Merkava Mk V the finest tank in the world

Email Me When A New Comment Is Made
Show Only Poster Name and Title Sort in Reverse Order Posted

Pages: PREV 1 2 3 4 5 NEXT

bsl RE:Horsesoldier 11/28/2003 11:12:15 PM

"No crew I was ever a part of ever had any pretensions of being able to go toe-to-toe on an evern basis with an MBT within the effective range " I don't know about the training. I take your word on this. I do recall that the issue Z.Z. raised *was* on the table back when the Bradley was being designed. There were people who argued, at length, against putting the stabilized autocannon and TOWs on the thing because they felt they created a serious risk that users, in real world situations, would be tempted to use Bradleys as tanks, rather than as APCs, exposing them unnecessarily to fire they couldn't handle. M-2s make good people movers with extra firepower. They're, at best, mediocre light tanks.

Quote Reply

bsl RE:Were some IDF regular tank brigades still using M-60's as of 2002? 11/28/2003 11:16:42 PM

Money, obviously, is the issue. Why hasn't America upgraded all the M-1s to M-1A3 status? We can't afford it. More important things on the table. We could also use a superheavy APC, armored like an MBT, to supplement the M-2s. We certainly can use a new self propelled gun. The new Army helicopter program is in doubt, because of funding. There's no prospect of a follow-on for the A-10, ditto. Money is always a factor. Israel is short, relative to it's needs. That's why they recycle so much kit. They're very good at it.

Quote Reply

bsl RE:Were some IDF regular tank brigades still using M-60's as of 2002? 11/28/2003 11:20:14 PM

IIRC, Israel has an upgrade program for M-60s for sale, internationally. I think they tried to sell Turkey on this. I think Israel has also done business upgrading MiG-21s, for several countries. The fact is that military kit is expensive, and virtually NO COUNTRY can afford all of what it needs, including America. Thus, there is always room for someone to figure out ways to upgrade and reuse older equipment. America probably should do more of this with our older MBTs.

Quote Reply

ZealousZionist Friends in need, Friends indeed - Israel Comes Through For the US... Again 11/29/2003 12:07:35 AM

Israel trains US troops on Iraq tactics IF THE USA'S expanded campaign against insurgent forces in Iraq is starting to look more and more like Israeli efforts to crush the Palestinian intifada, it's probably because the USA has been increasingly turning to their Israeli allies for advice on how to conduct such a war. [Jane's Foreign report - first posted to www.foreignreport.com - 26 November 2003]

Quote Reply

Horsesoldier RE:60mm mortar -- BSL 11/29/2003 9:01:44 AM

>>I suggest, again, you do some reading about the way the '73 War began. This is a sort of situation which could easily occur, again, and I'm suggesting that the Israeli designers have obviously reached the same conclusion.<< I've read pretty extensively from the English-language offerings on the 73 War and/or the IDF's history in general. My reading does not suggest you apparent belief that Israel, in the Merkava and its mortar, have hit upon the great philosophical truth for armored delaying forces. The Merkava, and the way the 1973 War started, are both children of the IDF's earlier successes which led them to a dangerous and doctrinally unsound conclusion that all they needed was tanks. As I think I have pointed out before, Avigdor Kahalani talks about just how dangerous and unsound IDF force structure was in his writings on the war. There was no infantry support for his tanks, and they were reduced to blindly firing their machineguns at night to scare off (non-existant, as it turned out) Syrian infantry infiltrators. Had the Syrian troops had the skill to make a night infiltration with RPG teams, and then follow this with an armored attack at daybreak, I don't think anyone would be discussing the heroic stand of the 77th Battalion at the Vale of Tears, because we'd be discussing the Syrian drive into Galilee instead. This did not happen only because the Syrians were dismal at these sorts of fights -- had they been capable of it, it would be fair and accurate to say that the IDF would have sown the seeds of its own defeat, not because of the inherent nature of armored delaying actions, but because the IDF saddled itself with a dangerously unsound force structure. >>So what if you have more organic artillery and mortar support, when you're a company facing attack by a regiment? First thing the attackers do is take out your battalion's artillery. Now what do you? They're attacking in what they feel is overwhelming force. They have enough to target all your heavy artillery, and, since the war-start lines are very well known, they probably have it registered before they open fire.<< In answer to your first question -- you're a company facing a regiment, what do you do with artillery? This is a silly question, really, but you: #1) Use your artillery to break up known or suspected enemy troop concentrations and staging areas. Little 60mm mortar rounds might not vex armored vehicles, but plastering with 155mm rounds will attrite tanks and IFVs, something you might want to do if you're grossly outnumbered, yes? #2)Use it to target enemy ADA assets hanging back outside your gun range, so the IAF can make CAS runs with less danger from enemy fire. #3.) Use it to obscure your movements with smoke, to maximize the effects of your local counterattacks (which the IDF has done at those sorts of odds). #4.) Use it for counter-battery fire to reduce the amount of steel falling on your head. #5.) If your enemy is smart enough to try and send infiltrating infantry teams up against you, you use artillery to destroy them, thereby allowing your vehicle to remain hidden from enemy observation. I could go on, if you like . . . Second, "First thing the attackers do it take out your artillery . . . " I might be mistaken, but I am not aware of *any* accounts of Syrian counter-battery fire being used effectively against IDF, and what little bit of IDF artillery was on station in the Golan appears to have fired throughout the war without serious disruption. Given the Syrian's, to be polite, "unimpressive" track record of firing anything but pre-planned preparatory missions, deciding SP artillery can't survive against their Syrian counterparts is rather like saying the IDF should not have any tanks, because they can't compete with Syrian tanks. Finally, yes, they probably have pre-planned their initial bombarment targets, particularly because these are the only sorts of missions the Syrians have fired effectively. Again, so what? And how does this argument mean anything for artillery that it does not mean for armored forces or other members of the combined arms team? How can the IDF possibly employ tanks when all that weight of Syrian artillery will fall on their armored forces? You put your guns in revetments, or put them back just outside enemy tube range and them move them up, or any number of other solutions. Then when they are in the fight, they shoot and move, which is something like page #1 of anyone's self-propelled artillery doctrine. My recollection is that immediately prior to the 73 War, the IDF had an armor brigade and some infantry deployed on the Golan (in an uncoordinated fashion), with another brigade moving into sector. Artillery was deficient. Compare this one brigade to an American Armored Cavalry Regiment -- a mix of MBTs and light armored vehicles (equipped with TOWs for anti-tank work, either in the form of Bradleys or under earlier organizations, the M901 ITV), with a very limited infantry capability (but enough to provide local security to AFVs from things like night infiltration attacks). Troop/Company level mortars, and Squadron/Battalion level artillery gives the regiment eighteen heavy mortar tubes (4.2" or 120mm, depending on era), and eighteen or twenty-four 155mm self-propelled guns -- and the artillery is down in the battalion commanders hands, and the mortars in the company commander's. Backing all this up is an aviation squadron with reconnaissance and attack helicopters to give the regimental commander the ability to smash up potential breakthroughs and otherwise influence events throughout the regiment's sector. You'd have an awfully hard time convincing me that this organization (using American vehicles, or reworked to reflect IDF AFVs) would perform less effectively than an almost tank-pure brigade in the sort of delaying action the IDF was fighting on the Golan. More importantly, it would perform better against a competent foe as well as it would against the Syrians. >>Neither is it really wise to totally rely on air supportto fill the mission, since there have been instances when it was unavailable, tasked to higher priority missions, or, as in the '73 War, especially on the Egyptian front, the Red force comes up with unexpectedly effective air defense resources.<< And had the Syrians come up with an unexpected infantry capability (i.e. an ability to make night infiltration attacks, or more widespread airmobile operations into the Israeli rear, etc), the tank, as used by the IDF in 1973, would have been potentially neutralized, or severely impaired. For Israel, with the traditional mantra of being unable to lose a single war, placing all their eggs in one basket is a bad idea, regardless of whether that basket is the IAF or the Armored Corps. "Combined arms win battles" is a tried and tested truism, but one could also note that combined arms are more resistant to unexpected technological or tactical innovations on the part of the enemy. The IDF got lucky that the Arabs were not better able to exploit their deliberate ignorance of this concept in 1973. No amount of apologetics changes this, and if I am not mistaken, changes in the IDF's force structure since 1973 reflect that they learned this lesson, as well, even if you claim there is no lesson there to learn.

Quote Reply

Worf_Israel To Much Pride 11/29/2003 9:46:27 AM

FORGIVE ME FOR ANY SPELL MISTAKES No disregard to any Israeli(like my self) but we have to much pride, yes as much as its hard to admit and realize we have way to much PRIDE, which is Israeli nature in place. I?m not saying this because im against the pride its just we got to cut it short. Yes im a very prude of my country, just take a second to think the odds this small country has overcome. And trust me if that country would ask me to jump in to the front line I would do it without even thinking twice (even so I know I well regret it later). But come guys you know very well we work on Quality not large numbers. This means we need more quality equipment. Lets take in to account, how many Tanks does USA make next to Israel??? They have numbers that?s why the tanks would logically cost less but still provide a very good performance. This idea nearly affects all aspects of the IDF. Anyone that has other ideas of my concept please say so. USA = LARGE NUMBERS GOOD PROFORMNCE ARMY ? VERY ADVANCE TOYS AND THE WORLDS SUPER POWER. ISRAEL = SMALL NUMBERS HIGH QUALITY ARMY ? VERY CREATIVE AND OVERCOMES IMPPOSEIBLE ODDS. (lets not forget we fight to survive not to win)

Quote Reply

WDDavenport Merkava production to be shut down? 11/29/2003 11:36:56 AM

News Updates Thursday, November 13, 2003 Cheshvan 18, 5764 The Bottom Line / The Merkava holds the IDF hostage By Amnon Barzilai The threat that 9,000-10,000 workers will lose their jobs because of the shutdown of the Merkava tank project is no idle one. The figures were in data Brigadier General (Ret.) Amir Nir, head of the planning group for the Merkava project at the Defense Ministry, presented to the Knesset. The planning group is a professional organization in the Defense Ministry, responsible for contracts with the factories in Israel and abroad that are participating in the Merkava project. According to the analysis the group performed, the layoffs will come in two waves. Each wave will send 5,000 workers home. This calculation includes more than 1,000 army personnel and civilian IDF workers. In all about 200 Israeli firms are linked with the Merkava. The deputy chief of staff, Major General Gabi Ashkenazi, said in a meeting with the leaders of the military industries that the army is stretched so thin after the NIS 7 billion cut in the defense budget in 2002 that even after significantly thinning its deployment of forces, canceling training programs and keeping maintenance to a minimum, it still has no available funds. The director-general of the Defense Minister, Major General (Ret.) Amos Yaron, emphasized that the budget approved by the government would not allow financing the continued production of 40-50 Merkava tanks each year. This is the minimum number of tanks for the project to remain economically worthwhile, according to the Merkava planning group. Given the cuts in the defense budget and especially after the decline in the tank's battlefield status with the increasing importance of precision-guided munitions, as demonstrated in the Iraq war, the Merkava project has reached a crossroads. Not only the treasury, but even the IDF Planning Division, the group responsible for the army's strategic long-term planning, thinks the IDF has more urgent needs and is recommending shutting down the Merkava production line. According to a report by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, the IDF has about 1,300 Merkava tanks - the backbone of Israel's armored corps. Experts, including the former commander of the IDF armored corps, Brigadier General (Ret.) Ami Flant, believe this is a reasonable number for the IDF, along with its other capabilities, to maintain deterrence against Syria and other potential enemies of the state. It should be noted that the recommendation to close the production line of the Merkava is consistent with trends elsewhere in the world - the Pentagon ordered the shutdown of the production line of the Abrams tank. Other Western countries with production capabilities have also chosen to stop making tanks. There is a surplus of thousands of tanks in the world that can be purchased at bargain prices. The local problem is the frightening data on the scope of job losses if the Merkava project is discontinued. This is why the discussion on the future of the project has been taken out of the IDF's hands. Thirty-three years since the first production of an Israeli tank, it seems like the IDF has become its hostage. Any decision about the continued production of the tank will be made less on military considerations, and more as a result of political and social pressures. This is G o o g l e's cache of link

Quote Reply

WDDavenport Merkava Lite? Wheels to replace tracked Merkava? 11/29/2003 11:55:50 AM

Can anyone extract the full article of this piece from Haaretz of 18 Oct 03? I can't get more than this summary. Ha'aretz, 18 October 03, by Amnon Barzilai Merkava lite? 'Will today's lumbering battle-ax be transformed into an agile wheeled vehicle capable of fighting today's asymmetrical wars? The tank of the future: that was the subject of the conversation two months ago between the chief of Army Headquarters, Major General Yiftah Ron Tal, and Jim Albaugh, vice president for Army Systems in Boeing's Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) unit.'

Quote Reply

WDDavenport Merkava lost to 100 kg command detonated mine? 11/29/2003 12:32:01 PM

I agree that an M1 is just as vulnerable to 100 kg. of command detonated mine as is a Merkava. Neither tank guarantees its crew invulnerability. This paragraph merits discussion: "... Military sources said, however, that the inquiry had raised questions regarding the planning of the operation, noting that the IDF had not operated in the area for several weeks. High-ranking officers said that better use of scouts and infantry forces could have prevented the disaster, adding that the entire operation should have been reconsidered in light of the muddy conditions. ..." By the way, most of this web site is written in a language I can't identify. Maybe Finnish? As in, "Tankid leiad siit"? Can anyone go to this web site and tell me what the language is? This web site evidently took the part written in English from another publication. ... The curious things one can find by just Googlin' around ... link Bomb blast under tank kills four soldiers in Gaza attack Four Israel Defense Forces soldiers were killed yesterday morning when their tank drove over a 100-kilo explosive device in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas's military wing, Iz a Din al-Kassam, claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it had been a response to the deaths of two Hamas activists killed near Beit Lahia in a clash with IDF troops earlier this month. The incident occured at 8:21 A.M., about one kilometer southeast of the Dugit settlement, and some 300 meters south of the perimeter fence marking the edge of the area under permanent Israeli control. As part of the lessons learned in the wake of three previous incidents in the Strip in which three Merkava tanks were attacked, resulting in the death of seven soldiers, yesterday's operation was being carried out with two vehicles - an armored bulldozer, followed, at a distance of some 50 meters, by the tank. It appears that the bulldozer passed over the same spot, but failed to detonate the explosive device. A few seconds later, the tank set off the bomb. Word of the casualties was held back for hours until the families of the soldiers could be notified. At a press conference yesterday evening, GOC Central Command Major General Doron Almog said the tank, a Magach 7, had been traveling south in the area when "it ran over an explosive device weighing about 100 kilograms." He said the blast had caused the ammunition inside the tank to explode, killing the vehicle's entire crew. "We know that Hamas is behind the incident," Almog said. "We know that Hamas planted the bomb in the area, and we also know who from Hamas was involved in this operation. Military sources said that the IDF was expected to mount a response in the Strip. In addition to targeting those directly responsible, the sources said, the IDF was expected to take widespread action against the terror organizations in general. IDF tank activity south of the perimeter fence has been increased recently in an effort, inter alia, to disrupt the firing of Qassam rockets from the nearby Beit Hanoun area. The blast yesterday led to a series of explosions inside the tank, apparently killing the vehicle's crew immediately. The subsequent blaze kept rescue forces at bay for a relatively long time. The initial IDF inquiry shows that the device weighed some 100 kilograms (the Hamas statement put the bomb at 25 kilograms only) and was comprised of military-grade explosives, perhaps mixed with improvised materials. The device was detonated by means of a pressure fuse and not from afar. The tank was not fitted with a protective plate on its underbelly, which would not have helped against a device of that size, military sources said. At his press conference, Almog said that the device may have been laid in the area some time ago. Based on the initial inquiry, he added, the force had operated properly, and the tank had been moving along the path cleared by the bulldozer. Military sources said, however, that the inquiry had raised questions regarding the planning of the operation, noting that the IDF had not operated in the area for several weeks. High-ranking officers said that better use of scouts and infantry forces could have prevented the disaster, adding that the entire operation should have been reconsidered in light of the muddy conditions. ( Israel's IDF chronic problem: a shortage of manpower, casuing shortage of infantry? -- WDD ) It was still too early to tell why the tank and not the bulldozer had set off the explosion, Almog said at his press conference, noting that the reason may be linked to the angle at which the pressure fuse had been laid, but adding: "At this stage, it's all conjecture." By Amos Harel and Arnon Regular

Quote Reply

bsl RE:60mm mortar -- BSL 11/29/2003 7:31:55 PM

"The Merkava, and the way the 1973 War started, are both children of the IDF's earlier successes which led them to a dangerous and doctrinally unsound conclusion that all they needed was tanks. " The statement of bad force mix at that time is correct, but the implication you draw is not. I'm sorry, but no matter how many times you claim otherwise, the situation on the ground in 1973 was NOT a matter of military policy, but a consequence of geopolitics and economics. There is just NOTHING you can do by way of adjusting force structure to change Israel from a reserve-based military to a highly mobilized professional structure. Neither can you change the potential for attack by superior numbers. These are givens in the strategic environment. The weapons designer must address these factors and the mortar is an attempt to do so. Your list of targetting priorities for artillery fire missions is fine. Might be right out of the textbook. And, once again, it completely ignores the situation on the ground. The nature of the region means you MUST be prepared to fight against grossly superior numbers. You are spending an awful lot of time trying to prove that this doesn't really mean much, and that the forces in the best protected positions on the battlefield can depend on the folk under no armor, at all, to keep them safe. This is just a bad idea. You'll note, too, that nothing in the placement of an internal mortar in MBTs gets in the way of ANY of your specific suggestions. It's an *additional* capability. Your last comment stands in contrast to your earlier observation of the way the Egyptians, especially, surprized Israel in 1973 with an unexpected air defense capability. IOW, *here* you say that there's no reason to worry about an enemy who might have the brains to pick up on doctrine and technology already old to target Israeli artillery. OTOH, earlier, you admit that Israel's enemies have managed to come up with effective surprizes on the battlefield in the past. When we get to the point of making binding assumptions about the lack of intelligence, foresight, and effectiveness of enemies when we design our weapons, we're already half beaten. No lesson in military history is clearer than this one. What's more, you ignore the reality of the strategic environment in another way, even worse. America has rarely fought in a situation where we could not afford to screw up in the opening days of a war, because we had the resources and safety of back areas to retool, retrain, try new ideas which we could move out into the battlefield in time to save the day. Israel has no such luxury. One lost war is probably one lost country. They not only have to get it right, the first time, they have to anticipate future developments, to stay ahead of potential enemies. Israel has no option to act as the Union Army did, during the Civil War, or as elements of our various forces did during WW2, and Korea. It took the Union nearly three years to get decent leadership during the Civil War. America entered WW2 with, for instance, submarine torpedoes which didn't work, a fighter force not prepared to fight the Japanese because of lack of understanding how each sides' planes matched against the fighters of the other side, and an infantry...well...remember the performance at Kassarine Pass? Korea was even worse. The Army units sent were grossly unprepared for real combat, which was a major issue not just at the war start, but, at Chosin Reservoir. (Compare the performance of the Army Task Force Faith, east of the reservoir, with the preformance of the Marine division to the west.) This internal mortar on the Merkava is one attempt to deal with a set of circumstances ALREADY encountered, which may easily be repeated.

Quote Reply

Horsesoldier RE:60mm mortar -- BSL 11/29/2003 9:03:46 PM

>>Your list of targetting priorities for artillery fire missions is fine. Might be right out of the textbook. And, once again, it completely ignores the situation on the ground. The nature of the region means you MUST be prepared to fight against grossly superior numbers.<< Again, this argument has no bearing on artillery. How does it ignore the reality on the ground? If anything, the reality on the ground calls for and demands artillery to help offset the enemy advantage in numbers. I can only gather from your various statements that you have some impression of the situation that the IDF cannot afford to field anything but tanks because of its small size and the small size of its active duty military component. First, this is the most silly of contentions -- how do I know this? Because the small, conscript IDF altered its force structure afrer 1973 to field a more well rounded, combined arms force. Second, since the IDF *did* move to a more combined-arms force structure, it would seem that you are saying that not only am I ignoring the strategic situation, but so is the post-1973 IDF. I must say I find that comical. >>You are spending an awful lot of time trying to prove that this doesn't really mean much, and that the forces in the best protected positions on the battlefield can depend on the folk under no armor, at all, to keep them safe. This is just a bad idea.<< Yes, it is a bad idea, and how you decided I was trying to suggest it is beyond me. Who, pray tell, are the "folks under no armor at all?" As for the "folks in the best protected positions" I, again, am vague on who you are talking about. If you mean IDF armored units, yes, they fought from prepared defensive positions in 1973, which helped their tanks survive. They also engaged in local and aggressive counter-attacks, which helped units survive. >>What's more, you ignore the reality of the strategic environment in another way, even worse.<< And how, pray tell, do I do that? >>IOW, *here* you say that there's no reason to worry about an enemy who might have the brains to pick up on doctrine and technology already old to target Israeli artillery. OTOH, earlier, you admit that Israel's enemies have managed to come up with effective surprizes on the battlefield in the past.<< Nonsense and silly in the extreme. You said that Israel should chuck the notion of having artillery on the battlefield because you made some sweeping and silly statement about enemy counter-battery fire and preparatory bombardment wiping it off the battlefield. I pointed out the Arab track record on this is rather poor -- sure, they might in some future conflict reveal a new bit of technology or some improvement in proficiency that makes them effective in this regard. If that happened, I'm sure the IDF would roll with the punches after a bit of trouble, and the surving artillery would adapt their tactics to stay in the fight (not unlike what, say, IDF armor and infantry did in Lebanon when it turned out -- imagine the notion -- tanks were not ideal to lead into restricted and mountainous terrain). The IDF has repeatedly, in all its war, demonstrated an ability to improvise and adapt both during peacetime and war. But, again applying your logic generally, rather than specifically to the issue of artillery, the IDF needs to get rid of its tanks and the IAF its airplanes, yes? I mean, if some future and notional Arab capability justifies getting rid of artillery lest they sweep it from the field, does this not also call for the abolition of the IDF Armored Corps and the IAF? I mean, some future Arab capability (top attack ATGMs, directed energy weapons, poisoned hummus, whatever) *might* render the tank or warplanes obsolete, so why not beat the rush and get rid of them now? I'd just as soon not continue this debate, as, while I find many of your posts well thought out, your take on this aspect of the IDF fails to make sense to me. Despite your assertions to the contrary, I have not made a comment on this issue while "ignoring the strategic situation" or whatever, my points are based on my personal experience in the (US) armor community and my reading on Israel's military history (their military history, of course, being of great interest to people involved with AFVs). I feel I have a very good understanding of Israel's strategic military situation, and am not, despite your argument to the contrary trying to "adjust force structure to change Israel from a reserve-based military to a highly mobilized professional structure." You seem bent on being an ardent apologist for the IDF and would like to excuse away their mistakes, but the IDF, and other forces, learn as much from their mistakes as their successes, even if you can't seem to believe they could commit something as heinous as an error . . .

Quote Reply

Siddar RE:60mm mortar -- BSL 12/27/2003 12:16:30 AM

I like the the 60mm mortar on Isreali tanks it makes sense to me in how I see Isreal using part of its tank force as a defnsive/reserve force. Western armor tactics are almost all about maunver and attack we dont really aprove of armor being used as a static defensive force. Isreal must guard its entire border at all times even when under major attack it cant just leave gaps in its border to rush all troups to the main fight. Given that im sure it plans to place armored units on its borders in times of war in nonmajor combat areas to both protect the border area they are guarding and act as reserves force for the main battle if needed. If I was a Isreali tank comander tasked with defending the border and being in reserve if main battle areas needed help I would expect that all my artilary suport would be taken away while I was in that mode to suport the main areas of conflict. Given that adding 60mm mortar to my tanks seems to be a good idea. Many also seem to view this as one tank with one mortar and not see the effect of every tank having this feature one tank with one mortar doesnt seem like much but twenty tanks with twenty mortars would put out a solid amount of iderect fire. I wouldnt see need for mortars on western MBTs because as has been said western armor tactics would almost always make sure that the tanks had artilary suport. Now on a Lite Tank made to be brought in by air I think a mortar added to it might be good idea for the opening stages of a airlift when supplys were very tight.

Quote Reply

northernguy RE:60mm mortar -- 12/27/2003 7:14:04 PM

There seems to be a widespread belief on this thread that proper strategic planning can and will ensure that the appropriate amount of artillery will always be available as needed. I think this reflects a Western bias. While Davenport's rather unpleasant comments about things Isreali and/or Jewish show how he arrived at his conclusions, I just don't see how everyone else is so sanguine about the vicissitudes of battle. Western forces have been able to control the strategic situation of their battlefields for the last fifty years or so. This might not always be the case. Just to give a couple of examples: If Nato had been forced to respond to a Russian attack in Europe during the cold war (absent all nukes on both sides) then Nato would have run out of artillery in a week or so if only because of lack of ammunition. Basing your force structure around having lots of arty available doesn't mean that you necessarily will have it all the time under all conditions. Similarly, if America were to be engaged in a land battle with Chinese forces, then soon the Americans would begin to feel uneasy about their ability to conduct combat without their customary arty. When Western forces have conducted battle operations in the last generation or so they have ensured that they had sufficient arty relative to the task to make sure that there was no serious shortage. As long as you take 6 months (GW1) or 3 months (GW2)to set up your battlefield, this is acheivable. And in GW2 it was a close run thing. Certainly, if Iran mobilises it's army and the local shiite population against the Coalition forces in Iraq you can bet there will be plenty of units without their requested artillery support. It may be a foolhardy move for Iran in the long run but beleive me, for a short while at least it would very bad for American forces. Israel will have 3 to 6 hours to respond not months. I just don't see how adding an internal mortar to their tanks is, by itself, a tactical or strategic disadvantage. As a citizen of a country that routinely sends it's forces into harms way under the direct control of the United Nations I am well aware that artillery support requests must be approved at a very senior level. This means that artillery support is available, in an unimaginably best case, only 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. New York time on a 5 day a week basis excluding myriad national holidays that preclude the multinational U.N. from making quick decisions. Normally, of course, U.N. executives are not available anywhere near those amount of hours. Of course, when America provides the bulk of a U.N. military mission they quite correctly insist on having control over such issues but other countries are not so favoured. As to whether the Israelis were foolish to employ a force structure that enabled them to handily defeat vastly superior enemy forces, the question itself seems a little biased. After all, they won!! Especially since they no longer have the identical force structure. Also, Israel can assume that it's forces will be in any number of intense battle scenarios where artillery response is considered "out of the question". Again, what's wrong with having the ablility to remove your stored ammo so you can run up and retrieve wounded or pinned down troops. Just because you can do so doesn't mean you have to do it when it's ill advised. Just like you don't have to stop and fire your internal mortar when it would be dangerous to do so. But it sure doesn't hurt to have the options both of which seem acheivable without too much penalty in the overall performance of the tank relative to it's mission design.

Quote Reply

gandalf 60mm Origin 12/28/2003 8:41:21 PM

I read somewhere that the 60mm mortar was originally installed in the Merkava as an illumination device. The front engined Merkava generated heat shimmer, ruining the night vision of the tank. Filling the spaced armor in the front of the tank with diesel to act as a semi-insulator helped, but did not compensate enough. Hence the mortar was added to allow the tank crew to fire illuminating rounds out to the tanks practical engagement range. Now, if the tank is really in need of an indirect fire weapon, I'd add a external short 120mm mortar to the back of the turret. Fitted with cargo rounds, this baby'll give you useful indirect fire out to 4000m for clearing defiladed targets, roof tops and etc.

Quote Reply

WDDavenport Mortars mounted in tank turrets are a British innovation 12/31/2003 4:09:57 PM

Mortars mounted in tank turrets are a British innovation, which appeared on the Chieftan or perhaps even eralier on some Comets. The mortar might have been a 50 mm size. Its main purpos was not fire support, but instead shooting illumination flares. This was before the era of passive night vision equipment.

Quote Reply

Pages: PREV 1 2 3 4 5 NEXT

	News As History - November 21, 2009
	Home News How to Make War Wars Around the World Austin Bay's On Point Dirty Little Secrets Features Al Nofi's CIC Prediction Market Wargames Measure of Respect On War and Warfare Videos Photos Jokes Community Military Discussion Boards Military Jokes Military Photos Military Book Reviews Military Movie Reviews Military Links Wargame Store StrategyPage Subscribe Login Feedback About Us Search Account Manager Advertise With Us