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Subject: Close Quarter Battle Tactics: The Darby Document
Braddock    3/2/2005 6:58:31 PM
Close Quarter Battle Tactics: The Darby Document By Terrance Jones ARNG Troop 1 Troop 1 determines the initial penetration of the attacking force and the success or failure of securing structures by space control and precision clearance interlocking fire that is assigned to each troop by vector field trajectory assignments. The weapon preference for troop 1 depends on reconnaissance reports on the configuration and size of the building that is to be attacked /secured. This last point will also need detailed analysis of the following: 1. Numerical troop strength of opposing force. 2. Spacing of individual rooms. 3. Overall building configuration. * The weapons used by troop 1 should provide positive tandem force continuity in regards to initial penetration/ repelling fire of troop 1. This will help troop 1 determine the rate of initial entry room control and the rate of multiple space entry and control. Troop 2 This assignment is a force multiplier position in urban assault missions, as it will exponentially accelerate the success of single and multiple room space control. Example: The initial entry assignment of troop 1 will facilitate an opportunity for troop 2 to severely weaken the opposing force by use of decisive marksmanship by M-16 and or handgun depending on reconnaissance factors, as the initial entry assignment of troop 1 should divide the positions of the opposing forces in the room to two vector field trajectory points which gives troop 2 a chance to neutralize several opposition force in one vector field if speed, stealth and surprise factors are successfully taken advantage of. Troop 3 Troop 3 operates as an attritional force establishment (advancement and space control term in this case) force multiplier along with troops 1 and 5. Troop 3 will give the attacking force more efficient and rapid control of a room due to its lethal rapid fire weaponry while giving the following members of a 6 man team the option of expanding their control to multiple areas. Troop 4 Troop 4 shares the speed and stealth continuity assignments of troops 2 and 6 on a 6 man team. Troop 4 will decide the rate of multiple room penetration and initial entry room control. This will make multiple room penetration and control possible while reducing the degree of difficulty. Troop 4 must execute his tasks precisely, as he will take on the role of troop 1 if the opportunity exists for more rapid control measures by two 3 man teams. This type of tactical assault should be implemented from the vector formation to facilitate efficient rapid control and relinquish tactics between the 6 man team members. Troop 5 Troop 5 must implement and exhibit lethal force through proper positioning and appropriate firepower depending on size and configuration of the building. Troop 5 performs redundant control tasks that multiply the options of troop 6. If dual team(3man configuration) rapid control measures are being implemented, troop 5 will assume the vector formation assignment of troop two although, his entry task and weaponry will remain the same. This is made possible by precision and speed in regards to all troop tasks. Troop 6 Upon entry, troop 6 will cover multiple gaps in the vector field trajectories of troops 1-5 with precision shooting by handgun or M-16. This coverage task will enhance the efficiency and lethality the 6 man team by redundant space control tactics. In a vector assault from the vector formation, troop 6 will take on the assignment of troop 3 to facilitate multiple room penetration and control by troops 1-3. Bibliography American Warfare: Merging Dominant Stratagems
 
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shek    RE:Close Quarter Battle Tactics: The Darby Document   3/15/2005 12:13:35 PM
I have come to the conclusion that you lack a basic understanding of current urban operation tactics. “A bottom down assault can be implemented by way of helicopters shortly after the ground assault has begun. By carefully coordinating this dual phase assault, you will have the high probability of capturing a majority of the occupants of the structure by way of stealth, speed and aggression while reducing the disadvantages each directional assault would have on its own.” Let’s examine this. Since the AAR was written on Fallujah, I will use Iraqi urban terrain as the lens to examine your proposed tactic. When inserting via helicopter in an urban area for a top down assault, obstacles are a huge consideration. In Iraqi cities, power lines are typically at rooftop level, making them a hazard. Additionally, most rooftops are accessible through a small room at rooftop level – this room typically prevents a large enough area from being available to actually land, so an insertion using either rapelling or FRIES is necessary. Both of these insertion techniques require soldiers that are trained in these techniques, unit leaders that rappel master or FRIES master qualified and current. Additionally, aviators must gain qualifications (both day and night) in these skills in order to safely conduct these operations. Now that we have identified that this is a very specialized skill set that only few units are trained on, lets turn to the actual insertion. Both of these techniques require that the helicopter come to a hover. Then the rappel ropes or fast ropes must dropped over the intended rooftop and the rappel/FRIES master must verify that the ropes are on the correct target building extend far enough. Once that is complete, then soldiers must descend the ropes. Since you’ll want enough force to complete the assault, you’ll have to have soldiers clear the ropes so additional soldiers can descend. Meanwhile, the helicopters are a perfectly stationary target and since the target is at the front line, the helicopters are exposed to small arms, RPG, and SA fire. The more this technique is used, the more the enemy can prepare ambushes against helicopters and refine these techniques. While the insertion is happening, inside the house, soldiers can no longer hear what the enemy is doing on the floor above them thanks to the rotor noise. If the roads are dusty, rotor wash may create brown out conditions, reducing situational awareness (to reduce hover time, helicopters will have to move closer to the rooftop to shorten the descent, increasing the likelihood of brown out and striking wire obstacles). At ground level, supporting fires by other members of the unit and adjacent units must be ceased to prevent fratricide from ricochets or poorly aimed fire, allowing enemy forces in adjacent buildings a chance to maneuver as well as a small window of opportunity for an enemy to move to the rooftop and kill/wound members of the insertion team while they are descending or trying to transition to the ready after first reaching the rooftop. Inside the house, the bottom floor clearing unit is exposed to grenades and other munitions that can be thrown down the stairwell while waiting for the top down assault. Additionally, to prevent fratricide, they have to carefully distinguish personnel descending the stairwell as they may be enemy or friendly, increasing the chance of both fratricide as well as WIA/KIA from enemy if they don’t discriminate correctly. Now, let’s examine the C2 for this operation. Because of the ACA considerations for both direct and indirect fires when the helicopter approaches, if you launch the helicopter too early, you’ll end up shutting down fires for a long time as the helicopter does tight racetracks to stay near the target area. If you wait too long to launch, you allow the enemy in the house time to develop a counterattack plan or to find a place on the roof to ambush the inbound helicopter. Because of these ACA issues and the lags in time you can have when passing word from the squad level up through the company at a minimum and probably the battalion level, you will hardly ever get the sychronization done satisfactory during continuous ops. Finally, with trying to implement this combined top/bottom assault, you’ll have to keep a large amount of infantry squads and helicopter assets out of the fight and then determine a way to disengage them from the fight so you can prep them again. This is a very inefficient use of infantry that could be better used as additional assault forces, to secure cleared buildings and conduct thorough searches, or to replace assault forces to allow a quick rest/refit to be conducted. I think it should be quite obvious that this is not a practical technique beyond a planned raid on a very limited objective where the ADA threat is not very high. Even in this scenario, you still have to develop very strict control measures to prevent fr
 
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Braddock    RE:Close Quarter Battle Tactics: The Darby Document   3/15/2005 7:39:48 PM
Shek I never mentioned landing on the roof, as fast roping is much more combat effective. Have you actually been a part of combat operations initiated from the ground while another assault force is hovering into position above the same structure. I seriously doubt you have examined every structure in Fallujah to ascertain the rate and depth of hover craft sound penetration, as you have clearly stated your disdain for physics. That leads me to believe you probably feel the same way about engineering. I am a student of both which is why I can say that I know how to use them to improve the lethality and efficiency of urban combat operations, but maybe you have compiled the data I've mentioned. Please share it with me if you have. Sounds can be altered in various ways and they penetrate structures in the same manner. We are talking about combat operations. If intel puts influential insurgent leaders in particular location, power lines will not stop a combat offensive that could cripple the insurgency. You actually want the enemies to hear the hovering, as it is a freeze tactic that can facilitate moments of indecisiveness that can be taken advantage of by the attacking ground forces. You can hover first and attack on the ground and still have time to put your assault force on the roof while covering the roof exit point. There are many ways to wage war.
 
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shek    RE:Close Quarter Battle Tactics: The Darby Document   3/15/2005 9:54:03 PM
I never stated a disdain for physics – I actually enjoyed those classes in both high school and college. What I did express is that physics terminology should be used in physics class/papers. If you are in Rome, then the expectation is to speak Italian. If you are speaking about tactics and doctrine, then doctrinal and common terminology should be the basis of your language. I have not measured decibel levels of hovering helicopters in Fallujah, as I’m pretty sure you haven’t either. However, I have been in dozens of Iraqi houses/structures during nighttime raids with OH-58Ds in armed recce support, and I could always hear them when they were within a kilometer. If I were on the rooftop, I could hear them from even further (2-3km, and this was winter when sound doesn’t travel as far). Now, if you want to insert via FRIES, then you’re going to have a MH-60, MH-47, MH-53, all of which will have bigger engines = bigger noise. As I stated before, the architecture and structural designs in Mosul, Samarra, and Duluiyah all look the same and when I see footage from Fallujah, Tal Afar, Baqabah, etc., I see very little difference. I’ve been in upper class neighborhoods, middle class neighborhoods, lower class neighborhoods, rural areas, and historical areas, and there is tremendous continuity across Iraq that allows for fairly accurate generalization. You’re correct that wires/power lines will not stop a raid; however, they will stop a helicopter dead in its tracks and were the cause of the only KIAs in the air cav squadron that supported my brigade. They are an obstacle that is critical to your air mission planning. As I stated in an earlier post, if you have a small OBJ and some planning time, you could synchronize the timing of a combined ground and aerial insertion so there isn’t a dangerous lull for ground forces. However, you will still have a high risk of fratricide without the proper control measures, which will include shifting/ceasing fire during the aerial insertion, creating a temporary vulnerability. Firing from the aircraft to eliminate threats is also a high risk proposition since you’ll have cordon forces on the ground isolating the OBJ 360 degrees. The planning factor for ricochets is 45 degrees from the point of impact, so rounds fired at the rooftop from below could ricochet into the insertion aircraft if you don’t have your angles right. Anything other than sniper fire from an adjacent building at the exact same level is an extremely high risk, and even with sniper fire you still risk ricochets. Additionally, inserting this sniper before hand to prevent delaying the helo insertion could compromise the op, and doing it during the insertion of the ground forces could delay the helo insertion. What are your control measures to prevent fratricide between two converging forces inside a building? If it is a terrorist/insurgent safe house, you’re going to get heavy resistance, so you’re going to have a lot of smoke and noise, and will probably have a lot of dust/smoke from demo breaches. How much additional planning/coordination time are you willing to give to conduct a combined bottom up/top down assault? Are you willing to wait for the additional assets to arrive? Are you willing to wait for the additional rehearsals to be conducted? FRIES configured aircraft, qualified crews, and qualified units are few and far between, and my guess is that the majority of SOAR assets are in Afghanistan due to the high altitudes that prevent Blackhawks from flying in the mountains and limit ACL on Chinooks. Bottomline here is that fewer moving pieces means that there are fewer things that can go wrong. “You actually want the enemies to hear the hovering, as it is a freeze tactic that can facilitate moments of indecisiveness that can be taken advantage of by the attacking ground forces. You can hover first and attack on the ground and still have time to put your assault force on the roof while covering the roof exit point.” Contrary to your “freeze” tactic idea, if I were a high value terrorist/insurgence in a safe house and I heard approaching rotary wing aircraft, my reaction would be “Oh s#$t!” and immediately execute the break contact plan, which would be the first thing discussed anytime I entered a safe house. An approaching helicopter is the warning I’d want rather than the concussion and resulting confusion of a demo breach having been conducted on a door. In fact, noise discipline is the reason why mechanized units use M1114s instead of their M2s for raids whenever possible (many times the benefit of stealth is not worth the reduced survivability) and a big reason why our Strykers were so effective in Iraq during raids. Well, at this point, it is quite obvious that my experience and knowledge gleaned from my NCOs won’t convince your academic musings, so I’m tapping out. I’m sure it is an entertaining thread for anyone reading.
 
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Braddock    RE:Close Quarter Battle Tactics: The Darby Document   3/16/2005 10:58:55 AM
Shek Your posts looks like it contains a dominant system until put through the scrutiny of methodical and careful analysis. You can tap out as I do not wish to make you discuss anything you do not want to discuss, nor do I wish to entertain you as you say. I am an expert in algorthms and I am not fooled by your insincere respect for your NCOs, as no captain I have met has ever deferred to his 1st Sgt. so much when it comes to explaining his competency and experience. Being trained by NCO soldiers does not make you a competent company commander. What you do with that training does. Veteran soldiers are already being thoroughly entertained by the countless soft spots in your analysis. I concur to one of your earlier posts, you are not qualified to comment on strategy and tactics that are based on an understanding of special operations capabilities. I will no longer respond to your arrogant posts.
 
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Braddock    You Knew it Was Coming Shek   3/18/2005 9:45:53 PM
Shek I understand your intentions. You attempt to use your experience in Iraq to gain an advantage in this conversation. That was an unwise decision. Please Note the Following. 1. You label firing from a helicopter as dangerous by noting the chances for ricochet • This is a copout and gives indecisive leaders a reason to opt out of the type of training that will facilitate an increase in air mobile assault operations that require discipline and a high level of training to implement. You further this intent by mentioning your personal choice of perimeter security. My collapsible perimeter strategy (Influenced heavily by the Green Beret Trai Bai base camp configuration) is one that is respected for its impenetrability against asymmetrical threats as a defensive posture as well as its ability to be used as a regional or multi directional assault strategy. Take a look at the Green Beret model. In an expanded theatre version, you will find no better perimeter security, but there are many more perimeter securities as well. I can fax you a diagram if you like. There are many ways to provide this security in a manner that will not be severely threatened by air Support. 2. You insult me with the fratricide comment • The U.S. Army has issued no ban on com units in combat operations that I know of. Communication equipment, disciplined soldiers that know how not to break the discipline of their multiple room and space convergence areas and a few good flashbang grenades will facilitate a seizure/ subdue area for the ground force to converge on or the opposite as their spacing will be at an offset angle to pin the insurgents in rooms if necessary(always have a contingency plan captain. 3. I am sorry to hear about the KIA that was caused by power lines. • Please understand what went wrong here captain. While it is regrettable that civilians have to be inconvenienced in war, this factor should not be allowed to alter more decisive implementation of combat theatre objectives Sincerely and Respectfully, Sgt. Jones Your quote- How much additional planning/coordination time are you willing to give to conduct a combined bottom up/top down assault? Are you willing to wait for the additional assets to arrive? Are you willing to wait for the additional rehearsals to be conducted? FRIES configured aircraft, qualified crews, and qualified units are few and far between, and my guess is that the majority of SOAR assets are in Afghanistan due to the high altitudes that prevent Blackhawks from flying in the mountains and limit ACL on Chinooks. *Shek If I respond to this quote, it may get a little ugly and I wish to maintain peace and cooperation between our military branches. Your Favorite ARNG Hero, Braddock
 
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JCT    RE:Close Quarter Battle Tactics - M249 Buttstock Question   3/21/2005 2:14:37 PM
Shek, the only USMC units with the 'collapsible buttstocks, short barrels, forward rails with pistol grip, and 100rd “nutsacks?”' are recon units. Line units make do with the standard SAW & 200rd drums. We've been agitating for those features, particularily in the LAR units where quarters are very cramped.
 
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shek    RE:Close Quarter Battle Tactics - M249 Buttstock Question   3/21/2005 2:27:51 PM
JCT, Thanks for the answer. The M249s were so much more CQB friendly with the new kit and accuracy wasn't affected until out beyond 500m, at which point it is really an area weapon anyway. It always pissed my XO off seeing the new stuff since he was a SAW gunner in 2/75 RGR and had to jump the old setup all the time. What's the general feeling in the Marine Corps over going with the M16A4 vs. M4 MWS? I know that there would have been a lot more busted noses in our Strykers if we had the "long" rifles.
 
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