Policy Towards Iraq
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The Cost of Invasion and Occupation
The basic military campaign would be well within American capabilities. Planned
as it would be by a cautious military, it would probably entail a worst-case
scenario force of roughly 300-400,000 troops and would probably take roughly 2-4
months to deploy and prepare the forces followed by a 1-3 month war. Under
reasonably optimistic assumptions, the United States would probably take only
about 3-4,000 casualties (of which 1,000 might be killed in action). As in the
Persian Gulf War, at least a hundred thousand reservists would need to be
mobilized and the National Guard would have to be shipped off to training centers
to prepare for certain eventualities.
Under a range of plausible scenarios, however, the cost in US military and Iraqi
civilian casualties could increase significantly. If Saddam's loyalists chose to fight
to the death rather than surrender and throw themselves on the tender mercies of
the Iraqi populace, casualty figures could double or even triple as American troops
would be forced to clear Iraq's cities in house-to-house fighting where our
advantages in technology, tactics, and air power would be heavily discounted. If
Saddam were to employ chemical or biological agents in defense of his regime -
and he would have scant incentive to refrain from doing so - U.S. and Iraqi civilian
casualties could rise even higher.
Nevertheless, the military costs of an invasion pale beside the political and
diplomatic morass the U.S. would encounter. Defeating the Iraqi military is easy.
The problem is that of the dog chasing the car—what does he do with it once he's
caught it? Once an international coalition dominated by the U.S. military
conquered Iraq, we would be stuck with a basket case of a country. After decades
of Saddam's totalitarianism, two prior wars, years of crippling sanctions, and a
U.S. invasion, Iraq would be devastated. Its economy would be in shambles, its
governmental structure gone, its basic human services - the production and
distribution of food, medicine, energy, and other basic necessities - would be
ruined. Like Germany or Japan after World War II, the United States would have
to rebuild a nation that has collapsed.
Every one of Iraq's neighbors, and a number of other European and Middle Eastern
states would have a tremendous stake in the future Iraq. They would want to
control who rules in Baghdad, what the new state looks like and how it is oriented.
Nor are they likely to simply stand on the sidelines and offer advice. Even before
the military campaign is completed, they would be maneuvering and manipulating
events to try to ensure that the postwar Iraq conformed to their needs. And many of
their needs would contradict one another and the likely preferences of the United
States.
Turkey would want a strong central government in Iraq that kept a very tight rein
on the Kurds and prevented them from exercising anything but the most nominal
autonomy. Saudi Arabia would want a strong Iraqi state dominated by the
(minority) Sunni population to serve as a bulwark against Iran and prevent the
Shiite from enjoying power. The Jordanians would probably want a weak Iraqi
state—at least weak enough so that it cannot threaten them—but that was also
favorably inclined to continue to provide Jordan with cheap oil. Egypt too would
probably prefer a weak Iraq because Baghdad is Cairo's greatest potential
challenger for leadership of the Arab world. Both Syria and Iran would actively
work for a weak Iraqi state, and may try to ensure the dominance of Iraq's Shiite
majority. Russia may want a strong, independent Iraq; one independent enough to
renew its former relationship with Moscow and perhaps even purchase Russian
military hardware. France may not care whether the Iraqi state is weak or strong,
but would certainly want to make sure that French firms were not excluded from
their fair share of Iraqi contracts. In short, the United States would be beset on
every side by wheedling, cajoling, pleading, subverting, and hindering allies, all
intent on seeing their interests satisfied in a future Iraqi state.
The American people would no doubt demand that democracy be established in
Iraq. After all, American soldiers would have died to conquer the country and it
would be highly unpalatable to the U.S. public for those soldiers, sailors, and
airmen to have died simply to replace one dictator with another. This too could
arouse the vehement opposition of regional states, most of whom are autocracies of
one form or another and who probably would be alarmed at a democratic precedent
in their part of the world. They might openly oppose or covertly subvert a
democratic Iraqi government. In addition, the Iraqi people may not be ready for
pluralism, and a U.S.-installed democracy might collapse into a new autocracy.
Moreover, who is to say the U.S. would be pulling the strings through this political
cauldron of an occupation? In order for the occupation to garner local and
international political support, the UN or a regional organization such as the Arab
league would have to provide some kind of transitional authority that would
govern Iraq and provide basic services in between the initial U.S. military
occupation and the restoration of some form of Iraqi government. As with the UN
operation in Somalia in1993, the U.S. would be heavily vested, politically and
militarily, but not necessarily 100 percent in charge. There is no guarantee that if
the rebuilding of Iraq were left to the UN or the Arab league it would turn out
democratic, stable, or well-disposed toward the United States.
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