What Can We Do To Fix The US Army?

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HERALD1357 2/16/2009 2:30:41 PM

Herald, Your point of repeating the mistakes of the Brits. Did the Brits have a good plan, but lacked the means to pull it off? Is it a case of now we have the enablers that were lacking in the past?, ie: We are now mechanized as opposed to foot/pack horses?

They underestimated the number of troops they required and screwed up their LoC security, got themselves bogged down and DEFEATED at al Kut-which should be familiar to Americans where we ran into trouble.

The Mesopotamia Mess: The Brit...

Excerpts from Trapped Between ...

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HERALD1357 This ios erxactly the BS I'm talking about. 2/16/2009 2:38:54 PM

The successful militaries are the ones who planned their campaigns to the finish.

Sometimes but not always. That is why the statement "Fog of War" exist.

I can cite three times when I know this happened.

I could cite many times when the best laid plans saw the planner defeated. You can't foresee everything in war.

And then there was Plan Orange, the USN plan to do in Japan. When Hector C. Bywater gives you the blow by blow description and you as the Japanese don't see that freight train coming?

Yet the USN had set backs and had to adjust just as the U.S. Army and USMC have done in Iraq.

Another example: Norman Schwatzkopf had a strauight up the middle plan for Iraq 1 before the rest of the Army showed up, and then he dusted off the old Patton "left hook". Franks screwed that up, but then nobody US saw the escarpment that funneled him and slowed that cautious cavalryman down, so you can't blame him too much. Still the terrain reconnaissance was botched. You didn't see the British do this charging around in North Africa without a terrain reconnaissance (LRDG) in WW II, did you?.

Our terrain reconnaissance was picture perfect literally! That had nothing to do with it.

BULL! That escarpment came as a complete surprise to VII Corps which relied on NRO satellite maps to give them a clue as to terrain. Nobody scouted on foot, to see the DROPOFF and the few ways down. The satellite maps didn't show this because they didn't see the shadow contrast that would have revealed this from orbit.

Iraq 2 you could read a map and see a replay of the British invasion of 1916 in the works-this time with tanks. Should have read Teddy Roosevelt II's account of the British invasion and noted what the British did WRONG. We repeated their mistakes.

Not quite. However if you can elaborate perhaps this is just a different point of view.

I just did.

Just thought I'd put all of that out there so that we kniow just what underlies this discussion from MY viewpoint.

Thanks

Herald

-DA

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JFKY But Herald 2/16/2009 2:42:13 PM

We didn't get bogged down and/or defeated...and the LoC's were secure...I have read nothing that said the US ran short of any combat consumable that adversely affected operations.

Sure the Army might have wanted 1.25 hand grenades per troop in Iraq, and had only 1 per troop, but no operations were canceled or curtailed.

Sure there were all sorts of media reports about the Fedayeen Saddam and the like, but their actual EFFECT rather than their effect on the Big-4 news anchors was pretty small.

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HERALD1357 2/16/2009 2:53:16 PM

The conversation is one way. Data from me to you and all I get in return from you is platitudes.

No, it's not one way. Also, you haven't provided any data nor do you even have the data necessary to make the conclusions you do. What you have is an opinion based on a partial set of information. I have the military service, training and direct experience with the conflict we are discussion to support my assessment. IOW, what you are trying to discern from google searches and guestimation I've seen with the MK1 eyeball.

History is the teacher- or to quote my favorite guy:

"Solid planning always yields solid results."

Raymond Spruance

I don't suppose PLAN ORANGE means anything to you?

If you are going to make such an obviously bad supposition then that's on you. Rather than continue to error on this matter, ask questions. I can tell you from experience that no plan survives first contact with the enemy Herald. Things change in war and the DoD was the was it was because the Civilians in charge of it wanted it that way. We planned for solid results against the Russians and later the PRC only to find that Yeltsin purposely neutered the Russian Military for fear of coup and the PRC is more business partner and competitor rather than enemy.

We went to Iraq, fought and won a conventional conflict. In the post conflict, Iran and AQI poured gasoline on the fire causing the nation of tribes better known as Iraq to go into insurgency with a 3 year FID campaign. The DoD didn't have the manpower or organizational agility to deal with the sudden change because it spent too much effort looking at the PRC. What we did have were well led soldiers and marines trained to deal with it anyway who adapted to the threat. We also had the industrial capacity to rapidly flood the battlefield with light armor and EW/ISR assets that made the enemy tactics combat ineffective and we had a POTUS with the guts to stick it out. The only place well laid plans always work out are in peoples heads and on computer simulation. That's not the way war works in the real world. With regard to solid results, we got that. Which says a lot about the capability of the U.S. Army.

-DA

First, I don't ask questions of you. I've told you why.

Second, don't confuse operational concept with tactical execution.

In the Winfield Scott example, the Anaconda plan was EXACTLY the way the Confederacy was defeated. Grant may have dusted it off a bit in 1864, and Shernan added his March to the Sea to add another constriction but the main elements of fighting off the rivers; splitting the Werstern Confederacy off from the East along the Mississippi, then blockading the Confederate ports, and then seizing the ports showed Anaconda always being applied. Local setbacks like Shiloh, Vicksburgh or Chattanooga were LOCAL adjustsments to further push forward the PLAN un5til the final squeeze came in Virginia and North Carolina.

You totally confuse local tactical battle or contact with the strategic Warplan.

I DON'T.

Herald

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DarthAmerica 2/16/2009 3:18:49 PM

We didn't get bogged down and/or defeated...and the LoC's were secure...I have read nothing that said the US ran short of any combat consumable that adversely affected operations.

Sure the Army might have wanted 1.25 hand grenades per troop in Iraq, and had only 1 per troop, but no operations were canceled or curtailed.

Sure there were all sorts of media reports about the Fedayeen Saddam and the like, but their actual EFFECT rather than their effect on the Big-4 news anchors was pretty small.

This is exactly right. Good for you for not getting sucked in by enemy propaganda or media marketing. The insurgents were more of a political problem from President Bush than a serious impediment to operations. And we adjusted VERY quickly to them and then killed them. Militarily it was a route.

-DA

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DarthAmerica 2/16/2009 3:26:03 PM

First, I don't ask questions of you. I've told you why.

Second, don't confuse operational concept with tactical execution.

OK well then why post in threads where I'm present? Let it go, Jesus. Also there is no confusion with either. There is a misunderstanding here by some of you about what happened and why. The bad analogies prove that....

You totally confuse local tactical battle or contact with the strategic Warplan.

I DON'T.

Good, no one accused you of that. Now back to the topic...

There wasn't a problem with our LOC which work remarkably well and are redundant and robust. The Leadership is excellent as is the training keeping in mind that both can always be improved and a good Army is both quick to recognize and implement which we did and continue to do.

-DA

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JFKY Artillery 2/16/2009 3:56:57 PM

Artillery - can someone please finally pick a SP 155 platform that makes sense??

and

Artillery is major weakness of US Army. It would have been a mistake to cancel Crusader, if NLOS-C can't come to service fast enough. US Army is now out-gunned by Germans, French, Brits, Russians (always) and Chinese (yes, the Chinese have better SPH). Granted that US artillery is more effective than Russians and Chinese due to doctrinal difference, it still doesn't make up for the deficiency from the system itself.

And exactly what is wrong with US artillery? If, US Artillery is superior to Russian and Chinese artillery, our main opponents, why does it need to be "superior" to German, British, and French artillery? And how do you define superior? The Crusader was a Cold War piece, for an army that was going to deploy it's forces, largely PRE-WAR, in Germany and fight in the Fulda Gap. That army is gone...N-LOS-C makes a deal more sense. it's deployable, unlike the 55 ton Crusader.

The USAF, JDAMS, UAV, Excalibur, and MLRS (GMLRS) have made US artillery a lot more lethal, so what SPECIFICALLY would anyone propose, rather than these gratuitous assertions that there ware problems that need to be "fixed?"

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JFKY Trucks 2/16/2009 3:58:24 PM

Ground transport - better armored trucks seem to be in order here.

Why? Trucks carry things and people, not armour....increase armour, DECREASE payload....or Increase overall weight, cost and maintenance burden.

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JFKY Infantry 2/16/2009 4:06:32 PM

Infantry - we have the M-4 procurement to complete and Geeezzz Louise... replace the 9 MM pistol with the 1911. Buy more 50 cals. Improve local intell - small UAVs, trained translators and handlers instead of tearing around town trying to be nasty. ID systems for both captured enemy as well as friendly forces.

Do we need to replace the M-4 or replace the M-16? Your posting is unclear....and why do we need to "complete" this replacement?

The M1911 is a FINE pistol, for male marksmen, but it is a sub-optimal round for the average shooter and womyn.... most users of the pistol have it as a weapon of last resort, it needs to be something that is handy and usable....the M-1911 requires a LOT of practice, to be useful...sure when in the hands of an expert it is deadly, most folks with pistols are not experts, and we would be wasting time and money in making them so. Lastly, according to Horsesoldier most of the Soldier Poll" complaints about the M-9 come from troops that never used it in combat.

Why more .50 cal weapons? Do you mean M-2's, do you mean M-312's, what? Do you mean more .50 sniper rifles? Why? Demonstrate a need for the average infantry unit to engage a target at 1,500 metres plus....What's wrong with a 7.62 mm or a Lapua .338 (8.6 mm)? These reach to ranges of 800 to 1,000 metres reliably, accurately and lethally?

Some of your complaints about stuff that needs "fix'n" is very vague...it's up to YOU to demonstrate that there's a problem, and what you would "fix" and how in these categories.

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JFKY What are you talking/maundering on about here? 2/16/2009 4:28:58 PM

Training and logistical support - develop and deploy small unit tactics - these were very ineffective especially in urban environments. A NTC for small unit and urban warfare is in order here. Make use of combat experience vets instead of simply letting them wander off. We did that in WII and Korea - it works and saves lives. Instead, we muster them out after being assured they will not go bezerk and pop a cap in someone.
The small unit tactics employed seem to work quite well, thank you very much. I wonder exactly how successful you have to be to get a passing grenade from Softwar? We lost at best one company-sized engagement, the 507th Maintenance debacle, and after that won every engagement platoon-sized or better, and only lost less than 5 rifle section sized firefights...in FIVE YEARS, a nd the US Army had bad tactics?

And make use of combat vets? Uh Helllloooooooo, that's what multiple tours in Iraq did!? That's what the high reenlistment rate guaranteed? have you read any of the books on Fallujah, the Marine units had multiple combat veterans, and they trained the units very hard PRIOR to Iraq deployment....they didn't just wander off...

And reenlistment bonuses, again Helllooooooo the US Army works(ed) very hard to keep it's combat veteran NCO's "in."

This is a weird complaint, dude....I can't grasp which army you are talking about, here...is it your contention that the US Army said, "OK, all you combat veterans, get the F*CK out so we can replace you with new sheeple/cannon-fodder?" Or that the US Army should have told those who's tours were up, "No you MUST stay, no matter what your contract says?"

I'm sorry this "complaint" about the "Broken" army just makes no sense. Seriously, you need to elaborate on these issues and make it clear exactly what the problem, you see was and how it can be fixed...

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