What Can We Do To Fix The US Army?

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YelliChink 2/16/2009 7:42:42 PM

And exactly what is wrong with US artillery? If, US Artillery is superior to Russian and Chinese artillery, our main opponents, why does it need to be "superior" to German, British, and French artillery? And how do you define superior? The Crusader was a Cold War piece, for an army that was going to deploy it's forces, largely PRE-WAR, in Germany and fight in the Fulda Gap. That army is gone...N-LOS-C makes a deal more sense. it's deployable, unlike the 55 ton Crusader.

The USAF, JDAMS, UAV, Excalibur, and MLRS (GMLRS) have made US artillery a lot more lethal, so what SPECIFICALLY would anyone propose, rather than these gratuitous assertions that there ware problems that need to be "fixed?"

Compare to 2S19 and PLZ05, M109A6 may have best fire control and communications gear, but it has less range, slower rate of fire and less driving rage. South African G6, French Caesar and Swedish Archer system weigh less or equal, but have the same ROF, or have longer barrel.

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verong 2/16/2009 11:42:35 PM

Training and logistical support - develop and deploy small unit tactics - these were very ineffective especially in urban environments. A NTC for small unit and urban warfare is in order here. Make use of combat experience vets instead of simply letting them wander off. We did that in WII and Korea - it works and saves lives. Instead, we muster them out after being assured they will not go bezerk and pop a cap in someone.

The small unit tactics employed seem to work quite well, thank you very much. I wonder exactly how successful you have to be to get a passing grenade from Softwar? We lost at best one company-sized engagement, the 507th Maintenance debacle, and after that won every engagement platoon-sized or better, and only lost less than 5 rifle section sized firefights...in FIVE YEARS, a nd the US Army had bad tactics?

And make use of combat vets? Uh Helllloooooooo, that's what multiple tours in Iraq did!? That's what the high reenlistment rate guaranteed? have you read any of the books on Fallujah, the Marine units had multiple combat veterans, and they trained the units very hard PRIOR to Iraq deployment....they didn't just wander off...

And reenlistment bonuses, again Helllooooooo the US Army works(ed) very hard to keep it's combat veteran NCO's "in."

This is a weird complaint, dude....I can't grasp which army you are talking about, here...is it your contention that the US Army said, "OK, all you combat veterans, get the F*CK out so we can replace you with new sheeple/cannon-fodder?" Or that the US Army should have told those who's tours were up, "No you MUST stay, no matter what your contract says?"

I'm sorry this "complaint" about the "Broken" army just makes no sense. Seriously, you need to elaborate on these issues and make it clear exactly what the problem, you see was and how it can be fixed...

Yeah My SRB for Infantry NCO's worked did it not

Sincerely,

Keith

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LB Ask more questions 2/17/2009 12:29:12 AM

In order to "fix" the Army may I suggest asking more questions? What do we need and require the Army to do and is the US Army best organized and equipped to fulfill that mission(s)?

Once upon a time a division in the US Army had 9 to 11 maneuver battalions in 3 brigades. Today a division has 8 batt in 4 brigades. We have less combat units and more support units with significantly more HQ's. The general consensus, till very recently, was that the most efficient brigade was one of 4 maneuver battalions. Having the same number of combat troops and twice as many brigade HQ's is something that needs to be rexamined along with exactly how a 2 battalion brigade functions in sustained heavy combat and how is such a force employed with the very limited range of formations possible with 2 maneuver units.

So in answer to the question posed one might consider increasing combat troops and decreasing support troops and consolidating HQs. One might also consider that ground recon units must be trained, equipped and led to fight for information and that the doctrine of taking away the CFV because the troops might fight too much was in error. For that matter one might rexamine the utility of the ACR and how many the US Army requires.

Lastly one might look at history and note that since WWII the US Army has prepared to wage the last war and was less than fully prepared to fight the war that actually came along and thus overly focusing on COIN today may mean the Army is not prepared for what actually comes down the pike. The future is more urban combat requiring more heavy armor, more armored combat engineers, a non existent heavy assault infantry vehicle, and a brigade structure robust enough to take losses while continuing the mission. If FCS actually does provide a breakthrough in armor where a 40 ton tank has the same protection as a 60 ton today then great put that armor on a 60 ton tank and let our troops have a superior MBT.

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JFKY LB 2/17/2009 9:32:53 AM

1) the division, currently HAS 12 battalions....the brigade has two maneuver battalions, but also has a cavalry unit, a squadron attached....it's not as large as the maneuver units, but it does bring significant firepower to the fight....

2) Studies have NOT shown the optimum division size to be 12 battalions...please show me these studies. British divisions began WWI this size but shrank, US divisions began WWI this size, but in the Inter-War period the number shrank...from 1939 on most British, American, German, Russian divisions had NINE maneuver battalions. 12 battalions does not equal an "optimum" number...there is NO optimum number...the optimum number is determined by the nature of the enemy, the size of your force, and the terrain, or MET-T. A 12 battalion division works, if your goal is to keep a lot of troops in the trenches, and holding onto terrain, i.e. the AEF or the BEF in WWI.

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JFKY Yellichink 2/17/2009 9:48:18 AM

And yet, is the US Artillery SYSTEM, more or less lethal than the 2S19 or PLZ05? Remember, in the Second Gulf War (1991) the Iraqi artillery out-ranged the US M-109, how did that turn out? Again, aircraft, JDAMS, UAV?s, Radar, and C4I can all compensate for lessened range. IF the Chinese/Russian tubes cannot see or target or hit US artillery, then it is irrelevant what the range advantage is, IF the F-16/35 is bombing your position effectively US artillery out-ranges you?.

Finally, all those other systems mentioned are not likely to be shooting at US forces, so is it really a call for US ?reform?? Bearing in mind that the US must transport itself thousands of kilomtres and all its ammunition and all its spares. That necessitates a fairly light, and lethal package. So I?m not sure that in the larger picture that the US hasn?t gotten he mix right?.I can only think of one system that is ?better? than NLOS-C, in weight and range issues, the Israeli Rascal, in 155mm L39/45?.and even then it has a larger crew and is not turret-mounted.

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JFKY Herald.... 2/17/2009 9:58:28 AM

You keep talking about the Anaconda Plan, as IF it was the battle plan adopted by the US in the Civil War, and as IF it were an actual war plan, a la the Schlieffen Plan. The US ended up putting pressure on the Confederacy yes, on multiple fronts, but I have yet to read anyone claiming it was the result of the Anaconda Plan, plus the Confederacy was fatally weakened not by the Anaconda Plan but by the loss of the Mississippi River and the division of the Confederacy. You overstate the importance of the March to the Sea, and an idea is NOT a Plan. Winfield Scott had the ?Idea? of pressuring the Confederacy using the Union?s exterior lines, and greater manpower and economic power. That?s not a ?plan? that?s an idea for a strategy. A Plan is the Schlieffen Plan, that allocated resources, made time and phase lines for advances, and the like.

Next, you keep talking about War Plan Orange, as an example of pre-war planning done right?WHICH War Plan Orange do you mean? The one where we hold onto Guam and the Philippines or the ones where we lose them? The one that has the US fleet advancing in a pell-mell rush across the Pacific or the one that takes a longer more gradual approach? There were MANY ?War Plan Oranges.? So, War Plan Orange is NOT an example of pre-war planning that bore great fruit?SOME War Plan Oranges were and some were very bad plans, and anyway it was the Rainbow Plans that ?won? the Second World War, not the Orange Plans?.now if you mean that pre-war planning foresaw many of the challenges and developed ideas to overcome the challenges of a war with Japan, then YES, pre-war planning was of inestimable value. But, no, no pre-war War Plan Orange saw the defeat of Japan.

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LB Brigade Size 2/17/2009 9:59:59 AM

I do prefer commenting on things I actually wrote. What I said was the general consensus was, till recently, that the optimum brigade size was 4 maneuver battalions. This would be for a heavy brigade (mech or armor). One could point to MacGregor or Barnett or the actual 4 battalion brigade structure as used by the US Army, West Germany, South Korea, and USSR (OMG) circa 1990 for supporting evidence.

Interestingly the West Germans and South Koreans also included a 5th reserve battalion primarily in the role of rear area security. Having 2 brigade HQ's, 2 artillery batt HQ's, 2 support batt HQ's, etc., is simply never going to be more efficient than having 1 to control the same number of maneuver units. It wastes personnel. Binary units have a rather bad history, see Italian divisions 1930's and 1940's. Units designed for colonial warfare often have issues with modern enemies. Two battalions yield very few possible formations- 1 up and 1 back or 2 on the line.

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JFKY LB 2/17/2009 10:46:05 AM

and my response is that generally you're wrong, about the "optimum" size of brigade...that most war-time armies adopted the 9 maneuver battalion division in 3, 3 battalion regiments/brigades. Now So. Korea may have 4 or 5 battalions, but as soon as war broke out I'd be willing to bet that span of command and attrition would rapidly whittle them down to three maneuver battalions per brigade.

And you still ignore the FOUR RSTA squadrons in a US division....

I will grant your position that 2 battalion regiments don't have a great track record, mayhap increased firepower and situational awareness will compensate this time. I am skeptical, myself....

But to keep talking about brigades having only 2 units is false, and to state that optimum size is anything, much less four is also false.

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JFKY Leadership 2/17/2009 11:03:16 AM

Leadership!!!
The patrol and plaster tactics used during OIF took too many casualties and left guys with their butts hanging out without proper communications, air support or control. Officers were slow to utilize unmanned/robot systems - instead they opted to bust down doors with the old bad-ass entry and shoot 'em up. Top brass are more interested in micro managing unit activity than trying to supply them with the tools and turning them loose.

Some more specificity would be useful here, too. So troop?s butts were left hanging out and your evidence IS?? If their butts were hanging out so much why did the US suffer so few small unit defeats? Would it not be more correct to say, that had the US been fighting the Immum Gun or the Wehrmacht, that it might have suffered serious problems, but that facing an ill-trained and ill-equipped light infantry force that the US Army had the COORECT tactics? It would certainly seem that the battlefield result would support that conclusion more than your conclusion.

And the officers were unwilling to use robots and UAV/UGV?s? Again your evidence please? It would seem, then, that the US NCO and enlisted corps are running the US Army as the number of UAV's and UGV?s has skyrocketed! So are you saying the NCO?s revolted against the officers and these systems came on-line INSPITE of the officer corps? Would it not be fairer to say that the number of robotic/unmanned systems was very low in 2003, because the number of unmanned/robotic systems was very low, overall, in the US Army, as compared to say 2007 or 2008? In short there weren?t many UAV?s in Iraq, because there weren?t many UAV?s in the US Army. And in fact, isn?t it easier to conclude that the US Army adapted admirably, rather than being ?dinged? for non-adaptation?

The old knock down doors and shoot?em up?well when the bad guys are hiding INDOORS, that?s what you?re left with. Knocking down doors and arresting/killing them?What alternative strategy/tactics would you have proposed? Rolling a non-existent SWORD into the many apartments and buildings of Iraq? A little robot with an M-4 is all very nice, but it doesn?t allow you to detain the subject, it allows you to KILL the subject?you want to get suspects for further intell, you need people KICKING IN DOORS, not robots?.and ?shoot?em up?? Really, shoot?em up? So that?s why the civilian casualties were so low, we were shooting them up?.

Bottom-Line: your complaints about a ?broken? US Army ring pretty hollow. They simply lack a degree of detail and supporting evidence or underlying philosophy. What EXACTLY is broken, and how do the battlefield results support that contention, and what needs, EXACTLY to be fixed, and why? Instead, we seem to have some talking points, that are devoid of any evidence, and that seem to run counter to the outcomes observed and seem to follow a meme that is not supported by evidence?on the pistol, on the shoot?em up on the retention of combat veterans, and the like?.

I don?t argue that the US Army is perfect, or that the US Army is ready to take on?.the Cylons or the Saurons?but I DO argue that the US Army is more than capable, at the battalion/brigade/division level of dealing with the Russians, the PRC, the North Koreans, and the Iranians?you know our most likely opponents. And that in a choice between your ?broken? US Army and your ?fixed? US Army?.I?ll go with the ?broken? one.

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YelliChink 2/17/2009 11:55:14 AM

While that is true that overall ordinance delivery efficiency of US military is unmatchable, there are still chances which artillery longer range and higher ROF is not only preferred, but also a life-and-death matter. Suppose that if the US is forced to fight competent enemy who are able to come up with some technology or tactics to negate the effectiveness of US air power, and take advantage of weather condition, such as sand storm, blizzard or monsoon, to employ artillery strike on US forces bogged down by obstacles and well-designed and well-concealed fortification, then such a system is indeed preferred to have.

Also, as far as I know, Russians and Chinese are very happy to export 2S19 and PLZ05 systems, alone with artillery radar and ammunition carrier. It's very possible that the US will encounter an adversary who has some of these.

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