Policy Towards Iraq
Statement
of
Dr. John Hillen
Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 1, 1999
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee; it is an honor to
come before you today to offer some thoughts on current U.S. policy towards Iraq.
Eight years ago today I was one of the northernmost U.S. soldiers occupying
Southern Iraq and we were confronted with a similar set of questions even then.
Current Policy
As the committee is aware, since the end of Operation Desert Fox in December,
the United States has undertaken a low-key but active campaign against Iraq –
focused almost exclusively on challenges to the no-fly zones from Iraqi planes and
anti-aircraft batteries. Public reports state that in over three thousand combat
sorties flown in the past ten weeks, the U.S. has attacked over one hundred
different targets with almost three hundred precision guided munitions. The
administration seems quite happy with these attacks – indeed happier still with the
notion of these attacks as representing the centerpiece of a new U.S. strategy
towards Iraq. As one senior military officer quoted in the Washington Post
remarked, "It’s a strategy we fell into. It’s not one that was originally planned. But
it’s working out very, very well for us." Several very high-ranking administration
officials with whom I’ve spoken recently have reinforced this optimism about the
success of the new policy.
I would like to offer the committee a different view on this issue. To call any
military strategy a success presupposes a coherent measurement of that success.
The current set of operations against Iraqi air defenses are deemed successful
because, by and large, American and British planes are hitting their targets and
slowly degrading Saddam’s anti-aircraft capabilities. Of this there is no doubt, and
we should all greatly admire the skill and professionalism of the aircrews carrying
out these missions. Nonetheless, while these short-term military goals appear
definable and achievable, they do not appear to be conclusively linked to an endgame
in Iraq. If the U.S. is only in the business of incrementally "plinking" 1970’sera
anti-aircraft batteries in Iraq, then the policy is indeed a success. If, on the other
hand, those military actions are supposed to be conclusively linked to a larger and
more sustainable political objective in Iraq, I’m not so sure. Using the destruction
of anti-aircraft batteries in Iraq to measure the success of our policy may be as
irrelevant as using body counts to measure the success of American strategy in
Vietnam. The daily military actions, in and of themselves, are important tactical
victories. But do they add up to a comprehensive policy? The question the
President and his policy staff must answer is strategic - "to what end?"
The administration claims that containment is the official strategy and the U.S.
wishes only to keep Saddam "in his box" such that he lacks the military capability
to threaten his neighbors, develop weapons of mass destruction, or destabilize the
Persian Gulf region in some way. American officials have even indicated that if
Saddam ceases his challenges to the no-fly zones, then what has been described as
a "low-grade war against Iraq" will stop. At the same time, the President and his
National Security Advisor have strongly hinted at the need for a change of regime
in Iraq and joined Congress in passing the Iraq Liberation Act. There is an inherent
tension between these two goals and I would argue that the administration cannot
have it both ways. In the first place pursuing two different policies on the cheap
greatly reduces the chances of either coming to fruition. Secondly, the
administration has not constructed a policy framework for either that would
prepare Congress, the American people, and our allies for a lasting solution to the
problem of Saddam Hussein. American and British pilots are busy in the skies over
Iraq, but little work has been done in the White House to plan for either a post-
UNSCOM containment strategy or the chance to help force Saddam from power.
For his part, Saddam appears to be counting on the fact that an administration with
only 22 months left in office will be mostly interested in running out the clock.
Incoherent as it is, the current policy could most optimistically be explained as
"playing for a break." Some analysts who agree with my thesis that American
actions do not appear to be linked to a larger objective still maintain that bombing
is better than nothing. Perhaps – so long as there are no American POW’s in the
equation. However, when you weigh the considerable danger of a Saddam Hussein
with an unfettered and unmonitored weapons of mass destruction program, the
current campaign is not much better than nothing. The recent bombings have not
been directed towards Saddam’s ability to build and deliver weapons of mass
destruction or his elite forces – the two instruments with which he maintains
control and could threaten the region. There is the possibility that attacking remote
anti-aircraft sites may send some indirect signal to the Iraqi military that Saddam is
a weak and dangerous leader. I cannot see how this could be a stronger signal then
when he lost two-thirds of his army in Desert Storm, but that is the line of
argument. Even then, if Saddam is weakening and Desert Fox or this current
campaign is accelerating his demise, the U.S. is ill positioned to influence or take
advantage of the outcome. Our lukewarm approach to a regime change in Iraq has
put America in the back of the bus, not the driver’s seat.
Playing for a break – where the U.S. applies small amounts of relatively risk-free
military pressure in the hopes of something good happening – can work. Some of
the architects of President Reagan’s policies in Central America have described
their approach this way. If we have patience and good fortune in Iraq then this
method could be supported. I believe that Saddam is too wily a survivor and his
WMD program too dangerous and advanced for America to rely on this strategy.
As we used to say in my unit – hope is not a method. More important, I will
describe in this testimony two scenarios where the threat posed by Saddam in the
future will grow greatly unless the U.S. takes action today. The immediate threat is
not imminent, but decisions are.
Containment
A policy of containment, bombing or no bombing, is not sustainable for several
reasons. First, it is inconclusive, having not yielded even the glimmer of a solution
to the Iraq problem for the past eight years. Second, every indecisive round keeps
pressure on Saddam, but also allows him time and breathing space to further
develop weapons of mass destruction. This is especially so now that the UN
inspections regime, imperfect as it was, has collapsed. Third, the continued
sanctions on Iraq give Saddam legitimacy and strengthen his hold on power over
the suffering Iraqi people. Fourth, the policy is expensive and demoralizing,
costing the U.S. billions every year to rush troops to the Gulf and further taxing the
much-stretched American military. Fifth, containment fatigue is setting in, with
allies and other powers tiring of the routine and wanting to resume normal (read
business) relations with Iraq.
Finally, and most importantly, the current containment policy leaves many parties
other than the U.S. in charge. During all these crises, America has reacted with
great gusto, but the prime determinant of the outcome has been Saddam.
Occasionally, an interlocutor has been involved to give temporary direction - such
as Russian Prime Minister Yvgeni Primakov last November and UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in February of 1998. Given the amount of political and
military capital the U.S. is spending to keep Saddam under pressure, retaining the
initiative of action should be the foremost element of a strategy for dealing with a
dangerous bully.
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