Policy Towards Iraq
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6
Removing Saddam Hussein’s Regime
Ultimately, if the U.S. is determined to remove Saddam Hussein from power there
is only one sure way of doing so: invade and conquer Iraq. If we want the job
done, there is no realistic way to do it on the cheap. Only U.S. armed forces have
the power to defeat Saddam's military and security services, and only the
willingness of the United States to employ whatever force is needed is likely to
convince our friends in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to go along with the
plan. Moreover, as so much of this conflict has been about preserving American
prestige, it could hardly be expected that the U.S. could cheerfully bankroll, supply
and even provide air cover for an Iraqi rebellion that failed or put another dictator
in power. If involved at all in supporting or fermenting an Iraqi rebellion against
Saddam, the U.S. would be in it up to the elbows and had better be prepared to
commit tens of thousands of ground troops to a prolonged campaign if they were
needed. There is no way to swim in this pool without getting wet.
That said, in the absence of a stunning Iraqi provocation, an invasion is the least
probable and riskiest course of action the U.S. could currently pursue towards Iraq.
A legion of headaches would confront the United States in pursuit of this course
and residual problems could plague us for years afterwards. However, there are
two scenarios in which an invasion of Iraq would not be our worst course of action -
indeed, in one case, it may prove to be our best choice. I do not come here as an
advocate for an immediate invasion and occupation of Iraq, but I do advocate
thinking seriously about the possibility of such action in the event of these two
circumstances.
In the first scenario, the U.S. would reinforce some limited success on the part of
an Iraqi opposition movement. I wish, for the sake of our friends in the Iraqi
opposition and the American public, that Saddam Hussein could be removed with
only a light American touch – air support, logistics, training, intelligence, and the
like. I am not sanguine about their chances under these circumstances. Moreover,
if the U.S. is not prepared immediately to heavily reinforce an opposition in which
we has invested our prestige, America should think carefully about being involved
at all. At some point in time, Iraqi opposition groups are likely to need more help
than was expected. Needless to say, the more the U.S. is involved on the front end
of such efforts, the more it can influence the manner and form in which American
troops may be involved further down the road. It will be much easier for the U.S.
to ensure success and maintain influence if it is a key player from the beginning
rather than having to come in as a key player on the heels of an imminent disaster
or stalled effort. There are many questions contained herein and too many to
address today. The main point I can make at this time is that these sorts of issues
must be thought through, war-gamed, and planned for. I do not believe the
administration is prepared in that sense.
The second scenario centers on the possibility of Saddam Hussein's Iraq being on
the verge of developing nuclear weapons. Saddam has every incentive to do so,
recognizing, as the Pakistani defense minister said at the time, that the chief lesson
of the Gulf War was to not take on the United States unless you had nuclear
weapons. Biological and chemical weapons are easier to develop and can be used
to devastating effect, but they do not, as a nuclear capability would, make Iraq a
world power overnight. If Saddam were close to realizing this capability, as many
analysts think he is, the U.S. would face a threat more serious than that of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, both in terms of U.S. national interests and the
stability of the vital Gulf region. It is well worth thinking now about how to handle
an Iraq on the brink of developing nuclear weapons. A pre-emptive invasion of
Iraq might then be our least-worst course of action.
Strategic pre-emption on this scale is a difficult decision because the best time to
undertake the decision is early – when the threat is not manifest enough to
galvanize the various actors involved. Unfortunately, the worst time to preemptively
invade Iraq would be when Saddam actually has a nuclear capability or
is close enough to shock the world. Then the international community would be
motivated to take action, but against a much more formidable opponent. The audio
tapes made in the oval office during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 show
President Kennedy, faced with the prospect of a nuclear Castro, expressing his
regret that he did not use the Bay of Pigs or some earlier opportunity to depose the
Cuban leader. Similarly, much of the international community long bemoaned the
failure to dispatch Hitler while he was weak, rather than paying the terrible cost to
do it when he was strong. It is my fervent hope that we have no similar regrets if
facing a nuclear Saddam in the future.
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6
|
