An article about RPGs and the M1

Email Me When A New Comment Is Made
Show Only Poster Name and Title Sort in Reverse Order Posted

Pages: 1 2 3 NEXT

Horsesoldier RE:An article about RPGs and the M1 6/18/2004 5:47:50 PM

It's an okay article. I think he still overstates some things, even while trying to down play them, and I certainly don't know that RPG strike information is hard to come by online. I think he also omits the third asset a tank has besides firepower and mobility (which he labels speed) -- armor. There is much to be said for using tanks in MOUT operations, so long as they are used intelligently and in an integrated fashion.

Quote Reply

mike_golf RE:An article about RPGs and the M1 6/18/2004 11:18:40 PM

I think this guy should read "Thunder Run" by David Zucchino and then rethink his column. First, given the intensity levels of the urban combat from the fall of Baghdad onwards the loss of less than 10 armored vehicles to enemy action is pretty damn good. Especially compare that to Russian performance in Grozny. Second, use properly, based on the experience taking Baghdad last year, it would appear that combined arms involving heavy armor and mech infantry can be very effective in an urban setting. But it requires appropriate combined arms tactics.

Quote Reply

mike_golf An old dog can learn new tricks 6/19/2004 12:12:18 AM

Before the fall of Baghdad in 2003 I would have been the first person to agree with many of the comments in this article. Baghdad was a serious paradigm shift. Heavy armor and mechanized infantry can go into an urban environment and take on light infantry, and come out on top. 2nd Bde, 3ID demonstrated that, with appropriate tactics, modern armored formations can fight, survive and win in urban environments. I'm willing to admit the paradigm shift, anyone else?

Quote Reply

Horsesoldier RE:An old dog can learn new tricks 6/19/2004 1:10:54 AM

Something else to consider is that cities have increasingly been built for rapid movement by automobiles, large trucks, etc. There may be portions of Baghdad, or any other city, which are really restrictive in regards to the mobility of tanks, but urban geography in the last 60 years has, I think, tended towards becoming much more permissive to mechanized operations. Still calls for combined arms and the ability to put boots on the ground, but it just isn't the same as the various urban slugging matches in WW2, Hue City, etc.

Quote Reply

Adamantine RE:An old dog can learn new tricks 6/19/2004 3:10:44 AM

If a RPG-7 can occasionally get a lucky shot and incapacitate some unlucky M1, Humvee and FCS and Bradly would be far more vulnerable. The experience in Baghdad underscore thee need for MORE armour for a tank, especially the TOP and the side. In fact the REAL experience of Baghdad point to the fact the israelis is right, ARMOUR is more important than maximum speed. In an urban area M1 or some future 70ton plus tank would be FAR more survivable than FCS or Bradley. Forget about the LAV. As to Humvee, its a easily recognise target and no matter how well its is amour with cermaic plate, its no match for RPG. driving a good civilian SUV or toyota pickup will increase your survivability as it is not easy to differentiate who is in the civilian SUV or truck or car. So the best combo is civilian auto with heavy tank (above 60ton) in operation where you are likely to face ambush and where your infantry cannot suppress most of the lurking RPG.

Quote Reply

mike_golf RE:An old dog can learn new tricks - Adamantine 6/19/2004 3:44:52 AM

Read "Thunder Run" is all I can say. The M1's and Bradley's dealt with a maelstrom of heavy machine guns and RPG's quite well. Only one tank was lost the first day and one more the second, plus several wheeled vehicles. A significantly different outcome from the Russian experience in Grozny. The M1 and Bradley were shown to be quite survivable in such an environment. Many Bradley's took and survived as many RPG hits as the M1's did. Contrary to your perspective, I believe what was shown was that a combination of mobility and armor and combined arms tactics at the company level are the key factors for heavy units in urban combat. I don't really agree with the Israeli preference for armor over mobility for the US. The IDF, due to manpower and equipment limitations, cannot easily put large combined arms units on the ground like the US can. Often they will have a very limited number of tanks supporting their infantry and the loss of even one tank could cripple the unit. Remember, the Merkava is built to support a small military that cannot afford to lose any tanks. Emphasizing armor over mobility limits its functionality as a general purpose tank, where the preference would be to balance armor and mobility.

Quote Reply

B.Smitty RE:An old dog can learn new tricks - mike_golf 6/19/2004 2:04:18 PM

I worry about this supposed "pardigm shift". Sure, we did well with our Thunder Runs, but it was against an incompetent & ill-equipped opponent! OTOH, many of the Chechens were former Soviet Army guys. They knew how the Soviets fought & were a lot more organized. Also, our primary threat in Baghdad was the RPG-7. Replace 20% of them with, say, AT-7/13s and gunners who know how to use them, and our casualties go up dramatically.

Quote Reply

Adamantine RE:An old dog can learn new tricks - Adamantine 6/19/2004 2:32:12 PM

>>Read "Thunder Run" is all I can say. The M1's and Bradley's dealt with a maelstrom of heavy machine guns and RPG's quite well. Only one tank was lost the first day and one more the second, plus several wheeled vehicles. A significantly different outcome from the Russian experience in Grozny. The M1 and Bradley were shown to be quite survivable in such an environment. Many Bradley's took and survived as many RPG hits as the M1's did. Contrary to your perspective, I believe what was shown was that a combination of mobility and armor and combined arms tactics at the company level are the key factors for heavy units in urban combat. I don't really agree with the Israeli preference for armor over mobility for the US. The IDF, due to manpower and equipment limitations, cannot easily put large combined arms units on the ground like the US can. Often they will have a very limited number of tanks supporting their infantry and the loss of even one tank could cripple the unit. Remember, the Merkava is built to support a small military that cannot afford to lose any tanks. Emphasizing armor over mobility limits its functionality as a general purpose tank, where the preference would be to balance armor and mobility. << Isreal has some 4000 tanks when fully mobilise. It also has 11000 other armour vehcile. It has about 650,000 to 800,000 troop within 4 day of rapid mobilisation. Thats about 170 to 200 people for every one tank deploy. Israel has only 6 plus million people and yet it has 4000 tanks (Merkeva1234, M60a3, M48, capture T-55 etc). Thats the HIGHEST number of tank per capital. Is real has about 660 tanks per one million population. Greece has 200 tanks per million people. If we exclude light tank maybe the figure for Greece is 120 tank per million people. North.Korea has 90 tanks per one million people. US has only 53 tank per million people. Isreal is the MOST tank and apc intensive country in the world. The experience in Iraq is not a good case study of the ability of M2/3 Bradley ability to accompany M1 in heavy combat BECAUSE you are fighting against a third rate miltary forces and conducting largely urban war after entering Bagdad. Its NOT a classic big scale armour against armour engagement AGAINT a WORTHY opponent. If Bradly is to accompany M1 to make a break through against a large number of T-80/90 or Western MBT like Leopard2 and Challenger, Bradly will suffer heavy lose. LUCKILY after the colllapse of cold war, such scenario is remote if not purely fictatious. Its unlikely that M1 and M2 bradly will face any WESTERN modern Mbt in any plausible future war, so M2 Bradly could still fight beside M1 in most of the plausible scenario. Unless Greece has a skirmish with Turkey. But then its Leopard 2 versus Leopard 2.

Quote Reply

mike_golf RE:An old dog can learn new tricks - Adamantine 6/19/2004 9:45:27 PM

First, I'm not talking about trying fighting heavy armor against heavy armor. Second, I think you are incorrect in your surmise that M2/M3 would suffer heavily in such a scenario. The tactics used would be dramatically different. I am talking about the use of heavy armored forces in urban environments defended by light infantry liberally armed with man-portable anti-tank weapons. Second, I agree that Israel has a huge number of tanks for the population of their country, however, a limited number of those tanks are actually modern generation MBT's like the Merkava. Second, Israel may have 4,000 tanks, but how many can actually be committed to intense combat scenarios in urban environments? And what real impact will the loss of those tanks have on the Israeli's? Just counting numbers of tanks and comparing that to their population is silly statistics that doesn't examine the true issues behind their force structure, weapons design and tactics. The reason for the Merkava to sacrifice speed for armor is that Israel cannot easily afford to lose even limited numbers of tanks and soldiers. Couple that with the fact that they are fighting their enemies either in their own country or very close by and mobility and speed are not as crucial as armor and firepower. Armor is not the be all, end all of tank design. In fact, alone of all modern western MBT's, the Merkava is the only one to place armor ahead of mobility in its design criteria. The Leo, Chally 2, LeClerc and M1 all balance armor and speed, believing, correctly, that a general purpose tank needs to have a balance of the two and that speed is as much of a viable defense on the battlefield as armor is. By the way, on your comments about the LeClerc being more accurate on the move than an M1. I have hit targets at 3500 meters on the move at 45+ kmh while moving cross-country in the desert, both in Iraq and in the US National Training Center. I really don't think the LeClerc is any better than that, and in any case, tactical movement is generally at speeds in the 40 to 50 kmh range. Please, stop and find out real facts before tossing out the latest manufacturer's propaganda.

Quote Reply

Clausewitz RE:An old dog can learn new tricks 6/21/2004 3:48:02 AM

Mike-Golf wrote: "I'm willing to admit the paradigm shift, anyone else?" 2nd Bde, 3ID was a brave, well trained and armed force. Their opponents were bad equipped and nearly untrained "Feddayin Saddam" (the ones who sacifice for Saddam, mainly ex prisoners led by one of his sons). The Republican Guards and Special Republican Guards were defeated in their conventional war defence ring around Bagdad (mainly by air strikes and partly by combined arms). They melted away and the marines/soldiers encounterd their remains in Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar province (western Irak). If Bagdad would have been defended by well trained and well armed light infantry there would have been no "Thunder Run". A lot of of the tanks and most of the armored vehicles would have been destroyed by RPG 29, RPG 27, Panzerfaust 3 and real large IED. I do not talk of helicopters and their fate if they would have encountered modern heat seeking SAM. Even the Abrams and the Bradleys would have gained some of the large streets (we do not even talk of the narrow alleyways most of old Bagdad is made of)it would have been impossible to supply them with fuel and ammo because no truck would have been able to drive the same way. To control a city you have to fight house to house, block to block and quarter to quarter. The irakis were not really prepared to defend Bagdad. Just imagine two/three US light infantry divisons prepared to defend Bagdad. Do you really think a "Thunder Run" would have been possible? Heavy vehicles are neccessary in urban warfare to transport your infantry to the points of decision (any use of soft skin vehicles would lead to something like "Black Hawk Down"). But tanks and IFV could just support the infantry you need to really take and hold the city. If Bagdad would have been a big Fallujah or Dschenin US forces would have cordoned the city to practice some patience. And we really do not talk of any PGM equipped enemy defending a city from positions of stealth and concealment.

Quote Reply

MikkoLn RE:An old dog can learn new tricks 6/21/2004 10:05:48 AM

I still wouldn't say that there's much resemblance between Grozny and Bagdad, apart from fighting insurgents. In both cases the opposition members seem to have been determined and even fanatic to their cause, but that's about all that's common. And, too bad for unlucky Iraqi resistant members, that doesn't alone matter much. What Soviets faced was a guerrilla force well equipped (nearly as well as their own troops, just imagine Iraqis with current US arms at their possession in quantity), somewhat experienced andprofessional, and above all, organized beyond the most obvious level. Chechen rebels were actually an army with clear organization, lead chain and objective, not a band of insurgents acting more or less remotely and by their own will, with mostly very primitive means of weaponary. What on the other hand Bagdad is just witnessing - groups of fanatic opposition members but with very poor organizational level (from military point of view). Now, what went wrong and what went right was that Soviets took on organized guerrilla army as if it was a weak group of unorganized insurgents. On theother hand, US is taking on weak unorganized insurgents like they were well organized guerrilla army. And don't take me wrong now, though in this context it might sound as something bad and exaggeration I don't mean it that way at all.Just to show how dramatically things differed from each other despite seemingly similiar situation. Now like I said before, at the situation being, the equipment used (and their differences) isn't the major cause to how things went and are going. No western equipment could have saved russians under those circumstances. And I would even dare to say that no russian equipment would prevent US from doing as well (or bad, whatever you want to take it) as they do under those circumstances. Should there be real organized and adequately armed guerrilla army vs. occupying greater force confrontation, i.e. the situation would resemble more wartime, equipment differences might be more important. But then again, like Clausewitz said, casualties would then be much higher among occupying force operating in urban territory, regardless of hardware. I hope current experiences don't feed too much positive opinions towards usage of mechanised troops in urban enviroment, since that might lead again to serious miscalculations in the future, if confronted with more able enemy. Going the russian way is never the right one - hope that was enough of a lesson for all the others too... But something from the original text also from now - I think the fear of M1's falling to prey of RPG's is still not very good reasoning. Sure, there might be more casualties and destroyed M1's, but not beyond the level that could be expected and what is acceptable. Under full scale guerrilla war troops might want to re-evaluate the usage of tanks. At the time being, I see no large scale reason for that fear. For everything that I've seen, and now written, the large scale operation hasn't been a failure from pure military operations point of view (civilian casualties, opinions, home field thoughts and huge political area are things of another classes).

Quote Reply

MikkoLn RE:An old dog can learn new tricks 6/21/2004 10:11:11 AM

For a usage of mechanised forces a slight correction - didn't say that to point out that mehc. troops shoudn't be used at all in urban environment, but just tried to catch the idea of careless, ill-planned or overconfident operations and the great risks that are included.

Quote Reply

Tac Ops RE:An old dog can learn new tricks - mike_golf 6/24/2004 12:27:16 AM

Israel has a lot of Merkavas. They have over 1,200 Merkavas. They can survive even if they lose a tank, they've lost them before. Also Israel is much better at fighting in an urban enviroment then the United States. The reason the Merkava is so heavily armored is because the Israelis found out through combat that armor is better than speed in combat. If they wanted to they could have built a bunch of light tanks.

Quote Reply

hybrid RE:An old dog can learn new tricks - tac ops 6/24/2004 3:27:04 AM

Sure the Merkavas are better at urban combat, but that and hilly/mountainous terrain is what they were designed to fight in. The modern MBTs of Europe for the most part and the Abrams series of the US were designed to fight the European theater against a massive russian armor threat. Mobility, accurate and heavy firepower and nearly as much heavy armor was necessary for those kinds of situations. Nonetheless as I said each tank has its own role in mind. The merkava's is urban combat, creating a whole new tank for urban combat only relegates a good chunk of its operations to being non-optimal.

Quote Reply

Adamantine Merkava 4 hp/ton may not be lower than M1A2sep 6/24/2004 2:44:57 PM

Now if we just talk about the Merkava 1 ,2 ,3. We may have this idea that IDF DELIBERATELY sacrifice speed for armour. But if we analyse carefully that is NOT a compromise. I rather say its due to lack of suitable engine. In the past, Isrealis depended mainly on US diesel engine. Teledyne Continental Motors is the supplier for Merkava MK 3. The max power rating is 1200hp. Apart from M1, Stvr 103 and T-80, very few if any tank would use a gas turbine. So lets assume IDF decided to use a diesel for Merkava, he generally has no choice except to BUY from US for political reason. No US design engine exceed 1200hp. Of course if Israel is going to pay Teledyne for R&D, Teledyner might try to engineer a 1500hp to 1600 hp engine for Merkava 1,2,3. But lets assume IDF do not wish to incure so much cost and would just make do with the most powerful US diesel engine that is available at a reasonable cost and what is offered is the 1200 hp engine. IDF would just MATE the engine to a tank that MET its requirement for armour protection, ammunition stowage and excess space for infantry. And it so happen that the tank weight 63 to 64 ton. Naturally you end up with a tank that is slightly underpower because the teledyne engine is simply no that power dense. We should also remember that the SPACE allocated for mounting the engine and transmission in Merkava is NOT necessarily LESS than Leopard2 or Ariete. It just so happen that the engine is not that high tech (low kw/m3). For political reason, German do not sell tank engine directly to IDF. So in the past IDF cannot get the MB 873 Ka501 (engine for the first generation of Leo2 A1 to A3) from MTU even though that engine would enable Merkava 1,2,3 to develop 1500hp of power. Note that supercharge AVDS-1790 engine use by Merkava Mk3 is about the same size as the older original version of leopard 2 engine---MB 870 KA 501. From the onset, Merkava is design with the capacity to accept an engine as big as the MTU MB873, but could not procure that engine for various reason, partly cost, partly political. All that change when General Dynamic start producing the GD883. This engine is just a LICENSE build copy of the MT 883 Europack engine used by the latest Leo2 and UAE Leclerc. IDF could procure this excellent german design diesel directly from US and circumvent the the need to import directly from Germany which still refuse to sell the engine for political reason. Suddenly, Merkava 4 achieve a power to weight ratio of a respectable 23hp/ton. That is just very slightly lower than the 24.2 hp/ton of the highly mobile Leo2a6 and 23.73 hp/ton of M1A2sep. With such a small difference, WHERE ON EARTH IS THE so call greater emphasis of mobility of M1 and Leo2 versus Merkava?? The newer generation of Leo2a6 and M1a2sep is getting HEAVIER because it is NECESSARY. The need for greater protection results in heavier armour. The emphasis changed. As for Merkava, its not a question of greater emphasis in armour, IDF just fail to get the engine it want in the past. Now it can procure what it really want, it chose the 1500hp GD883. If IDF do not see importance in mobility, it can procure a 10V version of the 883 engine, which develop 1250hp instead of the 12V version that develop 1500hp. I am sure if GD can license build the even more powerful and similar size MT 890 14v or 16v, IDF will not mind having an engine that develop 1800 to 2000hp for its future derivation of Merkava. The only modern high tech tank that TRULY emphasis speed over armour is the Japanese Type90. The combat weight of this tank is ONLY 52000kg. Its engine develop 1500hp which gives it a 28.8hp/ton power/weight ratio. When it comes to M1a2sep, we should note that the DU armour is quite heavy, uranium is about 2.3 times the density of steel. That why it is heavier. How heavy?? Some source indicate that M1a2sep weights 69540kg while other sources indicate that it is 63504kg. If we take the higher weight, M1A2sep only develop 21.57 hp/ton, lower than the 23hp/ton of merkava 4. The whole argument about Merkava emphasis less on speed collapse. Its high time to change the M1 engine to the LV100-5. And US army better make sure that LV100-5 develop 1700-1800hp instead of 1500hp. For a tank that is above 63000kg, a more powerful engine is necessary to maintain acceleration and speed. Otherwise the M1a2sep will be noticeably less maneuvrable than M1 or M1a1. Leopard2 will soon have a uprated MT883 that register 1650hp.

Quote Reply

Pages: 1 2 3 NEXT

	News As History - March 22, 2010
	Home News How to Make War Wars Around the World Austin Bay's On Point Dirty Little Secrets Features Al Nofi's CIC Prediction Market Wargames Measure of Respect On War and Warfare Videos Photos Jokes Community Military Discussion Boards Military Jokes Military Photos Military Book Reviews Military Movie Reviews Military Links Wargame Store StrategyPage Subscribe Login Feedback About Us Search Account Manager Advertise With Us