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Subject:
RE:The Falklands War (1982)- the unexploded bomb mystery
Worcester
12/17/2003 7:38:25 PM
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| How effective is "low level"?
British ships attacked and effect:-
May 1: Arrow, bombs missed, minor strafing.
May 4: Sheffield, Exocet, fire, later SANK.
May 12: Glasgow, 1 unexploded bomb (UXB).
May 21: Argonaut, 2 UXB; Antrim, 1 UXB; Broadsword, bombs missed, minor strafing; Ardent (3 attacks) 4 UXB but one exploded during defusing, SANK; Brilliant, bombs missed, strafing damage.
May 23: Antelope. 2 UXB, 1 later exploded, SANK.
May 24: Galahad, Lancelot, Bedivere, 5 UXB, operational.
May 25: Broadsword, 1 UXB; Coventry 2 UXB, 3rd exploded SANK; Atlantic Coveyor, Exocet, SANK.
June 8: Plymouth 4 UXB; Galahad hit, SCUTTLED; Tristram hit, afloat as accomodation hulk.
June 12: Glamorgan, land-launched EXOCET hit, damaged, operational.
Statistics:
19 British ships were hit in a total of 24 separate attacks on them from over 200 Argentine sorties.
Exocet: 3 of 5 airlaunched missed; 2 of 3 hits (incl land-launched) failed to detonate; 2 ships lost.
Bombs (the short version): 3 attacks missed completely; 21 bombs hit 8 ships and failed to explode; 3 additional unexploded bombs later detonated sinking 2 ships; at least 4 bombs exploded on contact (Ardent, Coventry, Galahad, Tristram) causing 3 ships lost.
It is reasonable to assume that some 75% of Argentine bombs failed to detonate or detonated too late. Where bombs hit and detonated correctly (Ardent, Coventry, Galahad and Tristram) the significant common factor in each case was that there was no effective defensive fire; as a result attacking pilots were able to release their bombs from altitudes high enough to allow the bombs to arm themselves before impact.
In order to avoid blowing themselves up with their own bombs, they were fuzed to arm after release from about 200 feet. Argentine aircraft were forced by UK air defenses into an ultra low-level approach and few attempted to climb to the proper bomb release height unless the targets were almost undefended.
UK surface weapons accounted for 20 Argentine losses. UK surface ship weapons accounted for 12 - Argentine confirmed vs. the UK claim of 28 (the biggest disparity is the old visual Seacat missile with 1 confirmed vs. 8 claimed). UK land systems took 8 Argentine aircraft vs. 24 UK claimed; (the biggest disparity is Rapier with 1 vs. 14 claimed).
By contrast UK air killed 32 Argentine aircraft. Sea Harriers took 32 confirmed Argentines (19 with Sidewinder, 10 with cannon in air and on ground) while RAF GR3 had 4 kills (ground).
Tasking and availability were key; in the most intense air combat period of May 21 to May 25, UK naval air generated some 300 sorties from an average 30 aircraft (max 29 Sea Harriers), while the Argentines generated only about 180 sorties from an average 60-90 available aircraft out of an even larger nominal airworthy number.
Miscellaneous bombardment/ground attack took 18 Argentine aircraft. The Argentine air force confirm losing 102 aircraft at the end of the conflict.
Once again, the main function of ground-based air defense is NOT how many aircraft they downed, but how many were forced into error - the deterrent effect - making the enemy pilot think twice, fly too low to arm or too fast to hit. Their success is measured in missed and unexploded bombs.
Source: UK Defence White Paper; "Air War South Atlantic" (Ethell & Price) - the latter is an exceptionally thorough American/UK-based work which interviewed most of the Argentine and many UK air crew.
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