Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs in Iraq
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Where are they headed? Typically, the regime in Baghdad will devote full resources to
its weapons programs. All evidence suggests this has not changed even under sanctions and while
the Iraqi civil society has been decaying. The regime has ruthlessly used a combination of reward
and punishment to achieve all of its objectives, whether protecting itself internally or expanding its
influence internationally. The use of force comes naturally and weapons of mass destruction are a
vital element of the spectrum of power the regime applies. The regime exhibits a fundamental
view that if you are not feared, you are nothing.
The regime seeks to dominate the region. It generates fear in its neighbors but also has
the inherent capacity to reward them due to its oil wealth. It has skillfully played these two levers.
Its influence in the region has steadily and incrementally grown since the debacle of 1991.
The Current and Future WMD Threat. Iraq has significant WMD capabilities in all
areas with the exception of nuclear. It is probable that a small force of SCUD derived missiles
remain in Iraq. Defectors have reported their existence and this is consistent with the remaining
uncertainties of UNSCOM’s work. Moreover, the ongoing Al Samoud liquid propellant missile
is proceeding quite actively. Iraq has also been active in developing solid propellant engines. Iraq
had a project called Badr 2000 which aimed to import non-SCUD missile technology. UNSCOM
eliminated much of this program, but it embodied an objective Iraq retained in its missile
programs—a multi-stage surface to surface missile. It is a reasonable assumption that such
development work continues. Even during the time UNSCOM was in Iraq, a facility for the
production of Ammonium Perchlorate, a key ingredient in solid missile propellent, had been
established (to eliminate the need to smuggle such material).
Key things to look for in the Iraqi missile program will be testing of separating warheads,
fusing for detonation above ground, and perhaps employment of supersonic parachutes to retard
warheads. Evidence of Iraqi interest in these areas before UNSCOM left and such testing would
indicate important advances in CW and BW missile warheads.
The chemical weapons program must be assumed to remain albeit in a diminished state
from the huge industrial production of the 1980’s. Dual-use facilities, even at known locations
such as the production plants at Falluja, have the ability to produce chemical agents clandestinely.
Chemical weapons have proven utility to Iraq on the battlefield against large troop
concentrations. Iraq will retain the capacity to produce significant amounts of agent and fill
munitions in a period of strategic warning. Storable, persistent VX agent may well have been
produced since UNSCOM left in 1998. CW munitions for the battlefield can be produced in
existing Iraqi munition factories.
The biological program is the most problematic for a number of reasons. First, it is the
least visible. Facilities can be hidden or made mobile. UNSCOM had received reports of mobile
BW facilities. Unlike nuclear programs, BW programs have a small signature. The best window
into the Iraqi program will be from defectors. Some have been providing such information.
Another key concern about the biological programs is that Iraq can accomplish everything
indigenously. They can produce all the production equipment (fermenters, dryers, centrifuges,
etc.). Iraq is also quite able to produce dispersal weapons of various sorts. Finally, they have
access to seed stocks for a whole range agents.
The types of research Iraq is known to have conducted points to their interest in BW not
just as a battlefield weapon, but as a strategic weapon, an economic weapon, a terror weapon, and
possibly a genocide weapon. It remains to be learned precisely what agents were used in
Kurdistan and whether they were strictly chemical agents.
BW is the most difficult present threat posed by Iraq. They certainly have the capacity to
deploy it clandestinely or through surrogates should the regime so decide. Moreover, it is
possible that such things as wheat smut could be spread without any way of tracing the source. It
is not impossible to imagine an economic disaster like the British Foot and Mouth disease
outbreak that could be secretly directed from Baghdad and we would never be able to prove the
source.
Biological weapons remain a high priority for the regime. Defector information indicates
recruitment efforts among top Baghdad University biology students. It is also interesting to note
that people associated with the biological weapons programs have been promoted. One key
individual is now deputy director of the Military Industrial Corporation—the state run defense
research, development and production center.
Saddam Hussein has stated his policy on weapons himself. In a televised meeting with top
officials of the Military Industrial Corporation on 12 June 2000, he said,
“If the world tells us to abandon all our weapons and keep only swords, we will do that. We will
destroy all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons. But if they keep a rifle and then tell me
that I have the right to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has
become a means to defend our country against anybody who may have designs against it, then we
will try our best to acquire the rifle.”
Finally, and most recently, the official newspaper of the Iraqi Bath party, Ath-Thawra
wrote that “Acquiescing to Israel’s, but not Arab, possession of such weapons (WMD) is a case
of double standards. But no matter how much those who pursue double standards try to obstruct
the Arabs, they will not stop their efforts to achieve this goal, be they overt or covert, in future.
Acquiring weapons of mass destruction is consistent with “the right to self-defense and the
requirements of national security, irrespective of the nature of a ruling regime."
Of course, the difference in the regime is everything. The present regime in Baghdad will
not give up WMD even if inspectors go in again. The present regime will also remain quite
willing to use them.
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