An RAF Avro Vulcan, as used for the Black Buck raids

The Black Buck raids were a series of five attacks on the Islands by RAF Avro Vulcan bombers of 44 Squadron, staged from Wideawake airbase on Ascension Island, close to the equator.

On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack on the airfield at Stanley. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight refuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted Handley Page Victors with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in the air. Thus, a total of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a massive logistical effort, given that both the tankers and bombers had to use the same strip. The attack yielded only a single hit on the runway. It was reported at the time that the song “Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet” by BTO was relayed over loudspeakers as the planes flew over. ^{[citation needed]}

Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine FAA BAE Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1s from HMS Hermes followed up the raid by dropping BL755 cluster bombs on Stanley and the smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. Both missions scored aircraft kills on the ground, as well as causing some damage to the airfield infrastructure. The aircraft had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all back."

British propaganda leaflet intended for Argentine soldiers dropped during the Falkland Islands War. Titled "Islands of the Condemned," it warns Argentine naval ships and aircraft not to enter the Falkland Islands exclusion zone.

The Falklands conflict was one of the few major naval campaigns to have occurred since the end of the Second World War. As such, the conflict illustrated the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and reaffirmed the effectiveness of aircraft in naval warfare. Stealth (in the form of submarines) again proved its usefulness, much as it did during the Second World War and the Cold War.

Neither side achieved total air supremacy; nonetheless, air power proved to be of critical importance during the conflict, due to the isolated, rough landscape of the Falklands in which the mobility of land forces was restricted. Air strikes were staged against ground, sea and air targets on both sides, and often with clear results. All of the UK losses at sea were caused by aircraft or missile strikes (by both the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation). The French Exocet missile proved its lethality in air-to-surface operations, leading to retrofitting of most major ships with Close-in weapon system (CIWS).

The war vindicated the UK decision to develop the STOVL Harrier aircraft, which showed its capability of operating from forward bases with no runways. The domination of air power in major naval engagements was demonstrated, along with the usefulness of carriers and it proved the small but manoeuvrable Sea Harrier as a true fighter. FAA Sea Harriers shot down 23 fast jets with no air-to-air losses themselves. Six Sea Harriers were lost to ground fire and accidents.

It should be noted that the disparity in figures, with the Argentine fighters failing to shoot down a single Sea Harrier, can be partly explained by several factors. The Argentine planes were operating at the limit of their range with little fuel available for dogfighting; the indisputably superior air combat training of the British pilots; and limited fighter control was provided by British warships in San Carlos Water. These factors together with the use by the British of the latest Sidewinder missiles, the then almost unparalleled Blue Fox radar, and the extreme manoeuvrability of the Sea Harrier went some way to countering the speed advantage of the Argentinian aircraft.

The logistic capability of the UK armed forces was stretched to the absolute limit in order to mount an amphibious operation so far from a home-base, onto mountainous islands which had and have few roads. After the war, much work was done to improve both the logistic and amphibious capability of the Royal Navy.

Task force commander Sandy Woodward refers to the conflict as "a lot closer run than many would care to believe", reflecting the naval and military belief that the logistics made war was a far more difficult operation than was, and to some extent is, widely understood.^[27]. The ships of the task force could only remain on station for so long in the worsening South Atlantic winter. With such a proportion of the Royal Navy's surface fleet actively engaged or lost to combat, there were precious few units available to replace northbound traffic. At the core of the fleet, Invincible could possibly be replaced by the hastily-worked up Illustrious, but there was no replacement for Hermes, the larger of the two British carriers. Woodward's strategy, therefore, required the land war to be won before Hermes, in particular, succumbed to the harsh environment. This, it turned out, was "a damned close run thing".

Trident II D5