Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts

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Black_7 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 9/28/2005 12:43:41 AM

Well, I'd agree with a lot of that, although I'd say 73 Easting is pretty damn close (1 cav troop conducts a meeting engagement against an Iraqi regiment, in a sandstorm). Is there a question in there, or just a set of thoughts about the Golan?

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S-2 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts-Black 7 Response 9/28/2005 1:44:52 AM

No question, just comments. I have great respect for the reactions of H.R. McMaster, and his troop at 73Easting, but training and technology were real keys to that success. Secondly, remember that the Golan attack was a massive, collective shock to the Israeli military system, coupled with major battles fought across a two brigade front, and an entirely dangerous theatre unfolding on the other side of the nation, in the Sinai. Third, the implications to the Golan fight for Israel were strategic in the extreme. A Syrian thrust into the Jordan valley would split the nation while opening Tel Aviv to assault. Fourth, while training clearly separated the Israeli crews from the Syrian, T-55/62 comparisons to SuperSherman, M-48s, M-60A1s, and Centurion (105mm)was very even, unlike the T-72/M-1A1 exchange at 73Easting. Finally, this battle didn't end in fifteen minutes. It took every ounce of man and material to turn this debacle to victory. Again, I'm not denigrating the 2ACR's accomplishment, and further recognize that simultaneously, Ghost Troop made contact as well further north, but size, intensity, duration, combined arms actions with the full employment of Israeli infantry, artillery, and close air, separate these battles in my mind. Most of our combined arms doctrine was formulated, or reinforced by the nature of these battles in the Golan. I remain in reverent awe for those Israeli crews and rifle platoons in the first forty-eight hours of that war.

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Eagle601 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts-Black 7 Response 9/28/2005 1:53:58 AM

You do realize that proably more people died at Kursk than made up the combined strength of the IDF and Syrian Army don't you?

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S-2 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts-Eagle 601 9/28/2005 3:33:22 AM

KURSK, in the minds of most, is a one day event with thousands of tanks swirling about a congested battlefield. Nevermind that it was a 9-11 day engagement involving Heersgruppe Sud & Mitre, their interested armies- Mitre(9th Army, 2nd Pz. Army) and Sud (4th Pz. Army, and Armee Abteilung Kempf), and at no point in my readings of that event do I recall the numbers and intensity of combat faced on the Golan Heights. Those German divisions on the south of the salient were ATTRITED over a nine day period, with the engagements fought around Prokhrovka never reaching the mythical numbers originally suggested by both German and Soviet propaganda, who, for differing reasons, had every motive to inflate the battle. Battles on the Golan over a three day period were absolutely battles of ANNIHILATION. Look at the relative orders of battle, duration, losses, relative engagement ranges, and casualties. Inspect Glantz's book on Kursk. His tables of tank losses are largely accepted and confirmed by other experts. Then look at the same for the Golan. Consider the Soviet defensive strategy at Kursk- falling back on successive defensive lines, while avoiding encirclement of local forces. On the Golan, it was fight or die. There was no fallback position. I comfortably stand by my original post.

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AlbanyRifles RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts-Eagle 601 9/28/2005 9:24:10 AM

Not to mention, US AirLand Battle doctrine was based much more on the Yom Kippur War than anything on the Eastern Front. The truly amazing stroy is the way the infantry held out in the bunkers coupled with how quickly the mechnics turned around battle damaged vehicles. Was it Duel For The Golan by Jerry Asher? I reread it this spring. If you want another good one read The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader's War On the Golan by Avigdor Kahalani

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S-2 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts-Albany Rifles 9/28/2005 9:37:47 AM

We were still dissecting that war four years later. Two guys that I knew went over as part of an artillery team to discuss artillery suppression of ATGW sites, use of smoke/WP vs. HE in immediate suppression missions, coordinating and identifying SEAD fire missions in support of close air, allocating targets in engagement areas...the list was endless just on the artillery side. The guy was an American jewish writer, I keep thinking Katz, who's written previously about the Israeli military. I'm sure if I googled 7th Armored Bde. with "Golan" or "Yom Kippur War" I'd find it. In point of fact, though, the book to a great extent was about Avigdor Kahalani. I can't remember if he was a tank bn. cdr. in the bde., or the bde. cdr., but it seems that command of the brigade eventually dissolved to him. One of his operations officers was on his honeymoon in the Himalayas, and flew home to the battle upon hearing the news. He arrived in time for the counterattack east to Damascus. Crazy intense fight. So was the writing as I recall, to be honest, but it captured the flavor of the fight really well.

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S-2 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 9/28/2005 10:03:18 AM

Found it. "Fire & Steel : Four Decades of Victory and Courage-The Story of the Most Awesome Tank Force in the World Today". Author is a guy named Samuel M. Katz.

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Desertmole RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/5/2005 3:11:27 AM

I recall reading Herzog's book War of Atonement probably 25 years ago. His description of the fight by the Barak Brigade in the Golan was awesome. It certainly captured the speed and lethality on the battlefield. He made a big point of discussing how the Barak Brigade was down to a handful of operational and damaged tanks with the Brigade S-2 being the only combat officer effective when they handed over the fight to a reserve armor brigade equipped with Shermans. The Barak had lost something like 130 tanks and had 11 (IIRC) left. According to Herzog the Syrians had lost two divisions plus in the Barak Brigade area. That must have been one helluva a fight.

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Carl S RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/5/2005 8:05:48 AM

There was a description of the Israli artillery in this battle, published in the US Field Artillery Journal. As on the Suez the IDF had too little of that arm in the initial stages and the few cannon available suffered severely from Syrian counter battery fires.

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S-2 RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/5/2005 3:16:21 PM

My understanding of the Golan battle is that the initial Syrian artillery and rocket barrage was extremely intense, and effective. The Syrian divisions rolled into the MBA right under the barrage. Evidently, their fires were able to range to the depth of the Israeli log/reception points down in the Jordan valley, making the move of reinforcements up to the fight quite hazardous initially. Their fires suffered from poor forward observation and communications, and weren't very agile. Israelis seem to think that the Syrians resorted to mapshoots, and that consequently, their effectiveness eroded. Too, the Syrian Air Force ran a number of interdiction sorties. I don't think that they actually sortied into close air missions within the main battle area much, too lethal. Lots of Israeli fighters tried though, and found out about SAM-3 and ZSU 23-4, often forward enough for Israeli tankfire to knock out. I guess it took the IAF a couple of days to capture air superiority over the Golan, because they were frankly tied up over the Sinai. However, once they had it, the IAF evidently ran a lot of strikes against Syrian artillery. Most of their stuff was still older towed systems (D-30 122mm as example), largely unhardened positions, very few 2S1/2S3 SP HOW, and quite vulnerable to strikes once the air defense net had been degraded.

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Desertmole RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/22/2005 2:37:35 AM

I recall seeing pictures many years ago of an Israeli 175mm SP battery that had been hit by a Syrian air strike. Chopped them up pretty badly. Too true about lack of arty, and infantry for that matter. IIRC there was only one battery of 155mm for the entire Barak Brigade. What little infantry they had was, I think, in Kuneitra. Not a well rounded force. The IAF had trouble with all sorts of ADA. The main missiles were SA-3 and SA-6, but they also faced gang-fired SA-7s. The Egyptians had a jeeplike vehicle with a rack for several (5, maybe 7) SA-7s on the back. As soon as one missile got tone, the operator would gang-fire all of them, in hopes one would hit. The SAM expenditure rates were supposedly enormous. something like half of all the SAMs then stockpiled in Europe.

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Horsesoldier RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/22/2005 8:35:11 AM

>>So much of modern combat in a high intensity environment trace their origins to, or were again reinforced by these battles (and the Sinai)in Oct. 1973. Crew survivability in vehicles, conduct of combined arms, ATGWs, psych studies on battle stress in high intensity environments, casualty management and evacuation... the list is endless, actually. Most of our battle force by 1985 was designed to fight, survive, and win in this very environment.<< I don't know about the combined arms aspect of the defense of the Golan in 1973. The Israelis were woefully deficient in infantry and artillery and overly reliant on armor and aircraft. Some authors, including Avigdor Kahalani (author of The Heights of Courage), if I recall correctly touch on the fact that one Syrian night attack by infantry with RPGs would punched through the defense easily. The troops that fought on the Golan in 1973 were brave, adaptive, and resourceful, but they also benefitted immeasurably from the incompetence of their enemies. That incompetence helped them survive serious doctrinal and organizational flaws of the IDF at the time. Had the Syrians been anything but a junior varsity team the results would have likely been much different.

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Carl S RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/22/2005 8:36:53 AM

Made a quick review of the Field Arty Jrnl artical. The specific bty it discusses was in place before the Syrian attack. The commander emplaced the SP 155mm howitzers in deep gullys and used indestructable features like large rocks as the primary azimuth refrence points. Redundant telephone wire loops were buried for battery comm. The Syrians shot frequent counter battery missions vs this battery. On some days the incoming CB fires were hourly and some multi battalion missons were fired on this battery. The arty commander took one SP howitzer out of action and used it as a armored supply vehical. It could back up to the other SPs and transfer ammo, fresh crew repair parts and mechanics while under fire. Casualties were taken out with this vehical. By the end of the battle most of the howitzers were imobilized with engine and track damage, and had numerous punctures in their armor. Casualties amoung the crews were in excess of 100%.

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Desertmole RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/27/2005 12:18:12 AM

Carl S. wrote: "Casualties amoung the crews were in excess of 100%." Casualties for the Israelis were horrific. Over 50% of all tankers and 70% of armor officers in the IDF became casualties during the war. The Barak Brigade officer casualties amounted to all officers in the original unit and reinforcements, except the brigade S-2 and the chaplain. The brigade commander and S-3 were killed outright during the battle. Sources: Post war briefings at FT Knox (when I was in AOB) and War of Atonement by Herzog.

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AlbanyRifles RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts 10/27/2005 9:28:24 AM

One of the big things which came from this was the Kevlar CVC and Kevlar vests and Nomex coveralls for tank crews. Also, nametag defilade in the cupola. While there is no doubting the courage and determination of the TCs, it was discovered that a lot of casualties resulted from comamnders taking unneeded risks by standing full up in the turret and wearing nylon CVCs. Also, cotton uniforms were about useless in vehicle fires.

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