to the Wehrmacht along with the scouting Helicopters and Jets. In most cases they were turned down as not needed . Hitler and Goreing passed a law in 1940, that since the war would be over by 1942, any new development that was not going to result in weapons by 1941, was to be halted! Milch in 'Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe' lamments that this killed a very promising surface to air missile called the schmetterling. Ofcourse when the tables were turned by the end of 1942 - begining of 1943,the very same Hitler and Goreing siezed upon these technologies to become the next 'wunder weapons' that would some how win germany the war. And true to form most were about to go into production at the end of the war. So if you remove that 2-3 year delay and replace the V-1/V-2 industry with these promising systems, all could be in production as war weapons by 1942/43. Another of the alltime dumbass Hitler mistakes. Admiral Raeder for his part channeled what funding he could into antishipping versions of the missiles and helicopters,which matured into weapon put into production by 1942. The HS-292 and Fritz X ASM are probably well known, but what maynot be known is that the helicopter completed sea trials and 1000 were ordered. Apparently trails were even set up between fighters and the helicopters that demonstrated it was almost impossible to get the helicopter in sight long enough to shoot them down. The tests conducted in rough seas developed a winch system to launch and land these Helicopters, and also showed that ,since Uboats of the day had to go to periscope depth to attack, they were easy to detect from the helicopters patroling above. The helicopter program was halted however just as it was about to go into production , when the factory was bombed and not rebuilt due to shifting priorities [Airdefense of the Reich being of paramount importance]. The plan was to put these on warships as small as 1800 tons and eventualy produce a weapons carring version that could carry upto 100lbs [two depth charges?]. In naval warfare, finding the enemy ships is most of the battle and these helicopters could have extended escort scouting radius to ~100km, enough distance to intercept merchants and avoid enemy fleets. Again all just potential.

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Carl S RE:Just a few thoughts..../Seeker 10/28/2005 7:02:43 PM

I had not considered altering events before Sept/Oct 1940. If one postulates a different naval program for the Germans from 1933 or 35, then the KM maight be in a better position in 1942-45. But with the historical situation as of the autum of 1940 the KM starts from a decidely inferior position. The surface ship program had several problems, the steel allocation being one. There were some design failures as well. The seakeeping ablity and endurance of the crusiers left a great deal to be desired. The German radar program was also far behind the Brit & US. The comm security of the KM was compromised long before Britian would fall. The Poles had done the essential work in breaking the Enigma system before 1939, and the Brits were well on the way to taking this to the next level. The key information needed to break the German codes had been duplicated in Canada before September 1940, so there was little chance the US would miss out on that advantage in a long term naval war with Germany. The one major advantage the KM had was its submarine fleet. In training, tactics, and torpedos the Uboats of 1940 were far superior to the US submarine fleet. Combine this with the grossly ineffective anti submarine doctrine of the US Navy and the Uboats would have a long 'happy time' in a naval war of 1940-42. How much the KM might improve from a 1940 starting point depends in part on what priority Hitler placed on it. The short term distraction would be the Barbarosa campaign. There would also be the mopping up of Brit remnants in Africa and the middle east. Both still requiring resources the KM needed to achieve the Z plan or something like it. If the US avoided imeadiate war with Germany and focused on Japan then Hilter might very well neglect his navy. Once a shooting war started the KM would be faced with the same problem it had in 1943-45. As an inferior force it had to defend a large ocean front and coast from a better supplied and equipped enemy. This was the same stratigic position Japans navy had from mid 1943. As with Japan the effective defense of Europes coast would have gone by default to the air forces. With the USSR conquored and saved from attrition in Africa the Luftwaffe could have been a dangerous opponent along the European coast.

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Seeker Could the USN mount a large enough 10/29/2005 3:08:15 AM

Amphibous assault all the way from CONUS to Europe , if all of Europe is in German hands [including Russia]? Such a long line of supply would be exceedingly vulnerable to UBoat/Maritime bomber interdiction.

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Carl S RE:Could the USN mount a large enough 10/29/2005 10:42:03 AM

No, such a direct assualt could not be done. The Germans would have to be cleared fro Greenland, Iceland, the Canarys, Azores and everywhere else in the North & Mid Atlantic. Once the midocean battle was won then a substantial forward base would have to be established in Iceland. The Luftwaffe was so far behind in designing longrange aircraft I dont see getting to iceland as a serious problem. But, Iceland is not the best base. The ports are small and the weather is bad. A more important route would be across the mid Atlantic to Africa. The German would have to run out of sub Saharna Africa, probably not a majr problem either. Then the coastal littoral would have to be seized at least as far as Morroco. This would be the real fight, where the US Army would learn the Germans were not the same as the Japanese. The shorter legs of the Luftwaffe would not be a problem, the Itlaina would balance the German naval transport inferiority, and the US would still have to learn about mechanized mobile warfare. A third front advancing up the east African littoral would be aimed at taking the middle eastern oil from the Germans. If India remains in the US camp then this task is so much easier. As the African & Middleastern fronts draw off German resources then advances can be made into Norway, Ireland, Perhaps Portugal or Spain, and eventually Britian. Of course nuclear weapons may enter the picture along the way, Germanys internal politcal and economic weaknesess may come to the fore, the US population may be sick of the whole thing. By the time one speulates out to 1947 or 1948 there are so many variables.

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Thomas RE:Just a few thoughts.... 10/31/2005 10:31:23 AM

As others have said a great thread! I would like to throw in a few points, partly covered by others: 1. The agreement signed 9th april 1941 in Whasington by ambassador Kaufmann and US - the use of Greenland - was actually a signature after the fact. In March 1941 the US had started building bases on Greenland. 2. US marines (and Keflavik is a Naval air staition) took over occupation of Iceland fraom Great Britain similarly before that signature. 3. Iceland was defended in the by P-40'ies, the most modern fighter in the USAirforce at that time (the other places was the Panama Canal and Phillipines). This sort of makes the airborne threat suspect - the paras would not have survived that. 4. I agree that the real premium in an occupation of britain would be the Royal Navy. Hitlers reluctance to wage war with Britain make sense in this view( though I don't know if he ever entertained this notion) as the Navy was an elusive animal - the US wanted it deployed to Canada just after the fall of France - the British idea was: If it has to be destroyed, then it might as well be in the defence of the realm. Hitler might have seen, that there was no gain in Britain if the colonies did not follow. Hitler thought of money, not of jews. 4. Design on the B-36 was started when the survival of Britain was still i the balance - as it had the range to hit from CONUS, it was put on the back burner later as the b-29 was a handier solution, and closer at hand. 5. The interesting thing for me is that the US realised they needed allies. The 200 and 300 division plan is a pertinent illustration of that need. 6. I concur with the notion, that the Panzers were stopped at Dunkerque for the fear of loosing them, there was still a large part of France unoccupied - thus an uncertainty as what might be in that bag.

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S-2 RE:Just a few thoughts..../S-2 Reply 10/31/2005 12:40:40 PM

Some comments Yeah, 6th Marines, I believe arrived in Reykjavik in March 1941, which is why I contend that Germany had to win the war in late summer-fall of 1940, any later and weather, British ground force reconstitution, and American occupation would have eliminated the direct the threat to the english, and any subsequent plans of German grand strategy in the Atlantic. Too me, had the Germans successfully occupied England, and subsequently Ireland and Iceland prior to Dec. 1, 1940, the north Atlantic battles would have been of an epic scale. So much of this speculation depends upon a more rational German war-making perspective. To be fair to Hitler and others, I believe, as with most others, they were overwhelmed by their success. Nor could they see the razor-edge chance for global contention that the possibilities offered. No guarantees, but I cannot see the Soviet Union successfully wage war against the full, unrestrained might of Germany, nor the early landing of U.S./Allied forces on European shores, or N. African, for that matter. Exploiting Iceland fully, defending her successfully, and supplying those forces effectively would define, I submit, German overall success...

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Carl S RE:Just a few thoughts..../S-2 Reply 10/31/2005 9:57:59 PM

A definition of German overall sucess must include a much better stratigic plan on 10 May 1940. It is clear the German notion of a sucessfull campaign was the occupation of Belgium and a slice of Northern France. The expectation was that with their armys mangled, and Luftwaffe bases advanced very near London and Paris the Allies would sue for peace and a armistice would be negotiate, at very favorable terms to the Nazis. The continued resistance of the French through June, the truclulent attitude of the Vichy government, and Britians defiance were something of a suprise. Hitler & his staff had no coherent plan for such a event. The final defeat of the French army, the occupation of France, the air attack on Britian, and Sea Lion were all hastily organized affairs with not much more than skimpy and incomplete staff studies yanked from the file cabinet as a basis. Hitlers strategy was based on the false assumption that Britian and France would throw in the towel after a few weeks of fighting. With proper preperation Germany could have conquored Britian. But the prepration was never made and the opportunity lost.

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Thomas RE:Just a few thoughts..../S-2 Reply 11/2/2005 7:16:14 AM

You might as well take into consideration the compromised warplan for the attack on France (compromised by Canaris???). That meant a new plan had to made from scratch (a better one actually) by the very same staff that should have been making an invasion plan against GB.

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S-2 RE:Just a few thoughts..../To All 11/2/2005 4:09:24 PM

I hate stereotypical, trite phrases, but it seems clear in the case of the senior German foreign policy and military strategists and planners, and their political leaders that they really did embody the notion of a "continental" power. Or, as were the other great powers of 1939, dismissive of the latent power that the United States represented, coupled with a geographic positioning that gave our nation great advantages. In short, it was beyond the conception of virtually all Europeans to understand the American storm just over their western horizons. Nor could the communists or the Japanese. Frankly, few Americans truly understood either. Carl is spot-on about the woefully inadequate plans, and the poor staff work that went into Sea Lion. What could better underscore the institutional ineptitude within Germany than the haphazard manner of those undertakings? When coupled with the lethargic tone emanating from Hitler down through OKW in the mid-summer of 1940, it seems that Germany imagined that the usual diplomatic rules of the past were still in play. Thomas raises a great point about the ensuing delay caused by the compromised attack plans for Germany. I can envision that had Germany been able to execute an assault on Holland/Belgium/France in late January-February 1940, the poor weather may have worked to even greater German advantage. I can also imagine poor weather working to great German disadvantage. Still, a Germany of early June, 1940, poised, reconstituted, and (perhaps)disappointed diplomatically with British intransigence would have little recourse but to engage in the serious business of invading England. I'd be curious, with a scenario assuming the Soviet and British defeated by Germany, and a fully distracted U.S. fighting in the Pacific, what Speer could have done to integrate European shipyards for the Kriegsmarine, and whether it could have any decisive effect. Still gotta find good German airborne/airlanding force data for June, 1940.

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Carl S RE:Just a few thoughts...US War potiential 11/2/2005 7:06:14 PM

The industrial potiental was understood by most knowledgable folks. Indeed some over estimated it. When the US entered WWI many British and French leaders were disapointed the US could not produce more weapons and deliver them faster. Churchill, who occasionally did do his homework, had a fair grasp of the US industrial power. An, I expect so did Stalin, and the French leaders of 1939. The Japanese were a split case. Industrialists and military officers (mostly naval officers) who had spent even a little time in the US had some grasp of the threat, tho apprently many did not. What the world leaders failed to grasp was the ability of the US to field an effcient battl winning military. The Japanese were thuroughly convinced the Americans were the morally weakest & least soldier like of the 'white devils'. Their war strategy was based on the assumption the US would give in after a couple sharp defeats, which would be easy as the American soldiers would not fight. The Germans fell prey to their own propaganda and choose the evidence from past US wars that suited them. The same was true for the British generals and marshals who disparaged the Yanks for their slovenly ill diciplined ways. Even in 1943 with clear evidence staring them in the face most thought the US incapable of fielding an effective army. There were exception of course, but the general assumption was that the US armys would be incapable of independant operations and would only supplement 'other' ground combat forces.

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Carl S RE:Just a few thoughts....Winter 1940 Campaign. Kreigsmarine 11/2/2005 7:36:16 PM

"I can envision that had Germany been able to execute an assault on Holland/Belgium/France in late January-February 1940, the poor weather may have worked to even greater German advantage." I'd thought that projected campaign would have been a stratigic disaster for Germany. The weather would have largely nuetralized the Luftwaffe, which was critical to the combined arms tactics that won the May 1940 battles. Another factor was the current operational plan. The Sickle Cut plan had not yet emerged, and the tank corps were not concentrated as they were in May. Instead the panzers were to be used in several groups under the control of local army comanders. Further the German plan sent the best of the attack force directly into the teeth of the best Allied armys in Central Belgium. While it is quite possible the Germans could have gained a tactical victory and secured a large part of Holland and Belgium the attrition would have been worse than in 1914 and in the Allies favor. Reconstituting German combat power faster than the Allies would have required Hitler and his Nazi cronys to have altered the industrial policys, before the war even started. Speer did not take over military production and industrial policy until after Todt was killed in a aircraft crash in 1942. Todt while not totaly incompetent was not the man for the task. Aside from a buercratic mentality Todt ascribed to Hitlers policy of butter before guns. He also was unable to deal with the competing an contadictory claims on materials by the various military and Nazi party organizations. Building capitol ships like aircraft carriers and battlecrusiers requires a long lead time. Even with the facilities of most of Europe it is hard to see a large effective battle fleet taking to sea in 1944, or even in 1946. The Uboats would have been a different matter. Once the priority was selected German shipyards with some Dutch and Polish facilities were able to crank out large numbers of these. Of course with Britian defeated then Adm. Raeders policys are not discredited and Donetz does not get a shot at implimenting his Uboat plan. There is no reason for it until the German German surface fleet is run off the Atlantic as the Brits did in 1940-41.

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