Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs in Iraq
Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities
Armed Services Committee of the
United States Senate
February 27, 2002
Charles A. Duelfer
Resident Visiting Scholar
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, D.C.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Committee. I would like to make my
presentation in two parts. The first part will address the motivations, concepts and organizations
supporting the Iraqi WMD programs. The second will discuss the ensuing programs and their
probable status today.
UNSCOM had long pressed Iraq to provide information and documents describing the
requirements and operational concepts for the BW, CW, Ballistic Missile and nuclear programs.
Iraq refused until shortly after Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamal defected to Jordan in
August 1995. Hussein Kamal was the most senior regime official with control over these
weapons programs. Baghdad was concerned about what Kamal would reveal and sought to limit
the damage by a burst of controlled cooperation and admissions.
On September 18, 1995, I had a long, late night meeting with several senior Iraqi ministers
and other officials. The meeting was arranged to discuss the Iraqi concepts and requirements for
their WMD development and production programs. Previously, Baghdad had refused to engage
in such a discussion. I remember the meeting quite well, not simply because there was an unusual
amount of candor, but because I suddenly realized how unlikely it was that the government would
ever comply fully with the UN demand to completely give up all WMD capabilities forever.
Consequently, the UNSCOM inspectors had an ultimately hopeless task under the conditions it
was permitted to operate.
Iraq revealed that evening how weapons of mass destruction were viewed from the
position of the Presidency. (They even provided selected presidential documents.) Partial
descriptions of the origin of WMD efforts were discussed. They also discussed how these
programs had been used and their importance to the regime. In essence, the possession of WMD
had saved the regime on two occasions. The first was in the war with Iran in the 1980’s when
Iranian human wave infantry attacks were repelled with chemical munitions (UNSCOM learned
that 101,000 were reported “consumed” during this period).
The second instance where WMD preserved the regime was more surprising. I had asked
about the decision by the Iraqi leadership not to employ WMD in the 1991 Gulf War. In a
carefully worded response, the impression was conveyed that the President thought if Iraq used
chemical or biological weapons against the coalition, retaliation would end his regime and
probably him personally. He was successfully deterred. However, my interlocutors went on to
describe how they had loaded BW and CW agent into various missile warheads and bombs before
hostilities began in 1991. Moreover they dispersed these weapons and pre-delegated the
authority to use them if the United States moved on Baghdad. The Iraqis stated that these actions
apparently deterred the United States from going to Baghdad.
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