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Subject: Combined Arms Division ... Part 1
Shaka of Carthage    6/6/2003 2:09:16 PM
What does a Division have to do with morale? In my utopian world, this is where it starts. Since I seem to have a few topics that are related, lets go over the basics. Combined Arms Bn is covered in Armor. Mission of the military is to kill the enemy and not die in the process. Train like you fight. Everything else supports those concepts. Morale has a few names. Esprit. Cohesion. In simple words, you would rather die than leave your buddy behind. There have been many ways of acheiving this throughout history (Theban Sacred Band, Templars, Napeolons Imperial Guard, Waffen SS, Zulu Impi, etc). How can we achieve this in the US Army? Thru the Division. And here is how. The Division as a combat maneuver element is gone (see topic about "Technology and its Implications"). The Division is now a depot, along the lines of the British Regiment. The Division musuem contains the history of the division, along with being the repository of the institutional memory that has been accumulated from the field units. Say what? Combat leadership is probably the most important thing that a military needs. The second thing are teachers. Not this "those who can do, those who can't teach" crap. Every successful leader has the responsibility to impart some of those hard earned lessons on the junior members. So lets "formalize" it at the Division level. This Division depot will have a varying number of Combined Arms Brigades(+) (topic not written yet), permanently formed from the existing Armored and Mechanized Infantry Battalions that were reorganized as Combined Arms Battalions. Those Combined Arms Brigades are your combat maneuver units. In the field, they answer to the Corp. Briefly a Brigade operates on a 18 month cycle, 6 months "training" and 12 months "ready". With three (3) Brigades to a Division, it works out quite nicely. Ideally, the Division depot can provide instructors and staff for the Reserve units that are "attached" to the division. Same with the National Guard. There are issues with this, but that can be another topic. And one last unit can be attached here. A "Peacekeeping" Brigade. The Reserves, NG and Peacekeepers will all benefit from the interaction, if not training, with full time Officers and NCOs. So where are these depot level people gonna come from? Current Division HQ's and other division level units. Another basic concept first. There are too many officers in the military. Specifically, Lt Cols, Colonels and Generals. This is the first place to eliminate some of those slots. Our Divisional depot needs someone to maintain the museum and historical records, personnel and administration, assist with training, recruiting, etc... all those "other" jobs that the military is so fond of. Here is a key point, these positions will be filled by personnel "seconded" from the depot. Not from the field units. In other words, the Brigades will go to the field overstrength, and other than people getting hurt or emergenices, you will stay with that Brigade during its "ready" time. All the other requirements are to be met from the divisional depot. I will go over the "slimming down" of the Divisional units in another post.
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 2 (completed)   6/7/2003 6:49:32 AM
We all know what a division is composed of don't we? Its ok if you don't. Usually you get the standard combat formations followed by "and numerous other battalions". Here is a typical US division. Some of my terms may be dated, so feel free to correct me. There is variation among the composition of the Aviation Brigade and Division Artillery depending on the type of Division, but this works for our purposes. Division HQ and HQ Company Three (3) Brigade HQs and HQ Companies Combat Aviation Brigade Divisional Artillery (DIVARTY Brigade) Engineer Brigade Six (6) Armor Bn's and Four (4) Armored Inf Bn's OR Five (5) Armor Bn's and Five (5) Armored Inf Bn's OR Nine (9) Infantry Bn's (Air Assualt, Airborne, Infantry) Division Support Command (DISCOM Brigade) Military Police Company Division Band Signal Bn Military Intelligence Bn Air Defense Bn NBC Company Lets strip out the units that are in the Combined Arms Brigades and see what we have left. We'll also add approximate number of personnel. Division HQ and HQ Company (200 men) DIVARTY HQ and HQ Company (500) DIVARTY General Support Bn (500) Engineer Brigade HQ and HQ Company (200) DISCOM HQ and HQ Company (250) DISCOM Base Support Bn (250) Division Band (?) Lastly, lets get rid of the units that will be "pushed" up to Corp. Division HQ and HQ Company (350 men) DIVARTY HQ and HQ Company (500) DIVARTY General Support Bn (500) Engineer Brigade HQ and HQ Company (200) DISCOM HQ and HQ Company (250) DISCOM Base Support Bn (250) Division Band (?) That gives me about 2,000 people. Here is what I need. Training Group (300) ... Job is to provide the expertise and maintain the Divisional training facilities used to get a Brigade during its 6 month "training" ready for deployment. This allows the Brigade HQs to do some training themselves. In other words, these are the people who pass on the expertise the other Brigades have learned as well as knowledge from the Army in general. Depot Admin (50) ? Historical archives, museum, personnel admin, etc. Standby (150) ? These are Officers and NCOs who are either assigned outside of the Division or are awaiting assignment within the division. That?s 1500 personnel slots that have been eliminated. There are various ways to accomplish the above. Details of how to do it are way beyond any position I held in the military. The method doesn?t matter, as long as we achieve the same result. A permanent Training Group, a pool of officers and NCOs that can be assigned outside the division and someone to handle the paperwork for the various brigades under the division. Let?s not forget that there is a ?pool? of labor from the Brigade doing its 6 month ?training? that can be used. This includes the recruits fresh from MOS school who during half of the day get to paint rocks and pick up trash, but during the other half go to classes to learn the ?traditions? of the division. And since these are domestic bases, there is a lot to be said for having civilians doing the jobs that a lot of the military people do.
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 2 (edited)   6/7/2003 1:25:58 PM
This should have been the "leftovers". Sorry for the mistake. ================================================== Lastly, lets get rid of the units that will be "pushed" up to Corp. Division HQ and HQ Company (500) DIVARTY HQ and HQ Company (500) DISCOM HQ and HQ Company (250) DISCOM Base Support Bn (250) Division Band (?) That gives me about 1,500 people. Here is what I need. ... That?s 1000 personnel slots that have been eliminated. ==================================================
 
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Thomas    RE:Combined Arms Division - Shaka   6/10/2003 8:48:27 AM
If I understand You right You have the following issues: Division is to take over the basic training task from the regiments, and the combined arms BTN is to undertake the task-oriented training. The training today is highly inefficient, as stone-painting contributes little to combat effectiveness. Ad DIV: why not do away with div and let reg do its job: produce combat-ready BTN: four Active BTN to a regiment: 2 fully qualified and ready for action, 1 on rest and recreation - holiday etc., 1 training the new BTN. BTN - 5-8 are reserve regiments. thats the Preussian model. It has worked before. Inefficient training: I concur with that. After 9 months of "training" in the air force light infantry I was as ready as a Home Guardsman af 1 week - I'm unfortunately not joking. The Home Guardsman is NOT combat ready after a week - it takes 2 years of forthnightly training in the unit to be combat ready for the limited task the HOme Guard has.
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:Combined Arms Division - Thomas   6/10/2003 11:51:26 AM
Unlike European nations or those who follow the Commonwealth model, America doesn't have a "regimental" tradition. There are a handful of US "regiments" that can go back past WWII. Most of those are post civil war. On the other hand, WWII is really when the US Army started its "traditions". There are roughly 89 US divisions from that period, and the current US Army and Marine divisions are based on those units. We also cannot follow the concept of reserve units the same way. Our Army Reserve is equivalent to your concept of reserves, but our National Guard is not. Our National Guard is in many ways a independent military service. Thats why we have to take a different approach. Also, while the Combined Arms Battalions can follow that model you are asking for, I want the Brigade to be the unit that is trained and tested. The practice of detaching battalions for independent operations should not be allowed for those battalions within the brigade. I tried to allow for that by having the ability to have independent battalions or even composite battalions within the division that can be used for those purposes. Especially for the special missions like Peacekeeping.
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:Combined Arms Division ... Proof it works   6/10/2003 5:28:24 PM
My o My. Either I have access to classified documents, or someone else thinks this is a good idea. While not exactly the way I outlined, this does prove that it works. Also notice the reference to keeping the lower level officers in the same positions. Sounds like the thing I talked about in the Combined Arms Battalion. And guess what the reward was for the guy who made this happen? They fired him. ================================================== An Invisible Revolution Sparked 3ID?s Success As Americans look back on Operation Iraqi Freedom, the most visible aspect of the stunning campaign was the performance of the U.S. Army?s 3rd Infantry Division, whose brave soldiers ? along with hundreds of thousands of personnel from the other U.S. and British units ? deserve our applause for their excellent performance. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the division raced again boldly into the heart of Iraq, reaching Baghdad in only three weeks. In terms of distance, speed and time, the division?s pace equaled the great ?blitzkrieg? thrusts of the German Army in World War II. In retrospect, it is no surprise that the American people focused on the period from March 21 to May 1, the duration of the ground combat phase, and to a lesser degree, on the harsh post-combat occupation that continues today. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and other Pentagon leaders are reportedly concentrating on the technological wonders of the war. They clearly hope to convince Congress for more money to buy even newer weapons and command-and-control systems to further advance the technological transformation of the U.S. military. It is distressing, but no surprise, that neither Pentagon officials nor the American people recognize one crucial factor that led to the 3rd Infantry Division?s stellar performance: A radical shift in the existing U.S. Army personnel replacement system in time of war and supported by then-Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White that allowed most of the division?s commanders and soldiers to remain with their units throughout pre-war training, deployment and combat. For most of a century, the Army has managed, transferred and promoted its officers and soldiers using a production-line personnel system known as the Individual Replacement System (IRS). That system rigidly focuses on the individual soldier or officer, setting arbitrary lengths of assigned tours and creating career development requirements that define who will receive promotions and who will not. The existing personnel system is oblivious to the needs of the service as a whole and to any Army unit?s quality of leadership, deployment requirements and combat readiness. But five months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, White supported steps to ensure that the 3rd Infantry Division would be fully prepared for war. He allowed it to be liberated from the Army?s obsolete and inflexible personnel system to ensure that its soldiers would be commanded by experienced officers and senior NCOs who had served in the unit long enough to master their responsibilities and ? equally important ? to be recognized and known by the troops themselves. Beginning last October, White and Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Jack Keane directed the Army?s Unit Manning Task Force to implement a different personnel program for the Army. Known as the ?Unit Manning System,? the program?s top priority was on unit, rather than individual soldier, needs. Its goal was to maximize unit cohesion ? continuity of personnel within each brigade, battalion, company and platoon ? and unit rotations, where the division?s component units as a whole would train, deploy and fight together over the duration of the campaign. The actions of the personnel community to stabilize the 3rd Infantry Division for combat fortunately paralleled the future vision of White and Keane and also provide insight to where the Army can go when Unit Manning evolves Armywide. In the shorthand of personnel management, the 3rd Infantry Division was ?unit manned by default.? What the Army did to enhance the 3rd Infantry Division?s killing power was not terribly complicated: As the division began preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it waived a number of peacetime personnel practices which otherwise would have seriously undermined unit cohesion and combat effectiveness: * Keeping the commanders: The first step was to extend command tours of key division leaders beyond the normal tenure of 24 months. A prominent example was that of Lt. Col. Terry Ferrell, commander of the now famous 3-7 Cavalry Squadron that was so well documented by Ted Koppel of ABC News. Ferrell took the reigns of his command Jan. 5, 2001. When his unit crossed the ?line of departure? into Iraq on March 21, 2003, he had been in command for 27 months, and the soldiers benefited from his extensive experience. Had the Army not waived its Individual Replacement System, Ferrell would have been arbit
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:Combined Arms Division ... Proof it works (the rest)   6/10/2003 5:31:33 PM
(continued) The division?s aviation brigade had had large elements in Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Spring during February-June 2002. * Avoiding loss of experienced troops: The Army implemented a ?Stop Move? order in January 2003 that held in place all 3rd Division soldiers who were scheduled for reassignment during the duration of the anticipated mission against Iraq. This preserved in the division?s ranks more than 200 officers and 1,700 soldiers who otherwise would have transferred out at that critical time. Military Reporter Sig Christenson of The San Antonio Express-News was embedded with one of the division?s task forces during the campaign. Christianson recalled how all the soldiers he met remarked about the level of trust between commanders and soldiers that had been established through months of training and living together. It is critical for future Army combat effectiveness that the Defense Department and Army leaders recognize that this was not something that automatically happened. The cohesion and morale of the troops that led them to operate and fight so effectively was a direct consequence of the Army scrapping its outmoded and self-destructive personnel policies. The 3rd Infantry Division?s success, unfortunately, exacted a toll on the rest of the Army, which continued (and continues) to use a personnel system focused on individual replacements to the detriment of unit strength and stability. In fact, turnover in other units was even higher due to other commitments and contingencies ? something the White-Keane initiative is trying to resolve. Just as deploying one brigade of a division impacts the remaining two brigades, deploying three Army divisions for Operation Iraqi Freedom, coupled with ongoing operations in Afghanistan, severely disrupted the rest of the force. The yearlong period of readying the 3rd Infantry Division for battle essentially involved the first two phases ? the ?train up? and readiness phases ? of the revolutionary three-phase unit manning system that the Unit Manning Task Force is examining for the Army of the 21st century. (The third phase is where the unit redeploys and disbands, turns in its equipment, sends soldiers to schools or non-combatant but essential duties around post, and prepares a new cadre of leaders for the next new unit cycle). Twelve days before he was ousted as Army secretary on Apr. 26, 2003, White spoke of the unit manning initiative: ?Why [unit man] do it by default in time of war? Why not all the time?? It would be a tragedy for the Defense Department and the Army to ignore this invaluable ?lesson learned? from Operation Iraqi Freedom.
 
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macawman    Soviet Combined Arms Army ... organization   6/10/2003 6:41:02 PM
The Soviet Army was organized very similarly to your proposed structure. In the "Great War" a full strength Soviet Div would go forward into combat leaving the XO and a small cadre to bring the follow-on Div up to strength. The Soviets let their Divs attrite down to less than 30% before they then replaced the whole Division with the follow-on Div. I do not recall how long this took to compete the cycle. I'm sure it depended a lot on operational neccessity.
 
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Thomas    RE:Combined Arms Division - Shaka   6/11/2003 3:42:42 AM
You can generally call me anything You like, except an early riser. 1. Wether you call it REG or DIV is indifferent to me, so long the task is done. It might be the politically smart thing to do, as You have proven the superflousness of the DIV in the intended role - it just might work - politically. Maybe I haven't paid enough attention, but: 2. How do you propose to integrate the National Guard units? Leave them to secure supply-lines and peacekeeping as integrated BDE in that role? That would make a lot of sense, as the task is radically different from combat. The composition of these forces would be different: More Light Infantry on trucks, more hospitals, more engineers, more administrators - hell some of the guys might even be doing what they were educated and trained for professionally!
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:Combined Arms Division - Thomas   6/11/2003 1:24:26 PM
The difference in Regiment and Division is important here. Thats one of the reasons the COHORT system failed here. It was modelled on the British Regimental system, and at the lower levels worked fine. But as soon as Division got involved, everything went to hell. Thats another story. National Guard... this is where it gets tricky. As I mentioned, the National Guard is not under the control of the Federal Government. Its under control of the State Government. I don't know if you have anything similiar to that. So I have tried to keep enough flexiblity in my system to account for this. Certain National Guard brigades are designated as "enhanced readiness brigades". In the event of a war, they are suppossed to be able to reinforce the Regular Army. For political reasons, there is a Congressional Mandate that forces the Regular Army to provide a "divisional HQ" for two (2) National Guard divisions. It has none of the combat support and service support units a division needs, but its the law. There are 5,000 to 10,000 Regular Army guys tied up in this. There are 15 "enhanced" brigades. So here is what I would do. We have 10 Active divisions, each one can receive a NG "enhanced" brigade. The existing Division depot has officers and NCOs who can supervise those NG brigades when its time for thier weekend duty. Those five (5) remaining Brigades depends on the following. I would have the mandate removed, then simply add those five (5) extra brigades to five (5) of the existing 10 active divisions. If I couldn't remove the mandate, I would stand up two (2) regular Army divisions or the two existing NG divisions and model them as Divisional depots. That allows me to eliminate the positions left over from the current 5 to 10,000 men minus what I need for the two (2) depots. There are quite a few other units that could use the manpower. Now we come to "peacekeepers". I would have each divisional depot "stand up" a composite battalion for peacekeeping duties. They can be volunteers from the National Guard and Regular Army. I believe 30 day training is all that is required. Equipment wise they have trucks, APCs, armored cars, etc. No tanks. These Battalions, along with Engineers, Civil Affairs, Medical units, etc can now perform the required Peacekeeping missions without effecting the readiness of the regular combat brigades.
 
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11b10    RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 1   6/11/2003 2:39:24 PM
How does your brigade rotate back from overseas are all Corps HQs in the States.
 
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