Americans in Iraq quickly discover that
they are in a different culture. It's a violent culture, where the
public order we take for granted in the U.S. does not exist in many
parts of the country. What is going on here? Don't the Iraqis
appreciate our efforts to liberate them from Saddam Hussein's cruel
rule? Well, most Iraqis do, but a sizable number want to bring back the
good old days (for them), and are taking advantage of some aspects of
Arab culture to make it so. Understand this, and you understand what is
going on in Iraq.  

Iraq has been a
violent place for centuries, a fact missed by most reporters. This
historical aspect of the area explains much about why, and how, current
military operations proceed. The basic problem in Iraq is that the
people there have never had a central government they could trust.
Thousands of years of kings, sultans, caliphs, emperors and warlords
will do that to you. Iraq is just now moving to "rule of the people,"
rather than rule by a nasty SOB with lots of heavily armed and mean
tempered friends. The American effort in Iraq means to make Saddam the
last such tyrant to rule the area. But there are some obstacles to
overcome first.

Who does rule Iraq
these days? It's the "traditional leaders." Under the ancient "SOB and
his thugs" model, the main goal of the tyrant was to stay in power and
get rich (in that order.) Saddam was an exemplary example of that
model. But the day-to-day running of the country was largely left to
more traditional arrangements. Tribal and religious leaders provided
services people needed to survive. Even much of the infrastructure,
like roads and irrigation works, was at least maintained via local
leadership. The tyrant might contribute (or loan) the large sums of
money needed for major efforts, but the locals were on their own when
it came to keeping things going. Saddam used infrastructure investments
as another way to keep his core followers (the Sunni Arabs) loyal, and
to punish those who would always hate him (Kurds and Shia Arabs). Thus
U.S. troops note that the roads and public works are more abundant and
in better repair in Sunni Arab areas. 

Local
leadership was also allowed to maintain public order, or else. Saddam
depended mostly on domestic spies to maintain control. He had muscle,
to terrorize those who were not behaving. The Sunni Arabs dominated the
army and national police. But Saddam had multiple intelligence and
security organizations, so everyone was being watched. This is great
for maintaining a dictator in power, but not much help in keeping the
streets safe. Saddam didn't care much about criminal gangs, as long as
he got a cut, and the gangsters were available to help terrorize those
who appeared disloyal. Gangsters being outlaws at heart, Saddam made
space in his prisons for some of them. Most of the prisoners were there
for political reasons. The criminal prisoners were expected to help
with getting information from the "politicals," and keeping these
disloyal Iraqis in order. Before the 2003 invasion, Saddam emptied the
prisons, expect for some of the politicals, and created a golden age
for criminal gangs in Iraq.

With
Saddam's secret police gone, the tribal and religious leaders were able
to form their own militias. These were needed to deal with the criminal
gangs, and other militias, especially some of the religious militias.
Saddam had kept the peace through terror, and with the government
terrorists in disarray, people looked to their traditional leaders for
security, as well as the usual dispute arbitration, emergency relief
and favors in general. In return, as they had always done, the people
offered loyalty, and sometimes their lives, to the tribal sheikhs and
Islamic clerics. 

There was one
major problem with these local arrangements, some of these groups
wanted Saddam back, and many of them had violent disputes with other
groups, which were now often  being settled with guns, not tribal
elders. The Sunni Arab tribes had lost most of their income when Saddam
was toppled, and his civil servants and army disbanded. Worse yet, many
Kurds and Shia Arabs were actively seeking revenge for decades of Sunni
Arab terror. But it got worse still, as there was no central leadership
in the Sunni Arab community. In such an atmosphere, everyone tried just
about everything, usually with the help of bullets and
explosives. Criminal gangs flourished, and still do, because of the
lack of courts and reliable police.

For
the first year or so, Sunni Arabs put aside the beefs they had with
each other, as they loosely cooperated to oppose the foreign invader,
and the attempt by the formerly subordinate Kurds and Shia Arabs (80
percent of the population) to form a government and run the place. But
once the government came together, splits began to appear in the Sunni
Arab unity. Some, and increasingly more, Sunni Arabs wanted peace, and
are willing to accept it as a minority in Iraq. But many Sunni Arabs
are not willing to settle for that status, and be at the mercy of the
people they long ruled. 

The lack of
unity in this Sunni Arab resistance has doomed the movement to failure.
There have been several hundred different groups fighting over the last
two years. Most have disappeared, Some of these groups are well known
in the West, like "Al Qaeda in Iraq."  But most of the anti-government
groups are led by tribal, religious or criminal leaders. A few are led
by foreigners, most noticeably al Qaeda. But even al Qaeda was only
able to survive because of tribal support. Religious and criminal
leaders could obtain temporary loyalty, but you always belonged to your
tribe, clan and immediate family. This was the ultimate safety net in a
very violent world. 

There are 
nearly a hundred of these anti-government groups still in business.
They survive largely because one or more tribes tolerate, or actively
support, them. The anti-government groups come and go because of combat
losses (especially the death or arrest of the leaders), or tribal
politics (the sheikh and the elders decide to cooperate with the
government). Sometimes, there is violence, as the tribes are forced to
fight to make it clear that the terrorists are no longer welcome. Some
of the terrorist groups have moved to another area, and continued to
fight back at the tribe that ditched them. This usually takes the form
of assassination attempts (often successful) against tribal leaders.
Many of these little wars are still going on, but don't get much
coverage in the Western media. The hard core terrorist groups have been
steadily losing ground over the last year. This has caused a decrease
in suicide bombings, but an increase in American combat casualties, as
U.S. troops move into the strongholds of the hard core terrorist
groups, and wipe them out, one by one. This fighting is reminiscent of
that on the Pacific islands, against Japanese troops, during World War
II. The Japanese were outgunned, out fought and rarely surrendered.
Same style of fighting is being seen in Iraq. This even extends to the
suicidal "Banzai" attack Japanese troops would often make. These
energetic, but rarely successful, frontal attacks, were a Japanese
custom, it being seen as more honorable, once the situation is
hopeless, to stand up and die making a desperate attack, than to wait
for the Americans to dig you out. Iraqi terrorists are sometimes coming
out and making these hopeless attacks, suffering the same fate as the
Japanese. 

The Sunni Arab terrorists
are sustained largely by encouragement from foreign Sunnis, and
portrayal as nationalist and religious heroes in many Arab news
outlets. But inside Iraq, it's a lost cause, coming to a bad end, as
the losers try to take as many of their enemies with them as they can.