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Subject: New USMC Section organisation
interestedamateur    2/7/2006 9:53:06 AM
Some news in this weeks JDW regarding this. Main facts: - Infantry sections reduced to 12 men. - The spare 3 men are going to the platoon HQ unit to form a 2nd platoon HQ (under the Platoon Sergeant) so as to provide continuous 24 hr platoon C2. Aim is to allow dispersed operations over a wide area. - Each section will contain a rifleman who can call in close air support This looks sensible (a bit like a SOG A-team), but won't the fact that a section leader is now presumably part of a fire-team make his job much harder? The 1/3 Marines have already tested this concept in Iraq by the way.
 
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Carl S    RE:Distributed Ops   2/11/2006 7:42:42 AM
Half a decade ago the USMC did a large scale experiment with a type of distributed ops. The specific method or doctrine proposed was tested until it broke. & it did and much sooner than the proponents expected. It did not invalidate the general concept, but it was clear the ideas has current limits even with the best technology available.
 
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interestedamateur    RE:Distributed Ops   2/13/2006 4:52:06 AM
Can you be more specific Carl? Was it an experiment turning USMC Platoons into Special Forces or some other kind? What was tried and why did it fail? Thanks.
 
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Carl S    RE:Distributed Ops   2/13/2006 10:46:21 AM
I'd have to get out the articals & reread them. At the time I did not have much interest in the subject & only skimmed the print. Heres what I vaguely recall. The concept was that a area would be saturated with small teams or squads. Carrying a lot of firepower, and connected directly to the most modern 'networked' fire support system these teams or squads would stealthly infest the enemy area of operations. They would spend their time spotting targets for all the cool ordinance the US can deliver. This was simply the target spotting fuction of recon writ large. Just as in Viet Nam or elsewhere a team would be placed to call in a air or artillery strike in its area of observation. When the thing was given a full scale field test the opforce commander mobilized every possible armed male a third world nation might muster. The landscape was counter saturated with police, milita, rear service troops, ect... In the case of Viet Nam the NVA did not know which mountain top the one spotting team might be on. In this exercise there was a spot team under every bush. Once a contact report came in the opforce would close in with diciplined trained mobile soldiers and run them down. it was not long before the teams were spend most of their time avoiding contact, or praying for extraction. It was possible to keep them alive with air & artillery strikes. But then the ammo, especially expensive PGMs, was being wasted on cannon fodder with AK47s rather than used on high value targets. There were other problems, but again I'd have to reread the articals. The basci concept was drawn from a variety of historical examples. There were the air/artillery spot teams planted deep in the NVA territorry in Viet Nam. In Nicaragua in the 1920s the Marines had some sucess with long range combat patrols deep in the forrests. (The earliest example I know of of air supply.) On Grenada the Marine battalion commander had emphasiszed initiative & independant action in his training plan. The Marines understood what the objective was & in simplistic terms dispersed across the island to achive it. This worked because the defenders were caught completely by suprise. With just about all the enemy primary force committed to fighting the Rangers there was nothing left to pick off the scattered Marine battalion.
 
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interestedamateur    RE:New USMC Section organisation   2/13/2006 11:31:53 AM
Thanks for this Carl - I assumed that your earlier comment was something of the sort where regular infantry units adopted a kind of Special Forces role and organisation. I suppose we shouldn't be suprised that the exercise you describe didn't altogether work - numbers count. I guess that there are environments (such as urban warfare) where the only option is to have enough troops who can physically hold ground and enter buildings as necessary. Having said that technology is allowing units to spread out more widely. This was from another thread I wrote: "Yedidia Ya'ari (CEO of Rafael) writing in JDW 7/9/05 described the future as 'a more distributed and diffused type of warfare' and that as 'everyone is networked, the operational combat centre will become smaller and more flexible and autonomous'. I take him to mean that smaller units will cover larger areas of the battlefield." What the USMC appear to be doing is developing the flexibility to disperse more widely or come together as the tactical environment demands. Good on them - it's a nice bit of forward thinking on their part.
 
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Carl S    RE:New USMC Section organisation   2/14/2006 12:19:44 AM
"Good on them - it's a nice bit of forward thinking on their part." Forward thinking, since 1775. Actually the concept of dispersed ops for the Marines goes back to Nicaragua in the 1920s. When the USMC was making that place safe for Dole Pineapple Co.
 
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Zardoz    New USMC Section organisation   4/15/2007 3:44:24 PM


But then the "section" (say squad leader for correct nomenclature) has always had a tough job in the Marines. Anti tank teams, MG teams, engineer teams, a mortar observe, ect.. are frequently part of his load. Most company commanders astutly recognize theat the Lt & Plt Sgt are likely casualties, so the surviving squad leaders have to be ready to fill those billets.


Carl,
 
Please expaned on the "ect" from above.
 
I saw a posting that stated the fire team (both Marine & Army) should go to six in order to support MOUT - assault, support and security force. 
 
I saw a posting from a Marine PLT commander suggesting an asst squad leader and a extra radio man and a 7.62 MG team be added to the squad.
 
New squad org - 33 men
 
Section Leader (or Squad Leader)
Squad Leader (or Asst Squad Leader)
FO
Radio man - 3 men
Fire Team - 18 men
AT team   - 2 men
MG team  - 3 men
ENG team - 4 men
 
 
 
 
 
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ambush       4/16/2007 11:58:25 PM
 

 This months Gazette has yet another proposal for reorganization of the Rifle Platoon and squad, including   moving the 60mm mortars from company level to one per platoon and putting the M240s at squad level. Cannot say I am a fan.

 

 My concern about al this change is that a lot of it seems geared just toward the Iraq situation but fails to take in to account as Marines they should be ready to fight anywhere. Should we find ourselves in areas like North Korea, the Philippines or Indonesia we may find ourselves wishing we had the old 13-man rifle Squad which when all is said and done is what I think we will find ourselves with. Past Marine attempts to move from this organization like the infamous ten-man squad were less than successful

 

 You might see some changes in Platoon organization with say two rifle squads and a support/suppression squad, which I favor, a bigger platoon headquarters and more independent ability to call and adjust supporting fires.

 

 It is my feelings that the 13-man squad gives you the flexibility to task organize for Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea or a NEO in Western Africa while the smaller proposed organizations are more specialized.

 
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SCCOMarine       4/18/2007 12:12:24 PM
It should also be explained to those who don't know, the Gazette isn't particularly reporting on what the Corps is or isn't going to do but its more of an outlet for both Off and Enl Marines to post their own valid ideas and views, almost a blog Pre Blog.
 
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Carl S       5/11/2007 6:57:11 AM
Sorry I was not back to answer the last question directed to me.  


But then the "section" (say squad leader for correct nomenclature) has always had a tough job in the Marines. Anti tank teams, MG teams, engineer teams, a mortar observe, ect.. are frequently part of his load. Most company commanders astutly recognize theat the Lt & Plt Sgt are likely casualties, so the surviving squad leaders have to be ready to fill those billets.


Carl,
 
Please expaned on the "ect" from above.
 

Any sort of attachment to the company can end up being either assigned to directly to the squad, or enter the squad leaders area of interest/control.  The nature of warfare demands the USMC squad leader know how this affects his mission and understand the basics of what to do with it.  I suspose that no different than in the US Army.

The pumped up squads or platoons outlined above or in the Gazette remind me a lot of the USMC regiments that assualted Iwo Jima some of the previous islands in late 1944-45.  Part of the MMG  assualt engineer sections or teams were distributed to the platoons on a more or less permanent basis.   The USMC rifle regiments preparing for Operation Downfall were begaining to configure their squads like small platoons.  The squads were training regularly with MMG from the company integrated into the squad, and the assualt engineer team was becoming common at the platoon/squad level.   Light weight radios were increasingly available and armored vehicals were everywhere.  In three and a half years of the Pacific war the squad leaders responsibility had gone from eight men with rifles, and maybe a BAR, to nearly sixteen men carrying ip to five diffferent rifle caliber weapons, explosives and flamethrowers, a radio or telephone connection, armored vehical support, and indirect fire support from both artillery and mortars.  


 
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ambush       5/11/2007 1:07:04 PM

Sorry I was not back to answer the last question directed to me.  


But then the "section" (say squad leader for correct nomenclature) has always had a tough job in the Marines. Anti tank teams, MG teams, engineer teams, a mortar observe, ect.. are frequently part of his load. Most company commanders astutly recognize theat the Lt & Plt Sgt are likely casualties, so the surviving squad leaders have to be ready to fill those billets.


Carl,
 
Please expaned on the "ect" from above.
 

Any sort of attachment to the company can end up being either assigned to directly to the squad, or enter the squad leaders area of interest/control.  The nature of warfare demands the USMC squad leader know how this affects his mission and understand the basics of what to do with it.  I suspose that no different than in the US Army.

The pumped up squads or platoons outlined above or in the Gazette remind me a lot of the USMC regiments that assualted Iwo Jima some of the previous islands in late 1944-45.  Part of the MMG  assualt engineer sections or teams were distributed to the platoons on a more or less permanent basis.   The USMC rifle regiments preparing for Operation Downfall were begaining to configure their squads like small platoons.  The squads were training regularly with MMG from the company integrated into the squad, and the assualt engineer team was becoming common at the platoon/squad level.   Light weight radios were increasingly available and armored vehicals were everywhere.  In three and a half years of the Pacific war the squad leaders responsibility had gone from eight men with rifles, and maybe a BAR, to nearly sixteen men carrying ip to five diffferent rifle caliber weapons, explosives and flamethrowers, a radio or telephone connection, armored vehical support, and indirect fire support from both artillery and mortars.  




 
 And it continues to this day
 
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