Depends on when you start the clock. The reasonable time to start the clock is when the first German tank superior or at least equivalent to the Sherman is encountered on the battlefield. That was late 1942 at the earliest, which in fact is when the design of the M-26 began.

No tank in WWII was designed in *less* than a year and a half, and this was for vehicles that were derivative works. The M4 that only required the design of a turret and turret ring, which were then slapped on an M2 chassis took about this long. So did the design of the T-34, which was basically a larger, heavier, and more powerful BT-7, beginning in early 1940--shortly after the end of the winter war with Finlandand--and still in a prototype stage until the summer. The Tiger took forever and a day to design. Development of the Panzer VI and Panzer V began before the war even started (A few Panzer V and VI prototypes were sent to Norway, broke down or got stuck and were scuttled) and the order to get them into a production ready state was issued in early 1941, yet the Panzer VI was still not on the field until late 1942, and the Panzer V until early 1943.

 

The Pershing was a new design, so expecting it to be fielded by 1943 is ludicrous, and any date to expect it to reach the field before 1944 is not at all realistic. It isn't suprising to see the Pershing ready for battle by fall of 1944, which is 2 years--not bad for a new from the ground up design.

 

For a look at what happens when you push a design into combat before it is ready look at the Tiger and Panther. They broke down with such regularity as to be practically useless and the Panther's transmission occasionally caught fire. Which gives a little more meaning to the problems the M-26 had getting a working tranmission-engine combination going.

Herald, the first 10 PROTOTYPES of the M-26, or what would become the M-26, the engine, the transmission, tracks, hull and turret (the argument on armament was on-going) were available until March-June 1944.  The earliest that the M-26 was going to be available was Sept./Oct. 1944, and then in the hundreds, certainly not the thousands.  Yes it would have helped in the closing months of 1944 and in the Ardennes Offensive, but the prime US tank was going to be the M-4.  I think Jeff is right it isn't very likely that a tank is going from design to usage in much less than 1.5 years, more likely 2 years. 

 

I will note that the M-26 was still vulnerable to the two largest killers of M-4's in Europe, mines and panzerfausts, penetration 20 cm RHA.  With 46 degree slope the 10 cm M-26 frontal equals ~14 cm at 90 degrees.  But it was proof to the Panther at 900 metres or more in range, frontally.  It was still vulnerable to the PAK 43/KWK 43 8.8 cm L/71 at over 1100 metres in range.

 

The M-26 is a great improvement over the M-4, but it was going to be a late comer to the show.  The Germans met the T-34 which sparked the Pzkw VI and the Pzkw V.  We didn't meet the VI until 1943, which means our response to it was not likely to be available until well into 1944.

 

I stand by the the realistic best the US could have hoped for was the M-4a3e8, the M-36 and a wider distribution of the HVAP round for the 76mm and 90mm rounds.  Followed by a limited introduction of the M-26 in late 1944.  The M-26 would not have replaced the M-4 until well into 1945 or early 1946 had the war continued.  The US fielded 3-4,000 M-4's?  Wartime production only saw 1,000 fielded in 1945.  It would have taken another year of wartime production to have replaced the M-4, fully, in the US inventory.

 

Bottom-Line: the US wasn't going to get the M-26 in 1944, because in 1942, we hadn't met the Tiger I.  Two years after we met the Tiger I we fielded a vehicle capable of dealing with it.  That's not a bad turn-around.

1. The US Army was receiving its own observer reports from North Africa and RUSSIA before it entered the actual fighting itself.

 

2. a.

 

 

2. b.

 

 

Read about the US Army tank development history for the fourth time. Do you notice that the US Army Ordnance  in response to the reported British/German armor gun race, which the British were losing in 1941, had already begun designing a US medium tank to replace the Sherman BEFORE the Sherman had even seen combat? Hello?

 

3. This may sound tiresome to you, but long before that Churchhill tank crawled up Abaila Ridge in Tunisia to shoot that Tiger I in the back in May of 1943, the automotive guys at Aberdeen and at Grand Blanc were acutely aware that the Germans had new tanks coming into service that were going to shoot holes in the M-4.    

 

4. The problem with the T-23 were disputes over the tank's electric transmission and the difficulty in retraining the US Army mechanics in electromotive as opposed to mechanical transmission systems. This was understandable, but was to me something of a bureaucratric shibboleth.  

 

So, you can claim that the delays were the result of indecision or incompetence, but you can't claim ignorance. The FACT rermains that the poor M-26 Pershing after all the delays and bungling rolled out in pilot model form, after all the delays that McNair and the bunglers in AGF and Army Ordnance went through in February 1944 and that low rate production for weapon proofing was in hand by MAY 1944. The batch run wasn't cranked up until October 1944. Shipping the tanks for the Zebra Mission didn't begin until late January 1945.

 

From February 1944[maybe May 1944] until January 1945. What happened? You do know what weapon proofing is, right? What was the holdup?

 

Herald  

 

 

Yes, Herald it does get tiresome repeating over and over again...the earliest that the M-26 was going see combat was Oct 1944.  By your own reckoning...the 1st prototypes weren't available until March 1944.  The M-26 was not going to decide the war in Europe, sorry.  The first year of production saw ~1,400 produced.  At the earliest that would have been March 1945, making the M-26 about 20% of the Allied tank force in Europe.  The first tranche of vehicles, about 250 would have been available in about Oct. 1944.

 

What went wrong? Nothing and one thing.  Nothing, you keep harping on the electric transmission, Herald that's a part of development.  People specify things they want, and sometimes they don't work out.  The electric transmission didn't.  You are viewing the M-26's development from the lens of the Pershing as deployed...and 60 years in the past.  In 1943 it wasn't so clear that the automotive decisions made were bad.  Just ask yourself this, what will the big seller for Toyota be in 2012?  In 2072 it will be OBVIOUS what it was and why, but in 2007 it's not so clear.  So too with the automotive development of the M-26.

 

One thing that DID go wrong was the debate on the 90mm gun versus the 76mm gun.  That debate was and fruitless, I agree.  That debate was settled in July/August of 1944.  But the M-26 was not ready for production and deployment for several months after that, because the automotive test rigs weren't all completed until JUNE 1944.  Then, changes were made, so that the vehicle was not ready for initial production and deployment until Oct. 1944, deployed in January 1945.

 

IF the US Ground Forces, Armour Board, Ordnance Board, and European Theatre had all been on the same page, then March 1944, becomes Oct. 1944, meaning that in June 1944 the M-26 would be ready for production and deployment.  The M-26 could have made it's initial deployment in Oct. 1944.  By March 1945 it could have deployed in numbers approaching 1,000, probably about 1/3 of the US tank force.

 

Bottom-Line: As tiresome as it is to say and to read, the M-4 Sherman was going to be the tank that ended the War in Europe.  The best that could be hoped for was the M-4 with HVSS, 76mm, "wet" ammunition storage, and HVAP was going to be the best that the US was going field for D-Day and the march to the Rhine.  The M-36 would have been an excellent supplement, giving the force a 90mm gun capable of engaging the Wehrmacht's best armour.  Finally, the M-26 would have been an excellent supplement to the force, allowing a victory at a far lower cost than was otherwise obtained, but it would have only been a SUPPLEMENT to the M-4, not a substitute. 

 

Finally, for all it's superiority to the M-4 the M-26 was still vulnerable to the Panzerfaust and mine, the majority of M-4 kills in Europe.  So less focus on armour-on-armour fighting and a greater focus on combined arms fighting and obstacle identification and clearance would have helped the US forces as much as a new tank.

They dithered with the electric transmission because of that very promise. If the Army had put its foot down, and mandated a conventional torqueamatic transmission from the start, then a half year of wasted tinkering would have been cut out. As it was, the T-26 pilot model, with torsion bar suspension and the torqueamatic transmission, did pop out of the workshop as a pilot model 120 days after the correct decisions were made. INCREDIBLY fast that was.

Since the M4 debate is so controversial, lets look at the design of something less controversial, but directly related. The design of the Tiger. The Germans knew from the very beginning that their tanks were less powerful than those of their opponents. So in although their Panzer III and Panzer IV designs had been successful, they began working on a heavier design. In 1932. (>

Herald I simply don't agree on the production time-line, bottom-line is we'll have to agree to disagree.  You put the M-26 in at Cobra, I don't see it until the fighting slows down in the Fall of 1944.  But we do agree that the vehicle that was going to defeat Germany was the M-4.  Because even in your presentation the first tranche is only in SELECTED armour battalions, the first tranche was ~250 M-26's, only 200 or fewer would be available counting some training and war reserve stocks.

 

As to the M-26 and the M-4 loss rates due to infantry and mines...you ascribe it to something about the M-26.  How about this, the US tankers and infantry finally worked out effective cooperation tactics between themselves?  Plus, by the time the M-26 was involved in fighting the Germans were reduced to Volksturm and a badly reduced Wehrmacht, neither of which were CAPABLE of inflicting the level of damage the Wehrmacht of 1944 was capable of. 

 

Had the M-26 been involved in the bocage fighting against the Wehrmacht it would have taken comparable losses as the M-4.  The terrain was close-in, the troops unblooded, and the Wehrmacht had weapons, panzerfausts and mines, that would have worked against the M-26 just as effectively as they did against the M-4.  The M-26 was vulnerable to the Panzerfaust 60, marginally and definitely vulnerable to the Panzerfaust 100.  The M-26 had the equivalent of 14 cm RHA frontally-counting slope, whereas the Panzerfaust 100 had a penetration of 20 cm RHA.  German Panzers would still have been able to lurk to the flanks and rear, engaging US armour confined to the roads.  The M-26 would have allowed us to bleed LESS, no doubt, but don't fool yourself into thinking that it would have been anything easy or MUCH easier than the first 6 weeks of the European Campaign were, historically.

 

Bottom-line: the M-4 carries us to victory, even you admit it...and the M-26 was "markedly superior" because by the time it made its appearance the opposition had fallen upon hard times.  Not that it wasn't a better tank, it was in terms of mobility, survivability, and lethality, but it comes into play at a time that the opposition has been badly depleted, as well.

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You neglect one small detail about the fast German prototyping...it made for unreliable vehicles.  The bulk of the Pzkw's BROKE down at Kursk.  Please note that the M-26 had far fewer problems in this regard.  Yes, the Germans got vehicles to front, reasonably quickly, but they didn't work real well.

 

Further I might question even your argument about German "speed".  In June 1941 the Germans meet the T-34.  In June 1943 the Panther makes it's appearance.  Two years.  Are you SURE the Germans were speedy?

 

Bottom-Line: the Germans took two years to introduce their response to the T-34.  It was an unreliable vehicle, and remained relatively unreliable for the rest of the war, because they "stormed" their answer.  The US took an equivalent amount of time, 2 years and produced a much more reliable vehicle.