Merkava Mk V the finest tank in the world

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aceofw RE:Israel tanks 11/28/2003 3:19:24 AM

Just as good as they are now, but they may only be manufactured in a rate of 40 each year.

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WinsettZ RE:Israel tanks 11/28/2003 9:46:58 AM

I expected the IDF to use mainly Sabras (upgraded M60s). Sabras also have the internal mortar. In Lebanon, didn't the IDF have some converted Chieftains, or were they Centurions? Either might be better off then a...T-55. But the Soviets are using T-55s for their BTR-T. It seems the amount of Merkavas isn't being tracked, or the amount is being held in secret. We know production rates but not amount. "At the beginning of the Lebanon war in 1982 the IDF had some 200 Merkava mk.1 tanks. Overall, according to most sources, only 250 tanks of the first model were built (although some mention the number 330). In September of 1983, the first Mk.2 rolled off the production line, IDF's frontline units first received them in February '84. Only a year and one month later, in October '84, a new Mk.2B model already entered production. But in December 1984 the budget was drastically cut and military spending seriously reduced. Accordingly, the rate of production of Merkavas slowed down as well. Another problem was that the major overhaul of tanks that were damaged in the Lebanon war, or simply used up their motor resources, was done at the same factory where they were assembled up until 1988, when a new repair facility was finally opened. All these factors and the changes from Mk.1 to Mk.2 to Mk.2B have contributed to a low production rate throughout the 80-s, with only about 550-600 Mk.2/2B ever built. Some sources, without mentioning the number of Mk.2/2B built, state that in 1989/90 (when Mk.2 was already about to be replaced by Mk.3) the IDF had some 600 to 800 Merkava tanks, including both Mk.1 and Mk.2/2B. In April 1990 the first 14 Merkava mk.3 were produced. But starting from the summer of 1990, because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the production was stopped, and all efforts immediately redirected to repair of older equipment. The serial production of Merkava mk.3 was restarted almost a year later, in the beginning of 1991. Merkava mk.3B replaced Mk.3 in 1994, but lasted for only two years - already in 1996 the production of Merkava mk.3B BAZ began. Since 1999, the BAZ was also fitted with a new independent commander's panoramic sight, but the upgrade was too minor to warrant a new designation. Later in the same year production of Merkava mk.3B BAZ dor Dalet began, and older mk.3 and mk.2B were modernized with the new armor pack The first official mention of Merkava mk.4 appeared in October of 1999 in IDF's Maarahot magazine which announced that "several" (later in May 2000 the JIDR magazine wrote that there were 3 prototypes) Mk.4 prototypes have already accumulated over 10.000 km each in various tests. In December of 2001, Israeli newspapers stated that the first Mk.4 have begun their field trials with the IDF, and on June 28th 2002 Merkava mk.4 was officially commissioned into service. Overall the total number of all Merkava tanks produced as of 2001 is estimated at 1280 tanks, although as opposed to most other sources, according to Jane's Defense Weekly, the IDF operates about 1,050 Merkava mk.2/2B and 700 Merkava mk.3/3B/BAZ tanks. Assuming the more widespread number of 1280 tanks is the correct one, we see that during the last decade (1990-2000, taking into account the stopping of production in 1990/91), some 480 to 680 Merkava mk.3 tanks were built, meaning a rate of production of about 50 tanks per year. Although the capability is there to produce no less then 120 machines a year, the funding most likely isn't." [Source link

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bsl RE:Merkava the Best? Debatable.... 11/28/2003 10:15:59 PM

"Merkava is the result of Israeli experience and development, to be used in and around Israel" Exactly.

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bsl RE:In re the Israeli Air Force, quod erat demonstrandum 11/28/2003 10:27:12 PM

The matter of helmet mounted sights in high performance jets is not simple. A few years ago, I was a fly on the wall at a discussion of adapting this technology from attack helicopters to fighters among several American fighter pilots, active and retired, including a couple of senior training pilots, one air force, one navy. I had thought the technology was a brilliant idea. What I heard, was universal skepticism, based on an issue which hadn't occured to me. High performance fighters pull high gee-loads in ACM. As many as ten gees. This is a serious issue when it comes to adding weight to a pilot's head. Virtually every other part of the body - everything save the hands, really - is supported by the seat. But, the head has to be free to move around; a matter of maintaining situational awareness. One extra pound, at G, becomes ten pounds at ten Gees. Even a fairly light helmet, with the new weight from various sighting aids, can be a serious problem. A three pound helmet becomes thirty pounds at maximum G-load. And, you can pull Gees very quickly in manuevering, which means you not only have a heavy weight straining your neck, but the "new" weight can be loaded so fast that it's as if you received a blow. A blow from a twenty or thirty pound weight on your head can do serious damage to your neck. And, so, it appears that experienced pilots have some concerns about anything which adds to the weight they have to carry above their necks. Cargo aircraft rarely pull Gees. Attack helicopters can't pull heavy Gees. Fighters are different.

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bsl RE:60mm mortar -- BSL 11/28/2003 10:44:18 PM

Horsesoldier, You're missing the point. I don't dispute any of your comments about combined arms doctrine, etc.. No argument. But, the more important issue is the one you don't even mention, which is the particular strategic environment in which Israel exists. I suggest, again, you do some reading about the way the '73 War began. This is a sort of situation which could easily occur, again, and I'm suggesting that the Israeli designers have obviously reached the same conclusion. There is just no answer for this sort of problem in jiggling the composition of forces. Not when the reality of the situation on the ground, because of factors totally outside the control of the military, means that a war may begin with small units facing much, much larger attacking forces. So what if you have more organic artillery and mortar support, when you're a company facing attack by a regiment? First thing the attackers do is take out your battalion's artillery. Now what do you? They're attacking in what they feel is overwhelming force. They have enough to target all your heavy artillery, and, since the war-start lines are very well known, they probably have it registered before they open fire. What survives has calls for many more fire missions than it can supply, a function of the disparity in numbers. What do you do? Neither is it really wise to totally rely on air supportto fill the mission, since there have been instances when it was unavailable, tasked to higher priority missions, or, as in the '73 War, especially on the Egyptian front, the Red force comes up with unexpectedly effective air defense resources. As long as you can put that mortar in without having to sacrifice the rest of the usual equipment, you're adding a useful increment of capability which addresses a real issue for the people who use that equipment.

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bsl RE:Horsesoldier 11/28/2003 11:12:15 PM

"No crew I was ever a part of ever had any pretensions of being able to go toe-to-toe on an evern basis with an MBT within the effective range " I don't know about the training. I take your word on this. I do recall that the issue Z.Z. raised *was* on the table back when the Bradley was being designed. There were people who argued, at length, against putting the stabilized autocannon and TOWs on the thing because they felt they created a serious risk that users, in real world situations, would be tempted to use Bradleys as tanks, rather than as APCs, exposing them unnecessarily to fire they couldn't handle. M-2s make good people movers with extra firepower. They're, at best, mediocre light tanks.

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bsl RE:Were some IDF regular tank brigades still using M-60's as of 2002? 11/28/2003 11:16:42 PM

Money, obviously, is the issue. Why hasn't America upgraded all the M-1s to M-1A3 status? We can't afford it. More important things on the table. We could also use a superheavy APC, armored like an MBT, to supplement the M-2s. We certainly can use a new self propelled gun. The new Army helicopter program is in doubt, because of funding. There's no prospect of a follow-on for the A-10, ditto. Money is always a factor. Israel is short, relative to it's needs. That's why they recycle so much kit. They're very good at it.

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bsl RE:Were some IDF regular tank brigades still using M-60's as of 2002? 11/28/2003 11:20:14 PM

IIRC, Israel has an upgrade program for M-60s for sale, internationally. I think they tried to sell Turkey on this. I think Israel has also done business upgrading MiG-21s, for several countries. The fact is that military kit is expensive, and virtually NO COUNTRY can afford all of what it needs, including America. Thus, there is always room for someone to figure out ways to upgrade and reuse older equipment. America probably should do more of this with our older MBTs.

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ZealousZionist Friends in need, Friends indeed - Israel Comes Through For the US... Again 11/29/2003 12:07:35 AM

Israel trains US troops on Iraq tactics IF THE USA'S expanded campaign against insurgent forces in Iraq is starting to look more and more like Israeli efforts to crush the Palestinian intifada, it's probably because the USA has been increasingly turning to their Israeli allies for advice on how to conduct such a war. [Jane's Foreign report - first posted to www.foreignreport.com - 26 November 2003]

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Horsesoldier RE:60mm mortar -- BSL 11/29/2003 9:01:44 AM

>>I suggest, again, you do some reading about the way the '73 War began. This is a sort of situation which could easily occur, again, and I'm suggesting that the Israeli designers have obviously reached the same conclusion.<< I've read pretty extensively from the English-language offerings on the 73 War and/or the IDF's history in general. My reading does not suggest you apparent belief that Israel, in the Merkava and its mortar, have hit upon the great philosophical truth for armored delaying forces. The Merkava, and the way the 1973 War started, are both children of the IDF's earlier successes which led them to a dangerous and doctrinally unsound conclusion that all they needed was tanks. As I think I have pointed out before, Avigdor Kahalani talks about just how dangerous and unsound IDF force structure was in his writings on the war. There was no infantry support for his tanks, and they were reduced to blindly firing their machineguns at night to scare off (non-existant, as it turned out) Syrian infantry infiltrators. Had the Syrian troops had the skill to make a night infiltration with RPG teams, and then follow this with an armored attack at daybreak, I don't think anyone would be discussing the heroic stand of the 77th Battalion at the Vale of Tears, because we'd be discussing the Syrian drive into Galilee instead. This did not happen only because the Syrians were dismal at these sorts of fights -- had they been capable of it, it would be fair and accurate to say that the IDF would have sown the seeds of its own defeat, not because of the inherent nature of armored delaying actions, but because the IDF saddled itself with a dangerously unsound force structure. >>So what if you have more organic artillery and mortar support, when you're a company facing attack by a regiment? First thing the attackers do is take out your battalion's artillery. Now what do you? They're attacking in what they feel is overwhelming force. They have enough to target all your heavy artillery, and, since the war-start lines are very well known, they probably have it registered before they open fire.<< In answer to your first question -- you're a company facing a regiment, what do you do with artillery? This is a silly question, really, but you: #1) Use your artillery to break up known or suspected enemy troop concentrations and staging areas. Little 60mm mortar rounds might not vex armored vehicles, but plastering with 155mm rounds will attrite tanks and IFVs, something you might want to do if you're grossly outnumbered, yes? #2)Use it to target enemy ADA assets hanging back outside your gun range, so the IAF can make CAS runs with less danger from enemy fire. #3.) Use it to obscure your movements with smoke, to maximize the effects of your local counterattacks (which the IDF has done at those sorts of odds). #4.) Use it for counter-battery fire to reduce the amount of steel falling on your head. #5.) If your enemy is smart enough to try and send infiltrating infantry teams up against you, you use artillery to destroy them, thereby allowing your vehicle to remain hidden from enemy observation. I could go on, if you like . . . Second, "First thing the attackers do it take out your artillery . . . " I might be mistaken, but I am not aware of *any* accounts of Syrian counter-battery fire being used effectively against IDF, and what little bit of IDF artillery was on station in the Golan appears to have fired throughout the war without serious disruption. Given the Syrian's, to be polite, "unimpressive" track record of firing anything but pre-planned preparatory missions, deciding SP artillery can't survive against their Syrian counterparts is rather like saying the IDF should not have any tanks, because they can't compete with Syrian tanks. Finally, yes, they probably have pre-planned their initial bombarment targets, particularly because these are the only sorts of missions the Syrians have fired effectively. Again, so what? And how does this argument mean anything for artillery that it does not mean for armored forces or other members of the combined arms team? How can the IDF possibly employ tanks when all that weight of Syrian artillery will fall on their armored forces? You put your guns in revetments, or put them back just outside enemy tube range and them move them up, or any number of other solutions. Then when they are in the fight, they shoot and move, which is something like page #1 of anyone's self-propelled artillery doctrine. My recollection is that immediately prior to the 73 War, the IDF had an armor brigade and some infantry deployed on the Golan (in an uncoordinated fashion), with another brigade moving into sector. Artillery was deficient. Compare this one brigade to an American Armored Cavalry Regiment -- a mix of MBTs and light armored vehicles (equipped with TOWs for anti-tank work, either in the form of Bradleys or under earlier or

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