The future of armour

Email Me When A New Comment Is Made
Show Only Poster Name and Title Newest to Oldest

Pages: 1 2 3 4 NEXT

Horse Soldier RE:The future of armour 5/11/2003 4:25:23 PM

A couple of notes on the initial assumptions: #1.) 1 (UK) Armoured Division consisted of one armoured brigade (7th) with about a 50/50 mix of tanks and armoured infantry with Warrior IFVs and 16 Air Assault Brigade built around three light infantry battalions. It was pretty close to an ideal task-organized force to send into an urban environment -- heavy firepower to back up lots of foot-mobile infantry. I'd say this is a case of tactical flexibility -- the unit appears to have been built for the mission, or at least drew the mission it was most suited for. #2.) Third Infantry Division (Mech) is entirely capable of armour-type manuevers -- it has four battalions of M1A1s and five of mechanized infantry mounted on M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. A US Armored Division differs from the 3rd ID only in reversing the ratio of tank to mechanized battalions (5 armor to 4 mech inf). This case would seem to argue that "Infantry" or "Armor" in reference to US heavy divisions is a pretty minor distinction.

Quote Reply

Thomas RE:The future of armour 5/12/2003 2:43:16 AM

Dear Horse Soldier Thank You for actually stressing my my point: We are moving towards a regular army where there is no real distinction between Infantry, Armour and Artillery - a Jack of all trades. I se a similarity Between the post-Julius Cæsar roman army, which was exclusively Heavy Infantry, that is untill the late empire, where they build cavalry corps based in Milan. The contrast to Alexanders well-balanced army. The situation is compareable in other ways: The Romans and the United States are the only significant military powers, whereas Alexander fought a number of competent diversified adversaries.

Quote Reply

Shaka of Carthage RE:The future of armour 5/12/2003 3:04:28 PM

Let me take a stab at this. Infantry are not really infantry anymore. They are mechanized (or armored) infantry. The squad operates around the APC/IFV. Thier training reflects that. Good old "infantry", in most of the top-tier nations doesn't exist anymore. You see most of these kind of units in poor nations. Squad here is based roughly around 10 people. "Rich nation" infantry is based on a squad of 10 people, but has fancy vehicles to move them around in. Be they helicopters, airplanes, LAVs, APCs or trucks. They get fancy names like Airborne, Airmobile, Paratroopers, Marines, etc. While they have more expensive toys, there training is almost identical to the "old-fashioned" infantry. A "rule of thumb" is to look at the squad size. If it is 10, they are the old fashioned/rich nation infantry. If its 8 or less, they are mech/armor inf. Armor, Tank troops are easy. They ride around in hot metal boxes, have delusions of being on horses and will usually hurt themselves if you give them a rifle. Artillery men can have SP or towed pieces. They talk funny, can actually do math and the new guys get to do alot of weight lifting. There will always be a distinction between Mech Inf, Infantry, Armor and Artillery. You can cross-train them, but its not cost-effective. The US Army is strange. We call our units "divisions", but in reality we "mix and match" battalions into whatever is needed for that mission. So a US Army Infantry Division could be "heavy" or "light". And for all pratical purposes a US "heavy" division is basically the same even if it is called Infantry, Armored or Cavalry. Here is where the Infantry and Armored names have lost the differences they once implied. British (and most European nations also I believe) operate as brigades. So they'll "mix and match" brigades to perform a theater mission. So that British Armored Division, as was pointed out, was really a Armored Brigade and a Infantry Brigade. Again, the name is misleading, since it could have been called a Infantry Division for all purposes. "Do we need the distinction between Infantry, Armor and Artillery?" Yes, but once you get above Battalion level, the Infantry and Armor names lose the distinction among the richer nations. "Do we need dedicated light, heavy and airborne troops?" This is a little harder to answer. Dedicated heavy? Yes. Without them, you cannot win a war. But you need a port or land access to get the equipment in. Dedicated light? Yes, for terrain the heavies cannot operate in (like urban, jungle, mountains). And if they are light enough, they can be flown into an airport. Dedicated airborne? This depends. Very few nations have the ability to take control of a hostile airfield to fly in "light" forces. And no one really airdrops in anymore. So that mission is really more suited for your commandos or rangers. But there is the "glamor" associated with being "airborne" or "paratrooper". And in alot of cases, the "light" forces are not really light anymore, so the "airborne" forces become those light formations. "On a divisional level?" I'll interpet that as asking if we need divisions. For the not so rich nations, yes. For maybe 1/2 of the top 10, no. If you have the necessary equipment and training at the command and control level, and for whatever reason you are a small force, the division or corp level of command can be removed. But politics will prevent that from being an easy thing to accomplish.

Quote Reply

Thomas RE:The future of armour 5/13/2003 3:01:32 AM

To Shaka of Carthage Thank you for your very interesting remarks. I tend to agree: 1. The BTN level is the last clean arms level. 2. The combination of arms is best done at BDE. 3. The DIV has become the ad hoc organisation the COR was earlier. If I understand You right: You are of the opinion, that a smallish nation that want the ability to field all kinds of forces: The regiments are the training unit, that trains infantry BTN's Heavy, Light, semi-light, Airborne. Artillery: Rocket, canon, howitzer. selfpropelled and towed. Armour: Now this is new and interesting (and I mean that sincerely) As the task is similar in principle Attack helicopters should train in the same regiments as tanks and light armoured vehikles. Do You then foresee peace time divisions (and corps) as a mere planning staff ?

Quote Reply

Shaka of Carthage RE:The future of armour 5/13/2003 12:51:40 PM

Thomas My opinions? That is a dangerous question. Combination of arms is best done at Brig... with an exception. Modern combat is combined arms combat. Armor, Mech, Arty and Aviation assets. I have always believed that the US Armored Cavalry has gotten it right. In combat, those Bn's are broken down even further into companies, which are then mixed and match for the mission. You end up with Armor and Mech companies working together who possibly have never worked together before. The Armored Cav on the other hand, organized them from the beginning that way. Makes alot more sense, especially if you believe in the "train as you fight" concept, not just give lip service to it. Regiments as the training unit... Yes, except that the Regiment training for the "heavy" inf is different than the Regiment training for the "light" inf. Attack Helicopters... Interesting point. Depends on what the military belives the Attk Helio is. Back in the old days, the "Soviet" belief was that it was a flying tank. American belief is that it is flying artillery. (I think the A-10 is a flying tank, but because of "interservice" rivalry is a wasted asset thru misuse). But yes, regardless of how it is to be used, it should be training with the Brigade. Problem though, is the cost. Not many nations can afford as many attack helicopters as they want, so they end up forming independent units and then try to attach them to whatever unit is deployed at the moment. But back to the Armored Cav concept, those Attk Helios (and Scout Helios) were integrated down to the Bn level I belive. Peace time divisions (and corps) as a mere planning staff... If we accept the Brigade as our major combat unit, then the Division level stuff should be eliminated. Scaled down version of some of it should go into the Brigade. Because of "tradition", if you want to call these brigades "divisions", do it. Most civilians don't know the difference anyway (GulfWarII, British 7th Armored Brigade was constantly referred to as the 7th Armored Division). These new "divisions" would report to the Corps. Major task doing this though, since you have just wiped out a layer of senior level officers and staff... and they don't take to those things too well. But it can be done. Your new "divisions" can "train as they fight", and everyone in it is "working for a living". The higher level Corp, would be that "planning staff", since most of them would reside in your home country. If there was a major war, there hopefully would be enough time to bring in some reservists to flesh out that planning staff. One thing though, what I have described works if your soldiers are four or five year enlistments. Not a very good method for one or two year enlistment soldiers. Those need a different method, but that would be a different post.

Quote Reply

Thomas RE:The future of armour 5/14/2003 2:33:45 AM

Shaka of Carthage You support one of my other points very well: If Your foresee no major conflict within the period, it is waste to train conscripts. What you need is the officers and NCO's to train the conscripts when the occasion arises. The training of conscripts can take place within the political span of attention - which is the next election. It is actually the way the Reichswehr survived during the lean post WWI years - the results were effective. My problem with doing away with the divisional level is my worry about logistics. The divisional artillery could be reduced (if you read the gunners discussion board - that much is clear). The Marines bought the Harrier to do away with the 205 mm canon (must be unwieldy in a rubber dinghy). This development shifts a logistic burden to the air force. The airforce seem to have developments in the opposite direction: The colonel in charge of the Air Base has for long been a glorified janitor. with the new flexibilty of fighter/attack aircraft the relative weight of missions depend on the arming of the A/C. The general proficiency training would be an Air Base problem, whereas the specific mission training a squadron problem. With the increasing firepower of army units the decision level seem to shift downwards. Train as you fight: I cannot help thinking how different things would have been for the Apaches of 7th Cav if they had made their probing attack with the support of squadron of M1 backed up by a couple of batteries of selfpropelled 155 howitzers. As it panned out it wasn't too serious, but against a halfway competent enemy it could have been a disarster. according to the press-reports it was a regular "Custer". Galloping in with scant regard for fire support. If the iraqi had had a Crazy Horse that had blocked the retreat with AA-guns .....

Quote Reply

Horse Soldier RE:The future of armour 5/14/2003 7:52:48 AM

Couple points of clarification again. #1.) The Apaches involved in the unfortunate shoot out during the recent fighting were not part of the 7th Cavalry, as 3-7th Cav has no organic Apaches. It's two Air Troops each have eight OH-58Ds. Third Infantry Division does have Apaches, but they are organized into a seperate attack battalion. #2.) If I am not mistaken, the Apaches used in that mission were actually drawn from Corps-level aviation units. #3.) Under normal circumstances the Apaches would have executed the mission in question with plenty of artillery support to suppress enemy air defenses. While overconfidence may have been part of the problem, the other problem was that the corridor selected for the operation took them near a number of civilian settlements and the customary plastering with MLRS and tube artillery did not take place due to concerns about civilian casualties.

Quote Reply

Shaka of Carthage RE:The future of armour 5/14/2003 2:14:05 PM

Conscripts... I think you are missing a point about the conscripts. The advantage of training conscripts (defined as upto a 24 month term), is that they go into the "ready reserve". That gives you a large pool of trained manpower to draw on, in the event of a military conflict. That is a major advantage for a country that has concerns. Granted, that once you get the "ready reserves" that were active duty within the last 6 months, you will have to re-train them versus a refresher course, but it is still quicker than trying to make a civilian into a soldier. And the other problem is the one about "foresee" potential conflict. What if you are wrong? Your country technically could be overwhelmed by sheer numbers. No politician wants the blame for that. Division stuff being reduced... I was thinking more along the lines of the Div HQ. If we assume our new brigades got one Bn of Artillery (155mm), and that the old division had 4 Bn's, that gives us a "extra" Bn. Generally, that would be the GS Bn with the heavier tubes. That unit would go to the Corp. And then you'll start to find a funny thing happening, as you do this to each division, you'll find that some of these Arty Bn's are paper units. Not enough manpower, and maybe not enough equipment. If so, use them as fillers to flesh out other Arty Bn's. All the other combat support units would follow the same basic concept... give the brigade the unit it needs, push everything else up into the Corp formation. Marines are a special cirumstance, since they technically have to be able to "assault" vertically or by sea. Aircraft instead of Artillery works, because the Aircraft can fly off the sea platforms. But it doesn't work the same for the Army guys. Since you brought up the Air units, let me bring up something. And this indirectly ties into the helio use. Alot of the USAF should be merged back into the Army. We are trying to do this thru "jointness", but for any who have served, you know it doesn't work that well. I'm sure that for that mission, a better platform would have been A-10's, not attack helio's.

Quote Reply

macawman Peacekeeping structure in the Army 5/14/2003 2:55:23 PM

Do You then foresee peace time divisions (and corps) as a mere planning staff ? Shimseki's Styker Bdes were supposed to be the answer to peacekeeping operations for the US Army. The rub is that the Styker can not stop a RPG or a 12.7mm and it is too heavy for medium lift (C-130)transportability. It still will have some play in peacekeeping because of its better road trafficability and light weapons armour protection.

Quote Reply

Thomas RE:The future of armour 5/15/2003 5:44:29 AM

Thank You Horse Soldier for the clarification, but I don't think it shakes my point on the benefits of combined arm. I do agree though, it's better to right fot the right reasons and with right data.

Quote Reply

1 2 3 4 NEXT