That has got to be one of the stupidest things I've read.

 

Strykers are the American equivalents of BTRs and as such they are indispensible because of the mobility they provide to their infantry. Furthermore, Strykers have outstanding communications and navigations gear (esp. Blue Force Tracker), granting American motorized rifle troops exceptional situational awareness in real time. I'm sure DA expand on this if he feels I've left anything out.

 

Now Stryker ATGM carriers and MGS can certatinly take on T-72s under certain circumstances, but the primary way a Stryker brigade would deal enemy armour is by designating targets and calling in fires. If the enemy tanks are attacking then Strykers' mobility allows the motorized rifle troops to be deployed in the best positions, and the SA Stryker provides will enable supporting fires to be brought very effectively to bear.

Historically, armored car units often use their mobility to perform armed reconnaisance and screening missions. Stryker units superb C4I equipment would be extremely useful in such situations not only because it would allow intellegence gained to be shared more quickly with higher headquarters but because it would give the unit itself a better chance of minimizing contact with the enemy while penetrating further into the area being reconnoitered.

Absolutely, but the main role of Stryker is to provide the infantry with mobility. Recon and C4I are secondary roles. Strykers are certainly more mobile than Bradleys and have a much smaller logistical footprint. The trade-off, of course, is the much reduced firepower and protection.

 

That being said, I seriously doubt Strykers would be used without Bradleys and Abrams in a high intensity warfare scenario like Iran.

Hey Folks,

 

Iran has mostly Light infantry which would b e no match for strykers

 

Sincerely,

 

Keith

Gents,

 

In response to the question posed in the initial post the answer is a catagorical NO.  Trust me people, an SBCT is one of the most formidable military organisations ever fielded.  And its not because of some silly Equipment A vs Equipment B type of comparison.

The Stryker vehicals are just one component of the brigade combat team.  The real strength of this brigade is in its ability to act with speed and superior coordination of supporting arms.  That is its firepower is in the artillery and aircraft supporting it.  The manuver companys of this brigade would have to act primarily as observers vs a heavy armored force, not as direct fighters.

This light armor/high fire power concept goes back to the earliest days of mechanized warfare.  The US military has tested it many times in several different forms and levels of technology.  Back in the very early 1980s the USMC ran extensive tests of a light armored/high firepower force at the National Training Center.  These were called the Armor Evaluation Exercises (ArmVal).  Over 150 mock engagements demonstrated that any light force trying to fight a modern armored unit must operate at extreme levels of effciency in using its supporting arms.  It was not enough to usually be ahead of the enemy in the ODA (Observation Decision Action) cycle.  The light force had to constantly be several steps ahead of the enemy.  No artillery missions or airstrikes could be wasted, movement had to be perfectly timed, communications had operate perfectly at all times, terrian had to be used with utmost skill.

In the ArmVal exercise the Soviet surrogate force had just six weeks to prepare its equipment and train in Soviet tactics.  The Marine ArmVal force had over five months to prepare itself.  In other words the Soviet surrogate modeled a unit of recently activated reservists while the ArmVal unit modeled a well prepared active service unit.  Despite this the Soviet surrogate won every single one of the first 70 engagements.  Masive artillery and air supprt failed to shift the balance.  It was only after the ArmVal unit ceased any attempt to fight the enemy with direct fires and focused on coordination of supporting fires that the balance swung.    After the ArmVal unit mastered every aspect of position, movement, fire planning, target identification, fires coordination... could they consistently win the engagements.   Lt Col Diggs, commander of the Soviet surrogate force (while a Captain) agreed with the conclusion: that a agrressively led armored force even with mediocre training can defeat a light force if any mstakes are made.  Any mistep in the application of supporting fires allowed the armored force to disrupt the light force and drive it off or destroy it.  Direct fires by the light force were confined to the rare ambush and mopping up sacttered surviviors.

While the platoon commanders of the light force and the air/artillery obserrvers had to be topnotch the core of the light force was in the fire support section of the CP and in the communications techs.  If the comm section or the Fire Support Coordination section (FSC) made any mistakes the situation instantly unraveled.  Other 'light force' evaluations I looked at confirm all this.  So does the experince of the US Army Armored Cavalry squadrons in WWII vs the Germans.

That meshes well with what has been discussed about the proposed capabilities of the FCS family of vehicles, specifically the XM360 gun and the MRM indirect fire PG AT rounds to avoid direct contact while engaging the enemy with indirect fire.

Useless?  No, not by a very wide margin.  Initially I hated the Stryker, but I've come around to being a fan.

It's a good vehicle, and the SBCT is a... good organization... perhaps not perfect for high-intesity warfare, over long distances (the support elements aren't robust enough for that).

 

I think Carl S deserves a big "thank you" for bringing up a very good point (how soon we forget our historical exercises):  flawless coordination is required to a light force to tackle a heavy one... and flawless coordination is a very high standard to acheive (which is why I see no reason to weaken, or rid ourselves, of the heavy force).

 

It happened in the past, that some fanatical crew, in the lone still-operational T-72 in a smoke-filled field, full of the wreckage of their armored unit, was over-looked, and managed to do some damage.

 

And of course I'd breathe easier if they managed to arm at least SOME of them with a 25mm or 30mm...

Hey Folks,

 

the armored humvee of the late 1980's was cleared to use the M-242 25mm bushmaster as for the most recent version  who knows if it still can????

 

Sincerely,

 

Kerith

 Haha, yeah, I have an old Field Manual on Light Cavalry that shows all of the Humvee's with M242 on a ring mount...

 

I'm sure if it can handle additional armor, it can handle a 25mm cannon with the ammunition (now can it handle both at the same time, and not have reliablilty problems??)

Would it be possible to resurrect a vehicle like the old ontos anti-tank, soup it up for higher speeds and use that for anti-tank support of the stryker? that or use a stryyker chassis, remove the compartment and fit ant-tank weps to use in conjunction with stryker APC'S? Just ideas, even I doubt the feasibility.

Strongly reccmmend this site for those interested in the SBCT concept. 

 

link