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Subject: Military Doctrine
M4A3E2(76)W    6/20/2003 5:07:16 PM
I love this subject almost as much as physics.

I would like to start with soviet cold war doctrine. I think it is the easiest to understand. I will go so far as to say, it?s brilliant in its simplicity.

Who wants to go first?
 
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M4A3E2(76)W    RE:Military Doctrine   6/21/2003 8:30:13 AM
Doctrine defined (DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (NATO) Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Soviet cold war doctrine was based on the Russian experience of WW2. A red army offensive has been described as; ?Water pressing up against a dam and a crack forms letting a few drops through. As more water leaks through, the crack grows, until the water flowing through the hole is a torrent. Finally the weaken dam just collapses from all the pressure.? How does this analogy fit with the soviet army doctrine regarding offensive operations? Also how does soviet army doctrine fit with the western definitions of doctrine?
 
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M4A3E2(76)W    RE:Military Doctrine   6/22/2003 8:55:54 AM
Western doctrine is meant to be ?authoritative but requires judgment in application?. I don?t think this applies to soviet doctrine. I remember reading about a Russian defector who said (I?m paraphrasing) if plan ?A? fails go to plan ?B?, plan ?B? is ? apply plan ?A? more vigorously, there is no plan ?C?.
 
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Final Historian    RE:Military Doctrine   12/3/2003 12:57:12 PM
The Soviets were incapable of using their doctrine as well as NATO could theirs. The lack of initiative on the part of Soviet troops would have been a major hindrance. Whereas the Soviets had a plan, and followed the plan to the letter, NATO had a goal, and let its individual commanders do what they felt was necessary to achieve said goal. Soviet troops had to ask permission from higher authority to deviate from the plan. This would have cost them dearly early on in any NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
 
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Thomas    RE:Military Doctrine   12/4/2003 7:50:58 AM
Deep Combat. A couple of years after the fall of the Berlin Wall I drove on the road along the railway line from Stralsund to Rostock in northern Germany. Then I understood why WAPA lost: A flight of Tornadoes going full blast under the generals hair-piece spattering mines and bombs along the column and railroad would have inflicted more than the regulatory confusion.
 
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Final Historian    RE:Military Doctrine   12/6/2003 5:10:25 PM
Well put. Logistics and tactics were the chief enemies of the Pact. As more and more infrastructure was bombed and destroyed, supplying Red Army troops in the front would have gotten more and more difficult. Unless they could end it quickly, the Pact would have stopped from a lack of supplies, fuel and reinforcements.
 
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gf0012-aus    RE:Military Doctrine   12/6/2003 5:31:39 PM
The interesting thing about comtemporary doctrines is that the so called Revolution in Military Affairs, was originally a concept developed by the Russians. It was driven by the legacy experience of their time in Afghanistan. The Russians never ran with it as a formal doctrinal foundationstone, but the west did. Interestingly enough, the absolute power displays by the US in the middle east in 1991 and 2001 have triggered RMA's with nations such as China (and indeed most western militaries) Although it isn't fundamentally an issue of doctrinal change, the initial soviet model is probably the "grandaddy" of all current military changes. The russians were trying to evolve an assymetrical warfare doctrine long before the US events of 911.
 
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gf0012-aus    The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine , 1945-84   12/8/2003 1:41:57 AM
M4A3E2(76)W, useful link for you... link
 
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macawman    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/11/2003 1:05:29 AM
Final Historian: I think you will find from Soviet archives that the Soviet military would have gone nuclear when they saw their planned Western Europe invasion stalled. Only a Soviet regimental commander was allowed to change an 'attack' order once set in motion.
 
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StudentofConflict    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/11/2003 4:02:00 AM
Russian tactical doctrine was to an extent a product of its manpower base. A huge conscript force of mediocre training requires either very close control by excellent officers (as in Napoleon's Grand Armee) or reliance on a number of easily rehearsed and understood battle drills. The Soviets, unable to guarantee the quality of their officer corps, had to go with option B. However, I think the Soviet military doctrine allowed some degree of ooportunism. The emphasis was on continually reinforcing sucess. For example, a Motor-Rifle division might attack with 2 BTR regts in it's first echelon, its BMP Regt in the second echelon and the Tank Bn in the exploitation echelon. The BMP regt and Tank Bn would be comitted in the sector of the BTR regt that acheives the greatest sucess. This applies operationally and strategically as well. The Tank division Operational Maneuver Group would be comitted in the sector of the motor rifle division that acheives the greatest advance.The Ai-Land battle concept, when fully applied, could defeat this. However for some NATO armies, AirLand battle existed more on paper then in the force structure.If the Soviets had broken the Belgians or Dutch's line and got an OMG into the rear of US V Corps/GE II Korps/UK BAOR,it could of got quite sticky.
 
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StudentofConflict    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/11/2003 1:44:02 PM
The point about commanders initiative is well put.I know of at least one army that inflicted severe defeats on the Soviets when it allowed leeway to its commanders, then was severely defeated when it tried to control everything from the top. Who'd'ya think I mean?
 
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StudentofConflict    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/12/2003 12:47:46 PM
The most important factor in any Soviet invasion of West Germany would have been the quality of NATO's strategic intelligence. The "absolute power" the US displayed in 1991 required many months to assemble and ready. Now, operating from the NATO infrastructure in Germany, it would have been far quicker to deploy the allied forces. But how long did REFORGER take to complete? Would the "bolt-from the blue" scenario, where the Soviets suddenly attacked without warning with the GSFG armies have been able to defeat a NATO taken totally by surprise and unreinforced? We know that Soviet doctrine emphasised surprise at all levels, from tactical to national strategy. We also know that if the Soviets were good at anything, it was lies and concealment ( or Maskirovka).Air-Land battle may not have helped NATO if its soldiers were chilling in barracks around Frankfurt or Munster whilst the T-80s were rolling through the Fulda Gap.
 
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joe6pack    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/12/2003 2:04:36 PM
I think post Gulf War we have tend to become pretty smug about "what if" the Warsaw Pact had gone rolling through in 80's.. Some things to consider in that regard: 1) Reforger would likely have been a bust. As pointed out it took months (of unoposed - transport to build up for GW1). We've found that modern warfare is if nothing else FAST. Even if it took only two weeks to move forces from mainland U.S. to Germany, where would the fighting be at that time? Now this might be different IF NATO had seen the attack coming and was in the middle of REFORGER before the fighting started. 2) Its unlikely that NATO would achieve immediate air superiority (if for just sheer numbers of the PACT airforce) Going back to how FAST modern warfare is... How hurt would NATO groundforces be if they had to fight a few days without the air supremacy that we've become accustomed to? 3)Artillery. How hurt would NATO ground forces be in the initial barrage.. Something that western powers have not really been subjected in recent history. (particularly in the quantity and quality the Warsaw Pact could potentially dish out) I think these are all things that NATO commanders were very worried about at the time. I'm sure there were no shortage of war plans that involved using tactical nuclear weapons against soviet formations. Now we have learned "some things". As has been mentioned - It would appear the Soviet Army was nowhere near as profficient as we thought and our technical edge was perhaps a little better than we thought... I think the real question of an 80's NATO vs WARSAW PACT showdown would have been skill vs endurance. Rather than tactics and doctrine (both sides had good ideas on paper) W.P. would have been an issue of skill, their lack of a proffesionals (and perhaps motivation)from the private on up and their polically correct command structure I believe would have seriously hampered them in their doctrine. NATO, I think would have been a question of endurance. Would NATO formations have held together enduring a continual pounding? How badly would they have been hurt by Warsaw Pact units that might have broken through the lines?
 
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StudentofConflict    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/13/2003 1:12:14 PM
Another NATO problem would have been the incorrect deployment of NATO forces. The wide plains of Northern Germany, most suitable for a Warsaw Pact armoured offensive, were not held by all of NATOs strongest forces. BAOR were up to the job, and the Germans, even if conscripts, would have been fighting to defend their homes and families, and would have been extra motivated by German memories of Russian atrocities in Eastern Germany in 1945. What about the Belges and Dutch though? Okay, they would have been fighting to protect the approaches to their homelands, but both were conscript forces, and their stupid soldier's trade unions, IMHO, reduced their training standards and readiness. Why were they allowed to go back to their barracks every night on training exercises? Would they send the Russians a note, saying please only attack the British, German and US forces till tomorrow morning? The US forces, despite their oodles of long range firepower were in a lot closer terrain to the south, which would have reduced their ability to exploit their long-range capabilities. Surely the Soviet plan would've involved a diversionary attack against CENTAG, with the intention of pinning them in place, whilst the main weight of their attack would have been against NORTHAG.
 
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macawman    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/17/2003 10:18:06 PM
Student: I believe you got it right. The Soviets thru the use of traitors knew our plans for counter-attack. And yes, the Dutch & Belgium Corps were the weakest points in the NATO line. Since we knew this I am sure that NATO Ops planned to counter this situation.
 
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mike_golf    RE:Soviet Military Doctrine & Tactics   12/19/2003 7:36:53 PM
I'm pretty sure, regardless of what we think today, that a war in Germany between NATO and Warsaw Pact would not have been a straight forward victory for NATO. There are the considerations others have brought up, specifically: 1. Russian quantative advantage and technical parity in terms of artillery. 2. For several days NATO would not have air superiority. Command of the air is fairly decisive at the brigade to divisional level of engagement. 3. A strong possibility that Soviet Maskirovka would have allowed for at least operational surprise, potentially even strategic surprise. 4. In the event of #3 REFORGER would take at least 15 days to accomplish and the war could well be over by then. 5. The North German Plain was defended by units that should have been in CENTAG, and vice-versa. 6. Regardless of how politically necessary it was, Forward Defense had the potential to be a massive disaster, as the Wehrmacht found out in 1943-45. Aside from all of that, there are some other issues to consider: 1. The Belgians and Dutch would have presented the clear schwerpunkt for the Soviets, and they likely would have been able to effect a breakthrough against them. 2. American, German and British technology for the ground forces was not as superior to Russian technology then. The T-64/72 generation of tanks had parity with the Leo I, M-60, etc., for example. Soldier quality and training would have made a big difference, but enough to overcome surprise and numbers? 3. As has been proven numerous times since France, 1940 the defense is not the advantage it used to be. With reasonably precise artillery and air, and tanks and infantry employed appropriate the attacker has the advantage. Given all of that it would have been a close run thing. The key to it would be which set of operational planners had the advantage in the decision cycles. If the Soviet optempo was faster than the NATO decision cycles that would be the endgame. And vice versa. The Soviets knew that, thus their field marshalls demand for strategic surprise.
 
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