(excellent reference, by the way)

Some notes on the Sherman:

 

its seemingly high hull height (mainly over the rear decking) was primarily in part to the installation of the R975 radial engine and the ungainly path the propellor shaft coming off the engine took down under the fighting compartment, to reach the transmission up front.

 

There was a later design suggesting a lower hull using multibank diesels, featuring a 90mm gun.

(except for the thicker metallurgy necessary back then to build a 90mm gun, it's line drawing doesn't look externally a whole lot different from that 1980s Brazilian (Bernardini) X1A2 light tank which mounted a Belgian 90mm Mk3 gun.)

 

There was even an attempt at fitting the Pershing's 90mm gun (M3) in an enlarged turret in July 1944 (both tanks had a 69 inch turret ring), which gave it the appearance seen in some later Israeli Super Shermans.

 

The high velocity 76mm gun (T1) initially suggested prior to the 17-pdr was at first 57 calibers long, but weight imbalances necessitated a reduction in length of 15 inches prior to widescale production (the APDS of the 17-pdr gave superior performance over the HVAP of the 76mm).

 

There was even a very formidable-looking assault tank, the T14, developed from Sherman heritage (featuring the same 69 inch turret ring, with armament initially the short 75mm M3, but the 105mm howitzer, 76mm high velocity, and 90mm were possible considerations. First pilot vehicle was delivered in July 1943, at about 47 tons (too many mechanical problems kept it out of production).

 

Definitely a very good book if you got the green for it.

(The Sherman looked especially good when trialling torsion bar suspension.)

The problem with the analysis is that like most analysis it assumes that the Army was in fact wrong in relying on the Sherman, and that the German tanks were in fact better than the Sherman at fighting an winning the war.

 

I'd day that in fact the Army was not wrong and that the Sherman was better at fighting and winning the war than either the German Panthers and Tigers or the M-26. Could it have been better? Certainly. It could have been fielded with the improved ammunition storage already in place, with the wider tracks already in use, and the switch to a 76mm gun could have been made earlier. If more HVAP ammunition could have been provided that would have helped immensely as well.

 

My concern is this. Lets say you can wave a magic wand and suddenly it is 1942 and the US is producing Pershings instead of Shermans. Does that make the war easier to win or harder? Can you land Perhings as easily as Shermans on beacheads? Are Pershings as mobile in the sand as Shermans. Once you get off of the beaches, can they cross bridges as easily as Shermans? Can they move overland in blitzkreig-style assaults as quickly as Shermans. Can they be produced in enough numbers to provide the mass that more numerous Shermans can? Can they move overland quickly enough to achieve the mass through maneuver that the Shermans can.

 

So-called "Quality" (usually meaning frontal armor + main gun penetration) is the single most over-rated aspect of armored warfare. This can be demonstrated through even the most cursory analysis nearly of any armored battle of WW2. The only exception, ironically is Kursk. In Kursk power was decisive. The more powerful german tanks achieve far greater numbers of destroyied enemy tanks than the less powerful Soviets. And yet they were crushed. This is because the key to armored warfare is not killing the enemy by gun power against armor strength, but destroying their formations through maneuver.

 

This was the strength of the early German tanks. They were more maneuverable, and had better communications and so could coordiate better with each other than their much more powerful French, British, and Soviet opponents. Similarly this was the strength of the Sherman. Compared to the German tanks which were much less reliable, and in the case of the Tiger much slower, and too heavy to cross most bridges. Compared to the Pershing it had better cross country mobility, which is key to success in a blitz.

 

Would it have been useful to have M-26s to suppliment the Shermans? Certainly. The Shermans were faster had better cross country mobility and the M-26s had more power, so if stiff enemy armored resistance was encountered they could have been used as a "breakthrough tank" to knock out the heavy armor, and if an enemy counter attack was launched they could have been used to stop it. Then again, that pretty much sums up the description of a Tank Destroyer.

The issue I have with the article on the M26 is that the M26 has a reputation for poor performance and being underpowered. This is not addressed. I have even heard that some M26 units in Korea swapped for M4s due to the need for better cross country performance. Haven't been able to source that though.

 

It is suggested that the early German success in the Battle of the Bulge is attributable to the weakness of the M-4. The author has apparently no comprehension of the effect that strategic and tactical suprise has, especially on utterly green troops. When experienced troops of the 10th Armored Division with M-4s and M-10s arrived, they achieved considerable success in slowing the German advance of the elite and well equipped Panzer Lehr division, and the fact that they were unable to stop the advance is attributable as much to the superior numbers the Germans had available during thier attack as to the superior quality of their tanks.

US tank destroyers used speed to flank enemy tanks, just like the shermans had to do.  The M26, if it was used to suppliment the shermans, would have been used differently from the tank destroyers and would have added a capability that the US army did not get from either the tanks or tank destroyers that were fielded.

That theory on how tank destroyers "work" always brings me a grim chuckle... How many people know what it takes, to behave so agressively when faced by a Tiger when you are in an M10, M18, or even an M36. Sure, go ahead and say what you would do, I'd like to see how many people would actually be able to pull it off in combat if they were ACTUALLY THERE.  It takes a really high level of training to maneuver like that, (and I'm not knocking just the US GI's here) and perhaps it's easier to not place all of your faith in that... It's the equivalent of the Imperial Japanese Army, equipping the troops with "truly wretched" weapons and expecting "fighting spirit" to overcome every enemy in every situation.

 

That fact remains that a great many US tankers died horribly, whether they were waiting on air support, or outflanking a Tiger only to find out too late that there were a couple Mark IV's hiding out there, too.

The M10 was actually no less armoured than an M4, from a functional point of view, when engaging Axis armour. Weapons that could defeat an M10 could also kill an M4, weapons that the M4 was proof against were likewise unable to take out an M10.

On the negative side, the M10 carried no co-axial machine gun and the HE of the 76mm gun was less substantial than that of the 75mm (higher firing stresses due to a higher velocity, so you need more steel wall and less HE.) So it fared less well against infantry and anti-tank guns, which were far more common German defences than tanks. Coupled with its open top, this was its weakness rather than protection against direct-fire weaponry.