While it is not an excuse nor a reason for it happening, the number of US birds in the air is far greater than any other country's air commitment to the conflict. While there is no way of proving it, it is possible that if britain/canada/netherlands/etc. Had similar/same numbers commited and similar/same numbers of instances of 'answering the call' the number of blue incidents could be equal. There very well may be some truth in the 'national guard/less experience' argument, but I don't see any way of it being proven.  I hate to have to put it this way but making mistakes is a very basic and common human function, that much is undeniable, and there can be no control over where mistakes/accidents occur. As I mentioned in another thread with a similar question, I praise the US for continually answering the call and one thing that you must ever do is label the many because of the actions of a few. There are a great number of pilots [be they helicopter or fixed wing] both US and British [and ofcourse of many other nationalities] whose actions go unpraised when really they should be hailed as nothing less than heroic.

 

Concerning the longbow, bear in mind that that technology was designed with the Russians and all their equipment in mind [please, someone correct me here if I am wrong], not for individuals running around in sandels and driving toyotas.

 

Also, while I [and I'm sure others on this site] respect your attitude and unemotional approach to this topic, don't be surprised if the response to this thread is minimal, this kind of discussion has a habit of luring the idiots [you know who you are] and turns awry rather early on.

I was sure I had spelt it NEVER instead of ever in my above post concerning letting the actions of a few determine your attitude towards the rest

Bob actually put it as well or better than I could.  If you look at the actual number of friendly fire incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan you would find that they are very low in comparison with other conflicts.  However, the rapid flow of information in this modern world has made it possible to broadcast every single blue on blue incident almost as soon as it happens.  In addition to that you have to consider the virulent anti-American bias that is prevalent in the European press.  There are many individuals and groups in this world that will do everything they can to portray Americans as stupid, careless, and warlike, and as such they are quick to report any incident in which American forces accidentally kill or wound soldiers from other coalition militaries, regardless of the circumstances that surrounded the incident.  "US Air Force aircraft kills British (or Australian, Canadian, Dutch, et al.) soldier in friendly fire incident"---for a lot of people that would be the entire story.  They are uninterested in finding out why it happened.  Sure, Clarkey seems to want to know the answer to this question, but he poses it more or less as "why do these friendly fire incidents still happen, and why is it always Americans?"  The question seems to answer itself, and that's what frustrates many of us Americans.

 

I think much of it has to do with numbers and the type of missions being flown.  Americans are flying the vast majority of the CAS missions, and therefore will be responsible for most of the friendly fire incidents.  That's the law of averages. 

 

I do want to make one point about National Guard pilots.  If anything, National Guard pilots on average are MORE experienced than their regular Air Force counterparts.  They are older, more mature, and have more flying time than the twenty somethings flying for the Air Force.  Most of the National Guard guys did time in the Air Force, and have logged many, many hours of flight time.  If it is proven that the vast majority of the friendly fire incidents were committed by NG pilots then I will concede the point, but I don't think that you can dismiss them off hand. 

In the interests of accuracy, Apache in UK and US service are flown by Army pilots.  The US ones may be NG (I don't know) but their training regime will be different to Air Force pilots.  Furthermore Apache operating in close support of UK ground troops are under a controller on the ground, usually a specifically trained AH controller.  That said sod's law says events will sometimes unroll in a way that one isn't available.  Perhaps the guy on the ground was a Geordie and the US pilot couldn't understand him.

There are dozens of examples of the RAF "brassing up" it's own side. Do a google search and you will find them. Also, as for friendly fire, I seem to recall that only a month ago the British killed 2 Danes in a freindly fire incident. CAS is a human endeavor subject to human error, and I would bet that US friendly fire incidents are often just as much the fault of British FAC's as American pilots.

1.  Apaches aren't flown by RAF.

2.  No doubt there were incidents of the RAF getting it wrong in WW2, although in that war there weren't any FACs (at least not in the modern sense) although as the army learnt the control measures around the tactical use of medium and heavy bombers did develop continuously and they tried to keep tight control of RAF actions inside the bomb line.  Don't know about Korea but haven't heard of any since then, not least because there haven't been many opportunites.  Now turning up late is another matter altogether ;-)

3.  The incident with the Danes seems to have happened several months ago (end Sep, I was in Denmark at the time), and wasn't realised until the Danes completed autopsies that it was a friendly fire incident.  It was probably a very confusing fire fight and in these situations fratricide is very easy (is it clear yet if it was day or night?).

4.  Although it's not being revealed which Apache attacked first the fact that the UK one got it right and a US one didn't is at least inviting pointed questions

5.  I have no doubt that the UK will fully cooperate with the Danes in trying to establish what happened, although it's likely to be difficult given the length of time before it was discovered.  We wait to see whether the US will be similarly cooperative.

Britsih freindly fire in North Africa was horrendous. Not only that, British air support back then had a habbit of not showing up. (ie Kessarine Pass). If you google British friendly fire incidents you will find plenty of them. Considering there has been only 4 or 5 Brits killed in the entire GWOT, I wouldn't get hysterical over friendly fire. Imagine how many British body bags would be coming home without US CAS?

1.  I am totally unable to see the relevance of fratricide in WW2 (or WW1) to today.  In world war when stakes are very high far greater risks are taken and there is acceptance that there may be fewer double checks to detect mistakes.  There's a difference between a ground commander choosing the lesser of two evils knowing that he may suffer casualties from friendly fire support and being the target of friendly fire due the the deliverers incompetance. 

 

2.  Troops on the ground in contact make judgements about the possibility of own casualties if they have to bring fire close to themselves.  There's nothing new in this, it's a long standing practice with artillery and no doubt was used with CAS as well (and may have been extensive in WW2).  However, they make these judgements with the assumption that the fire deliverers will put it where they want it.

 

3.  I'm also at a total loss to understand why fractricide casualties are the cost of  US CAS 'saving' other lives and that UK (or any other nations) should be prepared to pay for being an ally of the US.  This strikes me as extremely arrogant and clutching are very thin straws in the unsuccesfull search for excuses. 

 

1.   Of course you don't see the relevance.  That seems to be the way these "Why does this keep happening?" threads go.  Any argument or possible counterpoint is either ignored or completely disregarded.  It seems that to many British, Canadians and other Europeans the most common inference that is drawn for the reason there are "so many" friendly fire casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan is simply because Americans are a bunch of trigger happy cowboys and f%#k ups.  Many conclude that it is somehow part of our national character, and a few even go so far as to imply that somehow European troops are either incapable, or at least much less likely, to commit friendly fire incidents.  That is where the WWII comparison is relevant.  British forces (and any other country, for that matter) are quite capable of making deadly mistakes during the fog of war.  The Brits were responsible for many "blue on blue" incidents in WWII, and there were some in the Falklands as well.  

 

2.   When you call for an air strike or artillery barrage when you are in close contact with the enemy, you are certainly taking a chance that you could take friendly casualties, hence the concept of "danger close."  If you're dead, you're dead regardless of who fired the shots, but if you're in the middle of a firefight you know that your chances of survival are better if more of the enemy are dead or seeking cover.   The best ways to do that is to call in artillery or CAS, and the closer you are to the enemy, the more likely you are to suffer friendly fire casualties.  You certainly hope the bombs and missiles will land where they are supposed to (on the bad guys), but sometimes they don't.  They are many examples of commanders even calling in strikes on their own positions, knowing full well that their own troops will probably suffer casualties.  They do this because they hope to break the enemies' momentum and turn the tide. 

 

3.   Come now, can you really honestly say this?  As I said in the previous point, the reason you call in CAS is because you are already in deep trouble.  If you were a commander, and your unit was at the risk of being overrun, would you take a chance of losing a few of your men in a CAS strike in order to save the rest of your unit?  If a CAS, regardless of who's flying it, accidentally kills one or two of your troops, but at the same time kills a dozen or more of the enemy, can't you see where this might be a chance a commander would be willing to risk?  The best way to save friendly lives is to kill the enemy, and American fighters, bombers, and attack helicopters have killed many, many soldiers that would love to kill as many British, Canadian, Dutch, etc., soldiers as they could.  Successful operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would be difficult, if not impossible, without American pilots flying CAS missions.  Without them there would be a lot more casualties, but they would be at the hands of the Taliban or Al Qaeda.  Fratricide is sometimes the price you pay when you go to war. 

 

This is not just an "American War" with you Europeans simply tagging along and playing as our stooges.  I shouldn't have to remind you that the Islamo-fascists attacked you too (in London, Madrid, Vienna, et al), and will continue to do so if given the chance.  Despite all the bad media, friendly fire casualties are at a lower rate than they've ever been, and we should continue to work to reduce "blue on blue" casualties.  Still, it strikes me as very short sighted to reevaluate your commitment to the war on terror every time something like this happens. 

Taking the WW2 points first.  The reason the WW2 examples of own goals from the air are basically irrelevant is that the control and coord arrangements were close to non-existent in modern terms.  The air ground system used in the west was basically invented by the RAF and Brit Army, it was all about getting air requests into the system and processed as quickly as possible.  Coordination was usually not much beyond the GLO (army) at the airfield telling the pilots what little he knew of the situation on the ground (that said there were arrangements in SEAC, and in Italy Rover Bravo, etc, but these were not FACs or close ground control in the modern manner).  There were virtually no ground to air comms at the front.  I say virtually none, because there was a limited capacity system whereby an HF radio on the corps arty net was physically wired to a VHF radio on RAF frequencies.  The result of all this was that pilots on close support often had little or no detailed information about where the enemy or own troops were in anything but general terms.  It's not too much exaggeration to say that if the target was inside the bomb line (ie where the rules demanded air ground coord) then the pilots knew they had to take care and try to differentiate targets from friendly forces.  Unfortunately I've no information about how ground recognition training pilots underwnet.  By the end of the war arrangements for heavy bomber had been imaginately developed, using HAA to 'mark' the bomber flyline and some ground to air comms.  Nevertheless one of the worst incidents was in Normandy when USAAF managed to hit a Canadian divisional HQ, not the sort of unit that is in close proximity to the enemy!  Of course navigation was a lot more challenging in those days and IIRC it was night.

 

The system today is supposed to ensure that positive ground control prevents pilots attacking targets without clearance from those on the ground in the vicinity of the target (although the pilots may be talking to someone else).  This involves FACs trained to agreed NATO standards, direct ground-air comms as a minimum.  This of course still has scope for errors, eg pilots ignoring the rules or being charitable not realising they were in an area where the rules applied, or misunderstanding the ground controllers instructions (exactly what NATO standards are supposed to prevent), not to mention the ultimate check of vehicle recognition training.  Part of coord with the ground is supposed to include the pilots knowing exactly where friendly forces are.  This assumes that the FAC knows this, not always easy in a dynamic situation but a lot simpler than WW2.  Hence my view that trying to liken WW2 experience to todays is clutching at straws.

 

Of course mistakes happen, what should happen then if they are lethal is some sort of investigation to identify any lessons to prevent future incidents.  Unfortunately NATO procedures don't seem to address arrangements for this if two or more nations are involved, this isn't really surprising because there may be national processes governed by national laws.  However, it does mean that some nations tend to the 'no stone unturned' approach while others may prefer a quick whitewash, not exactly a good basis for a meeting of minds and fostering trust.  Particularly when there is a vibrant media waiting in the wings.

 

I haven't been monitoring air delivered fratricide in detail, but several incidents do seem to have been in circumstances where the pilots didn't recognise that friendly forces may be in the vicinity.  This may indicate a systemic problem.  The episode that triggered this thread is different, it was close support.  The other thing I don't know is the number of air fratricide events involving US aircraft attacking US forces.  The key question is are they proportionate to mistakes involving non-US troops.  In Afg there is also substantial non-US CAS, but perhaps there isn't enough data to draw statistically valid conclusions about fratricide.

 

Comparing arty and air fratricide has to be made carefully.  There are various differences in the characterisitcs of their munitions.  However, for arty the controller is usually on the ground with the guys in contact, hence has a very personal investment in the effects.  Pilots don't have this involvement.  The other key difference is air is direct fire (unless some types of PGM are used) and every shot is directly aimed.  Arty is inherently less susceptable to human aiming error because aiming is repeatable, although realising the implications of PE is important, something that took a bit of time to teach infantry in WW1.