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Subject: M 5 Sherman tank. What would you have done?
Herald1234    2/24/2007 3:24:09 AM
If you were receiving the first British battlefield reports about the performance of the M3 Lee/Grant, as the technical head of US tank production and you had the 1942 US automotive technology base, what would you have done with the Sherman design? Herald
 
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Jeff_F_F       3/20/2007 5:21:02 PM
I've been thinking of what a November delivery date for the Pershing would have meant. The thing is that would have been in the middle of some of the toughest fighting in the entire war in Europe. The Hurtgen Forest was terrible tank country with dense woods with few roads, hilly terrain and soft ground. This made it possible for only a few Panzers to have a disproportionate impact on the battle because there was no way to bring in enough Shermans to make a difference. The Pershing would have had a much better chance in these conditions.
 
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Herald1234    Vosges and the Hardt Mountains.   3/21/2007 12:00:08 AM

I've been thinking of what a November delivery date for the Pershing would have meant. The thing is that would have been in the middle of some of the toughest fighting in the entire war in Europe. The Hurtgen Forest was terrible tank country with dense woods with few roads, hilly terrain and soft ground. This made it possible for only a few Panzers to have a disproportionate impact on the battle because there was no way to bring in enough Shermans to make a difference. The Pershing would have had a much better chance in these conditions.



Just a question, Jeff. What do you think the contribution of Pershings or Jacksons would have been in that campaign? Remember that Patton and 3rd Army  was bogged down besieging Metz at the time just before the dash to Bastogne, when Patch and 7th Army had a handful with Army Group G in some of the worst terrain and fighting along the German/French border.
 
Vosges Mountain Campaign,  U.S. 15th Corp
In harsh winter weather, over difficult mountain terrain, and against a determined foe, the soldiers of the 44th triumphed. Of all these soldiers, the infantryman had had the hardest lot. In mid-December Eisenhower wrote to the ‘GI’s  friend’, war correspondent Ernie Pyle,  that it was these foot soldiers who had demonstrated the "real heroism?which is the uncomplaining acceptance of unendurable conditions." Starting at the forest de Parroy, Luneville, passes in the Vosges Mountains, Dossenheim,  Avricourt, Sarrebourg... and at the German main battle line, the Siegfried Line and Fort Simser... the 44th infantryman had persevered and, through his determination, vanquished the  Wehrmacht.
  1. Front Lines, October 1944
  2. Schalbach near Luneville, repulsed the Panzer Lehr Divis...
  3. Forced winter passage through ... Mts. capture Avricourt
  4. Capture Sarrebourg
  5. Assist in the capture of Strasbourg... (Strasbourg) with French 2nd Div.  First U.S.  troops to reach the Rhine River...
  6. Capture Fort Simserhof...
This is one place where the Pershing would have been usefully tested under adverse conditions, as it was here that the US Army first broke across and crossed the Rhine.
 
For an example of where the Pershing would have shone in glory, lets take a look at the 36th Infantry Division  and a desperate fight, it's 636th tank destroyer battalion[attached]  had;
 
 
[quoting]
 

German action quickened at the bridgehead a

 
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Yimmy    Speaking of tanks....   3/21/2007 12:34:37 AM
 
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JFKY    Re: Centurion   3/21/2007 11:39:18 AM
All I can say is some "Idiot" got hold of the British Tank design/production system, too.  This tank could have been available for D-Day I'm sure....
 
 
 
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Jeff_F_F       3/21/2007 12:29:57 PM
Accounts of the performance of M10s and even M4s against the best German armor truely boggle the mind, considering how woefully behind the development curve it really was. Part of it was the quality of the HVAP ammo when it was available, but the bulk of the credit has to be given to the guts and skill of our tankers. Of course, more powerful guns would have rewarded that skill with more consistent results.
 
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JFKY    Jeff   3/21/2007 12:42:34 PM
I agree that the M-4 was no match or the M-4 with the 75mm gun was no match for the Panther.  I also agree that US tankers were a very brave lot to advance as they did into the face of PAK 40 and PAK 43 fire and the Panther's HV 75mm.
 
BUT, look at the To&E of Panzer divisions.  Only ONE battalion was Pzkw V's...by number Pzkw V's represented about 50%  or LESS of the German Force structure.  I bet the Germans never had more 150-200 Pzkw VI's, of any stripe operational, in the period 1944-45.
 
Basically the M-4 faced Panzer IV's as much as it faced a much more dangerous foe, and versus the Pzkw IV the M-4 was not that outmatched, in fact it was a match for the Pzkw IV.  Also some have posited, and I'm not sure how true it was, that the German forces in the aftermath of D-day were also older FOREIGN vehicles, also a force that the M-4 could handle.
 
Bottom-line: it takes a brave person to go to war, and M-4 crewmen were braver than most, considering their vehicles, but it was not suicide, because probably more than half of their opposition was at best equal to or INFERIOR to the M-4.  We can make too much of the imbalance between the M-4 and the Tiger or Panther, because overall all the forces were much more evenly matched....
 
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Herald1234    Riposte;   3/21/2007 5:03:03 PM
 
[quoting]
 
 
 

German Army Battles & Campaigns: D-Day and Normandy, 1944

Background

Although the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, caught the German Army by surprise on the day, in terms of timing and location the Wehrmacht had been making extensive preparations to fight the Western Allies in France for several months.

The campaign in northwest Europe saw Hitler's army ground down against the huge material resources of the Americans and British. The Germans now faced a technologically advanced enemy that had control of the air in a large-scale battle. However, the ability of the Wehrmacht to fight against these odds was enormously to its credit as a military machine.

Rommel's leadership

A key factor in holding the Normandy front together for most of June and into July was the leadership of Erwin Rommel, the hero of North Africa and commander of Army Group B. While the lower level and divisional commanders were of good quality, higher up the chain of command was not so impressive. Friedrich Dollman of the Seventh Army was a far from inspiring leader, and other senior officers, including Hans Speidel, Rommel's own chief of staff, were preoccupied with the preparations for the Bomb Plot against Hitler.

The competent officers were being killed or injured at an alarming rate. One corps commander was killed in an air raid and three divisional commanders also fell victim to roving Allied fighter-bombers. The entire staff of Panzer Group West was killed in a huge bombing raid designed to obliterate its headquarters. In the first month of the battle some 96,000 Germans were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner in Normandy. Only 6,000 replacements and 17 new tanks were able to weave their way through the ruins of the French transport system to the front. Supplies of ammunition and fuel were also running short.

A master at work

Amid this carnage, Rommel was everywhere. He drove up to the front on almost every day of the battle, giving morale-boosting talks to the young troops who idolized him, backslapping tired divisional commanders, and cajoling wavering corps commanders. He would then return to his headquarters and spend the night pleading with Hitler, and anyone who would listen back in Germany, for more troops, tanks, and supplies. Rommel may not have been able to pull off one his dramatic panzer outflanking maneuvers during the Normandy battles, but he proved himself to be a master of improvisation, using his armored units to plug gaps in the line, time and time again inflicting heavy losses on the Allies. It was a solid and professional defense.

Rommel and the Bomb Plot

There has been a lot of speculation that Rommel was involved in or at least forewarned of the Bomb Plot. The truth is difficult to establish, but it was clear that by mid-July 1944 he was convinced that the great gamble had failed. His army was not strong enough to throw back the Allies into the sea. This could only mean the defeat of Germany. Some sources have suggested he was preparing to negotiate an armistice with the Allies if Hitler refused to bring an end to the war. Whatever the truth of the matter, Rommel was seriously injured when his car was shot up by an RAF Typhoon on July 16. He was in hospital when the Bomb Plot failed and could not influence events. As Hitler took his revenge on the conspirators, Rommel was offered the choice of suicide or an appearance before a People's Court. He took the cyanide capsule and was dead soon afterward.

Hitler's loyal commander

Hitler now cleared out the plotters from the German headquarters in France and installed men who would follow his orders to the letter. Field Marshal Walther Model, one of the Führer's favorites from Russia, was installed as commander in chief in the West. Model quickly made his views on the way the battle for Normandy was being fought clear to Fritz Bayerlei

 
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swhitebull       3/21/2007 9:42:54 PM

I agree that the M-4 was no match or the M-4 with the 75mm gun was no match for the Panther.  I also agree that US tankers were a very brave lot to advance as they did into the face of PAK 40 and PAK 43 fire and the Panther's HV 75mm.

 

BUT, look at the To&E of Panzer divisions.  Only ONE battalion was Pzkw V's...by number Pzkw V's represented about 50%  or LESS of the German Force structure.  I bet the Germans never had more 150-200 Pzkw VI's, of any stripe operational, in the period 1944-45.

 

Basically the M-4 faced Panzer IV's as much as it faced a much more dangerous foe, and versus the Pzkw IV the M-4 was not that outmatched, in fact it was a match for the Pzkw IV.  Also some have posited, and I'm not sure how true it was, that the German forces in the aftermath of D-day were also older FOREIGN vehicles, also a force that the M-4 could handle.

 

Bottom-line: it takes a brave person to go to war, and M-4 crewmen were braver than most, considering their vehicles, but it was not suicide, because probably more than half of their opposition was at best equal to or INFERIOR to the M-4.  We can make too much of the imbalance between the M-4 and the Tiger or Panther, because overall all the forces were much more evenly matched....


82nd and 101st faced the 91 Luftlande division, which really was a 2-regiment division trained in antiPara operations. In support of this division, the germans had the 100th Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildings Abteilung,  a training and replacement battalion.  This 'battalion' in name only got the worst of the worst equipment. 
Here's the TOE:
 
Battalion HQ   x5  French 35Rs
 
sicherung Platoon -      3 x French 35Rs
 
1. Kompanie -  
 
   1st Platoon
      1 x Pzkw IIID
      4 x Pzkw 38H (Hotchkiss 35h french)
 
   2nd Platoon
      1 x Pzkw B-2 (Renault B1-bis french)
      4 x Pzkw 38H (Hotchkiss 35H french)
   
   3rd Platoon
      1 x 35S (Somua 35 French)
      4 x 35R (Renault R-35 French)
 
2.   Kompanie
 
   1st Platoon
   5 x 35R (Renault R-35 French)
 
 
All of these supported the 91st division, and made appearances at Kellam's Bridge, Shanley's Hill, and Timme's Orchard, as the 82nd division tried to establish a bridghead across the Merderet river.
 
 
swhitebull
 
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Jeff_F_F    Is this really necessary? I guess so...   3/22/2007 12:38:50 AM

This has a good synopsys of the early history of the Pershing. It is generally in factual agreement with the details posted by Harold above until the summer of 1944. I'll be adding in bold after each paragraph containing a change in the status of the Pershing development project the date and the number of Pershing tanks requested, the number on order and the number actually in existence. Thus developing a timeline for the development of the M26 Pershing tank. My editorial comments will be in italics to separate them from the quoted text.

M26 Pershing (from Global Security)...

(cutting out background stuff about the Pershing in general)

In 1942 the Army Ordnance Department received orders to start development of the T20 medium tank. The tank was to incorporate improvements over the M4 Sherman, and also to serve as a testbed for various combinations of armament, transmissions and suspensions. It was decided to construct three prototypes equiped with interchanging turrets and the maximum total weight of thirty tons. These tanks were called respectively the T20, T20E1 and T20E2. All were equipped with the Ford GAN V-8 motor and "Hydramatic" automatic transmission without brace converter. The tanks were to allow experiments, but they were never intended to enter in service because in the meantime more modern vehicles were designed.
Great technical strides were made not only in more powerful guns, better armor, and more powerful engines, but also in the transmission and suspension mechanisms. Furthermore, the search was continuous for more effective ammunition and less weight in all components.
In parallel with the T20 series there was elaborated a new called model T22 (similar to the T20 but with the same mechanical transmission of the M4) and the T23 (identical to the T22 but with suspensions of the type mounted on the M4 and a motor from General Electric). In September 1942 the Ordnance Department suggested to arm one of T23 prototypes with a 90 milimeter gun. In 1943 there was a request for the production of fifty new vehicles, forty of which would be equipped with the same level of protection of T23 and ten of heavier armor in a position to compete with the German Tiger and Panther. Two heavy tank designs followed, the T25 and T26. Both mounted the a 90mm gun, but the T26 was given the higher priority. The turret was cast, but the hull was made from a combination of castings and rolled
plate.

1942 - Requested: 0 / Ordered: 0 / Built: 0
1943 - Requested: 50 / Ordered: 0 / Built: 0
 
Continued experiments toward the development of a more reliable heavy tank were largely inspired by the appearance in 1943 of German heavy Panther (47-ton) and Tiger (63-ton) tanks. American tank crews discovered in combat that the Sherman was badly outclassed by German medium and heavy tanks, most notably the Mark V Panther and the Mark VI Tiger. With their heavier armor, the Panther and Tiger were almost impervious to rounds fired from the Sherman’s 75 or 76 mm main gun; conversely, the 88 mm gun on the German tanks usually made short work of their American opponents.

On 24 May 1943 The War Department approved production of 10 T26 tanks as part of a larger production order on T20-series tanks. In an indorsement to an earlier Armored Command letter requesting adjustment to the production numbers of M4, on 13 September 1943 , the Ordnance Department requested production of an additional 500 T26s. General Lesley J. McNair, CG of AGF, successfully opposed this request. On 13 November 1943 General Jacob Devers, CG of the European Theater of Operations, requested production of 250 T26s. Because of McNair’s continued opposition to production of the T26 and other objections, on 7 December 1943 MG Joseph McNarney queried Devers whether his request was based on operational requirements. On 10 December 1943, Devers confirmed his request for production of 250 T26s. As of 21 February 1944 the Ordnance Department estimated first production of the 250 T26s in October 1944. (my Bold Face - Jeff) Production actually began in November. Prototypes from the batch of 10 ordered in May 1943 started arriving during February 1944. On 20 May 1944 The Armored Board at Fort Knox emphasized that the T26 was not ready for production in its present state.

May 1943 - Requested: 50 / Ordered: 50 / Built: 0 (the other 40 tanks were T25s a lighter version of the T26, but with a 90mm gun, still a lot better than an M4)
September 1943 - Requested: 500 / Ordered: 50 / Built: 0
Nov
 
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Herald1234    More on the German Wehrmacht's chaos in the West.   3/22/2007 12:42:37 AM
German Organization for Combat, 1944

Between 1939 and 1943 the German standard infantry division contained three regiments with a total of nine rifle battalions. Each of the infantry regiments had, besides its twelve rifle and heavy weapons companies, a 13th (infantry howitzer) and 14th (antitank) company. The division had also an antitank and a reconnaissance battalion. Organic artillery consisted of one regiment of one medium (150-mm. howitzer) and three light (105-mm. howitzer or gun) battalions with a total armament of forty-eight pieces. German division artillery was thus roughly equal to that of an U.S. division. Chiefly because of the antitank and reconnaissance units, on the other hand, the division with 17,000 men was substantially larger than its U.S. counterpart.

It was also substantially larger than could be supported by the dwindling supply of manpower after four years of war. In October 1943 the division was drastically overhauled to reduce its size while maintaining its firepower. Organization charts of the new-style division (with 13,656 men) comprising three regiments of two battalions each had only just been published when further slashes were ordered. The problem (set in January 1944 by Hitler) was to trim the personnel to something like 11,000 without affecting the combat strength. Army planners rejected this sleight of hand as impossible and contented themselves with a further cut from 13,656 to 12,769. Reductions were made chiefly in supply and overhead, and the proportion of combat to service troops was thereby raised to 75-80 percent. The result was the so-called 1944-type infantry division.

The reduction from nine infantry battalions to six was partly alleviated by the substitution of a Fü:silier battalion for the old reconnaissance unit. The Füilier battalion, still charged with reconnaissance duties, was organized like a rifle battalion except that one company was equipped with bicycles and the unit had slightly more horse-drawn vehicles and some motor transport. In practice the Füsilier battalion came to be reckoned as a seventh rifle battalion.

Besides lopping off three battalions, the new division pruned out the rifle squad and company while at the same time increasing the proportion of automatic weapons. The basic unit, the Rifle Company, was cut to 140 enlisted men and 2 officers, as compared with the U.S. Company of 187 enlisted men and 6 officers. Rifle strength in the German division was about 1,200 less than in the American but the total division firepower was superior. About equal in artillery, the German division enjoyed a slight preponderance in infantry howitzers, and a heavy superiority in automatic weapons.

The 1944 infantry division was set up as the basic type for new divisions as well as for the reorganization of certain old formations, as for instance, the Luftwaffe field divisions. The division which included the bulk of Rundstedt's infantry, however, the static (bodenstaendige) division, was exempted from reorganization unless specifically so ordered. The static divisions were formed at the request of Rundstedt in 1942 in order that he would have a nucleus of divisions not subject to transfer to the east. Though triangular with nine rifle battalions, they were substantially weaker than the normal old-type infantry division. They lacked the reconnaissance battalion and had only three battalions of artillery.

Although the static divisions were expressly designed as permanent garrison troops for the west, they were by no means safe from the periodic troop collections for the east. Actually, by the end of 1943, most of the divisions had lost their third regiments. Attempts in 1943 and early 1944 to rehabilitate the units and fill their ranks chiefly with 0st battalions resulted in virtual abandonment of tables of organization in favor of improvisation that reflected both the particular nature of the coastal assignments and the vicissitudes of the long struggle for manpower and equipment. In total strength and number and variety of combat units the static divisions bore little resemblance to one another. While the 716th Division, for instance, had six battalions and only one regimental headquarters under its control on D Day, the 709th, occupying two and a half times as long a coast line, had eleven battalions under three regiments.

Even after the 1944-type division had been standardized,
 
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