If you were receiving the first British battlefield reports about the performance of the M3 Lee/Grant, as the technical head of US tank production and you had the 1942 US automotive technology base, what would you have done with the Sherman design?

Herald

Considering that the time frame between the M2 medium tank design being finalized, basically an M2 light tank on steroids, to the M3 and finally the M4A1 is really not that long, June 1939 to June 1941 for the M3 to February 1942 when the M4 is standardized and placed into production.  Never mind that the first contract for production by Chrysler at the Detroit Tank Arsenal wasn't signed until August 1940 for the M2A1, that the M4 got out there that quick is sort of a wonder. Add to the fact that any changes would have to be passed by the Army and within the then current Tank/TD team doctrine, and the dire need to get as much equipment to the field as possible, I wouldn't want to slow anything down on the line. 

Given that, I might want to look at the armor thickness vs. changes in mobility and the ability of the suspension and transmission to take any added weight.  So maybe you're looking at a unit level upgrade kit for additional armor, especially around the ammunition storage in the hull and a rework of the ammo storage arrangement.  If I recall correctly, part of the reason for the M3 75mm/L40 gun was a weapon that would have a large number of rounds per barrel life since the tank was meant to get into the rear and shoot everything up, this included the known German tanks at that time, and in order to keep things moving along with production they used the M3 gun from the hull mount on the M3 medium tank.   The Tiger wasn't an issue at that point, the Flak 88mm however was, along with the rest of the German PAK inventory. 

A lot of the losses in the North Africa campaign for U.S. forces, especially early on, can be blamed more on lack of experience and tactics employed.  Not all of the units had the luxury of Patton's Southern California desert finishing school.  I mean you start to mobilize in 1940, push it into overdrive after 7 December 1941, and besides what's going on in the Pacific, you launch an amphibious invasion half way across the world in North Africa with Operation Torch in November 1942.  When the upgunned PzIVs and Stugs along with the first Tigers and Panthers start showing up in 1943, I'd have pushed for the best AT gun I could get my hands on in quantity, and if the quantity wasn't there, I'd fix that too.  Whether it be the 76 mm gun M1 or the British 17 pounder.  But then even if I could get the gun into the tank, I wouldn't have the power to make sure that the best AT rounds got to them in quantity, instead of going to the TD units as what happened.  The other great failure was with regards to intel, regarding the number of Pz Vs in France which didn't help matters.  Never mind the simple fact that the Normandy countryside couldn't have been put together better than it was for a defender.  And the Germans knew how to play that game very well indeed. 

The fact is that the U.S. were at least 1/2 to 1 generation behind the Germans on tank design, only catching up with the Pershing at the end of the war.  U.S. doctrine regarding the TD didn't help matters, but at least it meant that there were a lot of self propelled guns running around on the front line.

German tanks were in 1937. (Panzer I and II) approx. 2 or 3 generations behind then-existing French and Russian tanks, while 6 years later, Panther outclassed every then-existing tank by very long margin. But both Panthers and Tigers were complex tanks-every single was so complex that it could easily end up as museum exponate right after production. There is comparation: for same amount of work it was possible to build 4 Panzer IV's, 3 Panthers or 2 Tigers. However, Panzer IV could be built with much less complex machines so real situation would be 6 Panzer IV, or 3 Panthers or 2 Tigers.

And US TD doctrine meant they had something with which they can catch up with and destroy German tank. Sherman, even variant with 76.2 mm cannon, was highly immobile when compared to Panther or Panzer IV. But i think Germans made mistake-they should built

I was thinking something... was it possible to get Panther's 7.5 cm KwK 42 L/70 gun mounted on Pannzer IV? (My recipe how to counter swarm of T-34's).

The Jagdpanzer IV mounted the L/70 gun in a limited traverse hull mount.  A major complaint from the troops was that the vehicle was nose heavy. 

 

The Mk.IV chassis was maxed out for weight carry capabilities and a major weight increase would have produced mobility problems due to high ground pressure.  To turret mount the L/70 gun would have required reducing the already marginal armor even more to compensate.  The L/70 also requires more space, so a larger turret, possibly a 2 man turret design if the turret ring could not handle that.

 

One of the major improvements that the German's adopted from the T-34 for the Panther and Tiger was the use of wider tracks (660mm vs 400mm), which reduced the ground pressure for the Panther to the same as the Mk.IV.

German tanks were in 1937. (Panzer I and II) approx. 2 or 3 generations behind then-existing French and Russian tanks, while 6 years later, Panther outclassed every then-existing tank by very long margin. But both Panthers and Tigers were complex tanks-every single was so complex that it could easily end up as museum exponate right after production. There is comparation: for same amount of work it was possible to build 4 Panzer IV's, 3 Panthers or 2 Tigers. However, Panzer IV could be built with much less complex machines so real situation would be 6 Panzer IV, or 3 Panthers or 2 Tigers.

15,000 Panzer IIIs and IVs, even if we throw in numerous variants with anything from AA to SP artillery and TDs, would be a bad idea.

Those several hundreds of Tigers and Panthers that were derelict and broken down?

They weren't consuming any fuel, or ammunition, or personnel (other than maintenance, if any).

 

Now try providing enough fuel, ammunition, and crews to these proverbial 15,000 AFVs and see where it gets you.

As the War progressed, Germany just could not have sustained that many more vehicles, let alone the additional 60,000+ personnel and the provisions (rations, clothing, etc) required for them.

(And as more and more military-aged German males were being killed, who was going to operate these vehicles?

A volkstrum made up of old men and Hitler Youth?)

 

 

Fuel was just too critical.

And as the War continued and more Allied bombings took their toll on production and supply facilities, all those AFVs would've depleted ammunition and spares & repair parts stocks even faster.

 

Mathematically it may seem more ideal to produce more numbers of more dependable vehicles than took less material and manpower/manhours to build, but the end logistics of fuel, ammo, and the number of personnel required to operate them,

all those compute against the argument for 15,000, or even 10,000, of every other PzIII/IV-based AFVs that could've been built instead.

Yours are all good points, BUT...as Germany was being hammered by huge armoured forces I think it's fair to say that Germany ABSOLUTELY NEEDED a larger tank force.  And the Force wouldn't have required EXTRA men, it would have allowed men, in infantry to have become tankers.  So it's not 300-plus Infantry divisions AND more panzers...but rather 250 infantry divisions and more panzers...

 

Further, an increase in the tank force would have allowed the existing forces to have remained at a stronger level....rather than divisions with 20-50 tanks, you might have had divisions with 100-plus tanks....

 

All-in-all, your objections, though ultimately valid, are also flawed....Germany needed more panzers...she still would have lost (Thank God) but the victory would have been even more expensive....

P.S. Estimated loss in Pz.IV production during 1943. beacouse of decision to produce still-unreliable Panthers is between 1000-2000 tanks. That was mistake.