Military History | How To Make War | Wars Around the World Rules of Use How to Behave on an Internet Forum
Armed Forces of the World Discussion Board
   Return to Topic Page
Subject: Rising Sun over Hawaii....
Godofgamblers    3/3/2008 2:03:12 AM
IN this scenario, the IJN invades Hawaii instead of a hit and run attack on Pearl. One of the invasion groups that struck Wake, or Indonesia, instead re routed to Hawaii and siezed enough real estate to make it unusable as a resupply/logistical center. The US lines of communication with Australia-NewZeland-Philipines would have been broken irrevocably for at least a year and a half. All points west severed it also catches the US oil stock and fleet repair assets in the port. Nobody can argue I think that the US forces could have repelled the invasion by say 15,000 Japanese Marines fresh from duty in China. The entire Japanese gambit in WWII was to make the US sue for peace rather than fight it out in a protracted conflict. We know what happened when the Japanese missed our carriers and ran off. In my new scenario the battle of Guadalcanal never happens because the IJN have successfully severed the artery in the middle of the pacific.
 
Quote    Reply

Show Only Poster Name and Title     Newest to Oldest
Pages: PREV  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11   NEXT
Herald12345       3/17/2008 12:11:48 PM





challenging a wee sailboat is just a bit different from dealing with a large merchant ship especially if it was a scheduled delivery. 
has it really been that long you've been posting dreck and ignoring the historical record when it disagrees with your overactive fantasy life?  horses are horses, longbows are weak weapons, the tigris is too shallow and so forth.


US freighters entering a US NAVAL BASE were boarded and inspected before they ever approached  the main channel to have their ladings and registration checked and specifically  TO PUT A PILOT ABOARD SO THEY COULD BE GUIDED INTO HARBOR AND PROPERLY BERTHED.

A Japanese ruse de guerre  blockship the Ward would have warning shot and then torpedoed upon rejection of challenge per standing orders as a picket ship.

You don't know how merchant vessels approach a harbor much less a naval base then or now??

I suggest you just stop posting nonsense.

Herald
 
Quote    Reply

Ispose    Herald Question   3/17/2008 3:36:30 PM
As to converting slow ocean liners, starting in 1938.

Candidates:
Dollar Lines transferred to APl
1. SS President  Hoover
2. SS President Coolidge
United States Lines
3. SS America
4. SS Manhattan
SS Washington
Matson Lines
5. SS Lurline
6. SS Mariposa

As built by Bethlehem Shipbuilding or New York Shipbuilding, these passenger freighters all shared the following characteristics

displacement 20,000 -23000  tonnes displacement
speed            20-22 knots; capable of 25 knots when steam-plant uprated             
length  awl     620-650  feet.
as converted: estimated aircraft capacity between 40-60 aircraft.

Available for conversion; 1938 on.
Estimated time to convert-12-18 months. [As long as it took the  Japanese to convert the Junyos. If American shipyard s which turned Essexes out in 28 months could not do better, then something is WRONG with that estimate.

Cost per conversion FY 1938 dollars [estimate] $20-25M US. 

Available for service-2-4  conversions  NLT than Jume 1941.

Treaty violation? No.Japan renounced the London Treaty in 1937, all bets are off.

Result of this possible finagle? More carriers for the Pacific when the crunch time came in mid 1942, and no stalled Solomons offensive until February 1943.

Herald
I'm no naval expert but just how effective would these ships be in Combat?. I'm thinking their Damage Control and Toughness would be marginal. I realize that any Carrier is better than no carrier and these would be pulled from the Fleet and used for escort duty or training as soon as enough Essexes would be available.
I know these ships were used for troop transport duty quite heavily...how would converting these ships affected our ability to ship troops to where they were needed?
Just wondering
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345       3/18/2008 1:50:20 AM

As to converting slow ocean liners, starting in 1938.

Candidates:
Dollar Lines transferred to APl
1. SS President  Hoover
2. SS President Coolidge
United States Lines
3. SS America
4. SS Manhattan
5. SS Washington
Matson Lines
6. SS Lurline
7. SS Mariposa

As built by Bethlehem Shipbuilding or New York Shipbuilding, these passenger freighters all shared the following characteristics

displacement 20,000 -23000  tonnes displacement
speed            20-22 knots; capable of 25 knots when steam-plant uprated             
length  awl     620-650  feet.
as converted: estimated aircraft capacity between 40-60 aircraft.

Available for conversion; 1938 on.
Estimated time to convert-12-18 months. [As long as it took the  Japanese to convert the Junyos. If American shipyard s which turned Essexes out in 28 months could not do better, then something is WRONG with that estimate.

Cost per conversion FY 1938 dollars [estimate] $20-25M US. 

Available for service-2-4  conversions  NLT than Jume 1941.

Treaty violation? No.Japan renounced the London Treaty in 1937, all bets are off.

Result of this possible finagle? More carriers for the Pacific when the crunch time came in mid 1942, and no stalled Solomons offensive until February 1943.

Herald

I'm no naval expert but just how effective would these ships be in Combat?. I'm thinking their Damage Control and Toughness would be marginal. I realize that any Carrier is better than no carrier and these would be pulled from the Fleet and used for escort duty or training as soon as enough Essexes would be available.

Good question. Answer is to look at a Kaiser Koffin and see how well they did .

USS Gambier Bay: Huxtable's account.

Kalinin Bay was sunk by a single Long Lance that broke her keel.

St Lo was hit in the torpedo magazine by a Kamikaze that sank her after a thirty minute losing damage control battle.

http://www.angelfire.com/fm/odyssey/Casablanca1.JPG">


Data

Displacement:  7,800 tons standard displacement

Length at waterline:  490 feet

Length Overall:  512.25 feet

Beam (hull):  65.25 feet

Extreme beam:  108 feet

Draught:  22 feet

Propulsion:  Reciprocating - two shaft - shaft horse power 9,000

Speed (designed):  19.25 knots

Speed (actual service speed):  17.5 to 18 knots

Gun armament:   1 - 5-inch 38 cal. gun mounted at stern
                           16 - 40mm. AA in twin mounts
                           24 - 20mm. AA in single mounts

Aircraft:  28

Complement:  860

 
Quote    Reply

Godofgamblers    rocky, herald   3/18/2008 5:57:17 AM
By the way, rocky, congratulations on a great idea for a thread. It has attracted a lot of interest.
 
By the way, Herald, I wanted to ask you why the Pacific war is one of your favorite subjects. Was it your specialty at university? Did your father serve in that conflict? Just curious...
 
Quote    Reply

Ehran       3/18/2008 12:16:53 PM

IIRC Herald was correct in every single one of those friends based on a myriad of historical texts.  Stick to the thread at hand there is no need to pollute another one with more feuding between you two. 



if herald could manage a modicum of civility that would be good.  however he seems only to be able to manage that under threat of having his posting privileges revoked by the sysops.  you might also look back a few posts and watch his pattern of repeated insults rather than simply explaining why he disagrees with something i've posted.
 
i'm just waiting for him to pop a cork and get tossed off the board at which point i will have a jolly good laugh.
 
Quote    Reply

larryjcr       3/18/2008 2:56:35 PM




I feel like I should point out that at Midway, Spruance was NOT in command until late in the day.  VAd Frank Jack Fletcher was in command until he delegated to Spruance after the second attack on Yorktown.  By that time three IJN carriers had been mortally damaged, and the strike that would kill the fourth was already on the way.  It was Fletcher's battle and he won it.  Spruance's contribution was the decision to withdraw eastward after the attack on HIRYU to evade possible IJN surface attack.




Fletcher was senior in rank, but the man who did the planning when Halsey's staff collapsed into imbecility; the donkey work of fighting the battle mentally out in his head; and then implementing those moves; when their [Halsey's staff] miserable staff work failed him, and did most of the planning as well as actual damage, was SPRUANCE.

Nimitz didn't make Fletcher hisd chief of staff or look to Fletcher to whip CincPac into shape. It was Spruance. It wasn't Fletcher who was sent to face down Ozawa. it was Spruance.

And in carrier battles it wasn't Fletcher who won decisive victories. It was Spruance.

Fletcher was creamed at Coral Sea and Midway. At Coral sea he second fiddeled to Aubrey Fitch who handled the air battle as well as could be expected.with the green crews and  polots he had.

Fletcher second fiddled to Spruance again at Midway  leaving  Raymond, the junior admiral, virtually holding the bag for whatever would go wrong; if that battle went south.

During the invasion of Guadalcanal, Fletcher was the carrier admiral commanding. He RAN  for it leaving the invasion force uncovered and is held responsible for denying the Marines air cover during the critical 48 hours when the Japanese wiped out Rear Admiral Crutchley.at Savo Island.  Fortunately  Mikawa didn't know about that or the  invasion transports would have joined Crutchley's cruisers at the bottom of Iron Bottom Sound.

Let's see how Fletcher did in the Eastern Solomons when left to fend for himself?

Well he did sink the Ryujo. But in that battle and subsequent operations he got the Enterprise and Saratoga clobbered. It was the imbecile Halsey who lost Wasp and Hornet, so you can't blame Fletcher for that, but you get the idea?

Fletcher was transferred to Alaska; where he could do no further harm. When it came time to kick off on Japan's donkey and ream the IJN according to those old dusty War-plan Orange studies [the USN main effort], Nimitz sent the best admiral he had: SPRUANCE.

Fletcher pfui!

Herald       
 

You should try to do some research, Herald.
To avoid getting overlong, I'll do this in a series of post, one on each battle.
Coral Sea:
At the time of the Coral Sea battle, the IJN Kido Butai (Mobile Striking Force) of 6 CVs, 2 BBs, 2 CAs and escort was the most powerful naval force in the world.  Fletcher tricked the Japanese into committing only a  part of this force in their Port Morsby operation, opening the chance to destroy it in detail.  By remaining out of port (away from prying eyes) and just beyond the range of IJN patrol searches, he convince the Japanese that the US CVs had left the South Pacific, and nothing larger than a heavy cruiser would be there to oppose them.  Two CVs were sent to support the Morsby landing by attacking Allied land based air.
Fitch, who had more aviation experience, served as Fletcher's chief of staff for air.  He didn't run the battle, Fletcher did.  Fitch handled CAP, searches and strike planning, but Fletcher decided fleet movements, and when, and what, would be attacked.
As to getting 'creamed' at Coral Sea, the US losses were: 1 CV sunk, 1 CV damaged.  The IJN lost 1 CVL sunk, 1 CV damaged, and heavier losses in a/c and air crews compared to the USN. 
It can be argued that the Japanese won a victory on the tactical level as their ship losses were lighter, but the mission was to capture Port Morsby, and they didn't.  Fletcher's mission was to protect Morsby and he succeeded, so the battle was a clear cut victory for the USN and RAN forces, and for Fletcher on the operational level.
As a result of the Battle of the Coral Sea, a two of the Kido Butai's carriers were out of act
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    Dream on.   3/18/2008 3:00:48 PM




IIRC Herald was correct in every single one of those friends based on a myriad of historical texts.  Stick to the thread at hand there is no need to pollute another one with more feuding between you two. 





if herald could manage a modicum of civility that would be good.  however he seems only to be able to manage that under threat of having his posting privileges revoked by the sysops.  you might also look back a few posts and watch his pattern of repeated insults rather than simply explaining why he disagrees with something i've posted.

 

i'm just waiting for him to pop a cork and get tossed off the board at which point i will have a jolly good laugh.


That you are too obtuse to see that I never describe you without also pointing out your errors is obvious.

As for popping a cork, I simply note that you are comically arrogant in your stupidity, incompetent.in your presentation of  fact, and shockingly ignorant.about the simplest of things-like how ships approach harbor traffic control. [specific error pointed out.]

When you stop being a stupidly arrogant clown, I'll stop treating you like you are stupidly arrogant clown.

But as long as you present yourself as something you are, you will be so described: I always point out the QUALITY of the argument and the arguer on the other side when the arguer makes himself the issue.

NOW do you actually have something intelligent to say about Pearl Harbor or are you going to continue with your useless commentary spouting unsupported opinion and whining; when I continue to take your latest ridiculous assertion apart and negate it with FACT? I would like to see you step up out of the List 2 set JUST ONCE.

Herald
 
Quote    Reply

larryjcr       3/18/2008 3:42:43 PM




I feel like I should point out that at Midway, Spruance was NOT in command until late in the day.  VAd Frank Jack Fletcher was in command until he delegated to Spruance after the second attack on Yorktown.  By that time three IJN carriers had been mortally damaged, and the strike that would kill the fourth was already on the way.  It was Fletcher's battle and he won it.  Spruance's contribution was the decision to withdraw eastward after the attack on HIRYU to evade possible IJN surface attack.




Fletcher was senior in rank, but the man who did the planning when Halsey's staff collapsed into imbecility; the donkey work of fighting the battle mentally out in his head; and then implementing those moves; when their [Halsey's staff] miserable staff work failed him, and did most of the planning as well as actual damage, was SPRUANCE.

Nimitz didn't make Fletcher hisd chief of staff or look to Fletcher to whip CincPac into shape. It was Spruance. It wasn't Fletcher who was sent to face down Ozawa. it was Spruance.

And in carrier battles it wasn't Fletcher who won decisive victories. It was Spruance.

Fletcher was creamed at Coral Sea and Midway. At Coral sea he second fiddeled to Aubrey Fitch who handled the air battle as well as could be expected.with the green crews and  polots he had.

Fletcher second fiddled to Spruance again at Midway  leaving  Raymond, the junior admiral, virtually holding the bag for whatever would go wrong; if that battle went south.

During the invasion of Guadalcanal, Fletcher was the carrier admiral commanding. He RAN  for it leaving the invasion force uncovered and is held responsible for denying the Marines air cover during the critical 48 hours when the Japanese wiped out Rear Admiral Crutchley.at Savo Island.  Fortunately  Mikawa didn't know about that or the  invasion transports would have joined Crutchley's cruisers at the bottom of Iron Bottom Sound.

Let's see how Fletcher did in the Eastern Solomons when left to fend for himself?

Well he did sink the Ryujo. But in that battle and subsequent operations he got the Enterprise and Saratoga clobbered. It was the imbecile Halsey who lost Wasp and Hornet, so you can't blame Fletcher for that, but you get the idea?

Fletcher was transferred to Alaska; where he could do no further harm. When it came time to kick off on Japan's donkey and ream the IJN according to those old dusty War-plan Orange studies [the USN main effort], Nimitz sent the best admiral he had: SPRUANCE.

Fletcher pfui!

Herald       
 

Midway:
The planning for Midway was done before TF16 ever left Pearl Harbor.  Neither Spruance or anyone else did it 'out of his head'.  Spurance, who had much less technical knowledge of aviation than Fletcher, certainly didn't.  Spruance's staff (formerly Halsey's) under Capt. Miles Browning (a prima donna who had been told he was a genius once too often and believed it) fumbled operational planning in several respects.  They misjudged where the IJN CV force would be found when the strike arrived, and they misjudged TF16s rate of advance resulting in the loss of a number of a/c (especially from Hornet) due to fuel exhaustion.  But Spruance did (and could have done) nothing about it.
 
The Midway plan prepared in Nimitz's HQ at Pearl was for the the TFs, (TF16, Enterprise and Hornet and TF17, Yorktown) would operate together unter Fletcher's command, with Yorktown doing the air searches and CAP while Hornet and Enterprise were kept spotted to launch a strike at short notice.  When the IJN force was reported, Fletcher ordered Spruance to close on them and attack when he was in range.  TF17 would follow as soon as its search planes were recovered, and follow up TF16s attack.
 
Although Nimitz's, and Fletcher's orders, and and Spruance's battle order, emphsized the need to co-ordinate the USN attack, no one in TF16 seems to have made any effort do actually do so.  Not Spruance (who wouldn't have known how), not Browning, or Murray (Enterprise's Capt.), or Marc Mitscher (Hornet's Capt.), or their CAGs, McClusky and Ring.  None of them.  As a result, the air strike from TF16 went out in four seperate packets. 
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    Dream on.   3/18/2008 4:37:39 PM








I feel like I should point out that at Midway, Spruance was NOT in command until late in the day.  VAd Frank Jack Fletcher was in command until he delegated to Spruance after the second attack on Yorktown.  By that time three IJN carriers had been mortally damaged, and the strike that would kill the fourth was already on the way.  It was Fletcher's battle and he won it.  Spruance's contribution was the decision to withdraw eastward after the attack on HIRYU to evade possible IJN surface attack.






Fletcher was senior in rank, but the man who did the planning when Halsey's staff collapsed into imbecility; the donkey work of fighting the battle mentally out in his head; and then implementing those moves; when their [Halsey's staff] miserable staff work failed him, and did most of the planning as well as actual damage, was SPRUANCE.

Nimitz didn't make Fletcher hisd chief of staff or look to Fletcher to whip CincPac into shape. It was Spruance. It wasn't Fletcher who was sent to face down Ozawa. it was Spruance.

And in carrier battles it wasn't Fletcher who won decisive victories. It was Spruance.

Fletcher was creamed at Coral Sea and Midway. At Coral sea he second fiddeled to Aubrey Fitch who handled the air battle as well as could be expected.with the green crews and  polots he had.

Fletcher second fiddled to Spruance again at Midway  leaving  Raymond, the junior admiral, virtually holding the bag for whatever would go wrong; if that battle went south.

During the invasion of Guadalcanal, Fletcher was the carrier admiral commanding. He RAN  for it leaving the invasion force uncovered and is held responsible for denying the Marines air cover during the critical 48 hours when the Japanese wiped out Rear Admiral Crutchley.at Savo Island.  Fortunately  Mikawa didn't know about that or the  invasion transports would have joined Crutchley's cruisers at the bottom of Iron Bottom Sound.

Let's see how Fletcher did in the Eastern Solomons when left to fend for himself?

Well he did sink the Ryujo. But in that battle and subsequent operations he got the Enterprise and Saratoga clobbered. It was the imbecile Halsey who lost Wasp and Hornet, so you can't blame Fletcher for that, but you get the idea?

Fletcher was transferred to Alaska; where he could do no further harm. When it came time to kick off on Japan's donkey and ream the IJN according to those old dusty War-plan Orange studies [the USN main effort], Nimitz sent the best admiral he had: SPRUANCE.

Fletcher pfui!

Herald       
 


You should try to do some research, Herald.{You have got to be kidding]
To avoid getting overlong, I'll do this in a series of post, one on each battle.

Coral Sea:

At the time of the Coral Sea battle, the IJN Kido Butai (Mobile Striking Force) of 6 CVs, 2 BBs, 2 CAs and escort was the most powerful naval force in the world.  Fletcher tricked the Japanese into committing only a  part of this force in their Port Morsby operation, opening the chance to destroy it in detail.  By remaining out of port (away from prying eyes) and just beyond the range of IJN patrol searches, he convince the Japanese that the US CVs had left the South Pacific, and nothing larger than a heavy cruiser would be there to oppose them.  Two CVs were sent to support the Morsby landing by attacking Allied land based air.

That was Nimitz guidance in the Coral Sea Op orders. It was also Nimitz planning to leave the Hornet and Enterprise at sea in the area to convince the Japanese that the Americans didn't know MI and AL was in the works. POINT ONE discredited..

Fitch, who had more aviation experience, served as Fletcher's chief of staff for air.  He didn't run the battle, Fletcher did.  Fitch handled CAP, searches and strike planning, but Fletcher decided fleet movements, and when, and what, would be attacked.

The man who runs air ops runs the carrier air weapon and is principle adviser and PLANNER on naval air tactics as to what to hit and when. That is why Miles Browning who flatly failed Spruance at Midway was beached and buried in a career dead end because He FUed  those specific staffing issues leaving Spruance to lone ranger the battle totally  since Fletcher and crew weren't that much help eithe
 
Quote    Reply

larryjcr    Guadalcanal   3/18/2008 4:59:58 PM




I feel like I should point out that at Midway, Spruance was NOT in command until late in the day.  VAd Frank Jack Fletcher was in command until he delegated to Spruance after the second attack on Yorktown.  By that time three IJN carriers had been mortally damaged, and the strike that would kill the fourth was already on the way.  It was Fletcher's battle and he won it.  Spruance's contribution was the decision to withdraw eastward after the attack on HIRYU to evade possible IJN surface attack.




Fletcher was senior in rank, but the man who did the planning when Halsey's staff collapsed into imbecility; the donkey work of fighting the battle mentally out in his head; and then implementing those moves; when their [Halsey's staff] miserable staff work failed him, and did most of the planning as well as actual damage, was SPRUANCE.

Nimitz didn't make Fletcher hisd chief of staff or look to Fletcher to whip CincPac into shape. It was Spruance. It wasn't Fletcher who was sent to face down Ozawa. it was Spruance.

And in carrier battles it wasn't Fletcher who won decisive victories. It was Spruance.

Fletcher was creamed at Coral Sea and Midway. At Coral sea he second fiddeled to Aubrey Fitch who handled the air battle as well as could be expected.with the green crews and  polots he had.

Fletcher second fiddled to Spruance again at Midway  leaving  Raymond, the junior admiral, virtually holding the bag for whatever would go wrong; if that battle went south.

During the invasion of Guadalcanal, Fletcher was the carrier admiral commanding. He RAN  for it leaving the invasion force uncovered and is held responsible for denying the Marines air cover during the critical 48 hours when the Japanese wiped out Rear Admiral Crutchley.at Savo Island.  Fortunately  Mikawa didn't know about that or the  invasion transports would have joined Crutchley's cruisers at the bottom of Iron Bottom Sound.

Let's see how Fletcher did in the Eastern Solomons when left to fend for himself?

Well he did sink the Ryujo. But in that battle and subsequent operations he got the Enterprise and Saratoga clobbered. It was the imbecile Halsey who lost Wasp and Hornet, so you can't blame Fletcher for that, but you get the idea?

Fletcher was transferred to Alaska; where he could do no further harm. When it came time to kick off on Japan's donkey and ream the IJN according to those old dusty War-plan Orange studies [the USN main effort], Nimitz sent the best admiral he had: SPRUANCE.

Fletcher pfui!

Herald       
 

Guadalcanal:
In the pre-invasion plan, Fletcher was responsible for providing air cover for TWO DAYS.  Kelly Turner insisted that in that time he would unload the transports and withdraw all of them, and all but five of the cargo ships, which would be protected by the cruisers while they finished unloading.  Turner was seriously overconfident as it turned out.  Off loading went much more slowly than he had intended.  In any event, after dark on the second day, he called both RAd Crutchley and Gen Vandergrift to a meeting to discuss his intention to pull out ALL surface forces the next morning.  Attending that meeting was the reason that Crutchley and his flagship RANS Australia, were not with the other cruisers during the battle.  Shortly AFTER that, he was notified by Fletcher that the CVs would be withdrawing as planned.  He had provided the two days cover and couldn't stay longer due to losses to his fighter squadrons.  The Marines support was leaving anyway.
 
Fletcher would have had no way of attacking the Japanese CAs as they pulled out anyway.  They timed their move to be far enough up the Slot by daybreak to be able to avoid attack from carriers south of Guadalcanal.  As you yourself admitt, the reason they didn't stay to attack the transports was fear of CV air and the need to get away from it.  Fletcher's withdrawl simply wasn't a factor in how things worked out.
 
His critics either choose to forget, or simply don't grasp, that Fletcher's primary mission was to protect the Marines from the one danger that they couldn't hope to beat with their own resources: a major counter-landing with heavy surface ship suppo
 
Quote    Reply
PREV  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11   NEXT



 Latest
 News
 
 Most
 Read
 
 Most
 Commented
 Hot
 Topics