Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs in Iraq
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Chemical Weapons Status. While UNSCOM attempted to obtain documentation
covering missions and requirements from the Ministry of Defense we never succeeded--despite
some very intrusive inspections. Nevertheless, we gained a general picture of the chemical
weapons programs up until 1988, or the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The agents and munitions
developed and used were nerve and mustard agent. They had clear battlefield applications and we
were able to account for much of the weapons and production capacity. Remaining issues
included such matters as discrepancies about munitions consumed. (A key document found by
UNSCOM in the Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 was seized back by Iraq. Inspectors
had copied the data, which contradicted earlier Iraqi declarations accounting for nerve and
mustard munitions.) There also was production equipment which UNSCOM had evidence existed
in Iraq, but never located. There also was no way of verifying the disposition of much of the
stocks of precursor chemicals Iraq had acquired.
It was certainly the case that the work Iraq pursued in CW after 1988 was the most tightly
protected by Iraq. The one document that Ministry of Defense document UNSCOM did receive
provided guidance to continue to develop the types of Chemical Weapons, attempting to
manufacture the most dangerous types in large quantities. It was in this period that development
and production of the advanced nerve agent VX was conducted. There remains considerable
uncertainty about the extent of this program and its disposition. There was a pattern to Iraqi
revelations that they gave up the oldest and least advanced projects and materials most readily.
UNSCOM accounted for and destroyed huge amounts of chemical agent, munitions,
production equipment, and precursors. Yet, there certainly remained unaccounted materials for
the production of both precursors and final agent. Iraq can make munitions indigenously and can
probably make need chemical production equipment indigenously. The expertise for such work
Areas where Iraq could be expected to be doing development would be in producing
stabilized VX and improving their munitions and dispersal systems. In particular, the aerial bomb
designs Iraq had in the early 1990s were not efficient for dispersing nerve agent. Fusing was a
problem. It was apparent that Iraq was beginning to look into cluster munitions. Such munitions
could be much more effective battlefield weapons. Aerial spray devices, possibly attached to
remotely piloted vehicles, were under development and had application for both chemical and
biological agents.
Biological Weapons Status. The biological
weapons program was the least well verified of
all Iraq’s WMD programs. Part of the reason is
because, as noted earlier, it emerged from the
security organizations. The original purposes
probably were not military in nature. This
program was also not admitted until 1995, or
four years after UNSCOM began work in Iraq.
We know that the BW program largely shared
the same munitions as CW. However, the
production levels and disposition of both agent
and production equipment has significant
uncertainty.
The three biological agents Iraq states it produced for weapons were anthrax, botulinum
toxin and aflatoxin. There were many other biological agents on which Iraq conducted research
and development. These included clostridium perfringens (causes gangrene), ricin, wheat cover
smut and some early work on viruses. Iraq had begun some early genetic engineering work as
well. Iraq conducted experiments mixing lethal and non-lethal agents such as CS, commonly used
as a riot control agent.
Iraq never made clear the purposes of many of these programs and experiments, extensive
though they were. It seemed probable that military use was not the only purpose. In fact, the
military seemed to have almost no interest or relationship to the program. It is difficult to
understand why Iraq would produce and put into aerial bombs, aflatoxin. It has the effect of
causing cancer over a period of several years. Experiments Iraq conducted in mixing aflatoxin
with riot control agent appear particularly insidious as they would mask the exposure of
individuals to this cancer causing agent.
The experiments with wheat smut are evidently aimed at developing economic weapons.
It was clear that Iraq understood that depending on the method of dispersal, the origin of
the agent could be concealed. In other words, they understood the potential for conducting an
attack that would be near impossible to connect to Baghdad as the responsible actor.
The sites where Iraqi BW work was known to have occurred were accounted for by
UNSCOM. The largest, al Hakam was destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1996.
Another, the Daura Foot and Mouth disease facility is being used for civilian purposes according
to public accounts. There were elements of production equipment that UNSCOM understood
were shipped into Iraq, but which were never located.
Nuclear Weapons Status. The nuclear weapons program is the most critical and most
difficult for Iraq to achieve. While successful in all other WMD areas, Iraq did not quite achieve a
nuclear weapon capability before invading Kuwait. Iraq had a huge sustained investment in
nuclear weapons development throughout the 1980’s. The IAEA accounted for most of the
program and key facilities were destroyed. However, the intellectual capital remains, as does the
will of the leadership to achieve a nuclear capability. Even during the time UNSCOM and IAEA
were still in Iraq, there was a pattern of the former staff of the nuclear program being reassembled
in common locations according to their expertise, e.g. specialists from former centrifuge
enrichment program can be found clustered at one facility. Of course Iraq claimed they were
engaged in activities allowed by the UN resolutions, but coincidences like these occurred too
often.
Key facilities where personnel congregated included Al Majd Center, the Ibn Sina Center,
Al Raya Center, Sa’ad Center (right across from the Rasheed Hotel familiar to all visitors) and the
Al Tahaddi Center. These centers have legitimate rationales for their on-going work, but the
presence of teams of alumni from the nuclear weapons program is a key tip-off.
A recent defector who worked as a design engineer (evidently in the Al Majd Center)
stated that an explicit order to reconstitute the nuclear teams was promulgated in August 1998, at
the time Iraq ceased cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA.
The key hurdle for Iraq to surmount to obtain a nuclear weapon is the acquisition of fissile
material. Iraq had a viable weapon design and the capacity to produce all the elements of a
weapon. Predictions on when Iraq will achieve a weapon depend on whether Iraq can obtain
fissile material by smuggling or they have to produce it themselves which will take much longer.
Predictions are particularly uncertain. The German intelligence authorities made an oft-quoted
estimate last year in which it was stated that Iraq could, in the worst case, have a nuclear weapon
in 3-6 years. German intelligence noted the growth in Iraqi procurement efforts in particular for
weapons-related items. However, how this projection was made is not public and it may
include significant unceraity.
While precise estimates of the Iraqi nuclear program are impossible, what is certain is that
Baghdad has the desire, the talent, and the resources to build a nuclear weapon given the time to
do so.
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