Churchill vs de Gaulle

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Yimmy RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/2/2004 9:28:04 AM

De Gaulle is one of the few French it is polliticaly correct to hate. In WWII once, Churchill has so much mistrust for the man that while De Gaulle wanted to travel to Africa(?), Churchill would not allow a plane to fly him. De Gaulle completely stabbed the British in the back after the war. If only the Jackel had done a better job. :DD

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TOXICITIE 2 RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/2/2004 11:33:32 AM

I'm going to have to say churchill.Mainly because when de gaulle was here in Canada he basicly told quebec to leave canada and be it's own nation. That caused SO MANY PROBLEMS here in canada. Also Churchill had a great sense oh humour.

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ambush RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/2/2004 11:52:07 AM

How is this even a question? Even during hte war De Gaulle was as big a pain in the rear as the Vichy. I believe it was Churchill who said something to the effect that "the French owe us so much and for that they wil never fogive us"

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french stratege RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/2/2004 5:10:40 PM

Churchill has an outstanding will and leadership in the WW2 and exceptionally long carreer.Churchill did a lot of famous mistakes like Dardanelles, in the thirties or 1940/41, but has also innovative ideas like a prebuild artifical harbour to facilitate Normandy landing. However De Gaulle has also these qualities and have a better vision on military, strategy and economics. Everybody knows he was one of the first theorician of armored warfare, but he had a very good economic policy and understanding. When he was leader in the sixties France ranked as the fastest growing nation in world above Japan and of course he changed institutions which still last, developped French scientific institutions,industry, nuclear arsenal and modernized army. To take France down and bring it up again almost alone while preserving its independance and value is outstanding. Even people in French left parties does not dare to critize its policy and him now, he entered history. De Gaulle will last as a more universal model and was still a model as they have said it for Nehru, Adenauer, Chinese leaders like DengXiaPing, and others like Singapore prime minister. No leaders in western nation have such an impact on its country. Of course Churchill will stay first in anglosaxon world.Somepeople would may think that De Gaulle was antibritsh but it is false.During the war sometimes he have very bad relation with Churchill but Churchill supported him and they stay close and friendly most of the time. Most people here would critisize DeGaulle for Nato withdrawing and refusal of UK entering EEC but only Anglosaxons , not Germans or others. Past events shown he was right on both at this time.If situation have change and De Gaulle have lived more, maybe he would have changed this because he was a pragmatic and not an ideologist. Some conselor asked why he said "vive le Quebec libre": he replied that if there was a chance for Quebec people to obtain independance and if they want it (as it seems there was close to a majority), it would be good for France and by saying that it strenghtened links of French candians with France.If it was not the case , only Canadian anglosaxon would be angry and with their international weight, it has no incidence. In fact De gaulle have a zero fault career and it is exceptional.

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glenponder RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/4/2004 3:35:09 PM

Bloody hell Churchill must have been Physic LOL I dont belive that De Gaulle was the perfect man you claim FS i bet he did mess up some stuff. however i dont know every thing about him so untill i learn more i will take your word for it.

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GOP No doubt Winston Churchill. 10/4/2004 6:35:28 PM

The man was not only a great leader, but everybody loved him. Churchill, IMO

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Worcester RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/4/2004 7:18:59 PM

This is not even a question. Churchill's range of achievements far surpass deGaulle, even though deGaulle must be viewed as great by French and perhaps European standards. Chuchill saved democracy, certainly in Europe, probably in the world; deGaulle did rebuild France. Churchill was an officer in the last British cavalry charge, served in Cuba with Spanish forces, served in the Boer War as a journalist, was elected to Parliament when very young, became the youngest Navy Secretary and took the blame for the Dardanelles in 1915 - it was not solely his fault. What is VERY Churchillian is that to "pay" for the Dardanelles he volunteered to serve in command of an infantry battallion on the western front at Ploogstraat, a bloody sector, where he saw serious action. One cannot imagine many other senior politicians making this kind of personal commitment in wartime. After the war he served as Treasury Secretary (introducing the basis for a modern welfare state) and was recalled to the job of Navy Secretary in 1939, 24 years after he had left. His vision in spotting Hitler and Mussolini and preaching against the rise of the Nazis and Fascists made him unpopular, but he was right. No other politician in the world had the vision or courage. He was very highly regarded by the Royal Navy who sent a simple signal to the fleet, "Winston's back!" Later, after the fall of Chamberlain, he became Prime Minister and, despite the nouveau propaganda from French revisionist historians, did everything short of sacrificing Britain to support France. It was Churchill alone who pushed against all odds for the Brits to stand against the Germans - and inflict Hitler's first defeat in the battle of Britain, Italy's first defeat at Taranto (the model for Pearl Harbor), Italy's subsequent defeats in North Africa which forced Hitler to send troops to Africa; and the destruction of Rommel's Africa Korps. Not bad for a solo act: Britain vs. Germany & Italy & Vichy France. It was his relationship with Roosevelt which kept American support such as it was. This relationship also swayed US strategy to liberating Europe first before the Pacific for which any occupied Europeans should thank him. It was also Churchill who insisted on voctory in Italy first while most in the US though D-Day could happen in 1942 - fat chance! Churchill was the one who pushed Truman to nuke the Japanese; "if the American people were to discover that you had a means of ending this war, and you did not take it, what would they say then?" How's that for leadership? Churchills' leadership went beyond the execution of grand strategy to the rhetoric of power. His collection of speeches is still one of the most stirring moral weapons ever invented, re-quoted by politicians for generations: for the Gulf War ("we have drawn the line and they shall not pass" became the "line in the sand") and even during the 9/11 attack on New York the mayor reiterated the Londoner's slogan during the German blitz: "we can take it!" The only man to get the Nobel Prize for literature for the spoken word. Strategy, moral and physical courage and a feeling for the use of power on a global scale. de Gaulle deGaulle was never given the opportunity to use strategy or influence on a global scale; although he often acted like it, no one would suggest that "Algerie Francaise" or "Quebec Libre" were global commands to save democracy against the dark tyranny of the Nazis, but simply the jingoism for a domestic French agenda. During the period 1939-1945 France was not included in the Allies planning; de Gaulle was not even recognized as a head of government since no one wanted to antoagonize Vichy and among the "Free French" there were many claimants to this title. If de Gaulle had not had Le Clerc to mobilize French troops in Africa, there would have been no credibility for a French division at Normandy. And if de Gaulle had not had Le Clerc to command the "2nd Armored Division, US Army" (as it was in September 1945) he would not have been able to liberate Paris; the Allies certainly did not wish to, since it would have slowed the advance. But deGaulle was terrified of another Paris commune; his parting words to Le Clerc were "hurry, there must not be another commune" - and Le Clerc not only got into the city but prevented the Communists from seizing control. In the post-war era deGaulle was important in giving France a sense of unity which was not always apparent by the politics. In foreign affairs, deGaulle sent Le Clerc to Vietnam; Le Clerc recommended reaching agreement with Ho Chi Minh and said a ground war was not winnable. Another credit for Le Clerc! deGaulle, however, decided to pursue a colonial war. After tha defeat of Dien Bien Phu, the loss of Algeria was militarily unacceptable. deGaulle's promise of "Algerie Francaise" was another promise which was politically unrealistic and militarily unrealistic. The resultant French army mutiny was not surprising and the OAS actions to assasinate deGaulle showed that he had made one false promise too many. This Gaulllist policy of pursuing colonial consolidation is in stark contrast to the accepted British policy of de-colonization, and one supported (albeit grudgingly) by Churchill. In part this may be because of the "Vichy excuse": that the humiliation of Vichy had at least preserved France's colonies. This may ahve been another incident of deGaulle going along with a policy simply to prevent domestic discord. Perhaps, but it was an unrealistic post-war strategy. Even as late as 1968 during the Paris riots deGaulle had to travel in person to see the commander of the French Corps in Germany to reassure himself of his loyalty. The pursuit of a colonial war in Vietnam (against LeClerc's advice) and in Algeria (depite all the evidence) make the "Quebec Libre" pale into insignificance. Unneccessarily insulting to a liberator of France - particularly the Canadians who landed in Normandy - it was wholly impractical and it is difficult to see what advantage deGaulle thought it gave him. Perhaps, the audience was in France; as Reynaud said: "deGaulle never ceased to appeal to the jingoismm of the French people." It is against this fractious political environment, the desire to suppress war-time hatreds (collaboration vs resistance) and "restore France etc. etc. and the suspect loyalty of the army and OAS, that deGaulle's drive for "independence" must be seen. Not only did he need to appear strong domestically, but he was still not on the inside track enjoyed by the UK and he needed to watch his generals while giving them new toys to play with. Despite these handicaps, his ability to energize France was important as was his cooperation with Germany in starting what is now the EU. In conclusion:- Churchill was a proven warrior and a proven strategist who excecuted grand strategy in both world wars; he was a noted writer and historian "History of the English Speaking People's", and is the only leader to address the US Congress twice. He received numerous honors including the Nobel Prize for Literature and a Fellowship of the Royal Academy for his water colors; renaissance man perhaps. And his vision continued: the man who gave us "we have drawn the line" (plagiarized 40 years later to a line in the sand!) also gave us "an Iron Curtain has descended across Europe". deGaulle is a great man, but his influence on war strategy was very limited before 1945 and it is his post war record in re-invigorating France which is important. That he did this by antagonizing former friends and losing two colonial wars is perhaps the price to be paid for his peculiar place in French affections. Simply not the same breadth of achievement as Churchill.

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bigfella RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/5/2004 1:23:13 AM

Worcester, A brilliant post. You covered most of my bases and a few besides. A few minor points: * In the period after WW1 Churchill did his share of damage with the division of the old Ottoman Empire and of Ireland. In both cases the placement of British interests ahead of those of the locals had negative long term consequences. Still, he was not leader at this time, just a prominent politician. * His term as PM in the early 50s was a bit sad. he was way too old. The fact that the British people voted him out of office so quickly in 1945 suggests that they knew he was a great wartime leader, but not a man cut out for peace. *In many ways the same was true of DeGaulle. Althoug he was not formally involved in French politics, it was the interference of his political party that needlessly extended the war in Indochina at considerable cost. His use of the thinly-veiled threat of a military coup to gain power in 1958 is one of the great disgraces of postwar European politics. Having opened that Pandora's box he almost provoked civil war in 1962 by trying to put the military in Algeria back in their place. He was a poor democrat, and much better suited to the more autocratic style of a wartime leader.

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french stratege RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle 10/5/2004 10:36:56 AM

Indochina was started 19 december 1946.Before Vierminh was associated with other parties for transitioning to independance.De Gaulle has nothing to do with Indochina war as he thought France could not stay in Vietnam facing China and moreover he was not on power.Worcester has a strange reading of history.

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Worcester RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle: big fella 10/5/2004 2:08:16 PM

Indeed, you are precisely correct. And thankyou, I should have made more of the differences in democracy: Churchill clearly was a great democrat: deGaulle only when democracy was doing his bidding. What is interesting is deGaulle's paranoia about the Paris commune. He urged LeClerc forward in 1945 with this concern and sought military force 23 years later in 1968 for the same reason: "Paris must not become a commune". This reveals an interesting acknowledgement about the fragmentation of French society. The Middle East: The Sykes-Picot, the basis for the division of the Middle East, is an infamous document. T.E. Lawrence spent a lot of time campaigning against it especially since it contradicted the British promises made to the Arabs that they could keep whatever they captured. Of course, when Sykes-Picot was born, few would have believed the Arabs could capture Deraa and Damascus! And they wouldn't without Lawrence's leadership. Until Allenby arrived and harnessed the Arab revolt to his own advance, few would have even believed the British could have crossed the Sinai and captured Jerusalem. So Damsacus, always Lawrence's objective, took everyone by surprise. Sykes-Picot, without going into great detail, promised Lebanon and most of Syria to France while giving Britain Palestine and Iraq. I can do no better than quoting Basil Liddel-Hart's summary from "Lawrence of Arabia" of the subsequent negotiations:- "In Palestine [and Syria] Lawrence had been gieven a free hand by Allenby; in Paris he had to watch others undoing his achievement. To make it worse, the right and left hands of British policy were pulling against each other. These internal divergences produced ironical effects. The Foreign Office sincerely desired a settlement that should fulfill our undertakings to bothArabs and French, and still cherished hopes of satsifying both parties. But Mesopotamia, the inevitable bargain-counter, lay under the hand of the Indian Government, and Foreign Office attempts to prompt the setting up an Arab administration met with little welcome and less response. With the millstone of Mesopotamia around its neck, British statesmanship was hopelessly handicapped in trying to achieve a modification of Sykes-Picot. The French insisted on heir full pound of flesh not only because of their hunger for new colonies but because they feared the repurcussions on their old colonies in Africa if they conceded Syrian independence. The scales were weighed with dishonored bonds when Feisal made his appeal to the Council of Ten, and he obtained no satisfaction beyond carrying off the honors for debate. For when Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, discoursed on the Crusading pedigree of France's claim to Syria, Feisal pricked his eloquence with the quiet retort - "Pardon me, Monsieur Pichon, but which of us won the Crusades?" As the French stood fast, the British gave way. The urgency of greater issues afforded a convenient excuse for purposeful procrastination...and the new device of "mandates" which cynical Arabs spelt "protectorate", served to put a polish on the purpose. Thus abandonned to his own devices, Feisal postponed the end by coming to an arrangement with the French, or at least with Clemenceau - contrary to popular belief the "Tiger" was less rapacious than many of his jackals. In achieving this provisional agreement, Feisal was helped by French difficulties in Syria...where they had become engaged in a veiled war with undemobilized Turks who were trying to repeat their Balkan trick of stealing back during armistice what they had lost in war. Even Picot was brought to realize the unpalatable fact, conveyed in a significant telegram: " the absence of Feisal is encouraging the extremists." This confession reinforced the arguments Lawrence had already put to Clemenceau and produced the turn about by which Clemenceau having first repudiated Feisal, now offered to recognize the independence of Syria on condition tha Feisal supported the interests of France. Feisal was constrained to accept this offer much to the disgust of his father [Hussein] who regarded him as having bartered his soul for a mess of pottage. It was partly in revulsion from this bargain...that Hussein took the fateful step of proclaimimg himself Commander of the Faithful, an act which immediately hardened the Imam and Idrissi against him, and cause an explosion of wrath amomg the fanatical Wahabi's [even then!] which Ibn Sa'ud skillfully directed to Hussein's ultimate overthrow. There is a dignity which commands respect, if it leaves a sting, in the address Hussein delivered to the Bedouin sheikhs at Mecca at the year's end - 'I have come to remark a great change-round of the Allies, and especially of France in favor of Turkey. Asia Minor, comprising Armenia will remain Turkish, Syria is given to France in spite of our protests; our possession of Damsacus is strongly disputed.' Although Feisal made his compact with the French from a sense of practical statesmanship...he had no illusions when he returned to Syria of the slendernss of his prospects or the strength of the desire which their representatives cherished. He told [the French] representatives frankly, 'I will accept your aid but I will never accept enslavement.'" Leaving L-H for a moment, it is hardly surprising that the bad-will generated spread into northern Mesopotamia. The British conference on Mesopotamia said "something must be done" to meet Arab aspirations but the soldiers considered a military administration necessary until peace had been ratified with Turkey - a process which took 4 years and 9 months, longer than the war itself. In March 1920 the Arab Congress in Damsacus proclaimed Feisal Ling of Syria and Abdullah as King of Iraq. Neither title was recognized by Britain or France. The San Remo conference in April 1920 formally awarded Syria to France and Mesopotamia to Britain. Returning to L-H: "There was an essential difference between the recipients in that the British government was moving, if all too slowly, towards giving the Mesopotamian Arabs a real share in the government of Iraq, while the new French government, replacing Clemenceau's, was moving swiftly towards ousting the Syrian Arabs from control of Damsacus. In Iraq the British paid the penalty of delay when in July 1920 the tribes of the Euphrates rose in revolt. These were not suppressed until later in the year with troops from India costing six times what it had cost us to finance the Arab revolt against Turkey. In Syria, Feisal paid the penalty of French haste, when the possessors...seized the first chance of repudiating the agreement that Clemenceau had made, and of installing themselves in Damascus. Even by the admission of the French High Commissioner's staff, Feisal had striven to moderate the bellicosity of the Arab extremists. Yet he was made the target of the French ultimatum of July 14th. It was in vain hat he dispatched a message accepting the temrs of the ultimatum - another fact confirmed by French evidence. French forces had been set in motion by Gouraud whise soldierly simplicity made him an easy lever for political schemers to manipulate. Feisal fled to Palestine, but the French soon had cause to regret his overthrow for they involved themselves in troubles far more costly and propolnged than the British experience in Iraq." Conclusion:- The key question: if the Indian Government had relinquished sufficient land in Mesopotamia to "compensate" Arab claims in Syria, thus allowing these to be handed to France..this would have been tantamount to giving part of Abdullah's kingdom to Feisal...would either Abdullah or Feisal have accepted? Would such a step-down have helped Hussein? It is already clear that Sykes-Picot was used from the first by Ibn Sa'ud and the Wahabi's o destroy Hussain and the Sherif. Or is the real root of the problem that the British were always intent on Arab self government while the French were not. And that all the British achieved was a delay in the face of French intransigence which cost them in Iraq, but cost the French even more in Syria. It is easy to blame the French for seeking to turn back the clock which the British had wound forward by supporting the Arab Revolt. A better analogy perhaps is of France very firmly leaning against the stable door when the horse of ran nationalism is running free.

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french stratege RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle: big fella 10/5/2004 2:30:01 PM

At least the today good consequences of Sykes Picot agreement is that it turn out Syria from Saudis and bring Syria to be freed today of Whaabatism islamism and more modernised in their mentalities. By the way no relation to De Gaulle it seems!

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french stratege RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle: big fella 10/5/2004 2:40:17 PM

De gaulle was a democrat, he could have imposed its power in 58 (or maybe in 1945).Instead of that he asked election of president on direct popular votes soon after and presented him its self. When the plebiscit he asked for, in 68 was lost , he resigned while he was not compelled to do, to take the consequences. You would better read its memories. PS: the "paranoia" of De Gaulle in 45 was not without reasons: communists tried to get power everywere they could as the biggest armed group remaining, refusing to give up their weapons, killing thousands French political opponents ,right wing or moderate left even (and some of resistance), to prepare to get the power.We have seen what they have done in Poland or Czeckoslovakia.

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Worcester RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle: FS 10/5/2004 4:37:47 PM

"good consequences of Sykes-Picot is that it urn out Syria from Saudis [sic] and bring Suria today to be freed of Whaabatism [sic]" (a) Syria was never threatened by Ibn Sa'ud or the Wahabi sect. (b) Sykes-Picot undermined the moderate Sherifian Arabs who should have controlled much of the middle east - Syria, Iraq and most of the Arabian peninsular. Sykes-Picot gave Ibn Sa'ud the excuse to create Saudi Arabia and export Wahabism for 80 years. Undermine the moderates and bribe the oil-rich extremists. Not a good strategy. P.S. This relates to bigfella's comment on the middle east.

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bigfella RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle: big fella 10/5/2004 7:45:50 PM

Once again FS your reading of French history is idiosyncratic. It is true that DeGaulle did not grab power in 1945. Perhaps the possibility of sparking a civil war so soon after the occupation gave him thought. Rather, he chose to await the call of the French poeple. When it was too long in coming he let the military in Algeria effectively bring an end to the fourth republic by threatening to invade mainland France. True, he did not become a dictator, but he made sure that his powers as president were greatly expanded. As for Indochina, I am not sure of De Galle's role in the French re-occupation of Indochina in 1945-6, but as head of the Provisional Govt. ha must have played a role. Having given up Indochina to the Japanese without a fight in 1940 and stood by while they committed mass murder, France had no right to return tho a colony that had declared its independence. During the war that followed De Galle's party (the RPF) hindered peace negotiations and unecessarily prolonged the conflict. He is far from blameless for that bloody and needless war.

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Couac_Attack RE:Churchill vs de Gaulle: big fella 10/6/2004 3:06:16 PM

"Once again FS your reading of French history is idiosyncratic. It is true that DeGaulle did not grab power in 1945. Perhaps the possibility of sparking a civil war so soon after the occupation gave him thought. Rather, he chose to await the call of the French poeple. When it was too long in coming he let the military in Algeria effectively bring an end to the fourth republic by threatening to invade mainland France. True, he did not become a dictator, but he made sure that his powers as president were greatly expanded." In 1958, De Gaulle was popular, and the people were asking for his return, but at the same time, men like mitterand and other politicians of the parlement majority were blocking him, and didnt agree to give him the power until he created the kind of "crisis" situaiton you describe, based on an armyintervention on the mainland. "As for Indochina, I am not sure of De Galle's role in the French re-occupation of Indochina in 1945-6, but as head of the Provisional Govt. ha must have played a role. Having given up Indochina to the Japanese without a fight in 1940 and stood by while they committed mass murder, France had no right to return tho a colony that had declared its independence. During the war that followed De Galle's party (the RPF) hindered peace negotiations and unecessarily prolonged the conflict. He is far from blameless for that bloody and needless war. " As i had written 2 month ago, the Indochina conflict has been a very complicated one, and all the consequences of this conflict has been responsible in a some way to the Vietnamese war. To describe De Gaulle involvment brievly, he just asked to Leclerc, D'argenlieu and other men, to come back to Indochina and to reorganise the country, to the old froteers if possible, this objectiv cannot be seen as a "declaration of war" to the vietminh since there were not independentist revendications yet. Then De Gaulle left power and ,D'argenlieu, with the new government agreement or unconstraint, tried to create a virtual state, the Coconchine ( or something like that ), against the agreements made with the viethmin. to discuss what would have been De Gaulle's position, just remember Algeria, when he saw that it was impossible to keep algeria as a colony, he decided to ask to the Algerian people ...

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