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Subject: World War 2 US and German infantry tactics
bravoss    6/13/2007 5:36:04 PM
how many men did each fireteam consisted of ? who carried which weapons and what were the roles of each soldiers ? any info on infantry tactics will be appreciated.
 
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flamingknives       6/14/2007 4:52:56 PM
On a very basic level, the German section was nine men, eight with rifles and one with a belt-fed machinegun in the light role. Submachineguns were issued on a limited basis, and were more prevalent as the war progressed. Tactics focussed on the machinegun, supplying ammo and covering its flanks. This focus led to formidable firepower, but once flanked, they had a tendency to give ground, at least in the West.

US Squads tended to feature 12 men, mostly with rifles but one or two men with a BAR. Not sure on tactics. Support weapon crew were often issued carbines.

Airborne squads tended to feature a higher proportion of submachineguns and carbines, as these were easier to carry.
 
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longrifle       6/16/2007 6:27:54 AM
The fire team appeared as doctrine in the Marine Corps squad later in the war.  The Marine Corps finished the war with the same 13 man squad design they have today.  The squad had three fire teams of four Marines each.  The fire team in WWII consisted of three Marines with M1 Garands and one Marine with a Browning Automatic Rifle.

The Army did not adopt the fire team as doctrine until the late 1950s.  The Army rifle squad in WWII consisted of 12 soldiers.  I believe they were divided into scout group, gun group, and rifle group, with the gun group sometimes being a BAR team and sometimes an M1919 team. 

Although the fire team was not formal doctrine in the Army squad it often appeared informally anyway.  Here's an excerpt from The Making of a Paratrooper: Airborne Training and Combat in WWII by Kurt Gabel:

"The three of us, Jake, Joe, and I became.....an entity.  There were many entities in our close knit organizations.  Groups of threes and fours, usually from the same squads or sections, core elements within the same families that were the small units, were readily recognized as entities.  Often three such entities would make up a squad, with incredible results in combat."

So the fire team concept appears to be so natural - even when it's not formal doctrine - that it will invent itself in an informal fashion, on the fly.  As in "You, you, and you.  Bound up to that next hedgerow."  That seems to be just what happened more often than not.

 
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Herald1234    Applied anthropology.   6/16/2007 7:33:25 AM
Funny, that seems to fit the organization of the basic Human neolithic hunting party that went after a water buffalo or a wildebeest on foot. Spears were good enough for  most of them when they chased and the best shots would be given the bows and arrows.
 
I guess you could call that the origin of the four man fire team?
 
Herald 
 
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Horsesoldier       6/16/2007 12:03:17 PM
There's been some scientific research and writing concerning how infantry organization company-sized and below tend to reflect what appear to be set optimums hard wired into the human mind for group sizes.  I'm not sure if that has been pushed down to the fireteam level, but my vague recollection is that platoons and companies correspond quite well to what sociologists term Primary and Secondary Groups.
 
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caltrop    tactics   6/16/2007 11:04:33 PM
see >
 
As for US infantry tactics, the priciple was Fire and Movement.  From this website:
 

Fire and movement is one of the founding principles of assault doctrine, and can be applied all the way from two men covering each other in street fighting right up to higher formations.  The defender will seek to disrupt the assault on his position with accurate fire against the attacking troops.  To diminish the effect of his defensive fire requires a greater weight of offensive fire to be directed at the defenders.  This should encourage them to take cover, even if only temporarily.  During this disturbance, the assault troops attempt to close the distance to the enemy line and launch into the close battle.

At the Squad level, this was practiced using the combination of the Rifle and Gun Groups.  The Gun Group provided the base of fire, targeting known or suspected enemy positions.  This enabled the Rifle Group to break cover and advance towards the enemy line.  Ideally, the Gun Group would maintain covering fire until the riflemen were right on top of the enemy line.  In practice, this simple formula was not always easy to achieve.
 
 
I beleive the US Army training advocated the laying down of covering fire while some part of the unit moved to the flank of the enemy.
 
I'm not sure of Germany tactics
 
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jastayme3       9/28/2007 12:57:26 AM

German and American operational theory was similar but the devil was in the details. According to the stereotype Americans were wusses who couldn't do anything but dump "tons and tons of TNT", while the Germans were elegant experts in manuever who kicked around at foes like Bruce Lee. As with all such things there is some truth, but the German affectation is rather odd-besides the fact that they had no problem blowing up Poles, the idea is to make the other guy die for his country.
Americans trusted more to their rifles and were less centered around the squad machine-gun. This was because the M1 was quite good as rifles go.
The American Third Army had a fancy for what they called, "marching fire" which was a way of giving suppressive fire as one advances, rather then have one wing suppress while another advances which was more typical.
Neither army can be seen as a monalith. In 1942 the Americans were highly inexperienced. By 1945 there was little left of the German army but militia. So comparisons should be based on time.

 
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AlbanyRifles    Don't look at the squad   11/23/2007 8:37:36 AM
 

For the U S Army in WW II you had to look at the company and platoon, not squad.

 

            The basis for all tactics for the US Army in WW II was something called the holding attack.  From platoon through division, the US Army infantry was organized into 3s (3 platoons per company, 3 companies per battalion, etc) with additional support units assigned as augmentation. 

            The doctrine was for one unit to maneuver to contact with the enemy and conduct a holding attack to fix the enemy into place. A second element then maneuvers and tries to find a flank in order to attack a weak spot. Finally the final third is kept in reserve to exploit success or to pass through and maintain momentum.

 

            This same concept was kept from platoon through division and corps. It was a simple doctrine which worked for a rapidly mobilized Army with a worldwide mission. It also lent itself well to an Army which, primarily, was designed to be offensive in nature.  



American Rifle Company (1944-45)

 Headquarters
 
 3 Rifle Platoons
 
    Headquarters
 
    3 Rifle Squads
      10 x M1 Rifle
      1 x BAR
      1 x 1903 Springfield Rifle or M1 Garand
 
 Heavy Weapons Platoon
 
    Headquarters
 
    Bazooka Squad
 
      3 Bazooka Sections
        1 x Bazooka
 
    LMG Squad
 
      2 LMG Sections
        1 x .30 cal LMG
 
    Mortar Squad
 
      3 Mortar Sections
        1 x 60mm Light Mortar
 
    HMG Section
      1 x .50 cal HMG

 

 
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Sabre       11/26/2007 9:34:52 AM

There's been some scientific research and writing concerning how infantry organization company-sized and below tend to reflect what appear to be set optimums hard wired into the human mind for group sizes.  I'm not sure if that has been pushed down to the fireteam level, but my vague recollection is that platoons and companies correspond quite well to what sociologists term Primary and Secondary Groups.


The research that I have seen indicates that the "secondary group" should consist of no more than 150 people.
This does indeed correspond well to most companies, especially infantry companies (there are some bloated support companies, sometimes with two or even three hundred personnel, in the US Army).  More than 150, and the average person "loses track" of who everybody is.
 
Of course, I would argue for not being too far below 150, either, given the likelyhood of casualties or other attrition.
Any organization calling for less than 100 men in a rifle company scares me, since that can be whittled down so quickly, and besides, a "flatter" organization allows for fewer headquarters /administrative personnel.
 
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AlbanyRifles    Sabre   11/26/2007 10:15:30 AM


 

The research that I have seen indicates that the "secondary group" should consist of no more than 150 people.
This does indeed correspond well to most companies, especially infantry companies (there are some bloated support companies, sometimes with two or even three hundred personnel, in the US Army).  More than 150, and the average person "loses track" of who everybody is.

 
Understand that the HHC in a US Army maneuver battalion is large for a few reasons....but not as big as they used. to be.
 
When I commanded a mech battaolion HHC, I had 317 soldiers in my company...of which only about 15 worked directly for me.  Most were passed out and worked for others capatians on the staff.  The Scout platoon annswered to the S2 & S3, the Support Platoon to the S4, the maintenance section (104 strong) responded to the BMO, the medical platoon to the Surgeon and S1.  I was th ecomamdner for UCMJ and ration sin garrison.  Each of those staff and platoons had a SFC or MSG in charge of them with a platton leader in direct control.  In turn, that LT answered to a staff captain.
 
My job in the field was to run the field trains (the S4 ran the combat trains).
 
I know armored cavalry troops could get a bigger than a rifle company but not by much
 
You see even less of that now with the FSCs.
 
When I commanded my rifle company I had 108 assigned, but my usual task organization was 2 rifle platoons, 1 tank platoon, 1 engineer platoon, an ADA MANPADS section and of course my FIST.  This usually kept my manpower in the 130 - 140 range. 
 
 
 
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ambush       11/27/2007 2:33:01 PM


German and American operational theory was similar but the devil was in the details. According to the stereotype Americans were wusses who couldn't do anything but dump "tons and tons of TNT", while the Germans were elegant experts in manuever who kicked around at foes like Bruce Lee. As with all such things there is some truth, but the German affectation is rather odd-besides the fact that they had no problem blowing up Poles, the idea is to make the other guy die for his country.
Americans trusted more to their rifles and were less centered around the squad machine-gun. This was because the M1 was quite good as rifles go.
The American Third Army had a fancy for what they called, "marching fire" which was a way of giving suppressive fire as one advances, rather then have one wing suppress while another advances which was more typical.
Neither army can be seen as a monalith. In 1942 the Americans were highly inexperienced. By 1945 there was little left of the German army but militia. So comparisons should be based on time.



 

 The US infantry in the ETO also suffered quantity as well as quality problems in 1944 1945. It was burdened by a chronic shortage of replacements, McNair?s  stupid individual replacement system and the siphoning off of quality personnel into more technical specialties (Air Corps ,communications etc.).

Added to this was the lost of the ?old? experienced infantry soldiers.    As the Army expanded many were given opportunities to transfer to other branches such as the Air Corps with a chance to immediate promotion to NCO or even to officer.

 So poor was the situation that one Infantry commander complained that he lacked qualified officers and NCOS because? everybody higher than a moron? had been pulled out of his unit.(The procurement and Training  of  Ground Combat Troops , by Robert  Palmer, pp 16-19)

?on 1 December 1944 the Third Army was under strength in infantrymen by the equivalent of 55 rifle companies. ?


?The crisis reached a peak in January 1945, when the full extent of the casualties resulting from the Battle of the Bulge were felt. Stringent economy measures and a reorganization of the replacement pool improved matters in February. However, it must be said that the only thing that finally solved the problem was the end of the war.? http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/cavalry.aspx

 

 General Patton even went so far as to complain that his Infantry units were incapable of any sort of maneuver bellow Battalion level due to the shortage of quality Officers and NCOs.  He recommended the use of only the most basic of tactics, the Marching Fire you speak of.  (War has I knew it, George S Patton, pp 293)

 Patton was so discouraged by their performance of US infantry  the he felt the French criticism of US infantry in WWI still applied in WWII (The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; The American infantry needs all it can get?.  (The Patton Papers, pp. 521)

 

 

 

 

 


 
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