What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria?

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swhitebull RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria? 11/7/2005 7:00:37 AM

Old Grognard here. Avalon Hill's game Air Assault on Crete, was published over 25 years ago. Vance Von Borries was the designer. He also published a game called Drive on Damascus thru 3W games, about Operation Exporter, with lots of variable scenarios. Subsequently, he wrote an article for Avalon Hill's The General, which discussed in Detail the Stepping Stone plan, and included a a game of the fighting on Cyprus, and a linkage between Air Assault on Crete, and Drive On Damascus. If you are interested, I can try and dig up the article, and put it in PDF form for you. swhitebull

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S-2 RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria? 11/7/2005 6:52:08 PM

Under certain conditions this would be the only logical course of action. I would prefer England to be out of the war altogether. In the absence of that, a decisive immediate effort by the Germans in North Africa, with substantially more forces than initially provided to Rommel would possibly succeed in seizing Alexandria, Cairo, and the Suez canal. Either would render the next phase as appropriate. Or so I think. Then again, I wanted to seize Iceland. (:-)

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Carl S RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria? 11/7/2005 7:14:26 PM

Thanks, I already have those games & the artical. But there is likely someone else here that might want the artical. One thing the artical might have left out is that the Germans did send a composite unit of bombers and a few transports to Iraq. They few a few missions in support of the Iraqis against the Brits. After a few months the unit fell apart from lack of supply and the personnel were evacuated. ( It has been quite a while since I read this one so the locality may have been Syria.) The Turks apprently were ambivalent about allowing supplys to cross their country, and sea transport was very hit & miss. If Turkey had been friendlier to Students ambitions, or the Italian Navy more capable the the seizure of a port and the landing of some sort of mechanized corps (Mittle Ost Korps does not have the same cachet as Afrika Korps) might have been possible. Or am I crazy here? The Brits were badly streatched in the summer of 1941.

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S-2 RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria? 11/7/2005 11:55:41 PM

I'd again submit that the correct avenue would have been to aggressively reinforce Rommel through Sicily with the forces to leverage the Suez canal, while denying Egypt and Alexandria as a base of operations in the eastern Med. Although, and because it was not yet a problem, taking Malta would have been the preferable use of Student's men over Crete. By shutting down the western Med, closing Alexandria and the Suez, you isolate the eastern Med to your forces. These troops would be supplied by an Italian/Greek/French merchant fleet and protected by the Italian Navy, direct into Vichy Syria, avoiding the issues of Turkish neutrality. Remaining British forces in Palestine would be squeezed out between Rommel and Student.

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Carl S RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria? 11/9/2005 8:10:19 PM

Ya I agree "shutting down Alexandria & Suez" is a desireable objective for the Axis. Your post mentioned using the airbourne corps vs Malata rather than Crete. If so how do the Axis get at the Egyptian ports?

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S-2 RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria?/Suez & Alexandria 11/10/2005 2:03:52 AM

For the Germans in July 1940, having defeated France, neither the British Army, merchant shipping, nor distance would have restricted the Wehrmacht from providing Rommel with a full panzergruppe (about three corps/twelve divisions). Deutsche Afrika Korps didn't arrive in N. Africa until mid-late Feb. 1941, and faced modest forces initially from the British. Through the course of 1941 and into 1942/43, both sides obviously raised the stakes considerably. British harassment of Italian supply (and later, German)and reinforcements had been spotty, with no serious degradation to supply before July, 1942. Obviously, with the entry of the U.S. Army in Nov. 1942, serious interdiction of axis supply commenced. Rommel came close enough to Alexandria and the Nile delta at El Alamein in July-September, 1942 to seriously raise the question of what if...? Because of Barbarossa's demand for the maximum commitment of panzer forces, the chief "what if" would be, 1.) Could a panzergruppe be equipped, transported, supplied, and reinforced to North Africa, conduct successful offensive operations aimed at the Nile Delta before March, 1941, when Rommel eventually arrived with 5th Light and 15th Panzer? 2.) Are the British Isles assaulted concurrently by August 1, 1940? 3.) Would Hitler demand the return of DAG to participate in Barbarossa, or would success in N. Africa and the prospects of a drive on Palestine-Iraq/Saudi Arabia been sufficient to arrest such a notion? 4.) Wouldn't preventing the return of DAG to Europe be considered sound when given the objectives of arabian oil and turning the Soviet flank as a portion of Barbarossa, with Soviet oil in Grozny immediately at your feet, rather than Sept. 1, 1942 when Von Kleist's army finally was able to threaten the Caucasus Mountains? Particularly if DAG were to link with Student's forces entering Syria, this would be a most powerful element sitting between the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas. The possibilities to the German effort in the Soviet Union are totally staggering.

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Carl S RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria?/Suez & Alexandria 11/10/2005 9:37:16 PM

Those exact propositions have been dicussed many times. Folks who have researched the actual Axis transport capability (mostly Italian) thuroughly conclude that even without British interferance the Axis would have been hard pressed to support twice the motor vehicals that were used in Lybia. The tanker fleet the Axis had was apparently not large enough to supply the long truck column it takes to get Rommel to Egypt. Throw in the large losses from British submarines and aircraft in 1940 & 41 and there is no point in sending a larger Afrika Korps. It will just run out of gas faster. Rommel did not need more tanks he needed more supply trucks and fuel. Students idea for securing a port on the Eastern Levant may have run into the same problem. An Axis corps unable to defeat the Brits for lack of supply.

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S-2 RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria?/Suez & Alexandria 11/11/2005 12:55:30 AM

I disagree. German and Italian supply services, facing far greater allied interdiction efforts in the fall of 1942, managed to transport and effectively supply five German divisions and numerous Italian forces until March, 1943. Remember, Rommel and Von Armin were conducting offensive operations around Kasserine as late as February, 1943. All these German and Italian forces were supplied under much more adverse conditions than existed in 1940/early 1941. "The tanker fleet the Axis had was apparently not large enough to supply the long truck column it takes to get Rommel to Egypt. Throw in the large losses from British submarines and aircraft in 1940 & 41" Rommel's problem really wasn't trucks, or length of supply lines, it was usable ports. Rommel's forces stayed sufficiently supplied as late as July, 1942 to conduct offensive operations against a much larger Montgomery-led 8th Army than Wavell or later Auchinlek would be privileged to command. Moreover, Malta's importance to England wasn't acknowledged and modestly reinforced until September, 1940. Malta remained sporadically supplied up to as late as November, 1942, when the tide began to turn inexorably in the Allies favor. Hans Geissler's 10th Fliegerkorps dominated Malta at will. Diversion of his forces to Russia, and the Balkans prevented the effort from ever totally overwhelming Maltese defenses. They were, however, degraded so badly on numerous seperate occasions to make the likelihood of conquest a matter of "when", not "if". Fortunately for the British, the Germans never pulled the trigger on the most obvious target for Student's airborne forces. I'm absolutely confident that a true panzergruppe/army placed in N. Africa between the late fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 would have defeated the British in North Africa altogether, and been able to successfully seize Alexandria, Cairo and the Nile Delta, and the Suez. This effort would be easier still if England is defeated. However, even as events actually transpired in England, it seems very likely that the British would be defeated in North Africa with an initially more decisive and powerful force at the disposal of Rommel. As for the Italians, I would have culled the best commanders and formations from their African army, retrained and integrated those forces into German formations under German commanders, and sent the rest home-damn the political consequences. Units such as "Ariete" and "Trieste" fought superbly when operating as part of DAK. The key was Malta, and it was available to the Germans up to as late as May, 1942. It would have changed everything, to be blunt.

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Carl S RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria?/Suez & Alexandria 11/11/2005 6:43:17 AM

Over on the Consimworld web site they jokingly refer to this discussion as the North African Logistics Monster. Go there & look up Jeff Lesser, hes got the numbers at hand & can help you with whats valid & not with this thesis. If you have not read Ellises books take look. In 'Brute Force' he takes a quick look at this Axis problem. Jeff L. can refer you to some other authors on the subject. It seems to me the sea transport problem to a levantine port is larger than to Tripoli, Conversely the Air assualt operations may have the advantage of a brief surge requirement, and with sucess on Crete Cyprus, and sizeing this hypothetical port the Turks may at least allow some supplies to be sent via their railroad. Or allow ships to use the shelter of their nuetral coastal waters.

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S-2 RE:What About Crete-Cyprus-Syria?/Suez & Alexandria 11/11/2005 10:27:02 PM

"It seems to me the sea transport problem to a levantine port is larger than to Tripoli, Conversely the Air assualt operations may have the advantage of a brief surge requirement, and with sucess on Crete Cyprus, and sizeing this hypothetical port the Turks may at least allow some supplies to be sent via their railroad. Or allow ships to use the shelter of their nuetral coastal waters." Carl, maybe I'm missing something, but I don't care about any port in the Levant before following occur- 1.) Malta is eliminated-early. Anywhere between July, 1940-April, 1942 is perfectly doable by the Germans. However the sooner, the better. Regardless of whether England remains in the war or not. This isn't Crete, in Egypt's back door. This is Malta, and there isn't a damn thing around besides Axis forces. "North African Logistics Monster" is a hypothetical problem only. It assumes England, correctly stays in the war and Germany doesn't take Malta out of the Mediterranean battle early on, as they were eminently capable of doing-before introducing Rommel's Afrika Korps into battle in March, 1941. Whether England is still in the fight or not, with Malta gone, I can ship a Panzergruppe instead of a panzerkorps, and KICK the British out of Egypt. Like I said before, Geissler's 10th Fliegerkorps kicked the crap so hard out Malta in the fall of 1940-winter 1941 that there was no interference with the shipping of the Afrikakorps in Feb. 1941. You can "Ellis-The Overwhelming Production Theory of Total War" concept all you want, but that is based upon the assumptions of history. No dispute, except it leaves the human variable of "what if" out-completely. While it perfectly explains what was, it can't explain at all what could have been.

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