Well, I don't know... Eisenhower maybe? I'm not sure about his tactics and even local strategies, but he seemed to do the regional and overall strategy well, and most of all he was decent at coordinating other generals with each other.

To be fair Ike's role as Supreme Commander is often separated into overall coalition command (political role), where he dozens note he did an impossible job far better than anyone could imagine, and his role as commanding general in the military context. 

 A coalition commander cannot separate the political from the military. The best he can do is use the political currents to influence in such a wat to direct a sensible military strategy.

As a general Ike was awful.  Firstly he rarely bothered actually getting involved in military operations and failed to coordinate the actions of his various deputy commanders.  Moreover, he was loathe to fire poor leaders or supervise them.

 The purpose of a deputy commander (Montgomery)  is to take the strategic commander's (Eisenhower) political brief, develop and execute an operational plan. I don't excuse Eisenhower in that here was where he actually failed, but I want to make clear, that he was never tactically responsible for the operational stuff.   

The entire point of Torch was to seize Tunisia and yet not a single axis ship was sunk in November.  Having done nothing whatsoever to interfere with the axis build up Ike then designates about 10% of the total force to advance in Tunisia under Anderson.  It would be difficult to find a worse allied army commander.  Ike pretty much did nothing when much needed to be done in terms of command of the following 7 month campaign for Tunisia.

 

Operation Menace.... 

 

The failure to interfere in any way the axis withdrawal from Sicily is infamous.  The man in charge was Ike.  I won't even mention Italy.  One could fill volumes over Ike's failings as a general in NW Europe.  Not making sure Monty cleared the approaches to Antwerp was criminal negligence.  One or both of them should have been fired.  Same exact state of affairs over Market Garden.  Not properly supervising one's subordinates is leadership 101.  Ike never showed any strategic planning much less flair.  Letting all the armies under his command attack in a broad front was not a strategy.  Slowly pushing back the Bulge instead of pinching it out from the base was beyond amateurish.

 

 

 

  

 

That is a dominant land feature that channels approach avenues.  The only way to cut the Germans off would be land north of Syracuse. Montgomery refused. I agree that the Allies did not have the air-power to risk a landing that far north.

 

If you want to blame Salerno on a person, then blame Mark Clark. Same for Anzio. I agree, though, that Monty failed to come in to close the back door on the Hermans when 5th Army sucked them into Salerno. That is actually a good reason to double damn the Butcher of Alamein. He KNEW the situation, the opportunity present, when the Germans took the bait,, and still halted for a critical 40 hours, leaving the Americans to punch their way out of a mess worse than Omaha Beach.  Patton, overrated as he is, would have moved.    

 

Caen was Monty's responsibility and his fault.  Antwerp was also his fault. Market Garden (the narrow front strategy) was specifically  his fault. Funny, I don't see Eisenhower's name popping up here associated  with these disasters since he directed that those objectives (Caen and Antwerp) be achieved . Quote    Reply

The problem with pointing out failings in Monty is that he was not supervised.  There are dozens of instances where Ike should have fired Monty.  Clark should never have been given an army to command.

It would have taken Roosevelt to force this issue, as in the end it actually did.  Mark Clark was a lot better than Fredendall. He was actually better than Bradley. I guess that says something about US Army top leadership that most Americans don't like to admit. If you want to find the really good American  Generals then you need to look at the Pacific Army level commanders, (Geiger, Eichelberger  and even Krueger)  or the European Corps level commanders (Middleton, and Taylor for example) The only army level commanders actually worth mentioning in Europe are Patton., Hodges, and Simpson..

It is certainly correct to point out the difficulties in any operation to interfere with the evacuation from Sicily.  This does not excuse nothing whatsoever being done or even planned for.

Montgomery. It was his plan and his omission. . 

On August 10th at 10pm Alexander sent to Adm Cunningham and Air Marshall Tedder in regards to the evacuation "You have no doubt coordinated plans to meet this contingency".  There was no plan.  Taking few risks to destroy an evacuating enemy army you'll just have to fight again was negligent.  Alexander should have been fired by not focusing as an objective on destroying those forces.

He had no usable airfields with adequate airpower in range in North Africa, or in Sicily. Let me explain what I mean. When the Americans landed on an island in the Pacific, the first place for which they headed was the enemy airfield. That was to the exclusion of the high ground or the main enemy force concentration. Its only common sense, right? Not unless you fought Guadalcanal. Grenada, what was the first place on the American to do list? It was the airport. Second example was Panama. Among the first targets hit were the airfields.

 

 

Data.... 

 

Data.... 

 

 Looks like a good target for Montgomery right? Patton's troops took the airbase complex. That's right,  George Patton's 7th Army. How long did it take the USAAF to repair and establish its presence? 

 

That was not the American INTENT....

 

 IV. Allied and Axis Plans and Dispositions.