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Subject: Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts
S-2    9/24/2005 6:39:33 AM
I've just posted this on the Israel board in reply to a related question, but feel moved to throw it over here amidst all of you tankers. "RE:Kippur-Golan Battles of 7th Armored Bde. 9/24/2005 6:27:27 AM I can't remember the title nor the author, but it was an excellent book (trust me)detailing the fight on the Golan between two Israeli brigades, subsequent reinforcements as they were fed into the battle by the IDF Golan Command, and the best part of three-four Syrian tank divisions, while dealing with Syrian commandos throughout the brigades rear. To this day, the singularly most impressive tank battle that I've ever read. Nothing at Medina Ridge or 73Easting, nor Kursk, nor any other eastern front fight comes to mind for sheer chaos, intensity, close range violence, and courage. All that Prokharovka at Kursk was supposed to be, this fight actually was-in spades. Israel's shining moment, by far." So much of modern combat in a high intensity environment trace their origins to, or were again reinforced by these battles (and the Sinai)in Oct. 1973. Crew survivability in vehicles, conduct of combined arms, ATGWs, psych studies on battle stress in high intensity environments, casualty management and evacuation... the list is endless, actually. Most of our battle force by 1985 was designed to fight, survive, and win in this very environment.
 
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Desertmole    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/22/2005 2:37:35 AM
I recall seeing pictures many years ago of an Israeli 175mm SP battery that had been hit by a Syrian air strike. Chopped them up pretty badly. Too true about lack of arty, and infantry for that matter. IIRC there was only one battery of 155mm for the entire Barak Brigade. What little infantry they had was, I think, in Kuneitra. Not a well rounded force. The IAF had trouble with all sorts of ADA. The main missiles were SA-3 and SA-6, but they also faced gang-fired SA-7s. The Egyptians had a jeeplike vehicle with a rack for several (5, maybe 7) SA-7s on the back. As soon as one missile got tone, the operator would gang-fire all of them, in hopes one would hit. The SAM expenditure rates were supposedly enormous. something like half of all the SAMs then stockpiled in Europe.
 
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Horsesoldier    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/22/2005 8:35:11 AM
>>So much of modern combat in a high intensity environment trace their origins to, or were again reinforced by these battles (and the Sinai)in Oct. 1973. Crew survivability in vehicles, conduct of combined arms, ATGWs, psych studies on battle stress in high intensity environments, casualty management and evacuation... the list is endless, actually. Most of our battle force by 1985 was designed to fight, survive, and win in this very environment.<< I don't know about the combined arms aspect of the defense of the Golan in 1973. The Israelis were woefully deficient in infantry and artillery and overly reliant on armor and aircraft. Some authors, including Avigdor Kahalani (author of The Heights of Courage), if I recall correctly touch on the fact that one Syrian night attack by infantry with RPGs would punched through the defense easily. The troops that fought on the Golan in 1973 were brave, adaptive, and resourceful, but they also benefitted immeasurably from the incompetence of their enemies. That incompetence helped them survive serious doctrinal and organizational flaws of the IDF at the time. Had the Syrians been anything but a junior varsity team the results would have likely been much different.
 
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Carl S    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/22/2005 8:36:53 AM
Made a quick review of the Field Arty Jrnl artical. The specific bty it discusses was in place before the Syrian attack. The commander emplaced the SP 155mm howitzers in deep gullys and used indestructable features like large rocks as the primary azimuth refrence points. Redundant telephone wire loops were buried for battery comm. The Syrians shot frequent counter battery missions vs this battery. On some days the incoming CB fires were hourly and some multi battalion missons were fired on this battery. The arty commander took one SP howitzer out of action and used it as a armored supply vehical. It could back up to the other SPs and transfer ammo, fresh crew repair parts and mechanics while under fire. Casualties were taken out with this vehical. By the end of the battle most of the howitzers were imobilized with engine and track damage, and had numerous punctures in their armor. Casualties amoung the crews were in excess of 100%.
 
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Desertmole    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/27/2005 12:18:12 AM
Carl S. wrote: "Casualties amoung the crews were in excess of 100%." Casualties for the Israelis were horrific. Over 50% of all tankers and 70% of armor officers in the IDF became casualties during the war. The Barak Brigade officer casualties amounted to all officers in the original unit and reinforcements, except the brigade S-2 and the chaplain. The brigade commander and S-3 were killed outright during the battle. Sources: Post war briefings at FT Knox (when I was in AOB) and War of Atonement by Herzog.
 
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AlbanyRifles    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/27/2005 9:28:24 AM
One of the big things which came from this was the Kevlar CVC and Kevlar vests and Nomex coveralls for tank crews. Also, nametag defilade in the cupola. While there is no doubting the courage and determination of the TCs, it was discovered that a lot of casualties resulted from comamnders taking unneeded risks by standing full up in the turret and wearing nylon CVCs. Also, cotton uniforms were about useless in vehicle fires.
 
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bunkerdestroyer    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/27/2005 11:29:47 AM
Perhaps there exists a battle unread of in modern warfare, but I cannot recall a situation in which a single force (Is.) was surrounded on all sides by such an overwhelming force and not only survived, but came out on top. Despite the sneak attack, they could not get it done...The egyptians came close, but close is not good enough. Actually, for them, it turned into one the greatest embarrassments of modern times. They came so close....yet, Isr. will and skill came through(well that, and the massive us supply reinforcements) lets see, if kuwait was attacked in 90 by SA and IRAQ.....nah, IRAQ pretty much took care of them in all the military prowes(sp) in what-72 hrs? and the impressive thing about is. was that they had not been in exist. for what, 25 yrs? could the us have done such against say, england and spain in 1805 or so? I think not
 
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Carl S    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/27/2005 8:30:39 PM
"Isr. will and skill came through" The converse of that is the incredible ineptitude of the Syrian & Egyptian senior leaders. In his autobiography Anwar Sadat admitted he & his minister of defense knew the Isralis had located the gap between the 2d & 3rd Armys, knew that the Isralis had penetrated the gap to the Suez cannal, knew the cannal had been crossed, and he admitted that nothing effective was done to counter the threat.
 
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Yimmy    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/28/2005 8:59:55 AM
"Despite the sneak attack, they could not get it done...The egyptians came close, but close is not good enough. Actually, for them, it turned into one the greatest embarrassments of modern times" The primary reaso why the Egptions failed, in my opinion, was because of the cvhange of plan. The plan was, for a limited depth strike, just to ~20km's past the Suez, however under Syrian pressure to distract the Israelis from their front, the Egyptians moved around ~45km's past, and out of their SAM cover on their side of the canal. This gave the IAF easy pickings.
 
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Horsesoldier    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   10/28/2005 1:54:51 PM
>>The primary reaso why the Egptions failed, in my opinion, was because of the cvhange of plan. The plan was, for a limited depth strike, just to ~20km's past the Suez, however under Syrian pressure to distract the Israelis from their front, the Egyptians moved around ~45km's past, and out of their SAM cover on their side of the canal. This gave the IAF easy pickings.<< It also turned the battle into more of a war of manuever, which Arabs have consistently been absolutely inept at in every war they've fought since WW2. Once they outran their scripted and choreographed, Soviet-style battle plan, they were begging to be hammered by the Israelis who are extremely notable for their skill in precisely the realm where Arabs are notable for incompetence -- flexibility, adapting and improvising with the materials at hand, etc.
 
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BrittleSteel    RE:Golan Heights, Oct. 1973- Your Thoughts   11/5/2005 7:32:10 PM
Sevral points about the Yom Kippur war, In the first three days of war most of the pressure was on the southern golan where the main thrust of the ysrian force was. The north was held by the 7th brigade while the south by Barak (188th, also the brigade and battaloin i served in, long after the war of course) The war was extremely tough on both parts of the golan front but extreme on the southern golan was the unprepared Barak brigade faced 800 syrian tanks when they only numbered 77. They help but were pretty much wiped out. Reserves who had not yet been orginzed due to the suprise attack scrambled into battle with non-organic crews, pretraining, many without machine guns or even adjusting the gun sight for the cannon, but the Israeli's showed great adaptability and maneuver. As big part of the success was the repair crew behind the lind. In a day a brigades were reduced to 26 operable tanks, but by next morning the repair crews would bring the strength back to 200. A mistake on Israel's part was over confidence after the amazing success of the six-day war. The IDF was strongly routed in its 1967 war doctrines and high contempt for the arab neighbours (a view which was also held by coutries around the world like US and Soviet union), most tank units did not have night sights as they beleived tank battles would be fought in daylight predominantly. Syrian Soviet tanks however fought at night aswell with the use of soviet night sights and infra-red lamps. The israeli's had to improvise a way of fighting lbind since they also were highly short on flares. Another matter which traumatized israel was the introduction of infantry carried anti-tank weapons. Before this more nations of the world supported the idea of the 'totality of the tank' which was an israel view after the 67 war. Suddenly brigades and divisions (especially in the sinai) were being decimated by infantry toting the PRG-7 and sagger missile. THe israleis also showed their adaptive ability by withint a day or two inventing maneuvers and tricks to give them a chance of surviving. but the missiles took their toll. Another part of the israel doctrine was the absolute superiority of the Air force as was demonstrated in 67, (and a crucial part to fighting the war was based on air support). But with the mobile and advnaced Sam-6 the israeli air force was paralysed and losing a traumatic number of planes. A wing of fighter was sent on a daring and successful raid on the Syrian capital, to thier credit. And any dog fights outside with syrian and egyptian migs was non-compertition. Was suprised the IDF the most was the depthy of the attack and the seeming fearlessness of the arabs even if they were the one getting pounded (again as opposed to the memory of arab soldier dropping their weapons and running when the going got tough). An intersting fact is the is also the amount of militray aid the Soviets were giving the arab states at that time. After Syria was pushed back and had lost 1200 of their 1600 tanks. The USSR immediately shipped in 1000 new t-62's and a little more than 2 weeks into the war the Syrian army was almost back to full strength with 1400 tanks. Syria pounded The golan and israeli bases non stop, there was no less than 100 artillary pieces aimed at each israeli base and outpost. Today it can get up 500. But israel for the crucial first week of hte wra severaly lacks artillery support on both fronts. All these things going against israel only makes their success in the goaln in the yom kippur war that more incredible. A excellent book to read about the yom kippur war is by Abraham Rabinovich. I might get the title wrong but i believe its simply called 'the yom Kippur war'. Its an excellent book at took him decades of interviews and research with information given to him by the IDF that no one esle has had access to. It goes deeping into the politics, the tactics, and the battles to the level of foot soldiers on the front lines to the office of the israeli prime minister. published in 2003, A must read. He had also written a book called "The Battle for Jeruslaem" about the 67 war, ironacly that book was pulished in 1972 a year beofre the yom kippur war.
 
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