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Subject: What If: Rommel was the commander in Stalingrad and Von Paulus the commander in El-Alamein
InterArmaEnimSilent    1/13/2006 5:19:21 PM
What would have happened if Rommel got re-assigned to replace Von Paulus after his failure to fully capture the city of Stalingrad in September 1942 and Von Paulus got send down to North Africa to deal with the British. And when the Soviets en-circle the city, Rommel breaks out of the city to avoid total destruction where as Von Paulus choses to stay and fight to the last man in El-Alamein and in the process leads to the complete destruction of the Axis armies in North Africa but the German 6th Army survives destruction. How would the survival of the German 6th Army and the destruction of the Axis Army in North Africa effected how the remainder of World War II ?
 
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LB    1945   12/7/2011 12:19:53 PM
A lot of Allied operations in 1945 look effective.  One shouldn't, however, draw too many conclusions from this period given the often hideous force disparity.  It's also worth nothing that during Veritable the Germans could have retreated over the Rhine but were ordered by Hitler not to do so.
 
Monty should have been fired in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and Holland.  Veritable or Plunder in 1945 do not in any way make up the prior years.  Indeed Plunder can be seen as part of the indictment.
 
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heraldabc    Because they hadn't learned a thing. .   12/7/2011 4:28:34 PM

 
So your complaints are those of a person who doesn't like having his face rubbed in FACTs.
 
Have a nice day.
 
H.
 
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heraldabc    Because they hadn't learned a thing. .   12/7/2011 4:29:37 PM

 
So your complaints are those of a person who doesn't like having his face rubbed in FACTs.
 
Have a nice day.
 
H.
 
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JTR~~    Remarkable   1/5/2012 10:37:26 AM
i find it quite remarkable that many people on here have seemingly ruled that the Allied victory in North Africa as a result of Germany's failing in said theatre rather than as a result of the predmoninantly British activity conducted by the 8th Army and preceeding British formations/units.
 
as to the original question, little would have changed, even if Von Paulus could have brought even a modicum of success to the African ground campaign he would of only ever have succeeded in drawing the result out. the Royal Navy in conjunction with the RAF had almost complete control of the Med thus denying the Germans the ability to further sustain their ground operations for any further length of time on the African continent and as others have pointed out, Stalingrad was to all intents and purposes Hitler's battle, the commanding officers in theatre at the time were merely the puppet middle men to his overall intentions, that being as we all very well know, the fall of Stalingrad for purposes ammounting to little more than enhancing national prestiege.
 
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heraldabc       1/5/2012 10:50:31 AM
I find it quite remarkable that many people on here have seemingly ruled that the Allied victory in North Africa as a result of Germany's failing in said theatre rather than as a result of the predmoninantly British activity conducted by the 8th Army and preceeding British formations/units.
Why?
 
German reaction to Torch proved that if the Germans had committed those resources earlier the British would have been swept aside with EASE.
 
H.
 
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JTR~~       1/5/2012 1:28:33 PM


I find it quite remarkable that many people on here have seemingly ruled that the Allied victory in North Africa as a result of Germany's failing in said theatre rather than as a result of the predmoninantly British activity conducted by the 8th Army and preceeding British formations/units.




Why?

 


German reaction to Torch proved that if the Germans had committed those resources earlier the British would have been swept aside with EASE.

 

H.



"German reaction to Torch proved that if the Germans had committed those resources earlier the British would have been swept aside with EASE."  
 
 
The Germans were fighting green troops when they reacted to Torch (the debacles at Kasserine pass and Sidi Bou Zid is evidence of this). this was further compounded by the general lack of experience offered by participating American units at the time in terms of fighting German troops, and in terms of the terrain. the Germans lost in North Africa purely down to British action and little else on land, at sea and in the air. The 8th Army was of an infinitely higher quality that the American troops fielded for Torch, even many of the British troops fielded for the operation were relatively in-experienced. Rommel was well and truly on the ropes by the time of Torch, yes there had been this back on forth many times before in the North African theatre however the post Alamein Afrika Korps was a spent force, naval and air superiority had been well and truly lost, in fact one may assert that the Royal Navy enjoyed complete naval dominance and the ground campaign was heading in the same direction. despite the almost habitual criticisms aired in regards to Monty, his conduct during the North African campaign was largely admirable equallying the performance and indeed eventually outdoing the wily desert fox himself, the same can be said of the British forces as a general rule in theatre. yes some may criticise the percieved lack of British agression in the campaign however the tactics put to use, regardless of personal preference and opinion, were proven, they suited the British doctrine and in the end they worked well all the same.
 
Even Rommel commended the skill, tennacity and professionalism of the British and Commenwealth troops considering them to be his equal in theatre whilst remaining highly dubious and often critical of the US troops fielded in the campaign.
 
 
 
 
 

 
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heraldabc    HYou did not undertstand at all what I said.    1/5/2012 1:52:32 PM
 
 
With the Allies still trying to carry out a quick thrust to Tunis in December, the shape of the opposing orders of battle that would decide the outcome of the Tunisia Campaign could already be discerned. Kesselring was bringing up to full strength General Juergen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army, successor headquarters to Nehring's XC Corps, consisting of the Division von Broich, a heavily armored unit in the Bizerte area, the 10th Panzer Division in the center before Tunis, and the Italian Superga Division on the southern flank. On the opposite side, Eisenhower transferred units from Morocco and Algeria eastward into Tunisia, bringing in fresh troops as fast as they could be prepared. On the north, Anderson's Eastern Task Force would become the five-division British First Army, with three more divisions soon joining the 6th Armoured and 78th Infantry Divisions already in Tunisia. On the south the basis of a two-division anti-Nazi French corps was being laid. In the center Eisenhower planned a full American corps, to be commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. With regiments from Algeria and Morocco, the U.S. II Corps would eventually include the larger part of six divisions: the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry and the 1st and 2d Armored.
====================
 
While both sides waited for better weather they also grew stronger. With a dominant naval presence in the western Mediterranean and large garrisons in Morocco and Algeria, the Allies had little difficulty continuing their buildup in Tunisia. But the amount of Axis troops and supplies that infiltrated by sea and air from Italy was frustrating. From the surrender of Algiers in mid-November through January 112,000 men and 101,000 tons of supplies and equipment arrived in Tunisia to join enemy forces already there.
 
 
At El Alamein that reinforcement would have CRUSHED that tyro, Montgomery.
 
H.
 
 
 
 
 
 
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JTR~~       1/5/2012 3:25:51 PM



 


 



With the Allies still trying to carry out a quick thrust to Tunis in December, the shape of the opposing orders of battle that would decide the outcome of the Tunisia Campaign could already be discerned. Kesselring was bringing up to full strength General Juergen von Arnim's
Fifth Panzer Army, successor headquarters to Nehring's XC
Corps, consisting of the
Division von Broich, a heavily armored unit in the Bizerte area, the
10th Panzer Division in the center before Tunis, and the Italian
Superga Division on the southern flank. On the opposite side, Eisenhower transferred units from Morocco and Algeria eastward into Tunisia, bringing in fresh troops as fast as they could be prepared. On the north, Anderson's Eastern Task Force would become the five-division British First Army, with three more divisions soon joining the 6th Armoured and 78th Infantry Divisions already in Tunisia. On the south the basis of a two-division anti-Nazi French corps was being laid. In the center Eisenhower planned a full American corps, to be commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. With regiments from Algeria and Morocco, the U.S. II Corps would eventually include the larger part of six divisions: the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry and the 1st and 2d Armored.

====================

 




While both sides waited for better weather they also grew stronger. With a dominant naval presence in the western Mediterranean and large garrisons in Morocco and Algeria, the Allies had little difficulty continuing their buildup in Tunisia.
But the amount of Axis troops and supplies that infiltrated by sea and air from Italy was frustrating. From the surrender of Algiers in mid-November through January 112,000 men and 101,000 tons of supplies and equipment arrived in Tunisia to join enemy forces already there.


 

 

At El Alamein that reinforcement would have CRUSHED that tyro, Montgomery.

 

H.
 

 

 
 

 


if our lines of thought did indeed become crossed at some point as you have suggested then thank you for clarifying. however as to your last point, as much as i respect  your opinion, it really carries very little in the way of relevant historical value. it is essentially a "yes but if..." point. the main point should instead be that it was once again down to British tactics and military action that  the Germans were denied the usage and avaliability of such resources in the run up and during the operation at El Alamein. 
you would not seek to detract from the American victory on Omaha beach during the Normandy landings by saying that if the Germans had had the resources available to them in the sector that had been requested some weeks earlier that the US troops would have been crushed thus diminishing the significance or success their efforts somehow would you?
 
a victory is a victory, not all victories stem from direct combat action/confrontation in the heart of the operation between as is most commonly associated with war, the boots on the ground, it just so happens that the victory secured largely by the British in the North African theatre derived from a great many events, some in direct confrontation with the men of the Afrika Korps, some in the air and some at sea, all were part of the wider operation in theatre, all aided the eventual arrival of the allied victory therefore still outlining the point that the North African campaign was a resounding British success. all victories are diverse in terms of how they are achieved.
 
 
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LB       1/5/2012 4:43:46 PM
Stating that the Germans should not have been at El Alamein does not detract from British valor.  However, stating that El Alamein is the result of great allied planning isn't valid.  The problem with El Alamein is that the Germans should never have advanced to there and the actual plan that everyone had agreed to was after Tobruk would be Malta.  Rommel got victory disease and went over Kesselring's head to Hitler for permission to advance into Egypt.  One logistic amateur talking to another. 
 
On Herald's comment it's worth pointing out that an additional 100,000 axis troops at El Alamein could not have been supplied, as I'm sure he's aware.
 
As for Monty he should have been fired just for failing to pursue the enemy after El Alamein.  A pursuit is when you overtake and destroy the enemy not merely follow his organized retreat.  His performance in Africa after Alamein was also worth firing him over.  He mismanaged the entire campaign at every point after right up to the fall of Tunisia.
 
On the broader level that the British won the campaign for North Africa through better strategy and logistic ability that's certainly true.  However, the crux of the matter was having Malta and the Hitler backing off Hercules was the deciding factor prior to the entry of the US into the war.  Britain did not have naval dominance where land based air was concentrated as Crete clearly shows in 1941.  Britain could not have prevented Malta from falling and it was the idiotic notion of advancing into Egypt without Malta that doomed the Axis at El Alamein.
 
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JTR~~       1/5/2012 5:37:09 PM


Stating that the Germans should not have been at El Alamein does not detract from British valor.  However, stating that El Alamein is the result of great allied planning isn't valid.  The problem with El Alamein is that the Germans should never have advanced to there and the actual plan that everyone had agreed to was after Tobruk would be Malta.  Rommel got victory disease and went over Kesselring's head to Hitler for permission to advance into Egypt.  One logistic amateur talking to another. 

 

On Herald's comment it's worth pointing out that an additional 100,000 axis troops at El Alamein could not have been supplied, as I'm sure he's aware.

 

As for Monty he should have been fired just for failing to pursue the enemy after El Alamein.  A pursuit is when you overtake and destroy the enemy not merely follow his organized retreat.  His performance in Africa after Alamein was also worth firing him over.  He mismanaged the entire campaign at every point after right up to the fall of Tunisia.

 

On the broader level that the British won the campaign for North Africa through better strategy and logistic ability that's certainly true.  However, the crux of the matter was having Malta and the Hitler backing off Hercules was the deciding factor prior to the entry of the US into the war.  Britain did not have naval dominance where land based air was concentrated as Crete clearly shows in 1941.  Britain could not have prevented Malta from falling and it was the idiotic notion of advancing into Egypt without Malta that doomed the Axis at El Alamein.


a sound point  of view. 
nonetheless as i have stated in a previous post, the conditions that create a victory of any kind are often diverse, one must take into account logistics, morale, tactics, terrain, weaponary, weather and even the enemies mistakes and their tactics and combat condition, one does not always, in fact one very rarely achieve victories battles, campaigns and wars purely through ones own efforts alone the role of the enemy is always a factor, in fact of believe Sun Tzu advocated this very same concept quite clearly in his "Art ofWar" text, or by being based solely on how much physical damage you can cause to your enemy (in terms of how many casulties you inflict both manpower and material wise). victory is a colourful concept and does not require the physical act of killing or destroying ones enemy to be achieved, the physical attacking and engagement (and resultant casulties/damage) of the enemy is only one part of the victory equation.
 
 
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