Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs in Iraq
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Whether the Iraqi leadership believes this was the only reason the United States did not go
to Baghdad in 1991 is unknown. However, clearly they are convinced that the possession of
WMD contributed to keeping the Americans away and thus was vital to their survival.
The Iraqi WMD programs, which were begun in the mid-1970’s, and consumed large
material and human resources throughout the 1980’s were well worth the investment from the
perspective of the leadership. It was difficult then and more difficult now, to imagine
circumstances under which this regime would end these programs. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz said on more than one occasion, “You are not McArthur. You did not occupy Iraq.
Therefore, there are limits to what you can do.” He was absolutely correct. Inspectors would be
inherently limited in what they could do and accomplish. Nevertheless, we did eventually obtain a
pretty good picture of the extent of Iraq’s programs. From that, and from evidence that continues
to be available even now, it is possible to make a reasonable judgment about Iraq’s current
capabilities and intentions.
Organizations The key organizations of the Iraqi programs included not just the Ministry
of Defense, military services and Military Industrial Corporation, but also the intelligence services.
The role of the latter was particularly relevant to the BW program and contributed to our lack of
understanding in that area. The military services had clear roles in the chemical area. Air Force
and Army forces stocked and used a variety of munitions for battlefield purposes. The long-range
missiles were in a separate unit and had special warheads that could be loaded with chemical or
biological agents. The Military Industrial Corporation (or organization) was and is now the
ministry that coordinates all military research, development, and production. A special
department of the Iraqi Intelligence Service or Mukhabarat plays an important supporting role,
especially in arranging overseas procurement of weapons-related items. They coordinate
purchasing missions and establish front companies or work through companies who conduct
largely legitimate business.
The Special Security Organization (Amn al Khass) had a special role in the BW program
that was carefully concealed. UNSCOM only obtained fragmentary information on this but it was
clear that much of the original work on agent development was at the instigation of this security
organization. The purposes of such research were therefore uncertain, but not related to military
requirements. The Special Security Organization and the elite military units of the Special
Republican Guard are responsible for protecting and concealing WMD elements.
The place where all these programs came together was in the office of the President (or
Diwan). Only top presidential advisors had the full picture and gave direction and committed the
resources to these programs. Key among them is Presidential Secretary Abid Hamoud who plays
a role like the US national security advisor, but more so. (He has more command authority.)
Incidentally, the reason UNSCOM pressed so hard to gain access to presidential sites,
including palace areas, was because this is where we believed we could find the program and
planning data that would allow us to verify the full extent of the Iraqi programs. The top-level
control of these programs will not have changed today.
Long Range Ballistic Missile Status. The bulk of Iraq’s long range surface to surface
missiles derived from imported SCUDs from the former Soviet Union. They imported 819
missiles and eleven mobile launchers. Many were expended: against Iran, for testing, and in the
1991 war. Iraq unilaterally destroyed others in an elaborate ruse to preserve a limited force in
1991. UNSCOM pursued a long and tortuous process to account for these missiles, which was
made more difficult by the discovery in 1995 that Iraq had a program to produce such missiles
indigenously. This program was at least somewhat successful. At the end or our work in Iraq
there remained uncertainty over the disposition of a relatively small number of SCUD missiles. In
my view it is likely Iraq retains a small long range missile force (perhaps 12-14 missiles) that
would serve the purpose of a strategic reserve.
However, Iraq also retained a missile development and production infrastructure. This is
permitted under UN resolutions for missiles up to 150 kilometers. Iraq has an active development
program for a liquid fueled missile dubbed the al Samoud which utilizes engine technology from
the anti-aircraft missile SA-2 (Iraq had over 1400 of these missiles) and some technology derived
from its SCUD missiles. This program continues today and there are reports that Iraq may be
seeking the ability to extend its range and develop longer-range missiles.
Key areas Iraq needed to work on included, warhead fusing (their CW/BW missile
warheads in 1991 had impact fuses which would greatly limit their effectiveness), guidance, and
engine production. Another area where Iraq is undoubtedly working is on staging. The Iraqi
surface to surface missiles in 1991 were single staged. However, they were doing research on
ways to add stages and increase range. It should be noted that Iraq continued these research and
development efforts even while UNSCOM was inspecting during the early 1990’s.
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