The veterans belived that the average company commander could not single handely train the Lts & Sgts to the necessary level.

 

A program to provide long service warrant officers as weapons plt commanders was instituted.  The desire was for specialists or experts in infantry weapons able to bring the training and tactical use well above the level achiveable with junior Lts or junior NCOs.  (The Warrant was also to be trained as a company level fire support coordinator, to assist the company commander as well.)  

A second point is that the concepts of Fourth Generation Warfare, the Three Block War, or "we'll fight more of these gurilla wars" are seen as a broader context for USMC operations.  Not as replacement of other types of operations.  FMFM-1 that Gray had published makes it clear that flexibility & preperation for the full spectrum of warfare would be the doctrine.   Krulaks  full remarks concerning projected USMC operations and the Thee Block War reinforce the goal of full spectrum of warfare capability.  In 1986-87 my rifle company commander Cpt Scott made it clear that the need to mass or distribute the companys heaviest weapons was situational.  Had the MG been exclusivly a squad weapon suitable for independant squad combat it would interfere when he needed massed MG fires.  Just as using the MMG exclusively as a 'company battery' degraded squad/plt capabilitys.   We trained with the MMG in every possible configuration.  

I also spent three months with 3/6 when that battalion completed conversion to the two team squad.  Even officers wo had intially welcomed that reoganization were having second thoughts.  The concensus was the three team organization was superior to the two team squad as a starting base for the full array of squad operations.

Carl,

I mean that the GPMG should be a permanent part of the squad like the Germans had it, not just attached out from company or platoon as needed after the American fashion; after all, when the shooting starts the gun often finds itself at squad level anyway.

Big squads are better than small ones so go with three fire teams: one heavy team made up of a GPMG crew and DM; two lighter teams for clearing.

Why have the guns centralized in a company or platoon weapons squad if it's usually a squad fight?   The guns could still be pulled out of the squads and massed at platoon level, if needed, just as they are often attached downward now.  Just organize for the combined arms squad fight if that's what's usually encountered.  If really is usually a squad fight - a "three block war" and all that - then put the guns permanently in the squads.  We already know it will work.

I agree that General Gray had a valuable point to make; however, does that mean that squad organization - or any organization - is not to be refined or altered as needed?  After all, at one time it was decided that we needed to break up the machine gun battalions of the WWI era.  Might we not need to break up company and platoon MG squads now?

Just thoughts.

 

 I think you need to keep some sort of consolidation and control of key weapon systems, instead of spreading them out.

 By spreading them out too far you run the risk of repeating the mistakes of the allies in 1940 France. The French had plenty of tanks and anti-tank weapons but they spread them out so everybody had some tank/anti-tank support but nobody had enough.

 

 Instead of giving our squads a GPMG we need to replace the light machinegun they already have (M-249) with a true squad automatic rifle. The M-249 has already proven less than perfect for room clearing/house to house combat. Many M-249 gunners pick up lighter, easier to handle weapons when going  into buildings. An M-240G will not be any easier to handle.

 Instead I favor an organization tested by the Marine Corps: The SAWS are pulled from the Rifle Squads and replaced with a Squad Automatic rifle such as the Colt AR or the Ultimax 100. One of the three platoon Rifle Squads is then converted to a weapons squad with M-249s used in a role they are really designed for -Light machineguns. I would go a step further and add SMAWS to the weapons squad or perhaps three 3 man LMG teams (necessary for carrying the spare barrel tripod and ammo) along with two 2-man SMAW teams. Or perhaps keep the Squad members level of training so they can be easily equipped with either the M-249 or SMAWS depending on METT-T.

 If we accept that even by chance you go into battle with a full strength squad attrition over time will not leave it that way.   So look at it this way: If you start out with a 13 man Squad and attrition reduces by 1/3^rd you still have a 9 man squad. If you start out with a 9 man squad then you are down to 6 with same rate of attrition.

That is not the only wat to consider the situation.

 

Alternatively, say you have 52 men.  Now you either have four squads/sections of 13 men, or two men short of six nine man sections.

 

Lose a 1/3rd of your manpower, leaving you with 35 men, and you reform into either two 13 man sections and a 9 man section, or three 9 man sections and an 8 man section.

 

Big squads are better than small ones so go with three fire teams: one heavy team made up of a GPMG crew and DM; two lighter teams for clearing.

Why have the guns centralized in a company or platoon weapons squad if it's usually a squad fight?   The guns could still be pulled out of the squads and massed at platoon level, if needed, just as they are often attached downward now.  Just organize for the combined arms squad fight if that's what's usually encountered.

The above really does sound like the German WWII section, with the addition of more defined fire teams (which I expect occured in practice in the German squads, if not theory).

 

I would personally argue for more numerous, smaller sections, than fewer but larger sections.  I say this, because the more sections you have, the more actors you have in the battlespace, and so the greater your ability to maneuver your forces.  Larger sections, although equal in overall manpower, can not cover as much ground as multiple smaller sections, as a result of the limit of control (distance) the section commander has over his men.  Personal role radios don't have a very long range.  Of course you can break a section down into fire-teams, however this would mean each fire-team would need a full size manpacked radio, and would mean while one fire-team gained the experienced corporal, the other gained the less experienced lance corporal.  In addition, as an element a  6-8 man section can engage a 2-3 man enemy, while a fire-team will doubtfully be large enough to engage more than a lone enemy soldier in a prepared position going by classical doctrine.

 

Concerning the positioning of GPMG's, the British army have them at the platoon level, in the maneuver support section, in the light role, and at the battalion level as a platoon of the support company in the sustained fire role.  Personally, I think that a rifle or maneuver section should consist of identicle (two in a 6-8 man section, or three in a 10-13 man section) fire-teams.  I say this because the men will likely be of the same experience levels, be trained the same, and use the same SOP's.  In complex environments such as FIBUA, fire-teams and pairs will find themselves rotating around each-others roles, largelly as a means of necessity in securing multiple rooms in a large building, and especially in more lengthy engagements where periods of rest are required, in the principle of assault/suppress/rest.  However a different type of fire team, ie one equipped with GPMG's, could always be used in a certain role in the micro-fight, such as in the roles of beefing out the section command group and linkmen position in FIBUA.

 

I would suggest that is is a lot easier to break-up and give, than it is to take-away and form.  If section of x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x need a GPMG, they can be given y.y so equipped men, and the sections SOP's and framework will still work.  I would suggest that if you take x.x from x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x and y.y from y.y.y.y.y.y.y.y and q.q from q.q.q.q.q.q.q.q, and make a GPMG equipped section of x.x.y.y.q.q, I would expect it to be a clusterfuck long before it is decided who will command the new support section.

 

Looking at the section level fight in a hasty contact, it would be advantageous for the section to have an organic GPMG.  However looking at deliberate attacks, it makes a lot more sense for instance to have your three GPMG's centralised in an over-watch support position to cover your recce sorties, and then in a supporting position to support the break-in phase of a FIBUA assault on a building, than to have them fragmented in sections.  I think the GPMG soldiers have a lot more chance of achieving profesionalism and completing their mission if they are centralised together as standard, rather than being more a lose gathering of convinience for a particular mission.

 

Just some random thoughts. 

 

 

ambush,

 

I actually posted with the Marine Corps AR study in mind. 

 

IIRC, they evaulated two alternate platoon/squad organizations for AR and LMG employment: an LMG heavy squad in each platoon (as you said); an LMG heavy team in each squad.  And, of course, true ARs in all the other fire teams for easier employment in close combat.  

 

I like the second option best, I just think that a team with a GPMG crew and DM might make as much sense as a team with two (or three?) LMGs. 

 

I sure there's positives and negatives to doing it each way.

While it may well be that no hills have ever been taken by a TO&E platoon/company etc, we do have to have an some form of organization...

 

I think that the point someone made, about whether a platoon of 3 thirteen-man squads would be better, or worse, than a platoon of 5 or 6 squads composed of six to eight men is an interesting one (given that both platoons could have 42-ish personnel).  Certainly the latter provides more senior NCO's (assuming squad-leaders are the same rank in each) and is still within the "span of control" of the platoon leader.  From what I have seen, competent leaders can handle 3 subordinate units just as effectively as 5 or 6, and incompetent leaders can still screw things up even when only given two subordinate units to worry about.  5 or 6 squads gives you tremendous tactical flexibility

 

What I don't understand is why so many armies limit themselves to only 6 dismounts in IFV's (Bradley, Marder, Puma, etc), since that effectively determines squad size.  It isn't that impossibly difficult to design a slightly bigger vehicle, to carry eight or nine men (admittedly, something much bigger, like an AAV-7, forces severe armor trade-offs).  The Marines have vehicles (CH-46, Osprey and AAAV's) designed to carry 17+ personnel, whereas the US Army has vehicles designed to carry 9 or 10 (Stryker and UH-60), which is an improvement over the Bradley (and M-113, I can't imagine being crammed in one of those with a driver and 11 grunts - they must have been using school kids to come up with those numbers).