top 10 tanks in the world!!!

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mike_golf RE: Northern guy on Russian soldiers 1/19/2004 12:12:05 AM

Oh, one last comment. With high quality soldiers who understand tactics, have excellent training standards and exercise tactical iniative you can take on the enemy with inferior equipment. It's why the Germans kicked the Red Army around so hard in 1941 and 1942. The Red Army outnumbered them and had superior tanks (T-34) and artillery. But the German tactics and operational art and higher quality soldier more than made up for it. The Russian soldier of today is handicapped by both poor equipment, comparatively, and poor training. Their only advantage, mass, is gone as well, for the time being. Russia is in tough position right now. There is no way you will convince anyone here that a typical Russian tank crew in a T-90 could stop a typical American tank crew in an M-1, all other things being equal.

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gf0012-aus tank silhouette - AKS 1/19/2004 12:27:01 AM

mate, I didn't say it was a good tank, just a good silhouette... ;) it wouldn't get through a lot of mike_golfs selection criteria in todays environment... ;)

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swhitebull RE:tank silhouette 1/19/2004 2:00:51 AM

..RE:tank silhouette 1/18/2004 11:41:45 PM So guys which tanks have a better silhouette ... Jolene Blaylock in the tank top on the deck of the Starship Enterprise wins MY vote ANY day for the best tank(top)silhouette! Any one want to dispute THIS one? Bring it on! END of DISCUSSION- case closed! swhitebull ;-P

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Thomas RE:Summarizing a few things MG 1/19/2004 2:56:05 AM

I generally agree with your evaluation, but have a few comments. Mobility: One thing is the strategic mobility. The M1 can do the job and may not be that much more difficult bringing into place overseas than others; but it is a very demanding tank on the supply lines. A tank with no fuel and no grenades is not a tank. This banality reflects a more serious issue: Getting a larger army, to solve the problems around the world, is not just a question of getting more tanks and train their crews. You also need more supply trucks and their crews, You need more mechanics with their expensive equipment and spare parts, You need more field hospitals, because the supply people have a tendency to make road accidents, You need more light troops to protect the supply lines. Any increase in the shap end whiplashes backwards. If you insist on a tank that needs to pampered like a primadonna, you muliply an already high multiplication factor. This in turn moves the goalposts for the assesment of what is a vital security need, as the expense of moving into action skyrockets. Overwhelming firepower is a nice notion - if you can afford it - but someone has to carry all these shells. PGM help to some extend, but I do not believe it to be a pancea for all problems, as you cannot count on the opponent being as incompetent as Saddam. This is why I (with scant success) have tried to raise the question of the Medium - or even light tank (though a Sturmgeschütz of German pattern/HMMVV with missiles might be better bet). To me the important point is not the best MBT (there isn't much to choose from among the better ones), but the best ADEQUATE tank. Not that I would go without the MBT, but reserve it for occation where nothing else will do. The Abrams uses 75% more fuel than a Leo2, will it be possible to build a tank that uses 1/3 of the fuel of an Abrams with a 105 mm gun and enough armour protection to cope with all but the most serious opposing tank? To paraphrase you MG: The only thing more expensive than the best MBT, is to few MBT's - or there is more ways to kill a cat, than drown it in cream.

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Fedaykin Wishful Thinking 1/19/2004 4:33:15 AM

Stating that Russian soldiers are better trained than western ones is just wishful thinking. The current parlous state of the Russian millitary is well documented. In many ways the officer core is part of the problem with senior officers resisting any true modernisation. I will digress off tanks for a bit now onto pilot training but I feel that this will help clarrify the situation... Western Air forces pilot training is usually maintained to a fixed NATO standard. This covers the training syllabus and the amount of required flight hours per year. On top of this each air force will usually participate in several training exercises a year often with other air forces. Also older and more experienced pilots are encouraged to mentor newer pilots passing on the anecdotal skills often not covered in a normal training syllabus. This practice is particularly prevalent in the Israeli air force which has a very good combat recorded (Ignoring the politics of the present situation). In a recent combat air exercise between the Israeli air force and a Mediterranean based USN carrier wing the Israeli air force managed to get a 40 - 1 kill ratio. This is a useful example as it shows a real combat scenario between two countries fielding virtually the same equipment. In that case Israel with an air force that has seen near constant operation for 40+ years the skill showed. The fact is in the end whatever the Western air force their is a principle of developing a core of pilots who meet an average of skill across the board rather then have a large skill disparity. In the case of pilots trained in the eastern block things are a bit murkier. Obviously the pilots who appear at various western air shows are very good performing many impressive maneuvers like the cobra (invented by the prolific Russian test pilot Viktor Pugachev) but it is important to note that these pilots were either company test pilots or senior air force pilots. In the case of the average eastern block pilot things are different. It is well known that flight hours are low in the eastern block, the Russian air force itself has stated that this is a problem. Training in the eastern block is also based on Ground Control Intercept or GCI, something that in the west is regarded as outmoded and inflexible (It is worth noting that Western airforces do employ GCI in certain situations). There are two examples that I will pose to give a better idea of the state of training in the eastern block; firstly with the reunification of West and East Germany the Luftwaffe gained access to the former DDR's air force including the much vaunted Mig29. It was decided that the Mig29 would be placed into a new squadron formed around a core of ex Phantom pilots. Whilst in the BVR arena they found the Mig rather poor in comparison to western types in the close combat environment they found it to be superior. In the meanwhile the ex DDR pilots were tested to see their quality. It was found that they were very poor, the Mig29 whilst being flown by them lost all its advantages and was easy to engage and theoretically destroy for the Luftwaffe pilots. This was deeply worrying for the Luftwaffe so its was decided to place the ex DDR pilots through basic training. Most of them washed out and never flew a military jet again. The other example comes from the 1980's and the Iraqi air force which had decided to purchase the Dassault Mirage F1 and the Mig29. A number of Iraqi air force trainees were sent to France to train on the new type with the French Air force. A high number of these students did not meet the minimal quality standard and were sent home. These young men were then sent to Russia instead to train for the Mig29. In the case of Russia they did meet their standards and passed much to the surprise of France. In conclusion it is fair to say that the average eastern block combat pilot is not as skilled as the average western pilot, this is in no way should be read as an insult to the people of these countries.

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Heorot RE:Summarizing a few things mike_golf 1/19/2004 5:47:30 AM

Thomas raises an interesting point about the logistic trail and it made me think about something Mike_Golf said. He made the point that major work could be carried out on the Abrams in the field rather than returning it to the depot. I wonder if he could tell us what the logistics penalty is for that facility. By that I mean, how much extra manpower is required for this, how mush additional equipment is needed and what the fuel penalty for this support is. As I see it, if you have no logistics for this, as has been suggested for the Russian model, your tail is much reduced. I will concede that damage that is beyond local maintenance means the loss of the tank for the fighting, but given the overwhelming superiority and general reliability of the Abrams, would this be a problem? Or is the ability to maintain a high service level a reflection of the larger logistic tail? And if so, is the tail significantly worth the expense.

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Thomas RE:Summarizing a few things Heorot 1/19/2004 6:23:12 AM

Interesting point! If you have enough tanks, but not enough crews: If your tank gets a little dent take a new one from the pool, and let the transporter take the empty one back to the equally empty transport ship.

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gf0012-aus Summarizing a few things Heorot 1/19/2004 6:53:42 AM

[Or is the ability to maintain a high service level a reflection of the larger logistic tail? And if so, is the tail significantly worth the expense.] Isn't this a very fluid dynamic? If you look at GW1 the US learnt very quickly from that and applied change to the warfighting method for GW2. I would imagine that the logistics model would already have changed. Outrunning the tanker line is one issue that I would suspect they won't do again. Wouldn't an over resourced logistics mech support train be somewhat pruned the next time around - if this time they were a bit short on work??

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joe6pack RE:Summarizing a few things 1/19/2004 7:04:58 AM

Mike Golf I'm sure could give some excellent details... But from an ignorant bystander, the work I've seen done to Abrams in the field looks impressive to say the least. I've watched recovery vehicles pull up and swap out engines at what would make NASCAR fans envious (O.K. - thats a little exaggerated) but it was fricking cool to watch the work they are able to complete in the field. I'm not sure what extra logistics go into that... The recovery vehicles looked to be the standard armor recovery type.. I suppose the added logistics is in bringing the spare parts forward rather taking the tank back to a depot.... But from a warfighting point of veiw.. being able to make those kind of repairs in the field and a quick return of the tanks seems (to me at least) to be well worth the extra logistics....

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MikkoLn RE:Summarizing a few things 1/19/2004 9:28:31 AM

Just comment on a few things (much came in mind when looking through these posts from previous few days but I don't know if I'll remember One clarifying thing. People keep talking like T72's used in Iraq or Chechenya, or now in use, are basicly the same as those used in early 70's (this time in relation with protection). Latest model of T72 to pour out of lines has 200% the armour of the first model. So quite a difference there. T90 with K5 can achieve roughly (quickly counting) 350% of the protection of the first T72. Late model T72's now used in russia have been however upgraded with K5 so armour protection between late model T72 and T90 is not such significantly different (maybe around 20% difference). T72's Iraq used belonged mainly to mid-production export class, which has roughly 50% better protection than early model and 50% worse than late model (excluding era). And then to RPG's, along with the similiar lines. Though M1A1's (Iraq) are unquestionably more resistant to hand held at-fire than T72's with early era (Chechenya), the circumstances were pretty different. Iraq used weapons were mainly old generation RPG's with inadequate ammo, ok against M60's but totally outclassed by ceramic construction tanks. Chechens however had a good supply of new russian at-weapons (and russians have always known how to build them, being one of their strongest areas). But, this is not nearly as much of significance as the way they were used. Mike_golf (if I remember right) wrote something good about this issue some twenty posts ago...The reputation of T-series tanks being totally dead if faced with hand held at-weapon is mainly due to soviet first big drive to the centre of Grozny, ending in total disaster. After that, hand held at-weapons have done damage, but not nearly to the extent many may believe. Grozny was a total disaster already in the drawing board (a very good lesson for the overconfident us military boys I've seen recently ready to go for any war waving flags). Russians drove their tanks to narrow streets nearly as they were in a parade, with obvious results. Rebels had good firing angles from apartment blocks targeting vulnerable top and side surfaces with their numerous (more or less up to date) at-weapons. Multiple hits first diminished the era coverage where it was found(which still contains quite a many blocks, it's not easy to hit exactly the same spot twice) and then quickly produced repeated penetrations resulting in total annihilation of about all the tanks (this is much helped by the fact that T72 style tanks store wonderful combination of ammunition and fuel all around the hull making it vulnerable in case of penetration). A testament to completely failure in planning stages and above all, underestimating the enemy. Then more about T72. Much critisism I've seen here about maintenance issues. It's true that T72 is nowhere near the latest tanks in repairability (it has been long a common feature that complete powerpack can be replaced, this is not possible in T72). It's not particularly easy vehicle to repair in case some parts broke down, but far from impossible either, being in addition relatively easy vehicle to maintain. But then, I don't know what the hell are you guys expecting a tank crew should do under normal field conditions. To be specific, we weren't expected to put the engine in parts in the field and assemble it again (well, neither much more minor repairs). Integral field workshops were there for that. And, at least in Finnish army, they contained highly competent personnel and up to date tools and adequate supply of them. No, russian tanks aren't marvel vehicles running smoothly around (in many ways they're a real pain in the ass) but saying anything like it was/is end of the game for days should particular engine part break down is nonsense. More about it's overall design. The silhouette is low, but due to carousel autoloader, extremely cramped (should there be no carousel, it could be more roomy than LeoII. Particularly in offense (and even more until 70/80's) low silhouette is advantage, but tanks mainly in defensive would consider abitily to achieve good hull down positions much much more crucial. In T72, back at it's introducion times very low profile affects also to the protection, as hull is full packed with explosive material. Turret is not as vulnerable (yeah, only a couple of chaps in there!) in a sense penetrations wouldn't necessarily blow the whole tank up. There's also a good fire extinguishing system installed, but we considered it somewhat a nice curiosity as everyone can reason would it be much of a use if round stowage or fuel tank is hit. I don't know if it's particularly unengouraging thought to go in a battle with one (we didn't consider it to be any more than with anything else, just used to it), but of course the fact that as a commander you basicly sit on a few spare propellant cases, your back is to the pair of spare 125mm rounds and your arm

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